Sea King progress

Further to this post, there is some welcome news:

Military: Sea King pilot time up 35%
Flight time for choppers also up since 2006 crash

A Sea King helicopter lifts a crew member aboard off George’s Island in Halifax Harbour on Sept. 19 after taking part in a charity event. (Tim Krochak / Staff)

The amount of time Sea King pilots get in the air has increased considerably since a crash off Denmark nearly three years ago that investigators blamed on "an insidious combination of circumstances that led to a lowering of aircrew proficiency."

A recent report from the air force probe points to poor training due to a lack of working helicopters and available ships to practise night landings on as root causes of the Feb. 2, 2006, crash that happened when a Sea King tried to touch down at night on the deck of HMCS Athabaskan.

All five of the helicopter’s crew survived the crash into the ocean, but the subsequent investigation revealed pilots were only getting the bare minimum of training.

"The aircraft accident kind of happened at our low point and we’ve been climbing up ever since then," Maj. John Schwindt, the military’s maritime helicopter readiness expert, said Friday.

Since 2005-06, there has been a 20 per cent increase in the annual flying rate for Sea Kings, he said.

"And the average pilot time is up 35 per cent since that time."

The availability of ships to practise night landings on has also increased, said Maj. Schwindt, a Sea King navigator.

"The navy is willing and able to support the training," he said...

Attrition among technicians who service the 45-year-old choppers was a real problem at the time of the 2006 crash, he said.

But the air force has since increased the number of technicians who work on the Sea Kings. "We’ve had a significant improvement in the quality and the quantity of trained technicians we have that are doing the maintenance."

In 2006, the military trained 67 technicians and in 2008, it produced 76 technicians.

"Maintenance hours have been reduced by about 20 per cent and because of that, mean down time has decreased."

The air force only has one Sea King flight simulator, located at Shearwater, which the accident report says "is not of sufficient quality or fidelity to authentically replicate flying conditions."

Despite the lack of computer graphics, Maj. Schwindt said it sometimes runs 14 hours a day.

"Obviously, nothing will . . . ever replace flying the actual machine," he said.

The report on the 2006 accident says the pilots had "absolute minimum" training levels.

"We haven’t lowered the standards at all since then," Maj. Schwindt said...

2008 Canadian Blog Awards: Round 2

The Torch is still in for Best Group Blog. Click that mouse, please.

Update: From Raphael Alexander:

...
Best Group Blog

While I am sorely tempted to vote for my brothers at the Broom, and make no mistake, it is an excellent group blog, it seems that the military category was dropped from the awards this year, meaning the incumbent winner goes into this one. There is no better source for Canadian military information at The Torch, and they deserve an award for the work they do each and every day...

Thanks.

Joint Task Force Afghanistan Air Wing

The Air Force's distinct contribution to the mission is taking shape:

Thirty soldiers from CFB Edmonton's helicopter squadron will deploy to Afghanistan on Monday.

Members of the 408 Tactical Helicopter Squadron will make up the bulk of the current Canadian Helicopter Force in Afghanistan.

The deployment comes days after Defence Minister Peter McKay announced that eight Griffon helicopters will be used in Afghanistan. The Griffons will act as escorts for six Chinook transport helicopters recently acquired from the United States.

[A Chinook helicopter in Afstan, with a Griffon--in Canada--below]

The Chinooks are already in Afghanistan [all of them - MC?] and the Griffons will be shipped soon [via those handy CC-177s?].

Soldiers [Air Force personnel, please] leaving on Monday will run the Chinooks while the Griffon crews are scheduled to deploy later this year, said Capt. Rod Dietzmann.

The Griffons and 408 members were similarly deployed in Bosnia for troop transport [I don't see "troop transport" as a prime role in Afstan--that's what the blinking Chinooks are for; but maybe occasionally in support of JTF 2 - MC?] and aerial reconnaissance. It is the first full deployment of the squadron to Afghanistan.

Canadian Forces will also use Unmanned Aerial Vehicles for surveillance. All the airborne equipment is expected to be in place by February 2009.

A newly formed company -- the Joint Task Force Afghanistan Air Wing -- will encompass all deployed Canadian aircraft. Roughly 1,000 CFB Edmonton soldiers returned from Afghanistan this fall. The bulk of soldiers currently deployed are from CFB Petawawa.

