Monday, May 31, 2010

Video--May 31, 1600: Meeting with service chiefs/senior NCMs--Senate Committee

With live webcast:
National Security and Defence
Monday, May 31, 2010 4:00 pm
Location: Room 2, Victoria Building 140 Wellington Street
(Televised live on PTN)
(Webcast)
Clerk: Kevin Pittman (613-993-8968)


Agenda for the meeting - Senate

Examine and report on the national security and defence policies of Canada.
TOPIC: The State of the Canadian Forces

AS A PANEL
* (4:00 pm-4:45 pm)
National Defence
Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie, Chief of Land Staff
Chief Warrant Officer Wayne Ford, Army Sergeant Major

AS A PANEL
* (5:00 pm-5:45 pm)
National Defence
Vice-Admiral Dean McFadden, Chief of Maritime Staff
Robert Cleroux, Command Chief Petty Officer

AS A PANEL
(6:00 pm-6:45 pm)
National Defence
Lieutenant-General André Deschamps, Chief of Air Staff
Update: From Canwest News:
Army overflowing with recruits, but air force short

Canadian army, navy and air force chiefs gave starkly different reports to a Senate committee Monday on public enthusiasm to join their ranks.

The army is so overflowing with recruits that there's a waiting list for the infantry and when the Afghanistan mission ends next year many reservists who signed up full time will be pared back to part time.

After years of falling short of recruitment targets, the navy finally exceeded a target in the past year and is feverishly advertising itself to fill jobs.

The air force is short of active and reverse personnel and many hundreds of air force men and women in uniform are not trained yet; as soon as the economy improves many who are trained will go to the private sector.

Those comments by army chief Lt.-Gen. Andrew Leslie, chief of land staff; Vice-Admiral Dean McFadden, chief of maritime staff; and Lt.-Gen. Andre Deschamps, chief of air staff, gave members of the Senate committee on national security and defence a glimpse into the challenges the military faces during the transition to the post-Afghanistan period...

There are more than 61,000 active and reserve forces in the Canadian military.
Actual figures at of May 4, 2010, shown during webcast:

Regulars: 61,460
Primary Reserve: 24,265

(By comparison, Australia has some two-thirds Canada's population and a permanent "...defence force of 58,00 personnel.")

All three service chiefs said they had enough money under the (very long term) "Canada First Defence Strategy". But for how long will that promised money be there?

Making the argument for our Navy

I was privileged to once again be invited to the fifth annual Rev. John Weir Foote, VC, CD Memorial Luncheon at the Albany Club in Toronto this past Friday. I've been fortunate enough to attend all five of these luncheons, and have thus seen LGen Leslie (back when he was a lowly MGen), Gen Hillier, Maj Bill Fletcher, and Gen Natynczyk speak to attentive audiences in Toronto. This year, in a tip of the hat to the Navy's centennial, the guest of honour was Captain (N) Art McDonald, who recently served as the Maritime Component Commander of Canadian Joint Task Force (Haiti).

While his remarks were off the record - as is standard policy at the Albany Club - I can tell you he made a better case for the Canadian Navy than I've heard from anyone else in uniform. It can be boiled down to this: relevance comes from responsiveness, and responsiveness comes from readiness. A Canadian warship is the Swiss Army knife of responses - a self-contained and cohesive platform that can do everything from fighting a battle to building an orphanage. And you don't even need to decide precisely what it's going to do before it sails.

BZ to all those at the Albany Club and DND who continue to make this such a must-attend event each year.

Afstan: Battle of the bucks/Update: Battle

Nice juxtaposin' again from Norman Spector:
...

--A great Afstan moment

In Afghan region, U.S. spreads the cash to fight the Taliban (W Post)

Terror link alleged as Saudi millions flow into Afghanistan war zone | Times


...
Meanwhile the CF are asking Afghans how to help:
Canada gives Afghans say in Panjwaii projects

BAZZAR-E-PANJWAII, Afghanistan - Canada is changing the way it's rolling out projects in Afghanistan's Panjwaii district, allowing for more local input so that infrastructure development takes into greater account the desires of Afghans over those of the coalition.

Under the shift, local elders are being encouraged to propose projects at district shuras _ community meetings _ or straight to their district governor. In the past, the Canadian Forces and NATO's International Security Assistance Force delivered projects for the region without that level of Afghan consultation...
Update: What the US Army is up against at Kandahar:
Battalion among hardest hit in Afghan war

Insurgents in Kandahar's undergrowth drag Nato forces into 'green hell'

Spring brings renewed risk from IEDs, and political solutions seem a long way off. Julius Cavendish reports from Pashmul

Sunday, May 30, 2010

Afghan training... and performance? Plus two book reviews of War

1) Washington Post:
Training of Afghan military, police has improved, NATO report says

A U.S. military review in Afghanistan has concluded that the addition of more than 1,000 new U.S. military and NATO troops focused on training has helped stabilize what had been a failing effort to build Afghanistan's security forces, but that persistent attrition problems could still hinder long-term success.

"We are finally getting the resources, the people and money," said Army Lt. Gen. William B. Caldwell IV, who heads the NATO training effort in Afghanistan [site here] and oversaw the review of his command's past 180 days. "We are moving in the right direction."

U.S. war plans depend on Afghan forces maintaining security in areas of southern and eastern Afghanistan, where the U.S. military is adding 30,000 troops this summer. More broadly, the Obama administration's counterinsurgency strategy places a heavy emphasis on an expansion of the Afghan security forces before the United States begins to withdraw troops in July 2011.

Caldwell's report card on the training effort, which The Washington Post obtained in advance and is expected to be released within the next couple of days, paints a mixed picture...

U.S. and Afghan officials are weighing the possibility of increasing combat pay and giving soldiers a break from battle. "We are working real hard to set up a system to rotate units" out of areas where combat is heaviest [emphasis added], Caldwell said.

U.S. commanders have said the performance of Afghan police and army forces in Kandahar, the country's second-largest city, is essential to the military campaign planned for the area this summer. There are concerns that, as fighting with the Taliban increases, recruitment and retention could suffer...
That bolded bit is very important--from BruceR. at Flit almost a year ago:
...we should also understand that a lot of the pressure the army is under, in places like Helmand and Kandahar, is an artificiality we've imposed on them. Because we don't allow them to move their forces around.

I mean, really, there are a lot of Afghan soldiers, or at least a lot more than there used to be: 95 out of a planned 160 kandaks, all kinds, at last report. So why is Helmand Province, where the fighting is the worst, limited to less than half a dozen, and always the same ones? Well, that'd be our influence. For reasons alluded to above, Western military planners are extremely uncomfortable with unmentored Afghan soldiers using heavy weapons within their own battlespace. The mentors, shadowing their charges, if nothing else at least give the other Western soldiers some positional awareness on what the Afghans are up to, significantly reducing the potential for fratricide and confusion. The better ones by their example elevate the Afghans to a higher operational tempo than they otherwise might attempt on their own, and the really good ones provide an occasional lesson that maybe Afghans can learn from. But the liaison element is key. You always need someone on the inside of an Afghan kandak or higher headquarters to work together.

