Air forces' futures
...The Air Force’s point about preparing for the decisive wars is, in our mind, well-taken. It is hard for us to accept the idea that the nation-state is helpless in front of determined subnational groups. More important, it is hard for us to accept the idea that international warfare is at an end. There have been long periods in the past of relative tranquility between nation-states — such as, for example, the period between the fall of Napoleon and World War I. Wars between nations were sparse, and the European powers focused on fourth-generational resistance in their colonies. But when war came in 1914, it came with a vengeance.Meanwhile,"F-22 Super Manouverability"; we in Canada can but dream:Our question regards the weapons the Air Force wants to procure. It wants to build the F-22 fighter at enormous cost, which is designed to penetrate enemy airspace, defeat enemy fighter aircraft and deliver ordnance with precision to a particular point on the map. Why would one use a manned aircraft for that mission? The evolution of cruise missiles with greater range and speed permits the delivery of the same ordnance to the same target without having a pilot in the cockpit. Indeed, cruise missiles can engage in evasive maneuvers at g-forces that would kill a pilot. And cruise missiles exist that could serve as unmanned aircraft, flying to the target, releasing submunitions and returning home. The combination of space-based reconnaissance and the unmanned cruise missile — in particular, next-generation systems able to move at hypersonic speeds (in excess of five times the speed of sound) — would appear a much more efficient and effective solution to the problem of the next generation of warfare.
We could argue that both Gates and the Air Force are missing the point. Gates is right that the Air Force should focus on unmanned aircraft; technology has simply moved beyond the piloted aircraft as a model. But this does not mean the Air Force should not be preparing for the next war. Just as the military should have been preparing for the U.S.-jihadist war while also waging the Cold War, so too, the military should be preparing for the next conflict while fighting this war. For a country that spends as much time in wars as the United States (about 17 percent of the 20th century in major wars, almost all of the 21st century), Gates’ wish to focus so narrowly on this war seems reckless.
At the same time, building a new and fiendishly expensive version of the last generation’s weapons does not necessarily constitute preparing for the next war. The Air Force was built around the piloted combat aircraft. The Navy was built around sailing ships. Those who flew and those who sailed were necessary and courageous. But sailing ships don’t fit into the modern fleet, and it is not clear to us that manned aircraft will fit into high-intensity peer conflict in the future.
We do not agree that preparing for the next war is pathological. We should always be fighting this war and preparing for the next. But we don’t believe the Air Force is preparing for the next war. There will be wars between nations, fought with all the chips on the table. Gates is right that the Air Force should focus on unmanned aircraft. But not because of this war alone.
7 Comments:
Very interesting video! Thanks for posting that.
Since the F-22 can cruise supersonically without afterburners, I assume the aircraft's lighting them up at this airshow was for show. But pretty neat to watch, regardless.
I'd guess that the aircraft can do even more than what was demonstrated. The USAF would want it's uppermost capabilities kept secret and not on display at an airshow.
That's said to be why the F-22 is not going to be sold to anybody. The AF considers it's total capabilities so incredible, so much an edge for maintaining air supremacy against anybody, that they don't want the F-22 technology getting out to adversaries via espionage on Allies' Air Forces.
From what I've read, Japan, Israel and Australia have all expressed interest in buying F-22s. While the US military and top civilian leadership apparently have complete confidence in the Australian security, the same can't be said of the Japanese. (Confidence enough that, for example, the Aussie Collins class subs have the very latest advanced US sonar, the same as currently used on US nuclear subs. That speaks volumes.)
It's public knowledge there have been numerous Japanese leaks of top secret info, such as on the Aegis system, to hostile foreign nations. And, as far as Israel, it's also public knowledge that US secret technology tends to find it's way into Israeli foreign arms sales. Leakage with a profit to the leakers. If the US is selective and sells them to the Australians, it makes it extremely awkward vis a vis the Japanese and Israelis.
All these considerations (notwithstanding the resultant much higher per-aircraft cost) would seem to have played their part in the adopting of the policy of no foreign F-22 sales.
Stratfor has basically half-jumped the shark in that article by comparing apples to cheetahs.
The F-22 does have some innate ground-strike capability, but that role is properly reserved for the F-35. The F-22's primary mission is to keep the airspace clear of any other airborne threat. Which is, not coincidentally, something that no cruise missile (or present-day UAV) could hope to do.
Could an air dominance UAV be built? Sure. But they also have limitations. You have to have to be able to recreate remotely the kind of situation awareness a human would get from a high-vis cockpit. The UAVs we build today are meant to smoke relatively slow-moving targets on the ground, not go head to head at 1400kts closure against even yesterday's fighters.
And then you have to train an entire generation of pilots how to fly and fight ACM from a stationary trailer and not from the cockpit.
Finally you have to protect the C4ISR links from the pilot to the aircraft. In an F-22, the OPFOR has no way of disrupting pilot/acft interaction except to deal out incapacitating damage to the pilot or the aircraft. Not an easy proposition at the best of times.
Now imagine a remote situation -- say, notional pilotless F-22s with pilots in Kansas but the actual airframes in South Korea. The OPFOR does not have to neutralise either the pilot or the airframe in order to render the asset inoperable. All they have to do is sever the comms from the pilot to the aircraft.
