Monday, September 29, 2008

Contact Charlie: buy it, read it


If I hadn't been traveling on business last week, I would have posted about this sooner. In fact, I have a few posts rattling around the cavernous space between my ears, but have had no time to put fingers to keyboard in well over a week now...ah, well, it's a free blog, and you get what you pay for.

That certainly applies to Chris Wattie's new book, Contact Charlie: the Canadian Army, the Taliban, and the Battle that Saved Afghanistan.

Buy it. Read it. Encourage others to do the same.

Yes, yes, I know Mark posted someone's review the other day, and I'm glad he did. But I'm going to do one better - I'm going to post an excerpt, with Wattie's permission of course.

Now, for full disclosure: I've corresponded with Chris and lunched with him a couple of times. We even sat together on a "Media and the Military" roundtable for JCSP 35 at the Canadian Forces College today. That's not why I'm so enthusiastic about the book; on the contrary, I wanted to get to know Chris better because I got a chance to preview the book during the draft stages and enjoyed it so much.

More of that after the excerpt, though, taken from Chapter 10:

Despite the disturbing signs of a Taliban build-up in the region and the boldness and aggression of their fighters in meeting the Canadians head-on, the American commanders in faraway Bagram were not convinced of the seriousness of the threat. Instead of continuing their work in the Panjwayi, Task Force Orion was ordered to join Operation Mountain Thrust, a major coalition offensive that spanned the five southern and several eastern provinces. The operation would be planned and directed by the U.S.–led coalition task force that commanded all allied combat units in Afghanistan.

Mountain Thrust involved dozens of American, British, Afghan and other coalition units, more than ten thousand soldiers in all, spread across thousands of mountainous kilometres. The operation was designed to flush the Taliban out of the strongholds where the U.S. generals were convinced they were hiding. The Canadian role in the mission was relatively minor, a series of moves through the mountains north of Kandahar City, and Hope could barely contain his frustration at being forced to leave the ongoing battle in the Panjwayi.

Listening to Hope’s briefing, Bill Fletcher could tell his commander was angry, much as he tried to hide it. “We know damn well the enemy up there doesn’t want anything to do with us,” he thought, looking at the large-scale map that laid out the planned movements of the Canadian battle group through the mountains. "We’re being sent up there and our work down here’s not finished.” The situation was particularly irritating for Hope for a few reasons. After a month of on-again, off-again fighting, the Canadians were finally beginning to see results from their running battle with the Taliban in Panjwayi. Seyyedin had been the longest and most intense firefight to date, and although a handful of Taliban had managed to slip out of Charlie’s grasp, fleeing the grape-drying hut just before the bomb hit, all had been hurt. Charlie Company had killed, captured or seriously wounded an entire Taliban cell. Furthermore, for weeks Hope had been telling everyone in the Canadian and U.S. chain of command who would listen about the danger in the Panjwayi. Even before the more than two weeks’ fighting that climaxed in the battle at Seyyedin, Hope had personally told Major-General Benjamin Freakley, the general in overall command of coalition forces in southern Afghanistan, about the Taliban’s build-up in Panjwayi. He had gotten nowhere: the Americans just weren’t listening.

Hope had returned to KAF on May 29, straight from more than a week of fighting in the Panjwayi, to brief Canadian brigade commander, Brigadier-General David Fraser, about the fighting in his area of operations. He alit from his LAV as soon as it rolled to a stop in the Task Force Orion compound, a small corner of the sprawling base where the Canadians parked their vehicles and kept most of their ammunition and supplies. Clutching a roll of maps in one hand, Hope marched directly to the two-storey white building built out of converted sea containers that served as brigade headquarters. His hands and face were coated with dust and his camouflage uniform was stiff with sweat and dirt from nearly a week of constant wear. He trotted up the rickety metal stairs to the second-floor office of the brigade’s chief of staff, Colonel Chris Vernon, and without preamble, unrolled his map of the Panjwayi on his desk.

Vernon, a telegenically handsome British Army officer with a crisp public school accent and a shock of wavy grey hair, had a reputation as a keen military mind. Moreover, he was an experienced soldier, having served in the U.S.–led Operation Iraqi Freedom. He and Hope got along well and had a mutually high regard for one other, so Vernon listened closely as the Canadian pointed out the dozens of places his troops had made contact with the Taliban and described each in detail. Vernon frowned with growing concern at the picture Hope was painting: clearly there were more Taliban in the Panjwayi than anyone at the brigade or U.S. headquarters had suspected.

“Wait here,” he said after Hope had finished, scowling at the map. "The general is in camp on a visit: he ought to hear this.”

Hope knew who Vernon meant: Major-General Freakley, the commander of the U.S. 10th Mountain Division and the direct superior of Canadian Brigadier-General Fraser, Hope’s immediate boss. He sank wearily into one of the office chairs and waited, running a hand through his thinning hair, which had taken on the consistency of bleached steel wool.

Freakley had a reputation as a general who kept his staff running hard to keep up. His role as commander of the Mountain Division had created in him something of a fixation with Afghanistan’s mountains as the natural sanctuary for the Taliban. And his previous experience had only hardened this opinion. In 2002, he had been part of Operation Anaconda, a failed attempt to trap and destroy the last major pocket of Taliban and al Qaeda fighters in the rugged mountains of eastern Afghanistan. Anaconda had cleared the insurgents out of the Shahi-Kot Valley, but most of the Taliban and their al Qaeda allies had escaped due to poor coordination between the coalition forces and Afghan troops. One of that operation’s mistakes was the failure of American intelligence to properly locate the enemy, incorrectly predicting that they occupied several large villages in the valley. In fact, the valley floors were empty when coalition forces began swooping in by helicopter and many troops — most of them American — were caught in Taliban kill zones that were swept by fire from positions in the mountains and hills. Ironically, Anaconda was the first major combat operation that included a Canadian unit—the 3rd Battalion of the PPCLI — and among the soldiers protecting the troops on the valley floor was a Canadian sniper team, armed with a .50-calibre long-range sniper rifle. During the operation, Corporal Rob Furlong, of Newfoundland, set a world record for the longest sniper kill in history when he shot a Taliban machine gunner at a distance of 2,430 metres.

Freakley was determined to succeed where Anaconda had failed, and his staff had put together an ambitious series of operations that would send the Canadians all over northern Kandahar Province looking for Taliban. As Hope waited for the general, he wondered how Freakley would take the news that the enemy was much closer than he thought.

A few minutes later, Freakley strode into the room trailing a small crowd of staff officers in his wake. Vernon and a handful of Canadian brigade officers brought up the rear. The general was a big man with a booming voice, blunt features and a personality that took up all the space in a room. Hope was immediately conscious of his own shabby appearance and ripe smell—it had been days since he had had a shower. But Freakley smiled broadly and enclosed Hope’s hand with his own when the Canadian colonel rose to his feet. He waved him to a chair near the head of a long plywood table and eased into one himself. “Tell me everything,” he said.

Hope turned his map of Panjwayi around so it was facing Freakley and repeated what he had told Colonel Vernon about the obvious build-up of Taliban in the Panjwayi and the Canadian battle group’s attempts to disrupt them. “There are probably two hundred enemy fighters there,” he said, and watched as a sceptical frown formed on the general’s face.

Hope pointed out five villages where Charlie and Bravo Companies had separately contacted large groups of Taliban within the space of a few hours: obviously they couldn’t be in that many places at once. Freakley remained silent, but his frown deepened. Clearly, nobody had told him about the Taliban’s build-up in Panjwayi.

Hope carried on, detailing the ANA and ANP operations in the area and finally laying out what he had gleaned from Captain Massoud and his network of informants. “The Afghans are saying that the Taliban have chosen to build a base of operations in Panjwayi for one of two purposes: either to conduct multiple pin-prick attacks every day along the routes into Kandahar and in the city outskirts itself, disrupting us and causing worry amongst the locals, or to conduct one large-scale spectacular attack into the city.”

Hope took a deep breath. “They want to seize something symbolic—like the stadium, the palace, or the [United Nations] compound—and fight a bloody battle in the streets of Kandahar that they would lose, but which would have an effect similar to the Tet Offensive.”

The words had barely left Hope’s lips before Freakley became visibly agitated. “I don’t want to hear that!” he barked dismissively. “That’s a bad analogy: don’t use those words again.”