I would assume the Griffons might also have an escort role for these helicopters:

KANDAHAR - As the early morning Afghan sun struggled to rise above the rugged mountains, two Canadian-contracted Mi-8 helicopters lifted off from Kandahar Air Field carrying valuable supplies to troops in Canadian forward operating bases in Kandahar Province. The flights on Nov. 17 marked the first time these aircraft have been employed under a new contract that increases Task Force Kandahar's air capability.

Colonel Christopher Coates, Joint Task Force Afghanistan Air Wing Commander, said that the addition of this new capability will "get Canadians off the roads here in Afghanistan where they are exposed to all the dangers of this country... ambushes and IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices) and the other things that all Canadians are aware of.

"The Canadian aviation community that I'm very much a part of back in Canada is very excited to be here and it's something we've wanted to do for quite some time," he added. "We believe we've got a lot to contribute to the operation and we are very excited to be here."

According to Bob Waring, Project Manager for the Toronto-based Sky Link, the contracted Mi-8 helicopters are ideally suited for operations in Afghanistan. "It is a very versatile aircraft with extremely good capability for high, hot and heavy operations which is what we are looking at doing here," he said.

"It's an austere and difficult environment but we've got the airframes and we've got the crews that are up to the task," he continued. "We have the best of intelligence, the best of coordination, the best of communications, so through that, we are able to do what we need to do."..

Late this summer, Task Force Afghanistan began using the new Scan Eagle UAV [see II. Securing high performance Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance...Immediate Needs:... here] in support of its operations. The Heron UAV tactical system has been leased and is expected to commence operations in Kandahar Province in early 2009.

Chinook D model helicopters are being purchased from the U.S. government and are expected to be flying in support of operations by February 2009...

From a post in July 2008:

Some information from a good authority:

Afghan commitment: By the end of the year there will likely by some 700 Air Force personnel (vice 350 now) committed to the mission, at Camp Mirage and in Afghanistan [Update: maybe even more when the Griffons are in-country]. Air Force engineers are currently overseeing some of the road building being done by Afghans as Army engineers are stretched...

Some thoughts at the end of this post on a possible mission after 2011 for the new Joint Task Force Afghanistan Air Wing.

Update: Later reports:

Canadian Air Wing to take the skies over Kandahar

Canadian Forces launch new air wing in Afghanistan

"A significant piece of Canada's military history" be damned

What a crying shame:

A string of emails and several phone conversations later, the auction house unexpectedly told Simmons they received another offer from a local collector. The medals could still be his if he paid more than $17,000 and transferred the money "immediately," they said.

"It would have been doable in a week," Simmons said. "But not in one day."

Simmons said he "tried his best" and believes the medals could have been on the first ship back to Canada if there had been "goodwill from all sides."

"The people involved could've made it happen but it came down to the bottom line."

I know the seller was supposedly family, but this is just egregiously venal. These medals and memorabilia belong in Canada.

If we don't call it an 'about face', do you think anyone will notice?

I suspect that's what MND Mackay's staffers were asking themselves when the decision to put Griffons in Kandahar as armed escort choppers was made.

Pugliese either misses the point, or twists it, though:

I would also think Liberal Senator Colin Kenny might find this announcement interesting. He suggested sending the Griffons in the fall of 2007 at which point Mr. MacKay ridiculed him for it……Mr. Kenny wanted to the Griffons sent ASAP to act as surveillance choppers and to haul some supplies and troops.

The Air Force responded that the Griffons couldn’t operate in Kandahar’s high altitude and heat.

“It is unfortunate that Senator Kenny doesn't know his facts,” stated Mr. MacKay’s office. “There is no intent to deploy the Griffon to Afghanistan.

Okay, if you say so Pete………

I'm the first to admit the CF and the MND look like they've flip-flopped on this. But if you look at what was actually said in the public arena on the issue - in context - the disagreement isn't quite what Pugliese portrays:

But Mr. Kenny says Canada has an existing fleet of smaller Griffon choppers that could be used in Afghanistan. "Obviously the Griffons won't be able to carry as much as a Chinook, but they can still play a role in moving some equipment and reducing some of the exposure of supply columns to IEDs," he said. "Any amount counts."