The teams that do this are drawn from all over NATO. For obvious reasons, the NATO country that's providing the ground force element in a specific province or region tends to also provide the ANA mentors. It's hard enough to bridge the cultural divides between Afghans and the West without also bringing in any potential element of friction between a battalion commander from one NATO country and a senior mentor from another. All well and good, but now you've tied that Afghan kandak and all its personnel to the province that country is operating in.

Suppose the Afghan Army high command wanted to reinforce a province like Helmand with another few Kandaks right now. Well, you've got two alternatives there. You can either deploy the Afghans unmentored, at which point it now becomes a new burden on the Western forces in that area to take a couple hundred soldiers away from their other duties, because they're sure as heck not going to be able to have ANA in the battlespace, intermixed with their own units, without that liaison. (Plus another couple hundred Western mentors in the originating region would be out of a job, which the donating country might not appreciate.)

Or you bring the other country's mentors along with you. Which could create all kinds of impossible-to-solve problems for NATO chains of authority and logistics. The mentoring nations may have caveats that prevent them from deploying to a combat zone, to start with. So in the end, the path of least resistance prevails, and the mentors -- and their Afghans -- stay right where they are.

This doesn't just affect the reinforcement of problem areas. In the south of the country, mentor teams are desperate to find training time to help their Afghan charges with their new vehicles and weapons, or to, god forbid, conduct a training exercise of some kind. Well the best way to do that would be to focus those kinds of efforts on the Afghans in the relatively quiet north and west of the country, in 207 or 209 Corps (where the majority of mentors are drawn from Italy and Germany respectively, with a supporting role played by a mix of other NATO countries), and rotate the battalions in and out of the operating theatre (you know, the way we do). They may be very well getting good training in 207 and 209; I have no visibility. But those now highly-trained soldiers they've produced are not likely to ever come south to spell off the soldiers already in the south in order to get any kind of fighting-training rotation thing happen. Because they can't come without mentors, and their mentors can't move.

Even a one-for-one swap of just a kandak or a brigade between mentor teams on opposite sides of the country would be extremely difficult (I've never heard of it actually being done): neither mentoring country involved would likely trust the outcome, if only because Afghan logistical administration is so appallingly poor, with most of the equipment of both kandaks likely "disappearing" during the handover in mentoring. So left unchanged, depending on which corps they were assigned to, some Afghan soldiers in some areas will fight until they die or quit, and some will see very little action for years...
And from a month ago:
Ain't easy training the ANA
2) NY Times:
Taliban Push Afghan Police Out of Valley

KABUL, Afghanistan — Taliban fighters took control of a remote district near the Pakistani border on Saturday, scattering the forces of the Afghan government, who said they had run out of ammunition.

A force of Taliban attackers entered the district of Barg-e-Matal around 8 a.m. Saturday, after the local police retreated, Colonel Sherzad, the deputy police chief, said in an interview.

“Our forces retreated because they did not have enough ammunition,” he said, echoing other officials in the area. Only 24 hours before, Afghan officials had claimed that they had driven the Taliban from the district into neighboring Pakistan [see here].

The fall of Barg-e-Matal, while embarrassing to the Afghan government, is not necessarily strategically significant. The district sits on an isolated valley in Nuristan Province, one of the most inaccessible places in the country.

The Americans, who provided limited air support over the past few days in clashes with the Taliban, provided none on Saturday. Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the American commander here, has emphasized protecting population centers, even at the expense of writing off smaller inaccessible areas.

Barg-e-Matal would seem to qualify. Last year, a group of American soldiers spent two months in the valley to help the Afghan government clear and hold the area and pulled out in September.

Last month, the Americans closed their outposts in the nearby Korengal Valley, an equally remote place, after four years of trying to pacify local Afghans . Local Taliban quickly moved in.

[More here on the Korengal, and do read this review of Sebastian Junger's War about his time with the US Army there--the Toronto Star reviewer liked it too.]

Afghan officials said the Taliban fighters in Barg-e-Matal were Pakistanis, other foreigners and members of Al Qaeda, although they offered no evidence to support that assertion...
Update: Afghan and US special forces take it back:
Taliban Driven from Afghan District

Brig.-Gen. Ménard: How low can the Toronto Star go?/Update: Michael Yon gets his General?/US command for Task Force Kandahar?

Guilt by association, flip all your blinking biscuits, hurl to the stinking max, low. Goodest on Norman Spector:
...

--What else the Star is reporting (sic!)

Ménard is the second high-ranking Canadian military officer to be relieved of his command in recent months.

Col. Russell Williams, former commander of CFB Trenton, faces charges in the deaths of two women, the sexual assault of two others and dozens of break-ins.

...
Update: Topic thread at Milnet.ca, note that Michael Yon is on to the story. Really on it--from BruceR. at Flit:
...The recently disembedded Michael Yon is claiming personal responsibility tonight for getting Menard fired: "This fight was expensive for me in many ways, but I got him. Getting this man fired was worth the fight and the costs. This will save American, Canadian, and Afghan lives." In the comments he elaborates: "I reported the sexual affair."

And to be fair, there's reason to believe him...
Upperdate thought: Brig.-Gen. Ménard's command includes many more American field troops than Canadian, an unusual situation for US forces (from a previous post:"...three battalions versus one (augmented)--in the CF's official list; and why is the 1st Squadron, 71st Cavalry Regiment, 1st Brigade Combat Team,10th Mountain Division, not included in the list?
...the 1-71st Cavalry is in Kandahar, the country’s Taliban hotbed, attached to a Canadian battle unit...).
The Americans have already served under Brig.-Gen. Ménard's immediate predecessor, Brig.-Gen. Jon Vance, who is now being rushed back to Afstan to replace him. But I really wonder how they will feel about continuing to be subordinate to a Canadian when Gen. Vance is replaced in September by Brig.-Gen. Dean Milner. A time when things in Kandahar City, and the province as a whole, look like being very hot indeed (see middle of this story). Especially as the CF are to be pulled out next year.

Moreover ISAF Regional Command (South) will this fall be coming under US Army Major General James Terry along with his 10th Mountain Division HQ. It would be easy to argue that the CF's Task Force Kandahar, which is getting close to being a US brigade equivalent, might best fit under that HQ with an American commander.

From the Canadian standpoint, a rationale for such a change might be that Task Force Kandahar has grown so large, and its operations so complex, that the next Canadian commander will have his hands full enough under his other hat as chief of the overall CF mission, Joint Task Force Afghanistan.

Uppestdate: The Globe and Mail does the Star one worse: front page, top of the fold, lede paragraph:
The reputation and morale of Canada’s military, still reeling from allegations that a base commander committed multiple murders, has [sic] suffered another blow with the dismissal of its top soldier in Afghanistan for breaking the rules on personal relationships in the field...
Nice to know the reporters (one of whom is in Kabul, the other in Toronto) had time to do all that research to determine definitively the state of the country's and the CF's thinking; they can't even get their grammar right.

Beyond Uppestdate: A topic thread on Gen. Menard's relief (some remarks on Mr Yon) at Small Wars Council (via Starbuck in "Comments", thanks for kind words).

