Afstan: Mea culpa on government report

One really should do the work before reacting. My excuse is that the Government's news release and summaries do no justice to what the report actually says--now that I have taken the time to read it. One rationale, though not a justification, for my response, is that the PFD complete version was hard to find. The report actually is a remarkably frank document, perhaps worthy of what the British used to call a "State Paper". Some non-politicians have done some very good and, pretty honest under the circumstances, work--read the whole thing. There's policy, whether or not one agrees with it. My excerpts:

...we are preparing specific benchmarks that will allow Parliament and Canadians to assess progress. These benchmarks will be presented in next fall’s quarterly report, and subsequent reports will regularly measure progress against them...

Prominent among Canadian activities will be three “signature projects.” As we progress in our efforts, Canadian contributions will significantly benefit the people of Kandahar with a shift from 17 percent to 50 percent of programming focused in the province. These efforts will be highlighted with three Canadian signature projects. In the first, Canada will support rehabilitation of the Dahla Dam and its irrigation and canal system, generating jobs and fostering agriculture. The second signature project involves the construction of 50 schools. Through the third signature project, Canada will expand support for polio immunization, with the aim to eradicate polio in Afghanistan by the end of 2009...

To this end, as decided in Parliament, our military contribution is to be extended to
July 2011. In addition to helping ensure the security of the Province of Kandahar, this military contribution will be increasingly focused on training and other efforts that will enable the Afghan National Security Forces to sustain a more secure environment; provide security for reconstruction and development in Kandahar province; and support the Canadian-led Provincial Reconstruction Team in Kandahar. At the same time, Canada’s civilian contributions to Afghan security, governance and development are being expanded and redirected for early, practical and sustainable results, particularly in Kandahar province...

Security in Afghanistan deteriorated through 2007 and early 2008. Levels of both insurgent and criminal violence rose in many regions, and more civilians were killed in 2007 than in any year since the fall of the Taliban in 2001. For the rest of 2008, security conditions are expected to remain stable at best, and might grow worse in coming months in some provinces [emphasis added]...

Governance—the government’s ability to protect and serve its citizens effectively and accountably—is undermined by persistent weak capacity in Afghan ministries and other institutions. This is an area of particular concern to the international community...

To achieve measurable progress by 2011, Canada will focus on specific priorities that are mutually reinforcing and consistent with Canada’s own strengths. We will continue to support the Afghan government at the national level, but we will expand our concentration of resources and efforts in Kandahar where Canadian soldiers, diplomats, police, development specialists and others can work together to best advantage. Just as crucially, activities will be chosen based on a realistic expectation of visibility and practical impact—benefiting Afghans in ways that improve their lives and strengthen their confidence in their own country’s future. Again the logic is plain: as key districts in Kandahar become more secure and better governed, as Afghan institutions deliver more services and administer justice more reliably, then Afghans will trust their government more and advance their own development...

The Government is assigning more diplomats and development officers to Kandahar, and has appointed a senior-level Representative of Canada in Kandahar to strengthen operational management of the Canadian engagement. The number of Canadian civilians posted in Kandahar will almost triple this year, rising from 27 to 71; and at the Canadian Embassy in Kabul, the number of civilians is increasing from 24 to 32. More decisionmaking authority has been delegated to Canadian civilians in Kandahar, and it will be exercised with more effective civilian-military coordination [emphasis added]...

...The Canadian Forces are currently mentoring five ANA battalions (each
comprising, in theory, about 650 soldiers) and one brigade headquarters, all in Kandahar. The current ANA complement in Kandahar is approximately 2,400 compared with just 600 in 2006. Nationally, the current ANA complement is approximately 50,000 compared with approximately 20,000 in 2006. Progress has been significant with considerable improvements in both numbers and quality, but challenges remain. ANA leadership, administration and logistical support are weak, and the numbers of ANA personnel made available for training tend to fluctuate with the seasons. Some ex-Soviet equipment will need to be replaced with NATO-standard material and weapons. The Canadian Forces in Kandahar, working in close cooperation with the international community, are intensifying efforts to train and prepare the ANA to plan, execute and sustain independent operations by 2011. The recently announced U.S. deployment of 1,000 more troops to Kandahar by February 2009, and arrangements to acquire more helicopter-lift capacity and unmanned aerial vehicles, will strengthen the Canadian Forces’ capacity to pursue this objective while better protecting Canadian soldiers and civilians...

...The ANP, at a minimum, must be able to recruit, train, retain, pay and equip its members. But the ANP faces sizable impediments, among them an insurgency that systematically targets police. The ANP has also displayed high rates of illiteracy, corruption and drug abuse within its ranks. For many Afghans, local police personify the government itself; police failures alienate communities from the government and hold back development progress...

Kandahar is a province in a poor country. Scarcely 5 percent of Kandahari women can read; and the literacy rate among men is an estimated 26 percent. Basic public services remain inaccessible to most of its population. Nor have formal government institutions established a significant presence outside Kandahar City and a few larger rural communities. Governmental performance is further undermined by corruption and inefficiency. Plainly, successful development will require better governance, especially in the delivery of essential services and in job generation...

It is therefore a Canadian priority to help strengthen Afghanistan’s capacity to manage the border and promote stability and economic development in the border area. This can only be achieved by facilitating a regular and constructive dialogue, formal and informal, between Afghanistan and Pakistan at national and local levels.
Developing this dialogue will mean overcoming the uneasy relationships that have
prevailed between the two countries. The uneasiness has several sources: Afghanistan’s non-recognition of the internationally accepted Durand Line as the border; the presence of Pashtun and Baluch populations straddling the border and continuously moving across it; the failure in Pakistan to control extremist groups using Pakistani bases for attacks into Afghanistan; and the presence of 2.15 million Afghan refugees still in Pakistan. Mitigating Afghan-Pakistani antagonisms by addressing these and other issues will demand sustained, coordinated diplomatic efforts...

Canada alone cannot control outcomes in Afghanistan, a country at war. There will be setbacks along with successes. But Canada can focus its military and civilian efforts where they likely can do the most good. The Government has identified policy priorities for Canadian engagement and is concentrating more of Canada’s efforts in Kandahar [emphasis added]...

But see the Update here on "signature" aid projects.