The 1968 Tet Offensive, a series of attacks launched by North Vietnam deep into the southern half of the country, was still a sore point with many U.S. Army officers. The Vietnamese had coordinated attacks by regulars and Viet Cong guerrillas throughout South Vietnam, hitting U.S. military bases, South Vietnamese government installations and even the U.S. Embassy in downtown Saigon, which had been considered impregnable. Although a resounding military defeat for the communist North Vietnamese, Tet was a public relations victory. The American public had been told that the North was losing, but televised images of fighting in the heart of Saigon helped shift public opinion against the war, and it is now considered a turning point in the conflict.

Despite Freakley’s discomfort, Hope believed the analogy was entirely correct. The Taliban wanted to attack Kandahar not to take and hold the city, but for the psychological effect such an attack would have on public opinion in Canada and other NATO nations. He was taken aback by Freakley’s reaction and paused for a moment until the general calmed down. After a minute, Freakley’s attention returned to the map in front of him and he began quizzing Hope in detail about the Taliban’s activities and locations in the Panjwayi. Hope was puzzled. The American general seemed genuinely surprised to hear about such a large massing of the enemy almost literally under the coalition’s noses, but for months now the Canadians had been sending in regular reports on their operations and what they were up against. He and Vernon exchanged looks. Was it possible the information wasn’t making its way to Freakley? Hope glanced down the table at the general’s staff officers. From the looks on their faces, Hope surmised that Freakley’s staff were not happy with what their general was hearing, and even less happy that it was coming from a Canadian.

Freakley told Hope that he needed to watch this build-up by keeping forces engaged in the districts. The Canadian colonel pointed out that Task Force Orion was due to be withdrawn from the Panjwayi in just over two weeks in order to embark upon Operation Mountain Thrust. He gently suggested that the general alter his plan and allow the Canadians to remain in Panjwayi. Freakley thought this over, then countered with a suggestion of his own: the Canadian battle group could leave the bulk of its attached ANA troops in the Panjwayi to keep an eye on the Taliban, taking only a few Afghan troops with them when they went north.

Hope paused, wondering just what the general had been told for the past few months. The Canadian task force had been complaining almost daily about the shortage of ANA troops assigned to their area. “Sir,” he said carefully, “we only have a maximum of fifteen or twenty ANA there with us now.”

Freakley exploded. His face reddened and he slammed his fist down on the table. “Why the hell am I only finding out about this now?” he shouted at everyone in the room...


I'm not sure either Chris or Christie appreciate the comparison, but I see Contact Charlie and Fifteen Days as two sides of the same coin. Both books deal with the same cast of characters going through the same events, as part of Task Force Orion. But where Christie's book put you in touch with the emotions of those who were there and those who were left behind, Chris' book reads more like a campaign history.

In fact, when I reviewed Fifteen Days, I said this:

I also found myself aching for some of the X's and O's of the events described - maps and arrows that showed just what the troops were trying to accomplish in each of the stories of fierce and deadly combat. But I quickly realized that hope was an unreasonable one: this book isn't a campaign history, it's a selection of personal snapshots, an emotional collage. One day I hope to read a campaign history of Canada's experience in Kandahar, but this book was never intended to be that history.


Although I'm sure he didn't intend it this way, Wattie's book tells the rest of the story that Blatchford got to first, with maps and a chronological layout that answered my plea to the letter.

Most Canadian journalists could write everything they know about the CF on the head of a pin, and still have room to dance there. Wattie is one of the rare breed in this country who actually know a thing or two about the CF, and are willing to put that knowledge to productive use in educating the Canadian public.

This book does just that: it tells ordinary Canadians about a critical period in the most intense military mission Canadians have undertaken since Korea, and it does it in a compelling and fascinating fashion.

Seriously, buy the book. You won't regret it.

NDP defence platform: Sergeant Smokey the Bear

Talk about warm and fuzzy. The NDP wants to turn the Canadian Forces into forest fire fighters. This is the defence section of their platform (the last part of the document, natch--and note there is no costing):
Canada’s military has a proud history, built on the principles of defending human rights and promoting peace. New Democrats believe there are three main priorities for the Canadian military today and in the years to come:

1. Assist people facing natural catastrophes, including floods, earthquakes, forest fires [emphasis added] and other emergencies, both at home and abroad [emphasis added].
2. Provide support for peace-making [isn't that what we're doing in Afghanistan, Jack?--with a UN Security Council mandate], peace-building and peacekeeping around the world.
3. Defend Canada from potential attack.

The Canadian Forces must be properly staffed, equipped and trained to effectively cover the full range of possible military operations arising from these three priorities. Jack Layton and the New Democrats will:

Equip the Canadian military to resume leadership in United Nations peacekeeping operations, with major new missions reviewed and approved by the House of Commons.

Reform defence procurement so Canada gets good equipment for good value. We will require tendering of all major contracts and maximize Canadian content.

Support military families, veterans and ordinary Canadians by making fair pay, good health care, fair benefits, veterans’ services, emergency readiness and good equipment top priorities for military spending...
The Dippers clearly don't know that the CF have no mission fighting forest fires. Maybe they want to move the Forces to Parks Canada, or something:
Forest fire management is under provincial/territorial jurisdiction (with the exception of the Yukon Territory) with operational fire-control services and coordination of resource-sharing provided by the Canadian Interagency Forest Fire Centre [no mention of the CF there]. Parks Canada is responsible for forest fire management in our National Parks [no mention of the CF at that link either]...
And the NDP wants our Forces to fight forest fires abroad too? What next? Snow removal in Moscow?

By the way, as far as I can see our major media have given no coverage to the Dippers' defence platform. Nor to that of the Liberals.

A the same time the NDP seems to want to turn the Canadian Coast Guard into cops. According to their platform Dippers will...
Transfer the Canadian Coast Guard to the Department of Public Safety and increase resources to improve its operational effectiveness, including initiatives that will better protect and strengthen our sovereignty over Canadian waters.
Now, the CCG has these missions: marine search and rescue, environmental protection (e.g. oil spills), navigation safety and marine communications, and icebreaking; and, on behalf of Fisheries and Oceans, fisheries enforcement (with vessels carrying armed Fishery Officers) and providing vessels for hydrographic surveying and fisheries research.

The CCG is a completely civilian organization and has no criminal law enforcement or military role (a fact many people do not realize--it is not a replica of the US Coast Guard which does have these roles). CCG vessels however do from time to time act as platforms for law enforcement personnel. The CCG is under the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, not unreasonable given its roles.

Yet the Dippers want the CCG to be transferred to the Department of Public Safety. The public safety minister is responsible for the RCMP, the Canada Border Services Agency, Corrections Canada and CSIS (though you would be hard pressed to know it from the department's website--you have to find your way here to get the big picture--why?). That seems to me like George Bush's moving the US Coast Guard from the Department of Transportation to the new Department of Homeland Security.

Is imitating president Bush the Dippers' "New Kind of Strong?" Who'd a thunk it? I suspect Mr Layton and his adherents simply don't think.

Update: As someone in the Canadian Air Force wrote me: "If they get elected apparently the Hornet will have to look into water-bombing."

Upperdate thought: The Führerprinzip expands: "Jack Layton and the New Democrats will..."

Saturday, September 27, 2008

Afstan weekend update

1) NATO Hopes to Undercut Taliban With 'Surge' of Projects

2) Extra British troops for Afghanistan ruled out

3) Pakistan 'kills 1,000 militants'
Pakistani troops have killed 1,000 Islamist militants in a huge offensive in the Bajaur tribal district over the last month, the army says.
Update:
Pakistan's New Leader Denies Firefight as Mullen Confirms It
Upperdate:
What a Surge Can't Solve in Afghanistan
...
The need for precise targeting is why Gates is stressing what's known as ISR -- short for "intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance." He has been pushing for more than a year (against foot-dragging by the Air Force) for a big increase in the use of drones and cheap manned aircraft to watch the roads and mountain passes of this huge country and spot the insurgents before they strike. This ISR surge has more than doubled the number of daily Predator patrols in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past year, from 12 in June 2007 to 28 today, and that number should reach 55 by the end of 2009.

By using ISR sensors, U.S. forces can see what's coming at them across Afghanistan's porous borders. And with new surveillance tools, they may be able to identify the networks and individuals that pose the biggest threat -- and then call in Special Forces teams to capture or kill insurgent leaders. "You don't hit a whole town, you hit the two people you want," says Lt. Gen. Richard Zahner, who heads a new ISR task force...
Monday update:
[UK] Troops in Afghanistan to get 600 new armoured vehicles

Friday, September 26, 2008

"Afghanistan, Pakistan and security..."

Sodden footware

A letter in the Ottawa Citizen, Sept. 26:
Areas of dispute

Re: Boots on tundra, Sept. 23.

Letter-writer Bob Lidstone writes that "Simply put, a failure on Canada's part to put our boots on our Arctic tundra will inevitably result in someone else's being there." Hardly.