What ELSE General Menard May be Being Investigated For

In case you haven't heard yet, Canada has a new Task Force commander in Afghanistan:
Commander Canadian Expeditionary Force Command (CEFCOM), Lieutenant-General Marc Lessard announced today that he has relieved Brigadier-General Daniel Menard from his position as Commander Joint-Task Force Afghanistan (JTF-Afg) and has designated Colonel Simon Hetherington as Acting Commander in the interim.

LGen Lessard made this decision following allegations concerning BGen Menard’s inappropriate conduct related to the Canadian Forces Personal Relationships and Fraternization directives, which caused Commander CEFCOM to lose confidence in BGen Menard’s capacity to command.

An investigation into the circumstances related to the allegations is being launched.

In the near future, the Canadian Forces will dispatch former JTF-Afg Commander, Brigadier-General Jon Vance to Afghanistan to assume command, pending the arrival of the next JTF-Afg Commander, Brigadier-General Dean Milner.
Now, before one jumps to conclusions about the nature of the alleged "inappropriate conduct related to the Canadian Forces Personal Relationships and Fraternization directives", let's look at what ELSE is covered by said directives:

A CF member in a personal relationship with another CF member, DND employee or member of an allied force, contractor or an employee of a contractor shall not be involved, regardless of rank or authority, in the other person's:

  • performance assessment or reporting, including training evaluations and audits;

  • posting, transfer or attached posting;

  • individual training or education;

  • duties or scheduling for duties;

  • documents or records;

  • grievance process; or

  • release proceedings.

You can find the full Defence Administrative Orders and Directive on the issue - DAOD 5019-1, Personal Relationships and Fraternization - here.

Project JUSTAS: Long-term UAV acquisition still moving right

A shortage of personnel, and likely funds, for the MALE (medium-altitude long-endurance) UAV system. First delivery slippping two years to 2014, fully operational in 2017--the possible slippage had in fact already been reported in November 2008:
...defence sources said Tuesday [Nov. 4] that a long-term air force program to purchase high-endurance, unmanned surveillance aircraft for coastal surveillance - known as Project JUSTAS - was being bumped back two years, possibly to 2013-14 [emphasis added]...
Latest story (Ottawa Citizen front page, why?):
Lack of operators clips wings of drone plan
Not enough trained crew for unit
Here's the Sept. 2008 MERX post for Letters of Interest, note this requirement:
...
Reconnaissance (ISR), Target Acquisition, and all-weather precision strike capabilities in support of Canadian Forces (CF) operations worldwide...
Earlier:
Poor Peter II: Boy is he confused [more confusion near end of first part of this post]

UAVS: A story in search of fuss [lots of background]
Regarding UAV pilots, posts from 2008:
1) Aurora pilots to fly UAVs for Afstan [the Herons now there]

2) Air Force news
...
UAV piloting: This will be done by Air Combat Systems Officers, the new designation for navigators, not pilots. ACSOs will also manage UAV missions.

Saturday, May 29, 2010

CF-18 Hornet replacement update (sort of)/2010 air show Hornet

There doesn't seem to be any real news in this front page, top of the fold, Ottawa Citizen story. Moreover $9 billion all-in doesn't seem all that high for 65 modern fighters if one considers we are spending $3.1 billion [see 2680 here] for 28 maritime helicopters. And note this from a Citizen blog, Jan. 4:
START PROCESS TO REPLACE CF-18 FIGHTERS SAYS ASSOCIATION BUT HARPER GOVERNMENT HAS OTHER PRIORITIES
...
DND sources tell Defence Watch that the Harper government, currently dealing with finding ways to deal with a $55 billion deficit, is not looking at moving quickly on a defence procurement program that could cost as much as $10 billion over the long-term...
Back to the story:
Replacing Canadian fighter jets to cost $9B
Critics [check the go-to-guy] charge tab kept quiet [hardly, remember the $10 billion figure mentioned above, and see below too] over fear of taxpayer backlash

Replacing Canada's CF-18s with a new generation of fighter aircraft will cost taxpayers around $9 billion, one of the most expensive military equipment purchases ever, the Citizen has learned [the paper already knew a month ago, see below].

The Conservative government confirmed in 2008 its plans to purchase 65 fighter aircraft [see here] and is expected to approve the project some time this year [emphasis added, in this budget climate?], air force officials say.

The Defence Department would not provide a cost estimate, claiming that to make the figure public would undercut the procurement process for what is being called the next generation fighter. "To date, no decision has been made by the government of Canada on the choice of a next-generation fighter aircraft or on the procurement approach," added DND spokeswoman Jocelyn Sweet.

But in April, Col. Randy Meiklejohn of the directorate of aerospace requirements told a gathering of defence industry representatives in Ottawa that the cost of the program would be about $9 billion [so what's new today?]. The air force, he pointed out, plans to have the new aircraft in service starting in 2017. The figure he used would include not only the 65 aircraft, but spare parts and long-term support.

A number of different fighter aircraft could be considered as a replacement for the CF-18s, but the military has been partial to the U.S.-built Joint Strike Fighter [F-35].

The Defence Department's claim that it cannot release any figures associated with a new aircraft purchase until the project is approved by government appears to contradict its previous position. DND documents obtained through the Access to Information law previously estimated the full cost to replace at least 80 CF-18 fighter aircraft would be $10.5 billion.

Steve Staples, president of the Ottawa-based Rideau Institute [more here], said DND didn't want to provide the $9 billion figure because it's worried about a backlash from taxpayers.

"Their plan is to keep this in the backrooms and try to get this deal signed without anyone noticing," said Staples, who has spoken out against what he says are high levels of military spending. "The government wants to spend $9 billion on a stealth fighter when this country has a $50 billion deficit. They should try spending a little more on health care instead."

Staples noted that the cost of the project is creeping up without explanation; at one point the government was going to spend $10.5 billion on 80 fighters; now it is $9 billion for 65. "Who knows what this will end up costing Canadians?" he said [actually not a bad question, St. Steve; it's all about escalating fighter costs generally, and especially for the F-35--now over $100 million each, more here, causing problems for the Dutch government]...

On Thursday in the Commons, Defence Minister Peter MacKay said a new generation fighter would not only contribute to making sure the military has the right equipment, but would also provide opportunities for domestic aerospace companies. "There is eye-watering technology now available, and a fifth-generation fighter aircraft will be brought to Canada after the year 2017," he added.

But MacKay also appeared to contradict the Defence Department's claim that no decision had been made on how the procurement program for the new fighter aircraft will be handled, when he said there would be an open competition. MacKay went on to suggest the decision would be between the Joint Strike Fighter and another aircraft he didn't name [lots more here, with info on possible competitors--another one?]...

One does hope there will in fact be a real competition and that prospects for Canadian industrial participation in the F-35 program have not queered the pitch politically--and we know the Air Force does want the F-35 quite badly.

But if Mr MacKay intends on a real competition for a "fifth-generation fighter aircraft" the only real alternative to the F-35--now that the F-22 is going out of production--would be Russia's new T-50. I guess the MND is just not up on his fighters.

