Tuesday, June 30, 2009

Canada's New AFG Approach=Sacrificing Rural for Urban?

Concerns are out there (here, here and here, for example) regarding Canada's move to concentrate forces and focus on protecting Kandahar City. Some more details about the Canada's "Key Village" approach to doing this explains the strategy in interesting terms, straight from the pens of members of Canada's PRT in Kandahar.

This, from a Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) Team Leader: "Dand District is one of the areas where my unit, the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team (KPRT), is introducing the “Key Village Approach” to counter-insurgency operations. The idea is to secure and stabilize the villages near Kandahar City to make them better places to live, and much less accessible to the insurgents who use them as staging areas for operations in Kandahar City."

This, from a Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) operator: "In Kandahar Province, stabilization teams, or “stab teams”, are deployed into the villages along the key routes into Kandahar City to secure and stabilize them. The result will be to deny the insurgents the use of their traditional staging, resting and transiting areas, thus ensuring a more secure environment in Kandahar City."

My concern: I wonder how the bad guys could spin the red bits to the rural dwellers? "You die to keep them safe"? "Defending Kandahar to the last resident of Dand"?

Just askin' - (a bit) more here.

MND MacKay's procurement priorites

Keeping things close to home:
Knifemaker gets Forces contract

Defence Minister Peter MacKay issued a news release Monday pointing out that a knife manufacturer in his riding has won a big contract from the Canadian Forces.

Grohmann Knives of Pictou lost a contract providing knives to Canadian paratroopers last year, which caused a political headache for Mr. MacKay when it emerged as an election issue.

In January, the company won a contract for 1,500 knives, the release said.

"I’m delighted that Grohmann was awarded this contract in an open, transparent and competitive process," Mr. MacKay said.

His spokesman, Dan Dugas, said it was unfortunate that Mr. MacKay was blamed for the loss of the contract last time because the defence minister is not involved in picking who gets individual contracts.
Meanwhile, as for other procurement matters (more here)...

Update: Via Spotlight on Military News and International Affairs:
...Canadian Army Knife (CAF) #R3SA or commonly referred to as the "Jump Knife": Comes with straight blade and Overlap sheath, used by the Canadian Armed Forces since 1964.-( 3A sheath ) Shown here with rosewood handle and straight blade, but partially serrated blade and other handle materials are available as well. Various Kit Shops across the country stock this knife as well as a number of our other high quality knives.

*Please Note: the government does purchase other non-Grohmann knives as well, so any defects, complaints or problems with any other brand are to be directed to the government. If it is not stamped Grohmann / Canada it is not associated with Grohmann Knives.


Monday, June 29, 2009

Canada and Afstan: I cringe for my country

Read these excerpts and weep; our best and brightest (hah!) still see and, as far as I can see, always have seen our mission as pure and simple politics. Fie:
Obama Democrats have quietly sounded out power-brokers in Ottawa looking for advice on how to convince war-weary Canadians to keep military forces in Afghanistan after 2011.

Conscious of the deep political and public opposition to extending the mission further, American officials - political and military - are struggling to understand those concerns and identify the right arguments to make to the Harper government to "keep Canadian boots on the ground," said defence sources.

The U.S. has not formally - or even informally - requested Ottawa extend the deployment of 2,850 combat troops, trainers and aircrew in volatile and bloody Kandahar, where 120 soldiers and one diplomat have died over seven years.

The questions being asked are meant to lay the groundwork for a potential request, which the administration could make late this year or in early 2010, said one source familiar with the process.

It's unclear whether the U.S. would ask Canada to stay on in Kandahar or elsewhere in the country...

President Barak Obama has made it clear Afghanistan is the central front in the war against al-Qaida and terrorism.

Any discussion of Canadian involvement beyond 2011 will likely make Prime Minister Stephen Harper's minority government squirm because there's no appetite for extending such a costly war.

Contrary to the picture often painted by opposition parties, Harper is personally opposed to staying beyond the end date and has said privately that if Parliament "hadn't imposed a deadline" on him, he would have done it himself because an "open-ended war is not in the best interest of the country - or the army [emphasis added, see "Prime minister grumpy about Afstan"]."

Insiders say his view stems from the ever-increasing human and financial toll, where military cost estimates coming before the federal cabinet would literally make him "gulp."

Gordon Smith, a former Canadian ambassador to NATO, said Obama has skilled people now at the U.S. State Department, and tilling the ground ahead of time makes sense, even though some Canadians might look at it as manipulative exercise.

"Canadians will be horrified and there will be outrage," [emphasis added] said the former deputy minister of foreign affairs, who was quick to point out that Canada uses similar tactics in Washington to get its point across, including Harper's recent blitz of interviews with the U.S. media.

"None of the major political parties are going to like dealing with this issue."

Public opposition to the war in Canada has always been strong, with a majority telling the Defence Department last year in a wide-ranging poll that they would prefer the military return to being peacekeepers [emphasis added]...

Smith said he believes the Conservatives and the Liberals before them failed to give Canadians a compelling argument for being in Afghanistan beyond declaring that "the Americans are there - and we should be, too."..
I remember no such declaration in the last few years, i.e. since our original combat mission in 2oo2. And seeing as: in 2006, when our mission in Kandahar really took effect, we replaced Americans in the province; and that US forces were mainly in eastern Afstan at the time; and that our forces became part of NATO ISAF in the middle of the year; and that these forces have been operating under a UN Security Council mandate--one does wonder about the mentalité of the former deputy minister (note the, er, "thinker" pose--deep, what?).

Though I must confess that no "compelling argument" in terms of Canadian national interest has been given by either the Liberal or Conservative governments for the Kandahar mission. Maybe such interests are either beneath great and good Canadians; or else unspeakable in terms of Canadian political correctness (what's a terrorist, especially if Islamic, anyway?).

What a fog of thought our leaders, political, pundits and academic, perpetuate.

Update: Only to be expected:
Canada firm on Afghan deadline

The Canadian government shot down suggestions it might be arm-twisted by the Obama White House into extending its Afghanistan mission beyond 2011.

There are signs the U.S. government is preparing a diplomatic push to get Canada to stay.

But Foreign Affairs Minister Lawrence Cannon told a news conference Tuesday that he has not yet received that kind of pressure, and suggested that any such effort would be futile.

"Let me be perfectly clear: Canada is abiding by the motion that was adopted in our Parliament," Cannon said.

"Our position is perfectly clear – we are not going beyond 2011."

Parliament voted last year to set 2011 as an end date, and Prime Minister Stephen Harper has repeatedly said he's not interested in an open-ended military commitment to Afghanistan...
Hell, the CF were in the former Yugoslavia for more than twelve years; by mid-2011, in comparison, they will have been in Afstan for some eight and a half years. The difference of course is the combat role (now being downplayed by the prime minister) since 2006 and the deaths. And while the Army certainly looks like being unable to continue the mission at the current tempo (more here), one could always refocus the military mission on, say, the Air Force (more here).

Upperdate: From Raphael Alexander:
Canadians Prefer To Return To “Peacekeeping” Role

Deadwood in Kandahar City

From BruceR at Flit:

On the KC shooting

There are some conclusions one certainly shouldn't jump to when evaluating today's reports of the killing of the Kandahar Chief of Police in a gunfight.