Mr. Lidstone has fallen victim to the efforts of the Conservative government to stoke jingoistic fervour [for example] over the north. In fact no one except the Danes (Hans Island) has any claim on any Canadian land in the north. Foreign countries are about as likely to invade the north as they are to invade Newfoundland.

The areas of dispute are the status in maritime law of the Northwest Passage; the maritime boundary in the Beaufort Sea between the U.S. and Canada; and the economic rights to the Arctic seabed in offshore areas beyond various countries' coastal 320-kilometre exclusive economic zones.

Boots on the tundra will be of little help in asserting Canadian claims in any of these cases.

Mark Collins,
Ottawa

Thursday, September 25, 2008

HMCS Ville de Québec's mission off Somalia to help World food program extended

Further to this post, details in the official news release:

Canadian frigate extends support for the WFP humanitarian operation

CEFCOM NR 08.035 - September 25, 2008

OTTAWA — The Government of Canada has agreed to a request from the World Food Programme (WFP) to extend the support to the WFP humanitarian operation currently provided by HMCS Ville de Québec. This operation, which allows the safe shipment of life saving humanitarian assistance into Somalia, will be extended to no later than October 23, 2008.

On August 6, 2008, HMCS Ville de Québec was assigned to escort civilian vessels loaded with humanitarian food aid from Mombasa, Kenya to Mogadishu, Somalia, at the request of the WFP and the International Maritime Organization (IMO), both agencies of the United Nations. This task was set to end September 27, 2008, but it has been extended to allow the WFP more time to secure a replacement naval escort.

Since 2007, warships from NATO nations have been escorting WFP shipments from Kenya to Somalia to ensure their safe passage through waters notorious for piracy.

The WFP shipments are intended to meet the urgent needs of more than 2.4 million Somalis who rely on food aid, of which 90 percent arrives by sea. So far, 22,000 tonnes (22,000,000 kilograms) of corn and soy meal — enough to feed 145,125 people for a year — have been delivered to Somalia by ships escorted by HMCS Ville de Québec.

HMCS Ville de Québec will continue her mission under Operation ALTAIR. Following this extension, she will return to her original assignment on Operation SEXTANT, in the Mediterranean Sea with Standing NATO Maritime Group 1. She is scheduled to return to Canada in December.

...

For still and video imagery of Canadian naval vessels at work, visit www.combatcamera.forces.gc.ca.

From the World Food Program itself:

Canada saves lives by extending naval escorts to Somalia

Copyright: WFP/Peter Smerdon

Afstan: Contact Charlie

Excerpts from a review, by Arnav Manchanda, of Chris Wattie's new book in On Track (p. 36, Autumn 2008 edition of the Canadian Defence Associations Institute's magazine):
...
National Post
reporter Chris Wattie, who was embedded with the Canadian battlegroup in Kandahar for eight weeks in early 2006, covers this critical period (6 May – 3 August 2006) through the eyes of the soldiers of Charlie Company, 1st Battalion of the Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry (1PPCLI). Wattie’s first book, Contact Charlie is an account of the actions of the soldiers who prosecuted the battle for the villages and ground of Kandahar and Helmand province. Readers hoping for a strategic debate or academic overview of the Canadian mission in Afghanistan should look elsewhere – The Unexpected War [more here] by Eugene Lang and Janice Gross Stein, for instance. Chris Wattie’s effort gets down in the dirt with the officers and grunts of the Canadian Forces (CF), and the result is something quite unforgettable...

What this book truly excels at are the descriptions of the people, battles and events; they provide colour and texture to the largely bland accounts that we receive in Canada about the work of the CF in Afghanistan. We meet outstanding individuals and read of their extraordinary work and bravery under extremely trying conditions...

...the work of Charlie Company and 1PPCLI set the stage for Operation Medusa that September, disrupting Taliban activities and establishing the Canadians as a credible force on the ground. We can only hope that the weak points of the mission then – an unreliable Afghan Army and Police, the absence of diplomacy and development efforts, weak ground-level intelligence, and a lack of a systematic NATO strategy – have been developed since.

This book is not for the squeamish. There are bullets and rockets, blood and guts, cursing and graphic language, triumph and sorrow, and death. Those who feel that Canada’s soldiers should not engage in counterinsurgency, or are opposed to the so-called ‘glorification of war,’ should stay clear. However, if you want to read what life outside the wire for the CF in Afghanistan is really like, this book is for you.
The review (p. 34), by Jack Granatstein, of Maj.-Gen. ret'd) Lewis MacKenzie's Soldiers Made Me Look Good: A Life in the Shadow of War, is also well worth reading.

Wednesday, September 24, 2008

Afstan aid mess

The "international community", and individual countries, just aren't getting their acts together according to Anne Applebaum in the Washington Post:
The scene is a small textile factory in a new industrial park on the outskirts of Kabul; the characters are an Afghan businessman, his American partner and a USAID official, the latter straight out of central casting: flustered, important, accompanied by gun-wielding bodyguards. She speaks of the U.S. Agency for International Development's plans for "small and medium-sized enterprise development," lauds the USAID-funded industrial park and alludes to the "$5.4 billion" the agency has spent in Afghanistan since 2002. She hands out an expensive-looking, glossy USAID brochure that describes, among other things, the goal of our meeting: "to show international media opinion leaders that progress is being made in economic growth in Afghanistan."

Unfortunately, the factory is half-empty that day: Prices for fuel and other inputs are so high in Kabul that no textile business can compete with those in India or Pakistan. The factory depends on Afghan army uniform orders, which come in irregularly. So does the fabric to make them, since the customs bureaucracy is still plagued by corruption and inefficiency. When the USAID official starts listing the assistance given to the Afghan customs service -- this includes training for officials, construction of border posts, even gifts of uniforms -- the American partner shrugs, unimpressed. "It would be good to move forwards instead of backwards," she says. "There's never any follow-through." Afterward, the Afghan businessman confides that he has been robbed by the police. It isn't the Taliban that Afghan entrepreneurs fear; it is their own government, corrupted by international money and now infiltrated by criminal networks, too.

This is the chaos that is foreign aid in Afghanistan, a place where every mistake ever made in an underdeveloped economy is being repeated. This is a country in which all the best people are being hired away from the national government by the alphabet soup of aid agencies on the ground; in which the same aid agencies are driving up real estate and food prices; in which millions are squandered on dubious contractors, both local and foreign; in which the minister for rural development admits he doesn't know what all of the NATO reconstruction teams in rural districts do; in which the top U.N. official, given a mandate to coordinate the donors, says the donors don't respond to his attempts to coordinate them [that's the new UN "super envoy, Kai Eide--more on aid problems here].

Conflicting agendas, overlapping projects, money badly spent: We've been here before, many times, and the conclusions are always the same. Some of them have recently been restated by a former Afghan minister of finance, Ashraf Ghani, and Clare Lockhart, director of the Institute for State Effectiveness, in their book, "Fixing Failed States." Its central argument: Well-meaning foreigners should not fix roads; they should teach the Afghan government to fix roads, thus helping it acquire legitimacy. Foreigners shouldn't feed Afghans but, rather, develop Afghan agriculture so that the Afghans can feed themselves, export their surplus and develop a stake in the rule of law too.

Some of this thinking has filtered down to the provinces, where "Afghanization" is now a buzzword and foreign construction projects now fly the Afghan flag. But the change in attitude may have come too late: A harsh winter, a bad drought and constant fighting mean that Afghanistan, which suffered a terrible famine in 2001, could well be on the brink of another one. Starving Afghans? Think about it: A greater indictment of the massive international aid and reconstruction effort would be hard to imagine.

And a famine here would not just constitute a humanitarian crisis. To put it bluntly, Afghans who have no food are easily purchased by the Taliban, al-Qaeda and other extremists who come over the border from Pakistan, looking to pay insurgents. Last weekend's bombing of the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad is an excellent reminder of just how sophisticated these groups have become. But you don't have to cross the border to find trouble. Recent attacks on NATO soldiers in previously peaceful parts of northern and western Afghanistan are evidence that poverty and insecurity are spreading, not shrinking, within the country as well.