And as I have written:
...
Whether we need fighters with full capabilities for airspace patrol/interception, air-to-air combat, and precise ground attack is another good question since the government has been unwilling even to use our CF-18s to support troops in Afstan...
Keep in mind that the F-35's primary role is as a bomb truck; there's a reason it's called Joint Strike Fighter.

Meanwhile, one current fighter, several photos at link:
Canadian Forces Demo Hornet launches its 2010 show season

Friday, May 28, 2010

The Canadian Forces CF-18 Hornet national demonstration jet will be dazzling audiences across North America as it launches its 2010 air show season starting this weekend at the Jones Beach Air Show in New York.

Captain Brian Bews of 425 Tactical Fighter Squadron based at 3 Wing, Bagotville, Quebec, is this year’s demonstration pilot. “I am incredibly excited to be chosen as this year’s demo pilot,” he said. “It’s a pretty small group that gets to fly Hornets and a significantly smaller group that is chosen to be demo pilots. It’s a huge honour to represent Canada for 2010.”

In tribute to the Canadian Navy, the Air Force will adopt the Canadian Navy Centennial (CNC) as it’s theme for the 2010 air show season. “We are looking forward to celebrating the Navy's Centennial,” said Major-General Yvan Blondin, Commander of 1 Canadian Air Division in Winnipeg. “It is a proud moment for every Canadian.”

The demonstration jet’s tails have been specially painted to mark this important milestone. Featuring classic Canadian Air Force and Navy motifs and a striking paint design, the CNC theme is featured on both tails, rendered in freehand airbrush and paint gun murals in subdued blues. The tri-colour Royal Canadian Navy Roundel from the 1950s is featured on the fuselage [see Update here for the RCN's "Grey Ghosts" aerobatics team with McDonnell Banshees]...

A CF-18 Hornet from 425 Tactical Fighter Squadron, 3 Wing Bagotville, Que., displays its unique tail painting marking the 100th anniversary of the Canadian Navy, painted by technicians at 3 Air Maintenance Squadron. Credit: DND.

The Demo Hornet’s 2010 show schedule, as well as spectacular photos of the CNC Hornet, can be found at: http://www.airforce.forces.gc.ca/v2/cf18/index-eng.asp

For more information on the Canadian Naval Centennial, please visit: www.canadiannavy100.forces.gc.ca

Predate: Then there was the "Century (a different one) Hornet" last year.

Getting at that pesky Quetta Shura Taliban

Earlier:
The ISI and the Afghan Taliban/Quetta Shura Taliban Update
Now the US is still trying to find a way to get at them:
...the administration is trying to deepen ties to Pakistan's intelligence officials in a bid to head off any attack by militant groups. The United States and Pakistan have recently established a joint military intelligence center on the outskirts of the northwestern city of Peshawar, and are in negotiations to set up another one near Quetta, the Pakistani city where the Afghan Taliban is based, according to the U.S. military officials...

The "fusion centers" are meant to bolster Pakistani military operations by providing direct access to U.S. intelligence, including real-time video surveillance from drones controlled by the U.S. Special Operations Command, the officials said. But in an acknowledgment of the continuing mistrust between the two governments, the officials added that both sides also see the centers as a way to keep a closer eye on one another, as well as to monitor military operations and intelligence activities in insurgent areas...

The fusion centers are part of a parallel U.S. military effort to intensify the pressure on the Taliban and other groups accused of directing insurgent attacks in Afghanistan. U.S. officials said that the sharing of intelligence goes both ways and that targets are monitored in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.

In the Peshawar fusion cell, which was set up within the last several months, Pakistanis have access to "full-motion video from different platforms," including unarmed surveillance drones, one official said.

The fusion centers also serve a broader U.S. aim: making the Pakistanis more dependent on U.S. intelligence, and less likely to curtail Predator drone patrols or other programs that draw significant public opposition.

To Pakistan, the fusion centers offer a glimpse of U.S. capabilities, as well as the ability to monitor U.S. military operations across the border. "They find out much more about what we know," one of the senior U.S. military officials said. "What we get is physical presence -- to see what they are actually doing versus what they say they're doing."

That delicate arrangement will be tested if the two sides reach agreement on the fusion center near Quetta. The city has served for nearly a decade as a sanctuary for Taliban leaders who fled Afghanistan in 2001 and have long-standing ties to Pakistan's powerful Inter-Services Intelligence directorate.

U.S. officials said that the two sides have done preliminary work searching for a suitable site for the center but that the effort is proceeding at a pace that one official described as "typical Pakistani glacial speed." Despite the increased cooperation, U.S. officials say they continue to be frustrated over Pakistan's slow pace in issuing visas to American military and civilian officials.

One senior U.S. military official said the center would be used to track the Afghan Taliban leadership council, known as the Quetta shura. But other officials said the main mission would be to support the U.S. military effort across the border in Kandahar, Afghanistan, where a major U.S. military push is planned [emphasis added, more here, here and here].

Friday, May 28, 2010

New commander ISAF RC South/ “Taliban Score Publicity Coup”

Further to this post,
Afstan: It's official--ISAF RC South bifurcated
Voice of America seems to have had a bit of a scoop (plus some Canadian comment--Update: looks like North Country Public Radio had it first):
...
U.S. Major General James Terry [commander, 10th Mountain Division] will take command of southern Afghanistan forces in the fall. He is visiting Kandahar to get a sense of what is happening and describes what the coming weeks will bring.

"You are going to see an uplift of forces come in and I think you'll start to see this tightening ring of security in and around Kandahar city that I think will then provide the security bubble for governance to start to take in and development to start to take root in Kandahar city," the major general said.

In Kandahar city itself, Afghan police and military forces are to take the lead in the operation. Their military units, called "Kandaks," will be supported by coalition troops.

Afghan security forces have improved a lot since General Terry was last here in 2006 [one would rather hope so]...

Canadian Ambassador William Crosbie welcomes the strategy to build up forces and establish security. Canadian forces led the vanguard here nearly five years ago says Crosbie.

"We have battled against the odds in a province that has become increasingly violent. It's a province that desperately needs development, and better security so we're delighted to have the American troops coming."

Crosbie desribes the U.S. commitment as more than just forces.

"They're not only bringing the opportunity to give Afghans more security, working closely with the Afghan national security forces, but bringing very important development dollars," said Crosbie.

Alongside the additional military forces, civilians have come as well in an effort to shore up the region's infrastructure and provide opportunities for the people. Tens of millions of dollars have been poured into projects to help the people, like a $50 million Afghan police compound that will open later this summer.

Ambassador Crosbie said there have already been many changes.

"The biggest area of progress is giving Afghans the ability to actually change their own future, through education, through training of teachers, through economic opportunities such as the rehabilitation of the Dahla Dam, restoring agriculture [ah, that Canadian warm and fuzzy]."..
About the dam, from this January:
...
The auditor general visited several Canadian bases and flew over the Dahla dam - Canada's $50-million "signature" rehabilitation project that has largely stalled, in part because of security concerns...
More on the warm and fuzzy, from December 2009:
...
The report [Canadian government quarterly] also noted:..