One would be that there's anything unusual about this. Like Leonidas says about Sparta... "This. Is. Kandahar." As a policing environment, it has been for years and remains to this day highly volatile by our standards, often a home for rough, frontier justice: Deadwood with AKs. There's lots of armed men, lots of small arms, and lots of scores to settle. The insurgency bears the same relationship to this baseline that Indian raids did to the American Wild West: in that not all the social violence, perhaps not even most of it, is insurgent-driven. There's no reason at this time to believe the McGuffin at the centre of this tragic incident was anything more than someone "appropriating" somebody's car, or jailing somebody's brother for something minor even by Afghan standards. One shouldn't expect a sense of proportion in Kandahar City between the offense and the outcome in these things.

Another would be that any ISAF or OEF forces anywhere had the vaguest clue this was going to happen today, or were in any way complicit. It's simply highly unlikely that this was an attempt to "snatch" a high-value target or anything like that. Even if that sort of thing were going on, the last people Special Forces would use, or need to use, would be the kind of trigger-happy Afghans who would be likely to get into a gunfight with the Police Chief. If the U.S. special ops guys (or the NDS, or the ANA) really wanted somebody to disappear from formal custody, for whatever reason, friend or foe, there are other, quieter opportunities open to them for that sort of thing.

Another would be that because a lot of papers say "U.S. forces sealed off the area" after the event means that Canadians weren't involved, or possibly even the lead agency in the arrests of those responsible. Both Kandahari civilians and Western stringer reporters can tell Afghans from Westerners easily enough, but have extraordinary difficulty distinguishing Canadian soldiers from Americans, in my experience. In Kandahar City, there is little in the way of a uniformed U.S. presence, limited mostly to police mentors [more here]... odds are the Western forces responding were a mix of both nations' soldiers.

The only real question mark is who the shooters arrested will prove to have been employed by...
Do finish the post. Globe and Mail story here.

Update: More from Ghosts of Alexander and Registan (via The Canada-Afghanistan Blog).

How the Bundeswehr doesn't fight much in Afstan

Truly ludicrous:
...
Once thought to be far safer than the southern insurgent strongholds, the situation in northern Afghanistan -- where the Bundeswehr is in command of the security force -- has grown far more dangerous recently. Over the past few months insurgent attacks on International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops have increased. Since the beginning of the year, insurgents in the region perpetrated 31 armed attacks, 15 rocket strikes and 27 incidents involving explosives. "Kunduz is lost," says a sergeant who just returned to Germany because, as he puts it, his "luck ran out." The sergeant was in his "Dingo" armored vehicle when it was struck by explosives several times.

The Taliban is no longer limiting its activities to hit-and-run attacks. Instead, the insurgents have taken to ambushing German soldiers in Kunduz and the surrounding area and engaging them in sustained combat.

However, German Defense Minister Franz Josef Jung of the conservative Christian Democrats (CDU) still doesn't want to talk about " a war ["Not Calling Afghanistan a War Is a 'Semantic Farce'"]." According to Jung, the focus is on civil reconstruction and "networked security." The word "war," he says, sets "completely the wrong tone." But since last Tuesday those who disagree with him have become more vocal. Reinhold Robbe, with the center-left Social Democrats (SPD) and the German parliament's military commissioner, says that the situation is "essentially war." And according to former Defense Minister Peter Struck (SPD), the Taliban is "forcing war upon us [nasty chaps, what? - MC]."..

The German army, or Bundeswehr, has changed its tactics in recent weeks. In the past, a patrol that was ambushed was simply advised to "push forward." Today those soldiers are fighting back. "Anyone who attacks us can expect a response," says Defense Minister Jung.

The Defense Ministry often speaks of ambushes, but the German soldiers also appear to be seeking out areas controlled by the Taliban. In doing so, they are not only deliberately exposing themselves to risk but are, quite literally, making themselves the Taliban's targets. As one soldier reports, before some of the recent skirmishes, the Germans drew attention to themselves by making loud noises. The reason for this is the German military's peculiar mandate for its soldiers in Afghanistan.

The three soldiers who drowned in last week's fighting died in a "Fuchs" armored personnel carrier like this one.
Zoom
DDP

The three soldiers who drowned in last week's fighting died in a "Fuchs" armored personnel carrier like this one.

Describing last Tuesday's events, soldiers claim that about 170 men in German and Afghan units combed through the Chahar Darreh district, a Taliban stronghold southwest of Kunduz, looking for booby traps. When a Luna unmanned drone spotted a group of insurgents, the soldiers took their positions. They requested permission to drive around the enemy, but they received no orders at all over the next hour -- neither to withdraw nor to attack.

One soldier writing to his comrades afterwards would say they felt like rabbits in a trap. Under the rules of engagement in its current mandate dictated by parliament, the German soldiers are only permitted to attack when their lives are in danger. So did this mean that they had to wait for the Taliban to attack? Or should they have drawn attention to themselves so that the enemy made the first move and the battle could begin?

Is Political Expediency Making German Soldiers Targets?

Do German soldiers have to make themselves targets simply because of their commanding officers' reservations about legal definitions? According to the rules of engagement, which every Bundeswehr soldier deployed abroad keeps with him in the form of a printed pocket card, the German ISAF forces have the right to defend themselves against attack anywhere and at all times, as well as to repel attacks and to provide emergency assistance. But they are not permitted to hunt down and kill terrorists.

International law offers a broader mandate. In its resolutions, the United Nations Security Council has empowered the ISAF troops to take all measures necessary to fulfill their mandate. The Germans, however, have subjected themselves to more stringent rules.

...the German politicians responsible for sending soldiers to Afghanistan prefer to portray their mission as one that involves policing and developmental aid; they know that anything else would be unpopular with the general public. And with the exception of the far-left Left Party, all of the parties in the German parliament have agreed to keep Afghanistan out of the campaigns for the September parliamentary elections. And while there are many doubts about the mission, majority support for a withdrawal does not exist...
So long as it's not a, er, war. Here's another example of avoiding that which might smack of combat.

"stigma is a leadership issue"

Well, the Big Brass is at least saying some of the right things about mental health issues in the CF. Good for Natynczyk. You can see him speak about his “Be the Difference” Mental Health Awareness Campaign here, and read the transcript here.

Some of it seemed like uninspired boilerplate, to be honest, but there was one important point made that impressed me. First, from the backgrounder on the issue:

It has been said that military culture is not subject to quick or easy change, but in the CF, there is evidence that initiatives targeting the stigma surrounding mental health issues have been working. The CF have recognized for some time that stigma is a leadership issue, and leadership has increased its involvement accordingly. Now, the “Be the Difference” campaign will extend awareness across the CF, encouraging personnel of all ranks and at every level to become personally engaged in building strength and understanding. [Babbler's emphasis]


This is reiterated even more strongly in Natynczyk's speech:

We know that clinical and peer based interventions are effective and that the earlier they occur the better the chances are for recovery. Those who receive the support of unit co- workers and leaders have the greatest chance of returning to duty.

Therefore, I expect leaders at all levels to create a command climate that allows those who need help to get it. I also expect all CF personnel to foster a social climate of understanding, acceptance and support. Don’t under estimate the impact you can have on someone affected by mental health difficulties. [Babbler's emphasis]


The phrase "I expect" coming from the senior uniformed officer in the CF is not to be taken lightly.

Let's just hope the follow through lives up to the rhetoric.