For once, the solution lies not in greater funding but in more intelligent use of the massive resources available. It may partly lie in smaller Afghan charities such as Afghan Health and Development Services, which sends family doctors (without security teams) out to the provinces, where they work in conjunction with the Ministry of Health; or with less demanding foreigners such as the Filipino aid workers who have set up a credit union-- following Islamic banking practices, of course -- in the provincial city of Tarin Kowt. They lack qualified staff, and they don't like the gunfire they hear at night. But, with the advantage of "looking Afghan" ("people think I am Tajik," one of them told me, laughing), they soldier on: Their credit union has 467 members and has made 83 loans. A little bit of money goes a long way in Afghanistan, they tell me. Too bad so many in the aid community still haven't learned this, after all these years.
Meawhile, for domestic political reasons in response to the Manley Panel report, Canada is now putting big emphasis on "signature projects". Babbling calls getting aid delivery right "a delicate balancing task."

Update: A good piece by Nipa Banerjee, currently professor of international development at the University of Ottawa, who served as Canada's head of aid in Kabul for three years:
Our job is nowhere near done

Signs of progress have been hard to find in Afghanistan lately, but with a change in strategy our mission there need not end in failure

Tuesday, September 23, 2008

Interception at sea off Nova Scotia

The Navy in action in our waters (via Spotlight on Military News and International Affairs):
It happened mostly how police, the coast guard and the navy thought it would: a large sailboat filled with stack upon stack of packaged hash oil approached the Nova Scotia coastline in the black of night.

A small vessel was nearby, ready to transfer the drugs quickly and quietly to waiting vehicles before they would drive off into the darkness.

And by early Sunday morning, 12 suspects - who police say are part of an Ontario-based organized crime group - were under arrest after the covert takedown west of Halifax.

Cmdr. Bob Auchterlonie, captain of the navy frigate used in the operation, described the reaction on the sailboat as the vessel was boarded.

"To say surprised is a bit of an understatement," Auchterlonie told a news conference on Monday.

"It's four o'clock in the morning, you're sailing your ship ... and you find a 5,000 tonne warship very close astern with guys in black suits jumping on your boat."

Officers seized 751 kilograms of hash oil packaged in vacuum-sealed pouches, believed to be destined for Ontario, during the overnight operation near Liscomb.

The 12 suspects, who appeared in a Dartmouth court Monday, each face four drug-related charges, including possession for the purpose of trafficking.

No names were released, but police said 11 of the accused are Canadian citizens and one suspect is a foreign national.

Police also seized a small pleasure craft, a 12-metre speedboat and a 14-metre sailboat that officers dubbed the "Mother Ship" in the smuggling operation.

The sailboat was taken to the military's Shearwater air base near Halifax where it was being investigated.

RCMP said the drugs were shipped on the sailboat from the Caribbean an sailed up the eastern seaboard to Nova Scotia.

Insp. Brian Brennan said a speedboat went out to meet the sailboat and was being used to transport the drug cargo to land.

Most of the arrests were made on shore.

Meanwhile, police officers aboard HMCS Fredericton - which had shut off all its lights in order to sail undetected - approached the so-called Mother Ship.

Brennan would not say what the hash oil would sell for on the street, but said the seizure was "significant."

"It takes a group a long time to plan such an importation. There's really no expense spared to bring this quantity of drugs into Canada," he said.

"The amount of drugs alone, in itself, is an indication of what organized crime will go through to bring drugs into this country."

Police said the group accused of running the smuggling operation is well-known in Ontario, but they didn't provide any more details about the organization.

The drugs were likely being smuggled in through Nova Scotia because the province can be accessed easily by sea, said Brennan.

"I think one of the things that leads organized crime to using the East Coast is the vast coastline, the small communities, the small bays," he said. "The ability to use the geography of the area to work in a covert type of environment."

Aside from the Canadian Armed Forces, the RCMP also worked with the drug section of Halifax Regional Police, Hamilton police in Ontario and the Canadian Coast Guard.
Babbling was on board the Fredericton two years ago.

UN Security Council extends ISAF mandate, welcomes cooperation with OEF

Just in case you missed this, since our media do not appear to have reported it:
SECURITY COUNCIL EXTENDS INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE IN AFGHANISTAN FOR ONE YEAR, SEEKS REINFORCEMENTS TO BOOST SECURITY
The resolution passed unanimously; note from the preamble:
...

Reiterating its support for the continuing endeavours by the Afghan Government, with the assistance of the international community, including ISAF and the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) coalition, to improve the security situation and to continue to address the threat posed by the Taliban, Al-Qaida and other extremist groups, and stressing in this context the need for sustained international efforts, including those of ISAF and the OEF coalition...

Welcoming the continued coordination between ISAF and the OEF coalition, and the cooperation established between ISAF and the European Union presence in Afghanistan, in particular its police mission (EUPOL Afghanistan)...
I wonder what Jack Layton and Elizabeth May, who both want our troops out right quick, might have to say in response to the Security Council's resolution. Meanwhile, the US is really focusing on Afghanistan now:
Bush Administration Reviews Its Afghanistan Policy, Exposing Points of Contention
And here's a creative idea, though I doubt politically saleable in Pakistan at this time:
U.S., Afghans and Pakistanis Consider Joint Military Force
Update: This looks pretty definitive:
U.S. has no more troops for Afghan war until spring

Monday, September 22, 2008

Liberal platform on defence

This is it. Three pathetically thin paragraphs. Note the lie in the third paragraph.
6. Defence

Canada’s ongoing commitment to the military mission in Afghanistan has depleted our ability to deploy the Canadian Forces elsewhere in the world. When combined with the commitments that will be necessary in order to provide the needed security requirements when Canada welcomes the world to the Vancouver Winter Olympics in 2010, we are severely limited in our ability to offer assistance to other international efforts as they arise. By putting a firm end date on the military deployment in Kandahar, we will regain flexibility with respect to our military to respond to emergency situations both domestically and internationally.

A Liberal government will remain committed to the money allocated in the fiscal framework to the Canadian Forces (CF) over the coming four years [and then? More here.]– much of which was originally committed in the Liberal Budget of 2005. But the job of supporting Canada’s armed forces doesn’t end when our troops return home. Military life, overseas deployments, and dangerous missions take a heavy toll. Our soldiers need adequate support services when they return from overseas or leave the service. A Liberal government will support the current members of the CF and our veterans by establishing a dedicated $60-million fund to help them cope with post-traumatic stress disorder and other ailments. As previously mentioned, a Liberal government will also establish a health ombudsman both within the CF and within Veterans Affairs Canada.

The federal government must also ensure that our forces get the most value for money on military contracts. We will abandon the sole-sourcing approach to defence contracts taken by the Conservatives [so what would they have bought other than C-17s and C-130Js (A400Ms?)--and Ch-47Fs?], ensuring that Canadian industry can compete for contracts while guaranteeing the best equipment at the best price [for the above sort of aircraft? And what if Canadian industry can't do the job even when asked?--more here]. We will also finally act on the purchase of much needed replacements for the fixed-wing search-and-rescue (SAR) planes to replace the current ageing fleet. The previous Liberal government set aside money to make this purchase in 2005 [a lie--the money was budgeted in 2004 and the Liberal government failed to act] but the Conservatives have failed to act. These SAR planes are needed both for the safety of Canadians but also to promote our sovereignty in Canada’s North [Why?]. That is why we will ensure that some of the new fleet of SAR planes are based in the North .
Wow.

French adding to forces in Afstan

Every bit helps and at least the government is holding firm in the face of public opinion problems (unlike...)
One month after ten French soldiers died in a Taliban ambush in Afghanistan [more here, see Update], the government announced Monday that it would reinforce its presence there, sending more troops and better equipment despite the outpouring of anguish over the deaths.

There have been several reports - in the media and from leftist opposition politicians - that French troops were poorly equipped for their deployment in the rugged mountains east of Kabul. But Prime Minister François Fillon said during a debate in Parliament on the Afghan deployment that the government was more determined than ever to stay.

"The president of the republic and government have learned the lesson from this murderous ambush," Fillon said in the National Assembly. "We have decided to strengthen our military means.

"Not acting would leave the Afghans at the mercy of the Taliban and Al Qaeda, would re-expose us to the risk of terrorism and would leave our allies to fight for us alone."

Lawmakers later voted, 343 to 210, to keep the French military operation in place - a reflection of the strong majority held by the conservative bloc of President

There are currently 2,600 French troops on the ground in Afghanistan as part of a NATO mission and an American-led counterterrorism force.

Fillon said that France would send an additional 100 soldiers to Afghanistan "within weeks." The troops would come with Caracal [pretty big] and Gazelle [small] helicopters, drones, surveillance equipment and artillery that is better adapted to mountainous terrain, he said...

An opinion poll by the BVA institute published in the weekly L'Express on Sept. 16 suggested that nearly two in three French people wanted their soldiers to come home.

Reinforcing public discontent were the reports about French troops being sent into battle poorly equipped.