-Seven more schools were built under Canada's supervision, bringing the total number completed to 12, with another 21 under construction...
This bit on the Dahla Dam [see also Upperdate here] is rather revealing in the minimal precision on real progress achieved:
...
The three-year, $50-million rehabilitation of the Dahla Dam with its canals and associated irrigation system is a second Canadian signature project and one of the highest development priorities of the Afghan government. Completion will mean reliable delivery of water to an area supporting four out of five Kandaharis, with the irrigation encouraging farmers to shift from opium poppies to legal high-value crops like pomegranates. In the quarter, Canadian project engineers tackled technical aspects of the project, and a manufacturer for the gates and weirs of the irrigation canals was identified...
(Some recent Torch analysis about the new RC South HQ:
...
It would also seem that the new HQ--and commander?--for RC South (East ["East was dropped]) will be from the US Army's 10th Mountain Division (based near Ontario) when one puts these snippets together:
[1]...
Col. Andre Corbould will be promoted to brigadier-general and appointed as deputy commander of the U.S. 10th Mountain Division headquarters in Afghanistan...

[2] The 10th Mountain Division headquarters will deploy to Afghanistan this fall, officials confirmed Wednesday [Feb. 3]...

It’s still unknown where the division headquarters will be assigned once it is deployed to Afghanistan [one would think Kandahar]...)
Meanwhile, a Conference of Defence Association's media update, with lots on Kandahar:
...
Matthew Fisher for The National Post calls the recent Taliban attacks, “militarily insignificant,” but nevertheless a “spectacularly successful publicity coup” for the insurgency.
http://www.nationalpost.com/todays-paper/story.html?id=3067325

Matthew Fisher is interviewed by CFRA on the recent attacks on Bagram Air Base, which Fisher argues were neither unique or a demonstration of an emboldened insurgency.
http://www.cfra.com/chum_audio/Matthew_Fisher_May24.mp3

Joshua Partlow for The Washington Post writes that the Taliban’s ‘calculated assassinations’ is spreading fear and suspicion in Kandahar, but officials warn that they cannot all be attributed to the insurgency.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/21/AR20100521049...

David Zucchino for Los Angeles Times reports on Operation Kokaran, a comprehensive civilian-military effort to clear insurgents from Kanadahar’s western district from which the Taliban have been systematically assassinating government sympathizers.
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-afghan-kandahar-sweep-201...

Yarislov Trofimov for The Wallstreet Journal reveals that in a war of perception, the Taliban insurgents are succeeding in their attempts to intimidate Kandaharis.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704904604575262231676468708.htm...

John F. Burns for The New York Times reports on the historic and current importance of Kandahar to Afghanistan.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/23/weekinreview/23burns.html?hp=&pagewanted=print

Karen DeYoung for The Washington Post writes that ‘there is no Plan B’ should the counterinsurgency’s campaign for Kandahar fail.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/22/AR20100522034...

Matthew Fisher for CanWest News writes that Lt.-Col. Conrad Mialkowski, Canada’s new battlegroup Commander [emphasis added], considers holding eastern Panjwaii a priority and will only push west in cooperation with allies and Afghan counterparts. http://www.canada.com/news/Hold+ground+then+push+forward+Canadian+commander+d...

Marja: "...a bleeding ulcer right now”'? (McClatchy reporting)/Taliban--and Afghan--thinking

Further to this post based on a McClatchy story,
Marja: '...“This is a bleeding ulcer right now”'
an exchange of messages between ISAF (headline below a bit off) and McClatchy Newspapers:
U.S. military criticizes McClatchy story on McChrystal in Marjah
Regardless of the merits of the above dispute, readers might be interested in this post of Babbling's that recounts an encounter Torch contributors, and another Canadian milblogger, had with a McClatchy reporter in January this year:
There are none so blind as those who will not see
Meanwhile, a thought experiment at Foreign Policy's "AfPak Channel":
Kandahar Through the Taliban's Eyes
As the U.S.-led coalition attempts to retake Afghanistan's critical southern provinces, they should first attempt to look at the conflict from their enemies' perspective.
More on our opponents' thinking from Con Coughlin in the Daily Telegraph:
We will never defeat the Taliban if they think we're going home
And it ain't their perception alone that's important, as I wrote a few days ago:
Afstan: Brits going wobbly...

What's a poor Afghan to think?..

Thursday, May 27, 2010

US MPs working with ANP in Kandahar City/Field reporting

David Zucchino of the LA Times again gives on-scene reporting, including on CF, that our major media seldom do (but see below):
U.S. puts hopes in bedraggled Afghan police
If the U.S. is to succeed in seizing control of Kandahar — the country's second-largest city — from the Taliban this summer, improving the performance of the police will be at the heart of the effort.

Reporting from Kandahar, Afghanistan — Afghan national police checkpoint No. 4, substation 3, is a blighted shell of a building ringed by garbage and shaded by scruffy trees whose leaves are coated with fine gray dust. Here, nine police officers have the task of protecting the Shinghazi Baba neighborhood of southern Kandahar.

Sometimes they can't even protect themselves. Two months ago, an officer was fatally shot by an insurgent who escaped on a motorcycle.

"The force-protection posture is not really all that great," Sgt. 1st Class Arnaldo Colon, a U.S. Army military policeman, said as he arrived Wednesday morning for an inspection. He gestured toward dilapidated concrete barriers, a few sad strands of concertina wire and a yelping guard dog tied to a tree.

If the U.S. is to succeed in seizing control of Kandahar, Afghanistan's second-largest city, from the Taliban this summer, improving the performance of the Afghan police will be at the heart of that effort. The often bedraggled force patrols roads and operates neighborhood checkpoints, putting officers in daily contact with a civilian populace the U.S. is trying to win over.

Colon's unit, the 293rd Military Police Company [photos here and here--from the 97th Military Police Battalion, part of the CF's Task Force Kandahar (U.S. Army units), more here and here], trains and mentors Afghan police in Kandahar. The U.S. military is attempting to put an Afghan face on policing, pushing Afghans to take the lead on patrols, searches and neighborhood sweeps. The police and army will be responsible for security when U.S. forces begin to withdraw, perhaps as early as next summer.

When his company arrived in July as the only U.S. unit stationed in downtown Kandahar, Colon said, the police "didn't have a clue." They were incapable of patrolling on their own.

"Now, they're better prepared and know the minimum standards for patrol and security," Colon said as he led a foot patrol of seven U.S. MPs and six Afghan officers through busy streets filled with vendors hawking vegetables and shopkeepers selling sodas and snacks...

Canadian Army Sgt. Sarah Surtees, whose civil affairs [CIMIC, see below] patrol bumped into Colon's patrol at the checkpoint Wednesday [emphasis added], said the Afghan police have been instrumental in her mission. With their help, she said, she assesses community needs and encourages residents to seek help from the government-appointed district manager.

No projects are underway in the Shinghazi Baba neighborhood, Surtees said. But 300 residents of nearby neighborhoods have been hired to clean out clogged irrigation canals and culverts. Water carried by the system is needed by the small farm plots that dominate the area...
As for CF CIMIC work, more from Mr Zucchino:
Kandahar City: Matters involving the CF...