In other words down a satellite, which on average take 18 months to replace. A non-autonomous air dominance UAV will get smoked if it can't fly and fight on its own, independent of human control.
And the OPFOR still has the option of trying to destroy the airframe or the location of the remote pilot.
Air dominance UAVs will come along sooner rather than later, but no mere cruise missile can hope to accomplish what an F-22 can in the hands of a well-trained pilot.
Bravo, Mr. Taylor. A truly full but succinct description of why UAVs cannot yet replace manned aircraft.
I've written posts here on F-35 issues (especially technical) but I cannot imagine posting better commentary than what you've just done. Well done, sir.
Dave, your summary of the DOD/USAF's security concerns is excellent. However, there is a strong military incentive to release the plane to the Japanese so as to sustain the production line and reduce cost for another hundred or so USAF machines. It will be contingent on how well the JSDF convinces their US counterparts that they now take counter-intel more seriously.
BTW, Dave, I saw the F-22 at the 2007 Air & Sea Show in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Its manuevers coming out of a stalled flat spin were like nothing you'd expect from a fixed-wing aircraft.
And while I'm here: "Well done" to everyone at The Torch!
-Jay
Chris and Jay, thanks for your very informative comments. (That's what I love about the Torch. Not only do the blog owners know what the hell they're talking about and present it objectively, but we also get a lot of intelligent, informed commentary.)
On thinking about what Chris wrote about pilotless combat aircraft, I'm now much more aware of the huge technological challenges posed in transitioning. The whole set of challenges are probably far greater even than were posed in going from prop birds to jets. I expect we'll eventually see it but apparently not in the forseeable future.
Jay, as far as buying more than the intended 180 F-22s, I personally think it a bad idea. All that money is badly needed elsewhere. We need to replace most of the KC tanker fleet. We also need to buy a thousand or two F-35s. We need to build the strategic missile defense network. We need a new generation of intel satellites. China has built a successful anti-satellite system, therefore the US MUST do likewise. The Navy needs new destroyers, frigates and fleet auxiliary vessels. Pretty much the whole Coast Guard fleet needs to be replaced. Then, there's the mundane - much infrastructure at stateside bases needs replacement or upgrading.
So, priorities will have to be set and, as nice as some people (not including me) think it might be to have another hundred F-22s, IMO the money would be more wisely invested elsewhere.
(Incidentally, I recommend a couple of articles for everyone to read that's very much on point about the F-22 and the future of the USAF, which will influence the future of all Allied AFs.
First, writer and retired US Army Intel Col. Ralph has an excellent article in today's New York Post. Peters discusses at length the firing of Air Force Secretary Michael Wynne and Chief of Staff General Michael Moseley by the new Defense Secretary Gates. The reasons for the firings go to the state of the AF today and to the heart of the proposed AF of the future.
Second, there's an article at Strategy Page, entitled "Behind Gates' Decision to Fire Up the Air Force". This also gives some valuable background info.
(As a USAF enlisted veteran from the end of the Vietnam era into the mid 70's, I've been wondering what the hell the Brass Hats have been doing with the Air Force. Downsizing the AF by massive Reductions in Force of career officers and NCOs with good records, solely in order to save billions to buy more gold-plated F-22s strikes me as an appallingly bad idea.)
Thanks for the compliment, Dave. And you're right, some of the comments we get to our posts here are better than the posts themselves. I know I learn a great deal from some commenters.
Hi, Dave.
You very correctly poin out that the USAF has has many pressing needs, but please consider that 188 F-22s is not all that large a force when you consider the possible requirements of a future war.
More specifically, if that war is initiated by a well-equipped (and perhaps large) country whose air force WILL fight at a time and place of THEIR choosing, the US might face the necessity of defensively deploying fighters throughout a theater-wide area. Such a deployment could easily mean, perhaps, 8-10 bases. If you want to maintain a CAP/intercept capability of four ships 24/7 per base, you could then have the vast majority of US F-22s deployed in that one theater. When you then consider that the F-22 is also a vital component of North American air defense, it is entirely possible that there would be no Raptors available for operations ANYWHERE outside thes two areas.
Then, if any other country (even a small ally of the aggressor) decides to jump into the fight outside of the theater AO, the available US airpower will prove inadequate.
Now, while many people have confidence in the air-to-air capabilities of the F-35 (and for good reason), it's going to be many years before the Lightning II strike force is built up to the level where many F-35s could be spared to augment air defence.
(Please note: I'm purposely excluding the remaining F-15/F-16/F-18 force because these aircraft will increasingly cease to be the force multipliers that they have been over the last thirty years. That is why the Air Force requirement was for about 276 aircraft only about five years ago.)
UCAVs will eventually be nice, but for the next several decades the balance of air power will still be decided by manned aircraft. If you're the one on the defensive, you'd better have enough of them to compensate for the enemy's ability to choose where he concentrates his forces.
Maybe, therefore, a trusted (and rich) ally's purchase of F-22s will make the additional fighters affordable for the USAF in numbers sufficient for a two theatre war.
Please let me know if I've gotten anything wrong in my analysis.
Thanks!
-Jay
BTW, I read StategyPage, too.
You're right. The USAF needs good low level leaders and cashiering them wholesale is a bad idea. Therefore anything that we can do to keep F-22 costs down (without compromising security) is vital.
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