On Saturday, the Canadian newspaper The Globe and Mail reported that, according to a NATO document, the ambushed soldiers had run out of ammunition about 90 minutes into the battle and that their only radio had lost contact with their base, leaving them unable to call for reinforcements.

Fillon dismissed the article, saying that there was no such NATO document, only a rushed internal e-mail message. He said the soldiers had not run out of ammunition and that the radio went dead for only "a few instants" after the radio operator was killed. "The reality is cruel enough without adding lies," he said.

The parliamentary vote Monday was aimed at bolstering the legitimacy of an increasingly unpopular mission.

Sarkozy chose to act in accordance with a recent constitutional amendment that obliges the head of state to obtain parliamentary approval for military operations lasting four months or longer. He was not technically required to seek the vote because the French deployment in Afghanistan began before the constitutional measure passed.

Before the amendment, France was the only Western democracy that could send troops on open-ended combat missions without legislative approval [actually not true in Canada but the Conservative government has come close to making such a vote a constitutional convention]...

Getting facts right about Afstan

Further to the Update here, the Vancouver Sun does eventually print Brian Platt's letter:
Re: Why we can't win in Afghanistan, Soundoff, Sept. 16

Contrary to what Tony Smith wrote, the Taliban did not rule Afghanistan for 11 years until Sept. 11, 2001. They captured Kabul in September 1996 and ruled for the next five years. It is not true that the Russians fought the Taliban for 10 years during their invasion. The Taliban only formed as a movement in 1994. To take power, they themselves had to fight many of the mujahedeen who fought the Russians -- including the most successful anti-Soviet fighter of them all, Shah Ahmed Massoud, who was the defence minister of the government that the Taliban toppled.

Nor is the statement that the Pashtuns became "fanatics" when the Russians invaded true. Two of the most powerful anti-Soviet mujahedeen organizations in the 1980s were Pashtun royalists who favoured the return of the exiled king. They were pious in their religion, as most Afghans are, but not "fanatics." The current president, Hamid Karzai, was a member of a Pashtun royalist organization.

But the most egregious error is the statement that the Taliban are an "Afghani version of Wahhabism." They follow a version of Deobandism, developed in India primarily as a reaction to British rule. The author seems to have invented his own theory of the religious lineage of the Taliban.

We can't even begin the discussion about Canada's role in Afghanistan if we don't have the basic facts right.

Brian Platt

Vancouver
Keep up the good work, Brian.

US Army working with CF at Kandahar

From Stars and Stripes (Mideast edition--some interesting stuff in that edition); note last two paragraphs excerpted:
MAIWAND DISTRICT, Afghanistan — U.S. forces are beefing up their presence in southern Afghanistan, building a new base and joining a Canadian task force in an effort to stem a rising tide of violence in the heartland of the Taliban insurgency.

The construction of Forward Operating Base Ramrod, about 50 miles west of Kandahar, the former stronghold of the fundamentalist movement, puts the newly-deployed 2nd Battalion, 2nd Infantry Regiment in an area that has seen a sharp rise in attacks.

"This was a district that has been identified as needing a larger coalition presence," said Maj. Cale Brown, executive officer for 2-2 Infantry, during a recent visit to the new base.

In an unusual arrangement for U.S. forces, 2-2 Infantry has been placed under the command of the Canadian-led Task Force Kandahar. Canada has 2,500 soldiers in the southern province, where it has held overall security responsibility for the past three years.

But the addition of the 800 or so U.S. soldiers nearly doubles the number of combat troops in Task Force Kandahar, said Navy Lt. Alain Blondin, a spokesman for Canadian forces.

"It brings about 70 to 80 percent more in terms of boots on the ground," he said...

The Fort Hood, Texas-based battalion was supposed to deploy to eastern Afghanistan, but was shifted south after the Taliban pulled off a dramatic jailbreak in Kandahar in June, freeing hundreds of imprisoned fighters, according to a U.S. officer.

Insurgent attacks have skyrocketed in Afghanistan in the past three years, especially in the south and east, where the Taliban and al-Qaida are strongest.

Insurgent attacks in Kandahar province have increased since the jailbreak, and have not slowed in September, despite the fact that it is the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, according to Canadian military officers.

During the first 18 days of Ramadan, which began earlier this month, soldiers of Task Force Kandahar have encountered 80 roadside bombs, most of which were detected and neutralized before they exploded, they said.

"It’s been a steady climb (in attacks)," said one officer Thursday, who spoke on background, in accordance with standard briefing rules. "It’s been busy, and the insurgents aren’t slowing down."..

The strengthening of U.S. forces in southern Afghanistan comes as Canada has signaled that it intends to scale down its commitment, a move which could further worsen the security situation in this part of the country.

Last January, Canada threatened to pull its troops out of Afghanistan unless other NATO countries boosted their commitment, a move that prompted Defense Secretary Robert Gates to order a Marine battalion to neighboring Helmand province. The Marines have already started pulling out, and have been replaced by British and Afghan troops.

On Sept. 10, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper pledged that his country’s forces would be withdrawn from Afghanistan in 2011, saying that the Canadian public would not support keeping its soldiers in the country more than 10 years. A Parliament measure passed in March requires only that Canadian forces be withdrawn from Kandahar province by that date...
Via Moby Media Updates. More here from US Combined Joint Task Force - 101 (via milnews.ca, with photos).

Sunday, September 21, 2008

Another A400M update

Further to this post, Airbus gets down and dirty (via tomahawk6--more at the Milnet.ca thread):
Aerospace giant EADS has threatened to freeze production of its Airbus subsidiary's flagship military airlifter if clients do not drop penalty clauses for late delivery, a German news report said Sept. 20.

The A400M airlifter. (EADS)

Der Spiegel weekly, trailing its Sept. 22 publication, cited a letter sent by Louis Gallois, the French chief executive of both companies, to the governments of seven

In the letter, Gallois is quoted as saying the military carrier is "a heavy lossmaker" that is creating "considerable difficulties" at EADS, weighing down on the group's financial performance.

The "anticipated profits" from 180 orders on Airbus' books have already been "invested," with Gallois adding in the letter that the present position could become "untenable" within months unless a deal is agreed that "keeps everyone happy."

EADS wants clients to waive their contractual right to reductions in their bills due to late delivery, but Der Spiegel said Germany's defense ministry would be "standing firm," and Berlin is of the view that "financial concessions" should only be discussed upon receipt of the planes.

Business daily Financial Times Deutschland also reported this week that Gallois sent a letter pleading for "understanding" on the A400M.

Last week, Gallois said the plane's first flight would take place "before the end of the year," but the French press reported soon afterward that costs had risen astronomically and that the first flight was being put back to 2009.

Germany has ordered 60 A400Ms, making it the biggest customer.

Airbus has been struggling with four important delay announcements having been made since 2006 on delivery of its A380 superjumbo civil airliners.
Lovely artist's depiction.

World War II reality and resonance, Part Two

Further to this post dealing with Max Hastings' Armageddon: The Battle for Germany, 1944-1945, an earlier and excellent detailed review of the book by David Frum.

RCR take over from PPCLI at Kandahar

Latest roto in place:
After battling through one of the fiercest fighting seasons on record, the Canadian Forces officially handed the mission over to a new battle group during a small ceremony at Kandahar Air Field Sunday morning.

The sense of relief was tangible in the air for members of the second battalion Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry battle group based in Shilo, Man., who have been through more than most as the fighting season progressed.

The remaining few Patricias still on the ground will head home over the next two weeks as their replacements from the third battalion Royal Canadian Regiment of Petawawa, Ont., take over the mission in Kandahar province.

Eighteen soldiers have lost their lives in combat since the Princess Patricias arrived last February. Half of them were killed during a rash of violence over the last month, particularly in the Taliban strongholds of Zhari and Panjwaii.

It's widely held that Taliban-led insurgency across Afghanistan has been much more aggressive and sophisticated in terms of fighting style and weaponry this summer.

The rising number of coalition troops killed in the fighting is a testament to that.

In Kandahar, where the bulk of Canadian troops are stationed, insurgents have resorted to an asymmetrical style of fighting, including carefully orchestrated "shoot-and-scoot" ambushes, and relying on many more - and much bigger - improvised explosive devices, according to Lieutenant Colonel Dave Corbould, the outgoing battle group commander.

"I see it as almost like Nicky Nicky Nine Doors," he said. "When you're using tools like IEDs and shoot-and-scoot tactics, it means you don't have the resolve or the ability or the confidence to stay in one place and fight for a piece of ground."