...that one reads about in the LA Times, not our major media...
American and Canadian civil affairs and development teams [emphasis added] had arranged the meeting to follow up on Saturday's joint U.S.-Afghan Operation Kokaran...

The discussion turned briefly to development. The elders complained that their neighborhood had received visits from U.S. and Canadian aid teams, but no projects.

Master Warrant Officer Kevin Walker, a Canadian civil affairs specialist [that's a CIMIC operator, all reservists, more here, here and here], explained that Kokaran had to be secured first. He had heard such complaints before; he's on his third tour in Afghanistan.

Walker, who has visited Mohammed at his home, told him that Saturday's operation, designed to cut Taliban infiltration routes and set up police checkpoints, would make it easier to visit and discuss development projects.

"The fact that he made the effort to get here shows he's serious and wants to engage with us," Walker said of Mohammed afterward...

Soon it was time to go. The American and Canadian soldiers strapped on their body armor and weapons and climbed back into their armored vehicles. Eight of the elders, dressed in flowing white salwar kameez and silver and black turbans, piled back into a battered Toyota Corolla station wagon. The other two left in a pickup truck...
But there is the occasional similar piece in our media--one example at this post, good on Mitch Potter of the Toronto Star:
Canadian police working with Afghans in Kandahar City/EU police Update
More from Mr Potter at this post:
Kandahar City: Another view
As for Kandahar City more generally:
Hot time in Kandahar City? And CF?
And, for a bit of newspaper balance, a post based on outside-the-wire reporting this March by the Globe and Mail's Josh Wingrove (such reporting not too common at that paper):
The face in the field on our Afghan mission...

Afstan: A first last spike

This should also help ISAF supplies somewhat:
ADB President Inaugurates Rail Line Linking Afghanistan to Central Asia

HAIRATAN, AFGHANISTAN - Asian Development Bank (ADB) President Haruhiko Kuroda today inaugurated a 75-kilometer stretch of railway line that connects the Afghan city of Mazar-e-Sharif to the country's bustling northern border with Uzbekistan.

"The new rail link between Mazar-e-Sharif and Hairatan will help reduce trade bottlenecks, boost commerce, and speed the flow of much-needed humanitarian assistance," Mr. Kuroda said at the opening ceremony in Hairatan...

The rail link is being constructed from a $165 million ADB grant and should be completed by the end of this year. It will connect Afghanistan to Uzbekistan's expansive rail network, and to regional markets in Europe and Asia. Future links are planned, which will run across the north and to other parts of the country and region, including Pakistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan...
Via Moby Media Updates. Afstan has never had a serious railroad before, lots more on Afstan and railways at immediately preceding link. Earlier (Feb. 2009):
AfPak: Northern suppy route rolling

The train has left the station...

Wednesday, May 26, 2010

Marja: '...“This is a bleeding ulcer right now”'

A post by Paul Wells of Maclean's magazine, one of our few pundits who--ignore his brashness--makes a serious effort to understand things Afghan rather than treating them merely as a sub-set of Canadian politics:
Gen. Stanley McCrystal checks up on the progress in Marja and discovers, in extraordinarily frank language, that there hasn’t been enough. Marja is intended to be a prelude to the push in Kandahar that will be the last major Canadian operation [more here] before the bulk of our military engagement there ends. And Marja is not going well at all.
More:
A senior NATO general in Afghanistan says it will probably be months before Afghans in Marjah shun the Taliban and form a strong local government.

British Maj. Gen. Nick Carter tells reporters Wednesday that the 3-month-old, U.S.-led NATO operation in the southern region has been a military success. But Afghans in Marjah have been reluctant to form a strong government capable of shaking off Taliban influence.

Carter, who is NATO's commander in southern Afghanistan [command area being rather reduced], acknowledges that the process of building a new local government could take 3 to 4 months. Carter said a second major offensive in Kandahar was on schedule to ramp up this summer.
Via milnews.ca at Milnet.ca.

New York City Fleet Week 2010: HMCS Athabaskan taking a break from exercise

So it would appear. The exercise:
Canada - US Relations: Canadian, American and French Navy on task group exercise

Four Halifax-based warships, HMC Ships Athabaskan, St. John’s, Halifax and Ville de Quebec recently departed HMC Dockyard to participate in Canadian Fleet Operations (CFO) from May 18 until June 8. As part of this deployment the ships will also conduct operations with American and French vessels and aircraft.

Credit: WO Larry Graham, J5PA Combat Camera

HMCS Athabaskan is participating in Canadian Fleet Operations (CFO) with HMC Ships St. John’s, Halifax and Ville de Quebec.


CFO will test various aspects of Naval activities including seamanship and navigational training, weapons firing, international interoperability and communications. CFO is geared to maximize the fleet’s ability to deploy as a task group under various team-based scenarios and exercises.

Aerial, surface and sub-surface activities will test sailors’ abilities to search, detect and protect themselves from various threats.
NYC:
...
May 25, 2010

The Honourable Peter MacKay, Minister of National Defence, speaks on the deck of HMCS Athabaskan in New York City as Ban Ki-moon, the United Nations Secretary General and Ambassador John McNee, Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations look on. Minister MacKay praised the ship's crew for its recent humanitarian work in Haiti [more here]. The ship is in New York City as part of the US Fleet Week. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon also thanked the crew of Athabakan for its contributions to reconstruction in Haiti .
From the Fleet Week website, at its right:
Visiting Ships
...
HMCS Athabaskan – Pier 88N*

*Please note the Athabaskan will arrive on Tuesday, May 25th and depart on the morning of Sunday, May 30th...
From the ship's commanding officer:
...
ATHABASKAN will finish its spring sailing schedule with a few stops in Baltimore and New York. The New York port visit will occur during their Fleet Week celebrations where a number of vessels from Canada and the United States will partake in the week long festivities. This well deserved rest and relaxation will give the crew a chance to share a few pints with our American partners and perhaps share a few salty dits...
And forthcoming on the west coast:
International Fleet Review June 9 to 14, Esquimalt
Update: Crew members recognized:
Secretary General Ban Ki-moon thanks the crew of HMCS Athabaskan

Three sailors from HMCS Athabaskan have been personally recognized by United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon for their efforts in earthquake-stricken Haiti during Canadian Forces’ Operation HESTIA earlier this year.

Lieutenant (Navy) Kyle Sexton, Master Seaman David Leblanc and Petty Officer 2nd Class Paul Hoveland were largely responsible for the design of three orphanages in Haiti, as well as leading crew members from Athabaskan in the construction of two bunk houses with a kitchen/storage area for each...
Via David Pugliese's Defence Watch.

Canada and "peacekeeping"

Jack Granatstein sums things up nicely with a bit of wit:
Peacekeeping if necessary, but not necessarily peacekeeping
If one reads Mr Granatstein carefully, the occasions on which we should take part in UN-run peacekeeping seem, er, necessarily quite limited. But to require "...a clear exit strategy or a withdrawal date stated in advance..." is simply not realistic (see Afstan for this point more generally about military operations). Earlier:
UN peackeeping ain't necessarily what we crack it up to be/Update: "Why trade Kandahar for Kinshasa?"
We didn't, thankfully.