Sunday, June 28, 2009

New Air Force division HQ for training

One hopes this is not additional bureaucracy:
Air Force to regroup training establishment

NR 09.006 - June 25, 2009

OTTAWA– The Air Force is realigning its structure by establishing a second air division headquarters, which will be located near 1 Canadian Air Division Headquarters in Winnipeg.

“The creation of 2 Canadian Air Division/Air Force Doctrine and Training Division will regroup the majority of Air Force training, education and lessons learned functions into one formation, which will allow a better focus on doctrine, training and associated support at this crucial time in our history,” said Lieutenant-General Angus Watt, Chief of the Air Staff. “The reorganization of existing resources into two formations will allow 1 Canadian Air Division to enhance its focus on Air Force operations at home and abroad.”

A brigadier-general will command 2 Canadian Air Division/Air Force Doctrine and Training Division (AFDTDiv), which is expected to be operational by summer 2009. The commander of 2 Canadian Air Division/AFDTDiv will be responsible for Air Force training establishments at 15 Wing Moose Jaw, Sask.; 16 Wing Borden, Ont.; an Air Force Training Centre at 17 Wing Winnipeg (comprising several Air Force schools and related training institutions); the Air Command Academy at Borden; and, the Canadian Forces Aerospace Warfare Centre in Trenton, Ont.

The Air Force’s ability to be a “learning organization” while continuing to generate forces for operations will be significantly improved through this realignment of already existing resources.

-30-

For more information:

Captain Holly Brown
Tel: (204) 833-2500 ext. 6795, Cell: (204) 227-8535 (weekdays after 5:00 p.m.)
E-mail: holly.brown@forces.gc.ca

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Governor General presents new colours to Canadian Navy

An old tradition, renewed:
GG presents Canadian Navy with new ceremonial colours
Her Excellency, the Right Honourable Michaëlle Jean, Governor General and Commander-in-Chief of Canada, presents a flag with the New Colour during a consecration of the Queens Colour ceremony held in Halifax on Saturday June 27, 2009.  (Mike Dembeck / THE CANADIAN PRESS)
Her Excellency, the Right Honourable Michaëlle Jean, Governor General and Commander-in-Chief of Canada, presents a flag with the New Colour during a consecration of the Queens Colour ceremony held in Halifax on Saturday June 27, 2009. (Mike Dembeck/THE CANADIAN PRESS)

HALIFAX -- Carrying on an age-old tradition, Canada's navy received its Queen's Colour on Saturday during a parade full of pomp and circumstance at the foot of Halifax's historic Citadel.

The new colours or flag, were presented by Gov. Gen. Michaelle Jean, who during an address to 500 sailors and officers from across the country, contrasted her girlhood fear of Haitian military thugs with the pride she feels wearing the uniform as commander-in-chief of Canada's armed forces.

"I grew up under the yoke of of a ruthless dictatorship, where the military uniform came to symbolize the brutal repression of the people, tyranny and massacres," Jean told the assembled ranks.

"You can see how far I have come, from the child who saw her parents, her family, her friends grappling with the horrors of oppression ... And I can say before you now with absolute certainty that it is an honour and a source of great pride for me to wear your uniform."

Jean's speech also cited recent relief work by the navy in the wake of four devastating hurricanes that hit Haiti and its role in battling piracy off the coast of Somalia as examples of a "rich tradition of service and valour."

Jean also thanked navy families for "their tremendous sacrifices" over long separations endured while loved ones serve at sea.

"Know that wherever your duty may take you, you can count on the recognition and respect of your fellow citizens," she said.

The presentation of the colours is a prized tradition in the Canadian military and is seen as a symbol of duty to Queen and country.

The navy, which will celebrate its 100th anniversary next year, received its first colours from King George V in 1924, but King George VI became the first sovereign to present them in Canada in 1939.

The colours were next presented by Queen Elizabeth II in Halifax in 1959.

Saturday's parade marked the first time the navy had received its official colours since 1979, when the late Queen Mother presided over the ceremony.

The design of the flag, which is kept at defence headquarters in Ottawa, is the same as the 1979 version.

The navy's Queen's Colour is a silken white flag with the Canadian flag in the upper corner, the Royal Cypher for Canada in the centre and the navy's symbol in the lower edge. The edge of the colour is trimmed in gold.

Jean presented the colours after the new flag had been consecrated on an altar draped over military drums...
Good shot of the Commander-in-Chief in uniform:
More here from the CF's magazine, The Maple Leaf. The flag itself:

...

Queen's Color.

[Queen's Maritime color]
by Joseph McMillan and Graham Bartram

White silk, 36 x 45 inches, with the national flag of Canada in the canton. In the center is the royal cipher on a blue background within a circlet of roses ensigned with the royal crown, while in the lower fly is the mark of the Navy, a flying eagle affront� superimposed on a fouled anchor ensigned with a royal crown, all in dark blue. Gold and silver fringe, cord and tassels. (Note: fringe is a surprise, since the Royal Navy and Royal Australian Navy colors omit it. But the article by Harold Diceman cited below has a picture of the official design sheet, and it shows the fringe.)..

Saturday, June 27, 2009

Canada and the Afghan people/Update: And Gen. McChrystal

I just did the Americans, Paul Wells of Maclean's magazine earlier blogged on the Canadians:
Afghanistan: no more commuting?

Afghanistan

For a reporter, I get on fairly well with the Privy Council Office’s Afghan Task Force [my link], but as a generalist (dilettante?) I don’t follow their work from day to day. So I was surprised to get an email this afternoon [June 23] from their press shop bearing a complete sound file of a news conference that was held this morning in the south of Kandahar. Clearly this is something Canada’s Afghanistan shop views as important.

The voices on the recording, which you can listen to if you have a lot of spare time or interest, are: Kandahar governor Tooryalai Wesa, speaking in Pashto and then English; Ben Rowswell, Chargé d’affaires at the Canadian embassy in Kabul; Ken Lewis, the civilian Representative of Canada in Kandahar (or RoCK); and Brig.-Gen. John Vance. So you have the Afghan, Canadian civil, and Canadian military leadership in the province, all gathered in the little mud-hut town of Deh-e-Begh.

The short version: Dar-e-Begh, a pretty nondescript town, has been a pilot project for a more concentrated Canadian development effort — one that focuses less on megaprojects (though those continue) and less on military confrontation (though that does too) and more on local, small-scale projects to provide immediate tangible differences to local Afghans’ lives [see this post from April, and this one earlier this month].

“This is a logical turning point in Canadian operations,” Gen. Vance says. “The mission can transition to where we can focus more effort on reconstruction, development, and governance.” It’s Rowswell (who’s scheduled to become Canada’s third RoCK, after Lewis, in 2010) who explains the main reason why that’s possible now: the Americans are arriving, in very large number, to do more of the security work in Kandahar and across the South. So hints dropped by U.S. Defence Secretary Robert Gates way back in the first week of the Obama administration are being borne out: a clearer division of labour, with the U.S. soldiers doing more of the soldiering and the Canadians doing more of the, uh, nurturing [bit snide, that - MC].

This is also the beginning of an answer to a bunch of questions Colleague Petrou posed in April. This so-called “Operation Kantolo” does look like an attempt, inspired (or more likely prodded) by U.S. Gen. David Petraeus, to get and keep our soldiers closer to the Afghans and their preoccupations. That’s what a successful counterinsurgency does. Which is not to say that this operation is guaranteed success. Only that as the Americans rethink their strategy and arrive in force to implement it, it’s having a big, obvious impact on Canadian strategy too.