The insurgents have also stepped up the number of suicide bombings in the first 20 days of Ramadan, the Muslim holy month. These attacks included a twin suicide bombing two weeks ago at the police headquarters in Kandahar City that claimed the lives of two officers and injured 29 others, including eight civilians.

The rising number of civilians being caught in the crossfire, however, has more locals than ever reporting suspected Taliban hideouts and IEDs, Lt.-Col. Corbourd said.

Still, the Afghan and coalition troops have failed to gain much, if any, ground this year.

In order to establish a permanent presence in places like Zhari and Panjwaii, Brigadier General Denis Thompson, Canada's top soldier in Kandahar, has called for at least another battalion of Afghan National Army troops, in addition to three times as many trained Afghan police officers, and more coalition troops.

Some progress is being made on that front.

Earlier this month, the Afghan government agreed to nearly double the size of the Afghan army to 134,000 troops over the next four years, and another battalion of ANA is expected to arrive in Kandahar as early as next spring.

On Thursday, hundreds of Afghan National Police graduated from their eight-week training program, nearly doubling the number of uniformed officers in the province.

The eventual goal is to build the ANSF up so they can take over the fight themselves.

Prime Minister Stephen Harper has said he hopes to completely withdraw Canada's troops in Afghanistan from their combat role by 2011 if he is re-elected...

Lieutenant Colonel Roger Barrett, the commanding officer of the new battle group, said the Patricia's have left a "legacy of excellence." He added the new RCR battle group plans to take up that torch and expand upon the ground the troops currently hold as the fighting season dies down in the weeks ahead.

"My goal is to help the Afghans create a better more secure environment, that allows development and governance to flourish," he said.

"French soldiers unprepared for Taliban ambush: report"

By Graeme Smith in the Globe and Mail:
A secret NATO review obtained by The Globe and Mail shows that the French who were killed in August did not have enough bullets, radios and other equipment. By contrast, the insurgents were dangerously well prepared...
Good maps here. Note what the French defence minister recently said:
France says European defence neglect hurting Afghanistan
Unfortunately it seems the French themselves have work to do along those lines.

Friday, September 19, 2008

"Afghanistan: master and commander"

Latest Conference of Defence Associations' media round-up, actually fairly broad scope:
• Canadian Policy
• Piracy and Sea Lanes
• Conflict Dynamics
• Global Leadership
• The Pakistan Border Region
• Strategy and Doctrine

Thursday, September 18, 2008

Canadian aid arriving in Haiti

Further to this post, a news release from Canadian Expeditionary Force Command:

Canadian Forces provides Humanitarian Aid to Haïti

CEFCOM NR 08.034 - September 18, 2008

OTTAWA – In cooperation with the United Nations' World Food Program (WFP), Her Majesty’s Canadian Ship St. John’s is currently engaged in a life-saving effort involving the delivery by sea and air of 350 metric tonnes of urgently needed relief supplies, including food aid, to the affected south and southwest regions of Haiti.

Following the Government of Canada’s decision to support humanitarian operations in Haiti, HMCS St. John’s was deployed on September 10, 2008.

As part of the humanitarian effort, the WFP requested the assistance of HMCS St. John’s to transport aid to the disaster area. The Canadian Forces will assist the WFP with the delivery of food stocks until September 25th , 2008.

HMCS St. John’s is a Halifax based Canadian Patrol Frigate that has a crew of 225. The ship is also carrying a CH 124 Sea King helicopter and an air detachment from 12 Wing Shearwater to support the humanitarian effort.

Canada has committed $5 million in humanitarian assistance for Haitians affected by the devastating hurricanes that swept through the Caribbean. This is in addition to the initial $600,000 pledged immediately following the disaster. These funds will be channeled through trusted humanitarian partners to provide water and sanitation, food, shelter and health care to those who are most in need.

Haiti is the largest recipient of Canadian development assistance in the Americas, with a commitment of $555 million over five years. Canada takes a comprehensive approach in its support for Haiti, with a program designed to meet the needs of the people, reinforce the Haitian government, improve security and access to essential services and elevate overall living conditions in Haiti.

- 30 -

Information on all current and past missions is available on the Canadian Expeditionary Force Command (CEFCOM) website (www.cefcom.forces.gc.ca).

Another story from CEFCOM (with more photos):

HMCS St. John’s hauls food to hurricane victims

By Charmion Chaplin-Thomas, CEFCOM Public Affairs

The Halifax-class frigate HMCS St. John’s is in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, loading high-protein cereal blend provided by the World Food Programme for shipment to areas that are still inaccessible by road because of damage caused by the storm surges and high winds of Hurricane Gustav and Hurricane Hanna. The Government of Canada diverted St. John’s from a drug-interdiction operation to join the relief effort led by the United Nations (especially the World Food Programme) and the International Red Cross.


The crew of HMCS St John’s load sacks of World Food Programme corn-soya blend for shipment to parts of the island cut off by storm damage.

The US and Afstan--and the Brits (Update: And the Paks)

US thinking very hard:
The Bush administration is considering changing its war strategy in Afghanistan in light of rising levels of violence and an increasingly complex insurgent threat, Defense Secretary Robert Gates said Thursday.

"You have an overall approach, an overall strategy, but you adjust it continually based on the circumstances that you find," Gates said in an interview with a group of reporters at a London hotel. "We did that in Iraq. We made a change in strategy in Iraq and we are going to continue to look at the situation in Afghanistan."

Pressed for more details about the review of Afghan strategy, Gates would say only, "We're looking at it."

Gates visited Afghanistan on Wednesday and flew to London for NATO consultations.

He did not reveal whether the White House has launched a formal review of its war strategy. But his remarks indicated that the administration sees a need to make some adjustments as progress there remains slow.

The Joint Chiefs chairman, Adm. Mike Mullen, told a House committee last week that he had commissioned a study of Afghan strategy to incorporate the complexities presented by rising unrest and insurgent activity in Pakistan. Mullen also publicly questioned whether the United States is winning in Afghanistan.

Gen. David McKiernan, the senior U.S. general in Afghanistan, told reporters on Tuesday at his Kabul headquarters that he believed the current strategy was adequate but that he needed more U.S. troops and other resources to properly execute it. He said he needs more than 10,000 extra American ground troops in 2009, in addition to the reinforcements already announced by the Pentagon...

Gates also said that at a NATO meeting here Thursday and Friday he would raise the issue of how to share the cost of a planned doubling in the size of the Afghan national army [emphasis added]. He said building up the capacity and effectiveness of Afghanistan's own security forces is "ultimately the exit strategy for all of us."

The United States has about 33,000 troops in Afghanistan, and President Bush has ordered an Army brigade of about 3,700 soldiers that had been preparing to deploy to Iraq to instead go to Afghanistan in January [not the whole story - MC].

Bush also announced last April at a NATO summit meeting in Bucharest, Romania, that the United States would send even more troops to Afghanistan later in 2009, beyond his term in office, when ends in January.

Gates mentioned that Bush pledge on Thursday and said, "I expect his successor will meet that commitment [emphasis added]."..

Gates also told reporters that he believes Britain intends to add more troops in Afghanistan, but he offered no numbers and said he was not sure the government here had made a final decision.
But this will never fly with most NATO members including, I think, Canada (if the story is accurate; quite a bit of stuff in the "quality" UK press is not to be relied on):
US seeking sole command of Nato's war against the Taliban
Western allies risk public backlash if Washington commands troops
Update: Brit response to Mr Gates (via Norman's Spectator):
'No plans' to boost Afghan troops

Defence Secretary Des Browne has said he has "no plans" to announce more British troops for Afghanistan, after reports they could be increased...
Pity. But the British Army is about as stretched as ours.

Upperdate: Meanwhile, across the border:
U.S. military advisors may soon head to Pakistan

The U.S. and Pakistan have cleared remaining obstacles, so the long-delayed team may arrive within weeks, Joint Chiefs Chairman Michael Mullen says...
Certainly has been "long-delayed"--from January, 2008:
U.S. to Step Up Training of Pakistanis
Given Pakistani political sensitivities I wouldn't be too sure about that "within weeks".

Afghan war costs

Half the estimated costs are for veterans (details come late in the story, are quite speculative, and occur over who knows how many years). But a loud front page headline in the Ottawa Citizen seems to be the ticket to upset readers. Note the important points on funding in the last three paras excerpted:
Afghan war costs $22B, so far: study
Much sought-after numbers released ahead of report by parliamentary budget officer

VICTORIA, B.C. - The Afghan war is going to end up costing the Defence Department more than $22 billion, in actual money spent on the mission and future payments to rebuild equipment and provide long-term care for veterans, a military conference heard yesterday.