Predate: See also:
"After Afghanistan: Peacekeepers or War makers?"

New vehicles for Canadian special forces: "a year late and 40 vehicles short"

Remember this lurid journalism from March last year?
"War wagons"!?!
The contract was supposed to be signed in summer 2009, for 100 vehicles (most relevant further links at post above); now the contract looks like a year late and 40 vehicles short--and one of the bidders has mysteriously dropped out. Why the shortfall, the budgetary crunch, crunch, crunch (more here)?
Special forces units to get 60 high-tech vehicles

Canada’s special forces units will be getting new vehicles as early as next year.

Sixty special reconnaissance vehicles will be bought and housed at Canadian Forces Base Petawawa to support special forces units there, in Ottawa and in Trenton, Ont.

The new vehicles are being located with the Canadian Special Operations Regiment in Petawawa, which would also provide maintenance support as well as drivers. The high-mobility trucks will be available to various units such as the Ottawa-based Joint Task Force 2 or to special forces task groups...

Canadian special forces use Humvees in Afghanistan. Day said the Humvees will be usable until the end of the Afghan mission in the summer of next year.

The new vehicles will likely be a version of the British-designed Supacat Jackal. That vehicle is being built by Lockheed Martin in the U.S. and being marketed to Canadian and U.S. militaries.

The special forces command could look at an additional purchase of 20 more vehicles at a later date.

The special reconnaissance vehicle would be required to operate for extended periods of time in enemy territory and be capable of carrying maintenance equipment and other supplies.

The request for proposals from industry for the special reconnaissance vehicle closes at the end of May. Only one firm, Lockheed Martin, is expected to bid.

The Supacat Jackal is in service with a number of special forces organizations around the world, including with British and Australian units.

Day did not get into cost estimates for the Canadian program...
More on the Jackal here and here:
Predate: A thoughtful post by Babbling on our special forces more broadly:
Walking the secrecy vs. transparency tightrope

Tuesday, May 25, 2010

Afstan: Continuing CF presence?

Well, well, well, one does wonder why Matthew Fisher (more here and here) of Canwest News buried this at the very end of story on another sad matter--good on Norman Spector's assiduous reading :
...

More bets here

--What Canwest is reporting

Road bomb fells 'gentle giant'

Harper has said that all Canadians troops will leave the country by the end of next year.

However, talks are ongoing with NATO about whether a smaller number of Canadians might participate in a new, much less risky mission that would begin next year...

Now surely anyone talking with NATO has some sort of government blessing? In any event more on our political manoeuvring here and here.

Walking the secrecy vs. transparency tightrope

Further to Mark's post a month ago referencing two Torstar articles about JTF 2, and his recent post comparing the release of information regarding Australian SOF, I thought this piece by Dave O'Brien of the Winnipeg Free Press was worth a read:

The Star article was a rare expose of JTF2's work in Afghanistan at the end of 2001 following the American invasion.

The story was full of accounts of heroism and derring-do, but Brig.-Gen. Mike Day, a former member and commander of JTF2 who now leads all of Canada's special operations, told me in an interview from Ottawa he was upset with the article, even though it was about events that occurred nearly 10 years ago and there was no evidence it had put anyone at risk.

I suggested his response illustrated the view that the military is unduly secretive. He replied that he needed to weigh the media's desire to "satisfy your curiosity" against the moral duty to ensure the safety of his soldiers.

...

The exploits of special forces in other countries, notably the Green Berets, are frequently celebrated in the media, but Day said JTF2 is a more advanced unit, comparable in skill to Delta Force in the United States.

"The Americans have 45,000 special ops troops, but you don't read about the ones like us," he said. "They have a ruthless adherence to secrecy."

Day added that more information about the secret war in Afghanistan will eventually be disclosed, but Canadians have to be patient. "We are writing the history of our organization," he added. "There will be full disclosure."

I'm loathe to criticize officers for erring on the side of caution to protect lives, but I also believe Canadians don't have a clear idea of what their soldiers are doing in Afghanistan. Loose lips might sinks ships, but sealed lips don't contribute to an informed citizenry, either.


It's easy to read too much into what Day's saying. After all, O'Brien is free to pick whichever points from the interview he wants, and ignore the rest of the discussion. Perhaps Day has a far more nuanced view of information sharing than the article lets on. But on the face of it, I think O'Brien wins the exchange. Why?

First of all, it's important to recognize nobody's arguing an entirely black and white case here. Day's not saying the public should know nothing about his units, and O'Brien's not saying the public should have unfettered access to their most intimate workings. The argument is about where important secrecy and important transparency should meet. It's about the proper compromise point.

In that context, it's easy to see all the reasons why the government errs on the side of secrecy. First of all, soldiers know how to manage risk on the battlefield, but they're far less comfortable messing with public relations, and so are predictably risk-averse in that arena. Secondly, the system is set up so that if any of the players in the decision-making process surrounding the release of information raises an objection - operators, staffers, commanders, bureaucrats, politicians or their lackeys - the idea is stillborn. So the information has to be the news equivalent of pablum to make it through every gate on the way to our eyes and ears. But most importantly, nobody dies as a direct result of keeping a special operations secret. On the other hand, men and women in uniform can very definitely die as a direct result of divulging that same secret. It's a very simple cause-and-effect argument to follow.

Far more uncertain and complex is the case for releasing information. Some of that case involves accountability, but the biggest reason to tell Canadians about what our SOF community does is so that Canadians can value our SOF community. I've said this many times before, and I'll say it again now: long-term, there is not a single mission - foreign or domestic - that the Canadian Forces, including CANSOFCOM, can undertake without the support of the Canadian public. If the voting Joe and Jane Canuck show in a series of polls that they want CF members to wear pink uniforms with purple polka-dots, how long do you think it would be before the fabric was cut? Perhaps that's a silly example, but here's a more serious one: for a long time now, various factions in our society have been arguing for the Canadian Forces to become nothing more than a blue-beret glorified constabulary. While that viewpoint has never been fully realized, none can argue that the CF's combat capability was gradually eroded year by year until the beginning of the current conflict. And we're not out of the woods yet.

One of the key reasons the CF has struggled for decades now to secure stable funding is that the connection between the average civilian and the the Canadian soldier, sailor, and airman is a tenuous one. Stop a hundred people on the street in Vancouver and ask them if they have any close friends or family in uniform, and I doubt you'll get one in four to say yes.

The recent conflict in Afghanistan has forged a more immediate bond, but I firmly believe support for the military in this country is a mile wide and an inch deep. People say the "decade of darkness" could never happen again, but let me ask you this: Who is changing their vote over recent funding cuts? How many Canadians would vote for or against a particular candidate or party if those cuts were deepened? At what point does the repeated bromide "Support the troops!" become actionable at the polling booth?