Predate: As for Americans arriving at Kandahar:
Stryker brigade soldiers depart Fort Lewis for Afghanistan
5th SBCT homepage here.

Update: General McChrystal likes what we're doing:
Canada's Afghan 'model village' praised by U.S. general

U.S. Gen. Stanley McChrystal (centre) enters a store in Canada's 'model village' of Deh-e Bagh, Afghanistan, on Thursday. McChrystal praised the approach, saying winning over people is key to winning the war. (Colin Perkel/Canadian Press)...
Typical comments at the CBC story. Newsworld is running a pretty positive story on the project this morning (June 28) but I can't find any video.

US Gen. McChrystal and the Afghan people/Brits fighting with US aviation help

The new US and ISAF commander really seems to be making a effort to refocus things. The start of an earlier post:
Changing US Afghan strategy?/Update: Flawed NATO strategy

People, not places:
New Afghanistan Commander Will Review Troop Placements

Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, who took over Monday [June 15] as the top commander in Afghanistan, said he will launch a broad assessment of how U.S. and NATO troops are arrayed in the country to ensure his forces are focused on safeguarding key population centers and not hunting down Taliban fighters...
More recently:

1) Airstrike limitation:
U.S. Tightens Airstrike Policy in Afghanistan

The new American commander in Afghanistan said he would sharply restrict the use of airstrikes here, in an effort to reduce the civilian deaths that he said were undermining the American-led mission.

In interviews over the past few days, the commander, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, said the use of airstrikes during firefights would in most cases be allowed only to prevent American and other coalition troops from being overrun.

Even in the cases of active firefights with Taliban forces, he said, airstrikes will be limited if the combat is taking place in populated areas — the very circumstances in which most Afghan civilian deaths have occurred. The restrictions will be especially tight in attacking houses and compounds where insurgents are believed to have taken cover.

“Air power contains the seeds of our own destruction if we do not use it responsibly,” General McChrystal told a group of his senior officers during a video conference last week. “We can lose this fight.”

“When we shoot into a compound, that should only be for the protection of our forces,” he said. “I want everyone to understand that.”

The statements by General McChrystal signaled the latest tightening of the rules for using airstrikes, which, while considered indispensable for protecting troops, have killed hundreds of civilians...

General McChrystal’s new guidelines follow a deadly episode last month in the Afghan village of Granai, where American airstrikes killed dozens of civilians.

The episode highlighted the difficulties facing American officers under fire, as they are forced to balance using lethal force to protect their troops with rules restricting the use of firepower to prevent civilian deaths.

The episode, on May 4, began when a large group of Taliban fighters attacked a group of about 200 Afghan soldiers and police officers and American advisers. During the firefight, which began just after noon and carried on into the night, the Americans on the ground called for air support.

American fighter jets, and then bombers, came to the scene, dropping a number of 500- and 2,000-pound bombs. The bombs succeeded in ending the attack, but they did much more damage as well.

A Pentagon report estimated that at least 26 civilians had been killed in the airstrikes. It concluded that American personnel had made significant errors, including violating procedures, that led to those deaths. Among those errors, the report said, was a failure by the American personnel to discern whether Afghan civilians were in the compound before they attacked.

Other credible estimates of civilian deaths in Granai ranged much higher. An investigation by a Kabul-based group, the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, said that at least 86 women and children had been killed, and as many as 97 civilians altogether. The Afghan government said 140 civilians had been killed.

The Pentagon report did not dispute the conclusions reached by the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, and referred to its “balanced, thorough investigation.”..

The changes highlighted by General McChrystal go to the heart of what went wrong in Granai. In that case, there were at least four airstrikes: the first by F-18 fighters [they would be from the USS Eisenhower] and the other three by a B-1B bomber. The report found that it was the last two airstrikes that probably caused the civilian deaths.

In those cases, the report found, the bomber’s crew tracked suspected Taliban fighters as they entered a building, and then attacked without determining whether civilians were inside. The report said there were probably civilians inside those buildings when they were destroyed.

Under the rules that General McChrystal outlined, those strikes would almost certainly be prohibited. They would be prohibited, the general said, even if it meant letting some Taliban get away.

Referring to airstrikes, General McChrystal said, “If it is just to defeat the enemy, then we are not going to do it, even if it means we are going to step away from that firefight and fight another time [emphasis added].” ..
2) On the ground:
US general says troops need new view of Aghan war

U.S. Gen. Stanley McChrystal said that U.S. and other NATO troops must make a "cultural shift" away from being a force designed for high intensity combat and instead make protecting Afghan civilians their first priority.

The newly arrived four-star commander said Wednesday [June 24] he hopes to install a new military mindset by drilling into troops the need to reduce the number of Afghan civilians killed in combat.

McChrystal is expected to formally announce new combat rules within days that will order troops to break away from fights - if they can do so safely - if militants are firing from civilian homes [emphasis added]. One effect of the new order will be that troops may have to wait out insurgents instead of using force to oust them, he said.

"Traditionally American forces are designed for conventional, high-intensity combat," McChrystal said during a visit to Camp Leatherneck, a new U.S. Marine base housing thousands of newly deployed Marines in southern Helmand province. "In my mind what we've really got to do is make a cultural shift."

Because the military is such a big organization, the new message will take "constant repetition," he said...

Brig. Gen. Larry Nicholson, the Marine commander at Camp Leatherneck, said his forces were already following McChrystal's new commands.

"Our focus from the very beginning has not been Taliban. It's been civilians," he said. "We've paid a lot of attention to avoiding civilian casualties. ... We have a lot of combat vets, a lot of Iraq vets. And I think we learned early on the importance of trust and support of the locals."

He added: "There will be plenty of opportunities to kill Taliban, and we're pretty good at that. Bur the focus here, the reason we're here, is the people, not the Taliban."

The Pentagon has asked McChrystal for a 60-day review of the Afghan war, a review that could result in a recommendation to shift troops to new locations in Afghanistan [see first quote above]. McChrystal said he didn't yet know if he would request more troops [emphasis added]...
Clearly earlier efforts regarding civilians did not prove as effective as desired--from January this year:
Afstan: New NATO ROEs
As for that fighting:
British forces attack Taliban in major air assault in Afghanistan
More than 350 helicopter-borne British soldiers have attacked a Taliban stronghold in one of their biggest air assaults since 2001.

Soldiers running from helicopter: Black Watch troops launch major Afghanistan assault
Soldiers running from helicopter: Black Watch troops launch major Afghanistan assault

Soldiers from the Black Watch seized three river crossings north of Lashkar Gah, the capital of Helmand province, in southern Afghanistan.

Commanders hailed the assault as "very successful", with no British soldiers killed and none seriously wounded.

The Babaji area where the attack took place is an insurgent haven, where few Nato-led or Afghan government forces had ventured before, they said.

Taliban insurgents launched a series of small counter attacks after the raid before they "drifted away". Bomb-making materials, landmines and 1.3 tons of opium poppy seeds were also seized.

The operation, named Panchai Palang or Panther's Claw, used 12 British and American Chinook helicopters backed by 13 aircraft in what was described as "one of the largest air operations in modern times".