The figures are contained in a yet-to-be-released study by security analyst David Perry, a former deputy director of Dalhousie University's Centre for Foreign Policy Studies. The study will be included in an upcoming edition of the International Journal published by the Canadian International Council...

In an interview last night, Mr. Perry said he was not surprised at the numbers he found. "We're fighting a war on the other side of the world and that takes a lot of resources," said Mr. Perry, currently in Ottawa.

He said that the number of Canadian veterans of Afghanistan is projected to be around 41,000 by 2010. That far exceeds the estimated 25,000 Canadian veterans from the Korean War, Mr. Perry said...

The breakdown of the Afghan costs is as follows:

- $7 billion for the cost of the war. This is the incremental cost from late 2001 to 2012. It includes everything from ammunition and fuel to the salaries of reservists and contractors. It does not include the salaries of regular force military personnel.

- $11 billion is the estimated future bill for Veterans Affairs and DND for long-term health care of veterans and related benefits, as well as having to deal with post traumatic stress disorder among troops. Veterans Affairs Canada predicts an increase of 13,000 Canadian Forces members to its client base by 2010. Using U.S. estimates, between 10 to 25 per cent of returning veterans may experience mental health problems as a result of their overseas deployment.

U.S. studies estimate that country's long-term health care and disability costs for its Iraq and Afghan veterans to be between $350 billion to $650 billion.

- $2 billion for the purchase of mission-specific equipment. That includes everything from Leopard tanks, howitzers, six Chinook helicopters, counter-mine vehicles to aerial drones. Defence officials argue that such equipment will be used on future missions beyond Afghanistan. The figure didn't include the latest $95 million lease for additional aerial drones.

- $2 billion for the replacement of the military's LAV-3 fleet. "This fleet is going to be worn out pretty soon from the wear and tear of Afghanistan and will have to be replaced," said Mr. Perry.

- $405 million for repair and overhaul costs.

Mr. Perry's study also determined the Liberal government had provided extra funding to the Defence Department to cover 85 per cent of the Afghan war costs.

The Conservative government, however, is funding only 29 per cent of the cost to the Defence Department for the war, according to the study, with the remaining money coming out of DND's existing budget.

Mr. Perry said the Conservatives might be providing more funding, but that is not apparent from publicly released figures. "The Liberals were much more transparent in the funding they were providing," he said...
I'd like to see what the Parliamentary Budget Officer officer says:
Harper agrees to release of Afghan war cost report

Stephen Harper has given his blessing to the release of a report on the cost of the Afghan war -- a document that could sway Conservative fortunes in the vital electoral battleground of Quebec, where the mission is highly unpopular.

Parliamentary budget officer Kevin Page has tallied the full cost of the mission -- past and future -- and said he would like to release it. But he was worried about interfering with the federal election and asked for all-party consent.

All opposition parties gave their blessing Tuesday, and the prime minister agreed Wednesday.

The minority Conservative government has estimated the cost of the six-year mission at under $8 billion [emphasis added--and only so far I believe]. If the new figures are much higher, it could be bad news for Harper.

Polls have repeatedly shown that Canadians are lukewarm to the mission, especially in Quebec, where Harper must make gains to have any chance of winning his coveted majority.

And critics suggest cost overruns in the Afghan mission could erase the government's shrinking surplus and put the country into deficit, especially given the economic slowdown.

The Afghan mission has been a heavy burden for Canada with 97 soldiers and one diplomat killed. Canada has more than 2,000 personnel based in the dangerous Kandahar region...
Don't you just love the tone of the story? In any case it seems to me the government's cost estimate is in the same ballpark as the estimate above, veterans' and further equipment costs aside. But the Citizen story doesn't deal with that.

Latest edition of On Track magzine online

From the Conference of Defence Associations Institute; subjects featured are: Canadian Naval needs; common issues facing the Navy, the Army, and the Air Force; the defence budget; the CF-18 replacement; NATO; the former Chief of the Defence Staff; amphibious forces requirements; North Korea; the Caucasus; and book reviews.

Afstan news

Some interesting stories here.

Update: Two excellent pieces (with great photos) by Michael Yon with the Brits, Danes (Part II--someone notices them!) and Afghans at Helmand are here and here (h/t to Fred in "Comments"). And another piece by Mr Yon, in which Canadians are mentioned, about delivering the Kajaki dam turbine (a story our media ignored almost completely):
Where Eagles Dare

Wednesday, September 17, 2008

Whyever did we buy Cyclone helicopters, or, petting the rotor?

Pricier and very late delivery. There really does seem to something wrong with the Canadian government's military procurement process in this case (and it's not singular); the Canadian Forces too surely are not without blame. If they are not someone should go public about the politics of a deal made by the Liberals-- and the politics with the Conservatives having been in office for over two and half years:
Canada is closing in on a deal to cut lengthy delays in delivery of a new fleet of maritime helicopters, but it's going to mean a bigger price tag, says the defence minister.

Peter MacKay, interviewed this week while campaigning in Sherbrooke, N.S., said "hot and heavy talks" with Sikorsky to provide 28 CH-148 helicopters are "making headway."

The choppers were originally supposed to begin arriving on the tarmac last January, but media reports earlier this year suggested a 30-month delay from the original delivery date, and floated the possibility the Conservatives would simply cancel the deal.

However, MacKay said he's been informed by negotiators from Public Works and his own department that a shorter delay is possible now.

"We will get an aircraft that is improved from its original contract and the timeframe and the costs between our position and theirs (Sikorsky's) have been reduced significantly," he said.

"I feel some sense of relief particularly on the delivery date."

He now predicts the first Cyclone will arrive in 20 months, in 2010.

However, the minister concedes the proposed changes to the helicopter - such as more powerful engines and computer changes - and the fresh delivery date could mean millions more in costs to the taxpayer.

"You get what you pay for, and if we're getting a better aircraft of course, it's in keeping with commensurate fees associated with increased capacity," he said.

"Things like lift, the (helicopter's) ability to be out on missions further, the on-board computer systems. All of those things, there are incremental costs, even over the life of a contract.

"And that's par for the course, as we've seen in other procurements [emphasis added--that's the whole blinking problem - MC]."

Original media reports speculated the increased costs from the contract to replace the Sea Kings could run into hundreds of millions of dollars.

However, Public Works Minister Michael Fortier had countered that Ottawa expected Sikorsky to find a way to meet its contract as signed.

MacKay now is allowing that a higher price would be part of the deal.

"In terms of the cost overruns, we've negotiated very aggressively and we've made it very clear that the initial contract will be honoured but for some of this increased capacity, but for some of these added features in the aircraft," he said...
So much for being the first, and so far only, purchaser of the military version of this aircraft. We may eventually get "a better aircraft". Spin, spin, spin. But why then the contract for the original version that could not meet the required specs?

Afstan: American ISAF commander still wants a total of four more US brigades

Gen. McKiernan has been saying that for a while. Most recently:
...
To counter the increasing violence and speed progress in the war, McKiernan said, he needs a permanent increase in troop levels and other assets such as reconnaissance planes.

Although President Bush has said he will send an additional brigade, McKiernan said he needs three brigades beyond that. There are about 33,000 U.S. troops in the country.

McKiernan said the brigade arriving early next year, roughly 3,500 troops, would be sent to eastern Afghanistan [emphasis added] to counter an increase in violence there. The need for the three other brigades requested by his predecessor, Army Gen. Dan K. McNeill, still exists, he said.
Meanwhile, the US troop increase over the next few months will in fact be quite a bit smaller than the media our reporting--and the the withdrawal of the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit from Regional Command South is not good news there.

Whilst over the border:
[JCS Chairman] Mullen Visits Pakistan as U.S. Raids Stir Tensions
Whilst back across the border (full-court diplomatic press by the Pentagon I'd say):
Defense Secretary Robert Gates apologizes for Afghan civilian casualties
Gates pledges additional steps by the U.S. to avoid errant bombings and to compensate families of the dead more quickly.
From what I've heard the problem is not with planned air strikes but rather with "emergency" ones when US troops are in the heat of combat.

UAVS: A story in search of fuss

A front-page Ottawa Citizen article really seems to be trying to question procurement and even raise alarm when there isn't much there there. Note that everything is very preliminary. By the way the JUSTAS UAV program was created long-ago under the Liberals. The aircraft have been intended for both foreign and domestic operations--this from 2005:
...
Smith, who is JUSTAS project director, said he has a five-person team working on determining the Canadian Forces’ UAV needs. The aim is to employ UAVs for sovereignty missions such as surveillance of Canada’s coastlines as well as for overseas operations. By 2007, the military hopes to approach industry to meet its initial UAV needs...
Well, that's a year late on approaching industry (not bad given the sudden demand to get UAVs fast specifically for Afstan). What does seem new (the story link) is the likelihood that some of the aircraft will be armed (rejected heretofore--see end of this post); and it does seem odd putting "worldwide operations" before domestic ones given our 2011 exit from Afstan. We're unlikely to be engaged in a major overseas mission almost immediately after. I suspect that priority is just a bureaucratic hangover that may change:
DND seeks armed drones by 2012
Craft could be used for 'domestic' operations [shudder--we're going to use weapons domestically, right? "Armed drones. Attacking within Canada. We're not allowed to make things up."]

