Afstan: US Secretary of Defense stirs up a hornets' nest

Was he quoted accurately and in context? If yes, he should staple his lips when talking to reporters:

Gates faults NATO force in southern Afghanistan

The hornets:

NATO aghast at U.S. criticism of Afghan allies

The second story contains a Pentagon clarification:

In Washington, Mr. Gates' spokesman Geoff Morrell said the secretary had "read the article and is disturbed by what he read."

Mr. Morrell did not challenge the accuracy of the quotes in the story, but said he thought it left the wrong impression — that Mr. Gates had singled out a particular country.

"For the record he did not — to the L.A. Times or at any time otherwise — publicly ever criticize any single country for their performance in or commitment to the mission in Afghanistan," Mr. Morrell told Pentagon reporters in Washington.

Instead, Mr. Morrell said Mr. Gates had pointed out that "NATO as an alliance, does not train for counterinsurgency. The alliance has never had to do it before."..

Another version of this AP story is here. More on bickering at this earlier post.

My understanding, from a knowledgeable source, is that in fact we went into combat at Kandahar in 2006 having trained along Cold War lines based on the "Fulda Gap" scenario (Mr Gates coincidentally remarks: '"Most of the European forces, NATO forces, are not trained in counterinsurgency; they were trained for the Fulda Gap," Gates said, referring to the German region where a Soviet invasion of Western Europe was deemed most likely.'). However the CF have been exceptionally rapid at learning counterinsurgency lessons and putting them into practice; they are now very well trained for what they're doing. The source made a rather rude remark about Mr Gate's claims as they relate to the present.

Mr Gates has sparked a rather active discussion at Milnet.ca. One especially apposite comment:

Is he commenting on the day-to-day tactical abilities of NATO units, or more at the operational execution of these grand NATO HQ's with a piece of the pie for everybody?

He probably has some merit in commenting on the relative inexperience of other countries [the Brits?]. Let's be frank, Canada's last counterinsurgency effort was the Boer War. Although our experience (and the fact that most of our Army participated) in the Balkans has given us some institutional foundation for operating in a complex, ethnically/tribal riven, religiously fuelled conflict, I think we can say that we walked into Kandahar without really knowing fully what we were doing. We sent a mechanized battlegroup that was trained and organized to fight in Europe. We are fighting an insurgency with tanks and artillery - but whether these are useful or not is debatable; Mr Gates own military seems to delight in using them to smash insurgent strongholds like Fallujah. We don't have a counterinsurgency doctrine in place, and the draft of the one didn't make it too far before the preface became a political gongshow. Politically, our government(s) didn't know how to explain this to Canadians, and Canadians didn't know how to process it.

So, sure, maybe he does have merit by saying we're not "structured" or "experienced" like the Americans to prosecute this war. But that doesn't mean we ain't trying and we ain't learning, and I'll bet my backpay that we are far better off now then we were two years ago when we first went in...

Here's an article on the evolution of US counterinsurgency doctrine in Iraq. And here is the US plan for ISAF Regional Command East where they are in control:

The Afghan army will lead nearly all military operations in eastern Afghanistan this year, with U.S. troops in a support role, a top American general said Wednesday.

It's the next step in a strategy to increase the strength of Afghanistan's military so U.S. forces can leave one day...

Sounds familiar, if more advanced than our situation at Kandahar. And along the lines of what the Manley panel looks like recommending.

Here's some other potentially positive news (sorry, the post has grown like topsy):

Pakistan is taking a more welcoming view of U.S. suggestions for using American troops to train and advise its own forces in the fight against anti-government extremists, the commander of U.S. forces in that region said Wednesday.

Navy Adm. William J. Fallon, commander of U.S. Central Command, said he believes increased violence inside Pakistan in recent months has led Pakistani leaders to conclude that they must focus more intensively on extremist al-Qaida hideouts near the border with Afghanistan...

This type of assistance, it must be kept in mind, is something separate from expanded (and controversial) US covert operations in Pakistan.

Update: From the reporter's mouth:

L.A. Times journalist Peter Spiegel stuck to the story he broke, telling Mike Duffy Live (video here) that Gates was very clear in his criticisms and doubts about the training received by the U.S.'s allies in the region.

"The question as I presented it to him is I had actually been hearing a lot of buzz in the Pentagon from military leaders that they had been concerned about the south, and again, what they call a lack of capability of the NATO forces in the south in counterinsurgency," said Spiegel in Los Angeles.

"I asked him if he agreed with that, and he said he agreed. He went on to talk at great length about how his concern was NATO forces were not trained in counterinsurgency."

Spiegel said Gates never explicitly said American forces would do a better job in the region, but that he "certainly" compared and contrasted the relatively quiet eastern Afghanistan -- where the U.S. forces are in control -- and the turbulent south.

"The implication was the U.S. has now got it right," said Spiegel, ". . . and is ahead of the Europeans in the south and Canadians in the south in effectively fighting a counterinsurgency."

"Granted, I've talked to a lot of people both at NATO and some military analysts who said it took a long time for the U.S. to get it right," he added...

Upperdate: From another knowledgeable source:

1. Canadian Army doctrine generally sees "battle" as a spectrum of 'styles' ranging from the Fulda Gap to UN peacekeeping ops; COIN is one of those and not separable from the rest. In theory, a well-trained Army should be able to switch from one complex war 'style' to another with minimal difficulty. The transition is eased by having lower-level op-plans/templates which lay out the specifics required to fight defined 'styles' of war. Doctrine represents the codification of those plans for future reference. Whether the Canadian Army has a published Doctrine on COIN is less important than whether it can field the skills to fight a COIN-style war; the question is then, has the Army made such a change? I would suggest that the Army began changing its focus, from a pure Fulda Gap style to a COIN style, during 3PP's deployment to Kandahar in 2002. In fact, 3PP arrived in Kandahar with a CIMIC-type section to begin the "hearts and minds" task with the locals. And we passed on our lessons learned to our Allies.

2. The Army has a section which processes the "Lessons Learned" from After Action Reports and periodic field reports; the bulletins keep units informed prior to deployments, modifying operations and training, and therefore improving the skills with which the soldiers are fighting their battles. Eventually, the validated lessons lead to changes in doctrine, and sometimes new doctrine. There is no indication that the Army is not keeping up with our Allies in improving the requisite fighting skills.

3. Much of this silly kerfuffle appears to have resulted from injudicious opinions expressed by one or more "Pentagon officials". I would point out that, were individual Canadian military personnel solicited, one could collect similar opinions (with greater validity) on "Why the Canadian Army is superior to the US Army".

4. I note that someone denigrated the Army's time in the Balkans as being less than applicable to COIN expertise. Given the general readiness to cite Gen Petreaus as a COIN authority, I would point out that he was a BGen Ops in SFORHQ 2001-02. Where Canadian troops were standard-setters.