Lt Col Stephen Cartwright, commander of The Black Watch, said: "This has been a major air assault operation with a large number of helicopters by the UK and US [those choppers would be from the 82nd Combat Aviation Brigade based at KAF].

"The Black Watch met some resistance but we were able to establish a firm foothold in the area." The attack was made possible by an influx of thousands of US troops ordered to Helmand by US President, Barack Obama.

In the past three years, British operations in Helmand have been undermined by a severe lack of helicopters. However earlier this year Royal Marine Lt Gen Jim Dutton, deputy commander of Nato-led forces, said the arrival of dozens of US craft across the south could be "game-changing" [see 2/3 down this post for info on Marine helicopters at Helmand itself].

The men of the Black Watch, 3rd Battalion, The Royal Regiment of Scotland [actually based at KAF as the quick reaction force for RC South as a whole], landed in Babaji before midnight on June 19, supported by Apache and Black Hawk helicopter gunships, Harrier jets, unmanned drones and a Spectre gunship. [Bang! Bang! Better be no civilians.]

An additional 200 soldiers from the Black Watch, Royal Engineers and bomb disposal units set up check points after arriving in armoured vehicles.

By capturing crossings at Lui Mandey Wadi, the Nahr-e-Burgha canal and the Shamalan canal, a spokesman said British forces will be able to build permanent bases and checkpoints in the area for Afghan forces.

Lt Col Nick Richardson, a spokesman for British forces in the province, said: "The end result will provide lasting security for the local population free from intimidation and violence by the insurgents...

The US Air Force and the F-22/Future Canadian fighter

Imagine a serving Canadian flag officer speaking like this--a comment by CougarDaddy at a Milnet.ca Raptor topic thread:
Hopefully it won't stop at just 12 more Raptors.

http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/06/senate-panel-votes-for-more-stealth-jets-defying-gates/

Senate Panel Votes for More Stealth Jets, Defying Gates

By Noah Shachtman June 25, 2009 | 3:36 pm | Categories: Air Force, Paper Pushers, Beltway Bandits, Politicians

The White House and the Pentagon leadership couldn’t be clearer: they don’t want any more of the controversial F-22 stealth fighters. But Congress now seems ready to pour billions into extra jets, anyway. The Senate Armed Services Committee just “voted to fully fund seven F-22 Raptors for $1.75 billion,” Air Force Times is reporting.

Last Week, the House Armed Services Committee voted to add 12 of the planes to the upcoming Pentagon budget. Defense Secretary Robert Gates said he had a “big problem” with the move — a cornerstone of his plan to radically overhaul the U.S. arsenal. The White House went even further: “If the final bill presented to the president contains this provision, the president’s senior advisers would recommend a veto,” the Office of Management and Budget proclaimed.

The Raptors, originally commissioned to duel with Soviet MiGs, have never been used in Iraq or Afghanistan. The Air Force’s leadership says they can make due with 187 of the planes - to deter threats from countries like Russia and China, and fight off their advanced air defense gear.

But their subordinates have disagreed — loudly and publicly. In a letter to Sen. Saxby Chambliss (R-Georgia), four-star Gen. John Corley, the current chief of Air Combat Command, wrote, “In my opinion, a fleet of 187 F-22s puts execution of our current national military strategy at high risk in the near to mid term… To my knowledge, there are no studies that demonstrate that 187 F-22s are adequate to support our national military strategy.”
Another view on the need for F-22s vs. UCAVs here, with a Raptor video; and a pro-Raptor view here, also with video.

Meanwhile, regarding the future Canadian fighter:
Deciding on the F-35 soon?

Conference of Defence Associations' On Track magazine: Summer 2009

Latest number's table of contents:
FROM THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR............................................................4
Colonel (Ret’d) Alain Pellerin

LE MOT DU DIRECTEUR GÉNÉRAL............................................................4
Colonel (Ret) Alain Pellerin

AFGHANISTAN: THE NEXT PHASE.............................................................9
Colonel Ian Hope

AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN AND THE RATIONALE FOR WAR...........12
Louis Delvoie

AFGHANISTAN AND THE MYTH OF PEACEKEEPING.........................14
Colonel (Ret’d) Sean Henry

THE DRAGON IN THE HINDU KUSH: CHINA’S SECURITY
INTERESTS IN AFGHANISTAN...................................................16
Arnav Manchanda and Thomas Adams

CANADIAN MANOEUVRE TRAINING CENTRE:
A WORLD-LEADING TRAINING FACILITY..............................20
Lieutenant-Colonel Daniel MacIsaac

COMING TO GRIPS WITH THE INVISIBLE HAND:
UNDERSTANDING SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES.............23
Colonel Bernd Horn

OFFSHORE ANARCHY: BUILDING STABILITY AT SEA & ASHORE...25
Captain Brian Wilson and Commander James Kraska

LONG-WAVE THEORIES AND THE CANADIAN FORCES.....................29
Colonel (Ret’d) Howard Marsh

NORTH KOREA:
WHAT IS THE SUCCESSION WHEN KIM JONG-IL DIES?.....31
Vernie Liebl

NATO AT 60: SECURING OUR FUTURE?.................................................36
Major Eric Dion

MILITARY TRAINING ASSISTANCE PROGRAMME...............................40
Andrew Rasiulis and Sara Fortin

Book Review...................................................................................................43
“A History of the Royal Canadian Air Forces Police and
Security Services”

Bravo to the Fallen, the Coroners and the Techies

Friday, June 26, 2009

A more balanced opinion on OSI

There's been a good deal of sensationalized reporting on Operational Stress Injury (OSI) - a condition that has been labeled everything from cowardice to shell shock to post-traumatic stress disorder over the past century - recently, so I must offer kudos to the Globe & Mail for taking such a balanced stance in an editorial today:

The Canadian Forces have made progress since they arrived in Kandahar a few years ago. They are struggling to cope with a wave of young Afghanistan vets who have served in an overtasked and under-strength military. The CF are learning; joint personnel support units, to help those suffering from PTSD, have been established across the country; decompression time in Cyprus is now built in to tours of duty; Independent military-family resource centres offer a variety of programs to family members. But progress is slow, waiting lists are long, and stigma is still very real.

The military still faces significant hurdles. Cultural change does not occur overnight. In spite of programs to increase understanding of PTSD, many soldiers maintain it is career suicide to admit to an operational stress injury. As long as that view remains, OSIs, which emerge primarily through self-reporting, will remain an insidious problem.

It is easy for civilians to judge the military harshly for failing to remedy this very serious problem more completely or quickly, but the reality is that Bay Street and Main street are hardly in a position to crow about their own compassionate treatment of the mentally ill.

The military deserve the very best in care; they risk their mental health just as much their physical health in the service of the nation. Stigma and skewed perceptions about OSIs must be overcome, because the cost of failing to do so is too high, with casualties on the home front among Canadian soldiers and their families.


That's just an excerpt - you should read the whole thing.

I'd like to reiterate what was said about pointing condemning fingers at the military. This problem is slipperier than a greased pig. You put ten soldiers on the line and shoot them, and all ten will have a hole punched in them by a bullet. It doesn't matter how strong or fit they are, whether they're male or female, what their age or family situation is, their skin will be pierced by the projectile fired at them. It's an objective wound, and there's no opportunity for second-guessing whether the bullet penetrated because of some personal shortfall of character.