As media pundits, pacifist academics, and professional rabble-rousers try to discredit the CF and our special ops troops as a bunch of war criminals, who is coming to their defence? The politicians and high-level bureaucrats in whom the CF confides its secrets, and upon whom the CF relies to remain well-informed and to stay the wise course? Canadians are almost numb to the rank partisanship of our politicans at this point, and will either lap up or discount what they say without even listening. There are no universally respected statesmen to pour oil on the waters of public unease any more. The bureaucrats are silent for their own reasons: professional habit, jealousy of the CF's superficial popularity, whatever. Neither group can be counted upon.

The Canadian Forces in general, and CANSOFCOM in particular, needs to better understand and act upon this dynamic: politicians will follow the public mood, and mandarins will follow the politicians. So the key to stable, lasting support is a deep and committed bond between our citizenry and our soldiery. Tactically, more secrecy makes more immediate sense, I know. But strategically, the most important centre of gravity is your own domestic voter. If they don't know you, how can they possibly support you?

Kandahar City: Matters involving the CF...

...that one reads about in the LA Times, not our major media (also some details on the recent KAF attack):
An earful after a military operation in Kandahar
Afghan tribal elders in Kokaran, invited to discuss governance and development, turn the focus instead on security, especially complaining about not receiving advance notice of military raids.

U.S. Army Capt. Michael Thurman, center, listens as Kokaran village elder Haji Fadi Mohammed complains about the raid carried out a day earlier by coalition forces in western Kandahar.
...(Rick Loomis / Los Angeles Times / May 23, 2010)


Reporting from Kandahar, Afghanistan

It was supposed to be a meeting about governance and development — two of the three pillars of the U.S. counterinsurgency effort in Kandahar province this summer.

Instead, the shura, or assembly of local leaders, at a police station Monday turned into a gripe session about the third pillar: security. The elders complained bitterly about a U.S. military raid in their neighborhood, Kokaran, the night before, and about a big security sweep Saturday [May 23].

Security defines daily existence here — for the military, for development workers and for Afghans. Without it, neither governance nor aid to improve schools, sanitation and clinics is possible. And that is the crux of the challenge for the United States as it tries to wrest control of Kandahar from the Taliban.

"It's not good, these big operations. They worry the people," Haji Fadi Mohammed told the gathering Monday as other elders murmured in agreement.

American and Canadian civil affairs and development teams [emphasis added] had arranged the meeting to follow up on Saturday's joint U.S.-Afghan Operation Kokaran...

...The only visible hand of the government is the Afghan national police. Mohammed, speaking for the elders, accused them of taking bribes. Even American soldiers who train the police say they don't trust all of them.

One of four suspected insurgents captured after a Taliban assault on the main foreign base at Kandahar Saturday night was a police recruit. Three Canadian soldiers [emphasis added] and 10 civilian workers were wounded in the attack [more here]. According to the Canadian military, bomb-making materials were found in the officer's quarters at a police training academy a few miles from the base...

The discussion turned briefly to development. The elders complained that their neighborhood had received visits from U.S. and Canadian aid teams, but no projects.

Master Warrant Officer Kevin Walker, a Canadian civil affairs specialist [that's a CIMIC operator, all reservists, more here, here and here], explained that Kokaran had to be secured first. He had heard such complaints before; he's on his third tour in Afghanistan.

Walker, who has visited Mohammed at his home, told him that Saturday's operation, designed to cut Taliban infiltration routes and set up police checkpoints, would make it easier to visit and discuss development projects.

"The fact that he made the effort to get here shows he's serious and wants to engage with us," Walker said of Mohammed afterward...

Soon it was time to go. The American and Canadian soldiers strapped on their body armor and weapons and climbed back into their armored vehicles. Eight of the elders, dressed in flowing white salwar kameez and silver and black turbans, piled back into a battered Toyota Corolla station wagon. The other two left in a pickup truck...

Monday, May 24, 2010

Getting caught up in the wrong game

The Torch's Hippie-Hair Correspondent sent along this piece from CTV about a British milblog stepping over the line regarding a recent rocket attack at KAF.

The Helmand Blog, run by several branches of the U.K. military both in England and Afghanistan, said insurgents attacked the base from two locations Saturday night, launching five rocket-propelled grenades.

It said 13 people from the American and Canadian contingents suffered injuries.

The blog quoted Senior Aircraftsman Eric Telford, 24, from 2nd Squadron of the Royal Air Force, as saying he rushed to the site of the attack and applied a tourniquet to a wounded female Canadian soldier.

The blog entry was later removed after ISAF said it was posted without proper approval and contained some incorrect information.


Here's what Helmand Blog has to say about itself:

The Helmand blog is run by PJHQ and the team from UK Forces Media Ops. The team is located in Northwood in the UK and in Helmand at Camp Bastion and the Task Force Headquarters and works to support the coalition forces together with the other government departments such as the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department for International Development. Contact Helmand Blog - helmandblog@googlemail.com


Pardon me while I indulge in a bit of online navel-gazing, but this story is of interest to me. Why? Well, obviously I'm a supporter of the idea of milblogs. Mainstream media has very little experience of the labyrinthine world of professional military affairs, and so the vast majority of MSM pieces are extraordinarily shallow. Milblogs may not do a pile of original reporting, but they're invaluable for offering the depth, context, and perspective that the paid media lack. Taken as a whole, milblogs do an admirable job filling in the gaping gaps in the mainstream media's reporting on all matters martial.

Having said that, I've found a few areas where milblogs and milbloggers consistently get themselves into trouble:
  • Bitching: about kit, about their chain of command, about their allies or the local population, etc. Soldiers complain about everything under the sun, and have since the first ape picked up a rock and whined that it felt too heavy in his hand. But those complaints have generally stayed "in the family" up until now. Not anymore. And there's no surer way to have your world come crashing in around your ears than to air your team's dirty laundry on the internet.

  • OPSEC/PERSEC issues: soldiers are generally more cognizant of this stuff than anyone. But everyone's on a multi-national team now, and each country has its own set of rules. Your post might not break your rules, but if it breaks someone else's, there's going to be trouble.

  • Mission creep: this is by far the most prevalent problem for milblogs. You start off with a tight purpose - to tell the story of being a mentor at a police outpost in Iraq, or to talk about life after getting wounded and sent home, or to talk about the CF - and you find yourself drifting. You get drawn into online pissing matches. You start talking about stuff outside your self-imposed mandate, and maybe outside your sphere of expertise - in other words, you get outside your lane. Worst of all, you get caught up playing journalist - you go for a scoop, or you put a post up just because you know about the incident, not because it has anything to do with the purpose of your blog.


I'm sure there are more. I know I've been down at least two of those roads myself. From what I can see, Helmand Blog got caught up twice: they ran afoul of coalition rules, and they posted something just because it was "news." Their stated mission is to "support the coalition forces," but this post was of questionable value in that regard. Like I said, I've gotten caught up in that trap myself over the years. These days, I ask myself before I put up a post: how does this help the soldiers, sailors, and airmen, or how does it support the CF overall? I'll put up stuff that's critical if I feel it's in their best interests to address a particular issue up front rather than gloss over it. But if it doesn't fall into our stated mandate, I'll generally toss it before hitting 'post'.

Navel-gazing about milblogs notwithstanding, of course...