The problems with the Cyclone purchase

Here's an interesting article:

It has become far too easy to predict the failure of military equipment procurement in Canada. In fact, if you could get odds on this in Las Vegas, it would be easy money.

The latest project to enter into contract limbo is the replacement of the Canadian Sea King naval helicopters that help protect and monitor our massive coastlines.

It was revealed last week that the Cyclone replacement models chosen by the government in 2004 may not be delivered until 2010. The American company Sikorsky was originally scheduled to begin delivery of the helicopters at the end of this year.

Although the delay is a recent discovery, it was predicted by many defence analysts before the ink was dry on the original contract. The delay will also come as no surprise to the general public, as they have been hearing about contracts to replace the helicopters since the 1980s...

The Cyclone has never flown in a military configuration and Canada is its first customer.

This actually contradicts an earlier defence policy of only buying tried and tested equipment for the Canadian Forces. Ironically, the policy of avoiding a first production run was actually implemented in the last attempt to replace the Sea Kings in the 1980s and '90s. The government signed a contract with EH Industries (now AgustaWestland) for the EH-101 only after the British did so first to replace its own Sea Kings.

The Cyclone, which was then called the S-92, was barely even considered, as it was still in development and was nowhere near being certified and tested as a military aircraft.

The EH-101 was unanimously considered the superior aircraft over all competitors by the experts at National Defence.

Although a contract had been signed with EH Industries by 1992, Jean Chretien made cancelling the contract his first act as prime minister in 1993.

He claimed the EH-101 was a "Cadillac" and was completely unnecessary. He claimed the Cold War was over, that the world was returning to peace, and that he "would not lose any sleep" over removing this capability from the military.

The total cost to Canadian taxpayers to cancel the contract amounted to $478.3 million. There was no study done as to what the repercussions would be.

No military professionals were consulted. It was simply cancelled. And here we are 15 years later, still scrambling to keep helicopters in the air that have no place in modern operations. Just last week, two Sea Kings were pulled out of exercises off Nova Scotia due to engine fires...

Although Chretien's government was prepared to pay far more to cancel the 1992 contract, it is speculated that AgustaWestland let the feds off easy to help its bid for the search and rescue helicopter competition it knew was coming.

In 1998, AgustaWestland won this contract with a near replica of the model that Chretien had so vehemently attacked in 1992.

But when the competition for the naval helicopter was officially initiated in 2000, the Liberal government was determined not to be embarrassed again. EH Industries, by then called AgustaWestland, again put forth its military model. But as the allegations go, the procurement process was subsequently altered to preclude the company from winning. In July 2004, the $3.2-billion contract was given to Sikorsky and AgustaWestland filed its lawsuit.

Now we discover that the government is off the hook and the winning competitor may be nearly three years late.

The Canadian government could potentially penalize Sikorsky several thousand dollars a day for being late, and it would certainly set a good precedent. It is unlikely the Sea Kings will remain serviceable for three more years.

The tax dollars that have gone toward hours worked since the 1970s on replacing the Sea Kings are incalculable and there is still nothing to show for it.

Chief of Defence Staff Gen. Rick Hillier was obviously frustrated by the news and correctly explained that Canada needs to lose its reputation for being "world-class at maintaining old equipment." The first step, however, would be to buy equipment that actually exists and can be delivered on time.

Until then, the failures in the Canadian procurement system will remain a good bet.

Aaron Plamondon is a National Defence Fellow at the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary and teaches history at Mount Royal College

Update thought: So maybe it's all Paul Martin's fault, not Jean Chretien's as MND MacKay has said, since his government chose the Cyclone over the Cormorant. But the Cormorant itself has not been without problems...