But if you put the same ten soldiers into an inhumanly stressful combat situation, all ten will react differently. And it would be difficult to predict beforehand which will cope best. Unlike the bullet wound, OSI experiences can start with the same circumstances, but create completely different individual results.

Of course, just because it's such a complicated issue doesn't mean the CF gets a pass on dealing with it. As the editorial says, the soldiers deserve the best care we can offer them. But let's not fool ourselves either: we'll never completely solve this problem. We can only work harder and devote the appropriate resources to it in order to minimize both the frequency and severity of OSI incidents as much as possible.

The CF is taking some good steps, but there's a long and difficult road ahead.

Thursday, June 25, 2009

Kudos to DND for Fessing Up Quick

Tuesday, June 23, 2009

A contest!

We throw enough darts around here that when we see an interesting idea coming out of officialdom, we should have the good grace to note and applaud it:

Are you now, or have you ever been to Afghanistan?

Think what we’re doing in Afghanistan is important? Tell us why!


Joint Forces Command HQ Brunssum is sponsoring a contest in which you will have the opportunity to share your experiences with the world - and possibly win a camcorder!

Tell us in 3 minutes or less “Why Afghanistan Matters” and you could be a winner! The contest is open to all military personnel currently serving, or who formerly served, in Afghanistan. In addition, the contest is open to civilian personnel working, or who have worked, alongside NATO or Coalition Forces. For questions on eligibility, contact us.

How the contest works:

  • You make your video and either mail it to us or upload to this site.

  • We screen your video only to ensure it complies with the official rules.

  • We notify you when your qualifying video gets posted on the contest channel.

  • Public rating determines the winner (1 Grand Prize and three First Prize winners!)


Timelines: The contest will be open for submissions during June, July and August. We will post your videos once approved as a qualifying submission. From 1 to 30 September, we will allow further video rating, and winners will be selected on 1 October. Winners determined by highest average rating.

...

Why a Contest?

This contest, sponsored by Joint Forces Command Headquarters - Brunssum (the Netherlands) serves as an opportunity for those serving - or who have served - in Afghanistan, to explain why the work they are doing in Afghanistan is of such importance.

The intent is to provide a "boots on the ground" perspective of the military mission in Afghanistan from the point of view of those most closely involved. We will not edit clips for content, but will exclude contest submissions that jeopardize troop security, or show objectionable, disturbing or offensive material.




I've been saying for a long time that the most compelling spokespeople we have for the mission, other than the Afghans themselves, are those on the front lines doing the difficult and dangerous work to secure and rebuild that country.

So to all you Afghanistan veterans reading (in uniform or retired) here's your chance - sponsored by The Powers That Be - to say what needs to be said from your own perspective.

And to those of you who think this is trite, or hokey, or overly safe: it's a HUGE step forward for a governmental/military organization. If it's not a bold enough step for you, suck it up and get behind it anyway. All non-participation does is reinforce the idea that bold steps aren't worth taking.

Pitter, patter...

Monday, June 22, 2009

The straw and the camel's back

As longtime readers will recall, I've been touched personally by the issue of depression and suicide in the military a number of times. It never gets any easier talking about it, but talk about it we must if we're ever to beat back that particularly insidious demon.

Christie Blatchford and her G&M colleague Jessica Leeder have written what I believe is a serious and fair piece on the recent self-inflicted death of Maj Michelle Mendes. And BruceR at Flit has said what I would have liked to if I'd gotten to it first. Of course, being Bruce, he's said it better than I would have.

So why am I weighing in? Well, I have a few points to add.

First, Bruce's spot-on observation here bears repeating:

Every Canadian soldier in Kandahar Air Field and outside the wire goes to bed with a firearm and ammunition close to hand, and no one is immune to morbid impulse. Self-destructive actions that would take greater forethought and planning in accomplishing in a civilian setting are REAL easy overseas. Given that, Canadians should continue to be impressed with what I would still say is a surprisingly low rate of suicide on overseas deployments.


I know people here in Canada who would not be living full and happy lives had their bout with depression come during an overseas tour with the CF. I'm one of those people. Carrying a weapon and live ammunition makes it far too easy to successfully undertake a suicide attempt.

Second, everyone I've spoken to in the intelligence trade - including a couple of folks I bumped into on my trip to Kandahar - confirms and reinforces what Bruce has to say about the level of pressure in an undermanned Intelligence branch right now. It used to be that Int - along with Public Affairs, Admin, and to some degree Logistics - was the final career resting place for officers who had washed out of their original classification. They went into this COIN war in Kandahar with that cadre, that structure. And their branch was unprepared professionally for the demands the war has placed upon them, which has caused people problems.

Now, that's not to say that all Int specialists are also-rans, because there are a lot of good, solid people in the trade. And it's not to say the branch is even the primary architect of its own woes, because for the longest time it was an extremely undervalued and under-resourced corner of the CF.

But whatever the reasons that got us here, the Forces are right now faced with a huge need for top-level intelligence personnel, and not a lot of structure to train and field it. That needs to change. The silver lining is that some of the people currently being thrown into the deep end are showing themselves to be exceptionally strong swimmers, and they'll be in a good position to pass along the hard-won lessons of their experience to the next generation...if we can keep them that long and give them the opportunity.

The wrenchingly sad part is that some being thrown into that deep end are drowning, too.

Third, it's very difficult to explain to people what it's like to live with huge expectations in the CF when you're not quite ready for it. I don't just mean the expectations of the those in charge of you, either: it's your family and friends, your coaches and teachers, your mentors and those you look up to, all those who see you perform at a high level and assume you can always do that. Most difficult of all is the pressure of not letting your peers down. They're more than just friends and colleagues, they're brothers and sisters to you. And running with that pack - the most gripped, crazy, intense, loveable group of high-achievers you've ever had the good fortune to be associated with - is intoxicating and addictive. You push yourself to keep up even when you shouldn't, even when you're hanging on by your fingernails emotionally.

And when you crash, you crash hard. Worst of all, you know that once you've crashed, there's no going back: you're now the one who couldn't quite cut it. It's not always a correct perception, especially in today's CF, but when you're in that moment, you know you've just blown everything you care about, for good. And when you're convinced you've lost it, you want to escape: from yourself as much as from everyone around you.

I cringed when I read the Globe's description of Maj Mendes' career path. I cringed because, while our situations were undoubtedly very different, I can identify with how she got to such a dark and desperate place. And as someone who luckily didn't have such a simple way out of this life readily at hand, as someone who's come back from depression and built what really is a blessed existence out of my second chance, I wish I could have been there with her in that room in Kandahar and said "The only mistake you can't ever recover from is the one you're about to make. Trust me, I've been there and I know from personal experience that you can hit bottom and bounce instead of break. I've done it, and you can too."

My most heartfelt condolences go out to her friends and family.

Update: From a correspondent...

Your post today has literally brought me to tears. I have lived for many years with the stigma of how I failed my regiment, my family and myself through depression and maniac paranoid behavior. As a former infantry Captain I live every day with the stigma of failure and the difficulty of always wondering what if...

Help is a lot easier to obtain today than it was 20 years ago but there are still strong feelings of failure when an officer seeks it out. Thank you very much for your intelligent and informed discussion and viewpoints. It all helps to know that while each situation is different there is someone out there who is trying to educate and understand.


No, thank you: it's responses like that that keep me writing, especially on such a difficult topic.

Depression thrives in the dark. We need to keep talking about it.