Canada's military is pushing ahead with its plan to buy aerial drones outfitted with weapons even as the Harper government is promising to pull troops out of Afghanistan in 2011.

The government's Afghanistan Procurement Taskforce has released details to the defence industry about the $500-million project to purchase a fleet of unmanned aerial vehicles or UAVs.

The first of the UAVs would be delivered in February 2012, according to the material provided to the defence industry on Sept. 5.

Executives from aerospace and defence companies will meet in Ottawa on Oct. 2 and 3 to get further information about the project from Canadian Forces officers and officials from Public Works and Government Services Canada.

Armed UAVs have been playing a key role during the last several years in hunting down Taliban and al-Qaeda insurgents in Afghanistan and more recently in Pakistan.

The aircraft, mainly U.S.-built Predators, have launched missiles at a number of locations where insurgent leaders are thought to have been meeting. Some top insurgent officials have been killed in the attacks, but at the same time, civilian casualties have been reported [so what?--as they have with manned aircraft strikes, and fire from crew-served weapons and small arms].

The Defence Department program, called the Joint UAV Surveillance and Target Acquisition System or JUSTAS, has been planned for some time [now we are told]. According to the documents, the project would initially purchase a fleet of drones for "primarily overland operations both domestically and overseas."

"Phase 1 will acquire a long-range UAV system, suitable for worldwide operations, and capable of carrying a suite of sophisticated payloads and precision weapons," the documents added.

Sensors on board the UAVs will be required to track targets as small as a human carrying a weapon...

In a previous interview, Lt.-Col. Alex Tupper, the air force's UAV project director, said meeting various procurement deadlines was expected to be challenging. "To get a contract awarded in 2010 and to have an initial operating capability in 2012 is going to take a lot of work," he said.

Lt.-Col. Tupper noted the project still needed government approval [empasis added]...

...last year a similar UAV project was also sidelined. That one was also to have involved the purchase of surveillance drones, and, although the ability of the aircraft to carry weapons was regarded as "highly important," it was not mandatory, according to documents released at the time.

In this latest UAV procurement, though, having the systems capable of providing all-weather "precision strike capabilities" is a main component of the program.

The U.S.-based General Atomics, the firm that builds the Predator, and its partner, the Ottawa-based General Dynamics Canada, are reviewing the details of the government's letter of interest. General Atomics spokeswoman Kimberly Kasitz said the firm remained convinced the Predator B was the best solution for Canada's UAV needs.

David Hargreaves of MacDonald Dettwiler in Richmond, B.C., said that company was hoping its upcoming experience leasing UAVs to the Canadian Forces for the Kandahar mission would put it in a strong position to bid on the JUSTAS project.

"The lease is going to allow us to gain an awful lot of experience operating and maintaining the aircraft in an operational theatre," Mr. Hargreaves said.

It will also provide the Canadian Forces with the opportunity to appreciate the capabilities of the Heron UAV being offered by MacDonald Dettwiler and its partner Israel Aircraft Industries, he added...

The letter of interest sent to industry is considered the first step [emphasis added] in moving ahead with the project. Information gathered from defence companies will then be used to further refine the proposal, which still needs approval from the Treasury Board and cabinet...

A second phase of the UAV project would involve the purchase of drones for maritime surveillance off Canada's coasts and limited surveillance in the Arctic...
It's not at all clear to me that the aircraft for domestic operations will themselves be armed--look at that headline again.

And from David Pugliese's blog:
...
Phase 1 of JUSTAS will acquire a long-range UAV system, suitable for worldwide operations, and capable of carrying a suite of sophisticated payloads and precision weapons. JUSTAS Phase 2 will provide a domestic maritime and limited Arctic surveillance capability. In order to achieve the greatest operational flexibility and the lowest total lifecycle cost, these two increments will be linked by a common UAV system, a common support network, and common infrastructure, according to material provided to the defence industry. “To limit risk, the project will base the development effort on a suitable, commercially available MALE [medium-altitude long-endurance] UAV system and integrate the subsystems and payloads required to meet the user’s operational requirements,” the documents note.

The project still has to receive Treasury Board and Cabinet approval. But here is the proposed schedule:

• Letter of Interest – September 2008;
• Draft RFP for Industry comment – Summer 2009;
• RFP Release – Winter 2009;
• Contract award – Fall 2010;
• Phase 1 Initial Operational Capability – Feb 2012;
• Phase 1 Final Operational Capability – 2016;
• Phase 2 Initial Operational Capability – 2016;
• Phase 2 Final Operational Capability – 2017; and
• Decommissioning and Disposal – 2032...
It does seem odd to me that the domestic version, with its maritime capabilities, is not scheduled for service until 2016 given the difficult situation our destroyers and frigates (contract for their upgrade still not announced--see middle here) will be in by then. Then there will be the diminishing Aurora patrol aircraft fleet.

Update: Here's the government's MERX posting--very broad parameters indeed (via Ammo).

Predate: Another approach to maritime surveillance (that includes Air Force UAVs):
A civilian maritime patrol aircraft fleet?

"Ross Munro Award: 2008 Recipient"

From the Conference of Defence Associations:
15 September 2008
Mr. Alec Castonguay – 2008 Ross Munro Media Award Recipient

The Conference of Defence Associations (CDA), in concert with the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI), is pleased to announce that Alec Castonguay, journalist for the newspaper Le Devoir and magazine L'actualité, has been selected as the recipient of the 2008 Ross Munro Media Award. The selection committee was unanimous in its decision.

With an authority based on thorough research and intellectual integrity, Alec Castonguay offers commentary on a broad spectrum of national security and defence issues. He not only describes people, events and ideas at face-value, he explores their background and potential linkages and, in so doing, offers his readers valuable insight to some of the nation's most daunting challenges.

The Ross Munro Media Award was initiated in 2002 to recognize Canadian journalists who have made a significant and extraordinary contribution to increasing public understanding of Canadian defence and security issues. Recipients of the award have produced outstanding work regarding the efforts of the Canadian Forces in preserving Canadian democratic values. The award consists of a replica of the Ross Munro statue and a cheque for $2,500. Previous recipients of the award are Stephen Thorne, Garth Pritchard, Sharon Hobson, Bruce Campion-Smith, Christie Blatchford, and Matthew Fisher.

Alec Castonguay was born in Laval in 1979. He received a B.A. in Journalism from Université du Québec à Montréal and has worked as a journalist since 2001. As a journalist for the daily Le Devoir for five years, he was first assigned to the Economy desk. In 2004 he became the youngest parliamentary correspondent in Ottawa, for any media organization, at 24 years of age. Since then, he has followed the various activities of the House of Commons as a team member for Le Devoir. Alec has followed the activities of the Department of National Defence and the conflict in Afghanistan for over two years. He traveled to Afghanistan in April 2007. Alec has also been a contributor to L'actualité for two years, covering the federal scene for Quebec's top information magazine.

The selection committee was chaired by Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Richard J. Evraire, Chairman CDA. Members of the Selection Committee were Dr. J.L. Granatstein, Canadian Military Historian; Mr. Peter Kent, VP-Corporate Communications Hill and Knowlton; Mr. Stuart Robertson, of O'Donnell, Robertson & Sanfilippo; and Colonel (Ret'd) Charles Keple, Vice-Chairman CDA (Public Affairs).

The Award will be presented at the CDA Institute's Vimy Dinner, which will be attended by the Right Honourable Beverley McLachlin, Chief Justice of Canada, on Friday, November 14, in the LeBreton Gallery of the Canadian War Museum in Ottawa, Ontario.

Inquiries may be directed to Captain (ret'd) Peter Forsberg, Public Affairs Officer or Mr. Arnav Manchanda, CDA Institute Project Officer at:

TEL: (613) 236-9903 ~ FAX: (613) 236-8191
E-MAIL: pao@cda-cdai-ca ~ URL: http://www.cda-cdai.ca
Update correction: Note Dexter's comment--in fact the grant referred to in my comment (the second) comes from the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, not the Conference of Defence Associations Institute.