Upperdate: A CF compilation of stats and facts surrounding suicide in our military.

Saturday, June 20, 2009

Snowbirds being made ready to perform again

Further to this post, the problem has been fixed:
Snowbirds will fly again soon, say feds
Photograph by: WEEKENDLIFE-Sadler Request
REGINA — The Snowbirds, Canada's famous aerobatic flying team, will soon be back in the air after a faulty ejection-seat system kept the team from flying over the past week.
The Department of National Defence implemented an "operation pause" on June 13 that affected a number of Canadian military aircraft that share the same ejection seat system. A problem was identified with the lapbelt system, which is designed to disconnect if a pilot ejects from the plane mid-flight.

That "pause" has now been lifted and, according to a government statement issued on Friday, all lapbelts will be "overhauled and tested" and individual aircraft will return to service once the overhauled lapbelts have been installed.

The problem was discovered June 12 as the Snowbirds were preparing for a performance at an airshow in Bagotville, Que.

"We caught the problem on the ground as part of our standard pre-flight checks, and once the investigation was launched, our people acted quickly to determine the problem and find a resolution," said Major-General Marcel Duval, commander of 1 Canadian Air Division/Canadian NORAD Region in a statement released to media.

Eight people have died as a result of Snowbird accidents, including seven pilots.
Official news release here.

Friday, June 19, 2009

More on Identifying, Burying Canada's Missing War Dead

Remember this ?

Here's what today's National Post is sharing about the proposal call.

(A little) more here.

Thursday, June 18, 2009

Deciding on the F-35 soon?

Dreaming in...given our incredibly drawn out procurement process:
Canada Looks to Accelerate F-35 Decision; Lockheed Eyes Consortium Buy

Canada is working to bring forward a decision on its new fighter to later this year, with the Lockheed Martin-led F-35 Joint Strike Fighter facing ostensible competition from the Boeing F/A-18E/F, Eurofighter Typhoon and Saab Gripen NG (Next Generation) [see here and here].

"We are trying to advance the decision to 2009," says a Department of National Defense (DND) official. The intent, assuming the F-35 is selected, is to allow Canada to participate in a potential "consortium buy" promising better pricing and industrial rewards.

"A consortium buy would allow us to put international aircraft under a longer-term contract in advance of U.S. multi-year procurement," says Tom Burbage, Lockheed's executive vice president and general manager, F-35 program integration. "This would allow us to do some average pricing," to reduce the cost of early production aircraft.

Lockheed tried to put together a consortium-buy proposal a year ago - criticized by some as a controversial effort - but Burbage says the supply chain was "up to its ears" negotiating the first three low-rate initial production contracts.

"We plan to go back to the supply chain a year from now and negotiate a proposal for Lot 5. Most of the international aircraft come in with Lot 6," he says.

Canada is working to get a fighter decision on the cabinet's agenda for later this year [emphasis added, interesting subject for the sentence]. A cabinet go-ahead would allow the DND to submit its plan for procurement of 65 aircraft to Ottawa's treasury board for budget approval.

According to the DND official, there are no plans to accelerate the delivery of new fighters, which are planned to begin by 2018 [emphasis added] to replace Canada's CF-18s as they are phased out between 2017 and 2020.

Canada was the first country to join the United States and the United Kingdom as a partner in development of the JSF, and its industry has significant participation on the program. The original plan was to replace all 80 CF-18s, but "65 is sufficient to do the job," says the official.

Photo credit: Lockheed Martin

On the other hand, if the government doesn't actually have to spend significant money for some time, and if Canadian firms get business...

See also:
Future fighters
As for lengthy acquisition: the fixed-wing SAR aircraft still under, er, discussion, along with CH-47Fs, and not enough money for Joint Support Ships and Arctic/Offshore Patrol Vessels (suitable Canadian designs for ships are also something of a problem).

Update thought: What about that competitive bidding process? Can hardly do it in six months from now.

The title alone will attract the trolls...

...like flies to honey. Best of luck to Argent.

With a tip of the hat to John Donovan, I give you GayMilitaryLife.com:

...my new blog GayMilitaryLife.com is working to a level I am happy with. So now I want to open it up to the world.

GayMilitaryLife.com aims to provide a positive aspect on gays in the military. We want to encourage acceptance of the value of gay service in the military as well as improved attitudes to military activities amongst gay civilians. There main focus will be on gay and/or military issues as well as some of the issues surrounding that like current national affairs, politics, history etc.

I invite you to have a look and let me known what you think by email, comments or otherwise.

I recognise this is a controversial undertaking but I urge your support. I need quality content. I have set up a means to gather information from the net but it will not see everything. If you find something that is obviously related to both gays and the military let me know.

I also need to know military or gay significant event dates internationally if you have a good source for that. If you run a blog a link or post would be appreciated as well. In short I need to give the blog exposure. If you know any gays in the military who would like to contribute, perhaps with a story of their experience, that would be great too.


For those who haven't already guessed, my thoughts on gays in the CF are exactly the same as my thoughts on women in the CF:

If a woman wants to be in the combat arms, she needs to be able to hit the same performance requirements as her male counterparts, including the physical ones. Period. Sacrificing performance for political correctness is anathema to the military ethos.

But if she can do the job, she should be able to serve. Period. Discriminating against individuals on the basis of anything other than performance is also anathema to the military ethos.


Replace "woman" with "gay" in the above passage, and you've got a good idea how I feel on the subject.

So, as this new blog aims to draw on gay military experience across national delineations, I'd like to bring this to the attention of the readership here, on the all-too-likely chance some of our audience qualifies.

Is it expertise or a mental rut?

A friend pointed out an interesting article in the Wall Street Journal to me:

Gen. McChrystal's decision to set up a Pakistan Afghanistan Coordination Cell means creating a corps of roughly 400 officers who will spend years focused on Afghanistan, shuttling in and out of the country and working on those issues even while they are stateside.

Today, units typically spend six to 12 months in a war zone, and officers typically spend only a couple years in command before getting a new assignment. This undermines the continuity needed to prevail in complex environments like Afghanistan or Iraq. Too often, just when soldiers figure out what's going on they are shipped back home and neophytes arrive to take their place. Units suffer a disproportionate share of casualties when they first arrive because they don't have a grip on local conditions.

There was a saying that we didn't fight in Vietnam for 10 years; we fought there for one year, 10 times. The North Vietnamese, on the other hand, continued fighting until they were killed or immobilized. That gave their forces a huge advantage.


It's worth reading the whole article, as Max Boot lays out a good thumbnail synopsis of the arguments both for and against longer deployments and "going native."

I spoke briefly with a Canadian general on this topic awhile back, and he mentioned that familiarity cuts both ways: after six months of hard fighting against the Taliban - like Ian Hope's or Omer Lavoie's troops did, for example - it's easy for a soldier to see every Fighting Age Guy (a politically incorrect acronym, but it's what serves) as a Talib gunman, every white Toyota as a VBIED, every upset farmer as an enemy informant, every kite flown by the side of the road as a semaphore signal to a hidden foe. Is that soldier the guy you want executing the next phase of the mission, having to cooperate with the Afghan locals as we move to more of a reconstruction posture? In other words, does that experience do more harm than good as the mission evolves?

My friend says:

We didn't fight WWI or WWII on 6 or 9 month rotations...If I recall we won those.

We are at war in Afstan, not policing the Balkans - are our 6-9 month rotations a peacekeeping hangover?


Of course, we didn't fight either of those wars with a small, 100% volunteer army, either. And neither of those fights was a generational COIN war.

You could go back and forth on this all day...hopefully with a few pints in front of you to lubricate the debate. But this is one question with no easy answers, I'm afraid.

Afstan: Germans and Danes

1) Germans:
Germany increases troop numbers to Afghanistan

The German cabinet on Wednesday agreed to deploy up to 300 further German soldiers to Afghanistan. They will assist airborne surveillance as part of NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).


The German government said the mission would help "better coordinate" civilian and military air traffic. This would support the protection of the deployed soldiers and the Afghan civilian population.

Afghanistan's mountainous landscape hindered radar controls by ground troops, it said in a statement. Air traffic had also increased significantly in the past years.

"The reconnaissance aircraft were therefore urgently necessary to increase security," the statement said.

Germany will provide the troops for up to four Airborne Warning And Control System (AWACS) aircraft, whose home base is Geilenkirchen in western Germany. These will be sent when NATO begins its deployment of AWACS planes in Afghanistan. The aircraft will be stationed at the NATO base in Konya, Turkey.

The mandate is limited to December 13, 2009 [emphasis added]. The lower house of parliament still has to approve the mission and is expected to do so at the beginning of July.

NATO defense ministers approved the surveillance mission last Friday.

In total, Germany has about 3,500 troops in Afghanistan and there is a parliamentary mandate to send 4,500 as part of the NATO mission. But an additional mandate was required for the deployment of troops to assist the surveillance mission.

The AWACS planes will be unarmed. They can monitor a region of over 300,000 square kilometers from an elevation of 9,000 meters and can be refueled in the air.
It took the Germans almost a year to make the decision. See Update here for more on Germans.

2) Danes:
Danish troops die in Afghanistan

Three Danish soldiers have been killed in the southern Afghan province of Helmand, Denmark's military has said.

The soldiers were reported to have been leading a convoy when their vehicle was hit by a roadside bomb or mine.

Twenty-five Danish soldiers have died in Afghanistan since Denmark joined the US-led coalition in 2002.

Denmark has about 700 military personnel stationed in Afghanistan, mostly based in Helmand, a turbulent stronghold of Taliban militants.

Danish Foreign Minister Soren Gade told the country's TV2 news channel he had learnt of the soldiers' deaths "with great dismay".

The soldiers were taken by helicopter to the British Camp Bastion base but were declared dead on arrival...

From an earlier post:
...
By the way, the Danes, with very little notice (except inside NATO circles I guess), have been doing a bang-up job in Afstan; rather more than us on a per-capita basis--see end of this post:
Denmark 700 [emphasis added-- fully in combat--more at Update here]
Denmarks's population is one-fifth Canada's so 25 fatalities would equate to 150 Canadian deaths on a per capita basis. In fact we have suffered 142 so the sacrifice now seems roughly comparable. The Danes' 700 troops would equate to 3,500 Canadians; we have some 2,800.

Wednesday, June 17, 2009

Arctic/Offshore patrol ships: More never never land

Guess what? The vessels' planned capabilities are being reduced and the project is being delayed--not enough money (here's another never never land):
Navy waters down plans for Arctic patrol ships

The federal government has put off asking shipbuilders for ideas on the construction of a flotilla of Arctic patrol boats, a sign that the two-year-old program is in trouble.

The navy's project management office advised the defence industry on June 10th that the long-anticipated letters of intent had been delayed.

"The extent of the delay is unknown at this time," said the note obtained by The Canadian Press.

The navy's project office describes the postponement as a "glitch," but the officer in charge, navy Capt. Eric Bramwell, declined to explain what the holdup might be.

Prime Minister Stephen Harper announced in July 2007 that the navy would acquire six to eight ice-capable vessels for nearly year-round operation in the Arctic. The announcement was a cornerstone of the Conservatives' northern strategy

At the time, the proposal was a step back from the 2005-06 [silly] Tory election promise to build three armed, heavy icebreakers to enforce Canada's northern sovereignty.

[As I wrote back then:
Such vessels would make much more sense than having the Navy take on a true icebreaking role. But to have even their limited arctic capability they will be less capable (speed, range, etc.) for general naval duties--and building them in Canada means they will cost more than they should...]
The Conservatives have said the Arctic is a priority as competition for boundaries and resources with other nations, particularly Russia, intensifies. But the heavy cost has increasingly given them pause.

A National Defence estimate last year pegged the annual operating expense of Arctic military operations at $843-million, excluding capital purchases, such as the patrol boats.

As the patrol vessel plan went through the definition phase, the capabilities of the ships were scaled back from the original Conservative proposal in order to stay within the original $3.1-billion budget.

The navy now envisions purchasing just six Class 5 ice-cutting ships and arming them with 25-mm cannons -- the same calibre carried on the army's light armoured vehicles -- as opposed to larger 40-mm weapons.

The ships will also be slower than originally planned and have less cargo capacity [previous specifications at 2) here; they're already damned slow for naval patrol vessels--"cruise speed of at least 14 knots and a maximum speed of at least 20 knots"].

Despite that, Bramwell says the navy is happy with the look of the ship that's on the drawing board.

"We've been working the issue with our requirement colleagues to keep an eye on affordability," he said.

Cmdr. Dave Soule, who's overseen the ships' development, said a lot of attention has been paid to the smaller gun, which critics suggested turns the warship into nothing more than glorified police boat.

"We've looked at what other navies do for the kinds of missions these ships would be employed," Soule said in an interview Tuesday. "That calibre of gun is suitable."

He said many of the operations envisaged would be in support of domestic operations by other government departments; security and other non-military type threats.

"Those generally tend to be not like a warfare situation."..
In fact these ships' main role will be to replace the Navy's Kingston-class maritime coastal defence vessels. More from the prime minister's July 2007 announcement:
...
While the current Kingston-Class Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels (MCDV) have the versatility to operate in coastal areas, these minor war vessels have limited ability to operate in the open ocean, cannot support a helicopter, and are restricted in their capacity to support boarding operations. The Navy must use its large combatant vessels – destroyers and frigates, which are expensive to operate, to patrol the open ocean.

To fill this capability gap, the Navy will acquire up to eight Polar Class 5 Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships (A/OPSs)...
Yet even the Kingston-class have a 40 mm gun.

Meanwhile, given what I am sure are the now-limited capabilities of Canadian shipyards to design and build naval vessels, foreign shipbuilding practices are being looked at. Here's another sad story following on the insistence by all our governments that their ships be built in Canada to prop up a failing industry. Oink. Oink. Oink:
New Canadian Coast Guard vessels: Paying more to build in Canada

The Mid-Shore Patrol Vessel saga is yet another sorry procurement effort. Nobody in Canada could build them for what the government was willing to pay. So now some shipbuilder in Canada will have to buy a foreign design and then build it in Canada. Not a way to get the best vessel for the best price. But I suppose better than paying even more by trying to design it here. Might the same thing happen with the Navy's Joint Support Ships and Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ships? Still a wasteful way to try to maintain a wasting industry for political advantage...
As for our general procurement mess, remember that the Joint Support Ships (now too in never never land) and the Mid-Shore Patrol Vessels are projects that began quite a few years ago under the Liberals. Good grief.