"Why isn't that being done?" Mr. Kenny asked. "Why do we have 76 Griffons still sitting here in Canada?"

Defence Department spokeswoman Sarah Kavanagh said the current Afghanistan mission requires a medium-lift helicopter able to carry sufficient numbers of personnel, up to 30 at a time, or an appropriate amount of cargo and equipment.

"The role of the Griffon is not intended to fill the role of a medium-lift helicopter, and at this time there is no intent to deploy the Griffon to Afghanistan," said Miss Kavanagh. But, she added, "While the performance characteristics of the Griffon are not ideally suited to the environment in Afghanistan, the Canadian Forces continues to monitor the evolution of operations in that theatre to determine if there may be an appropriate role for the Griffon in the future." [Babbler's emphasis]

It seems to me that Kenny was suggesting the Griffons should be used for airlift. It seems to me that the MND's spokesperson said that the Griffon isn't suited to that role. And it seems to me that the Griffons being sent over now aren't going over in an airlift capacity - they're going over in an escort and possibly CCS (Close Combat Support) role.

It also seems to me that the MND's office left itself considerable wiggle room to reverse course on the idea of a Griffon deployment with the weasel words I've highlighted in bold print at the end of the quoted piece above.

Not quite the 'gotcha' moment our CanWest scribe would have you think it is. Of course, I don't have to feed my family or make a mortgage payment off what I write, which means I'm not part of a mainstream media culture that values such 'gotchas', and I feel no pressure to dig them up.

And as I said, regardless how the journalists focus on the political side of the decision, DND has really screwed the pooch with their public handling of the issue. I was told by any number of people within the defence community that deploying Griffons to Afghanistan was never going to happen, and was also told that it was happening for sure. 'Never' is one hell of a long time, people, and I don't know anything in the military that's 'for sure'. The MND and his people should have been saying all along that all options were on the table - not bashing Colin Kenny and setting themselves up for people to accuse them of going back on their word.

Now, to the rest of the silliness surrounding this announcement...

• Mark has already dealt with Ujjal Dosanjh's predictable idiocy.


• The Griffon may have been gussied up to do this role, but it's emphatically not an 'attack helicopter'.


• A 7.62mm gatling gun isn't insignificant, but it's hardly a "large machine gun" as this CBC piece would have you believe.


• Remember that the Griffons going over will be INGRESS equipped, which means they will be able to provide a significant ISR resource to the battlegroup as well as armed escort. It's not just about the guns, people.

Much as the questions being asked by our politicians and media are mostly off track, I think there are some questions surrounding this deployment that are worth pursuing. We at The Torch asked them months ago, and I don't believe they've been answered since then:

Thanks, *******. There's a lot of acronyms and jargon in there that I don't fully understand, but if I'm getting the gist of things, the writer believes it's worth stressing a few airframes in order to get even their most limited capabilities into the fight. Your idea of CCS [Close Combat Support], with the option of medevac if required/practical is an interesting one.

But is it worth trashing those choppers by riding them that hard in a situation they weren't designed for? I'm still on the fence on that one. At the end of the day, the CF doesn't exist solely to fight the Afghan mission, and as sure as God made little yellow politicians, you're going to need the whirlybirds somewhere else at some point - at which time, if they aren't there because we flew them too hard in Afg, somebody's going to throw a fit. Not to mention what happens if one goes down - remember the shit-storm over using the Iltis in Kabul? Best vehicle we had for the job at that point, just not the vehicle anyone wanted - which sounds suspiciously like the Griffon. And there's not a single politician who wants to be accused of sending over kit that's not up to the job.

Tough call on this one.

If one of these helos goes down, will people be screaming "Iltis!"? You bet they will. Is the government and the CF ready for that possibility? We'll see. Same thing with riding the birds so hard they wear out quicker than we're willing to replace them. But 'sufficient to the day are the evils thereof' or something like that, I guess: DND and the GofC will have to cross that bridge when they come to it.

I'm cautiously optimistic about this announcement. It's not the equipment we'd hope to have for such a situation. But it's what we've got, and we're finally going to stop letting the perfect be the enemy of the good. We're also finally going to be letting our Tac Hel guys and gals do more than just play RC pilot with UAV's, which they've been squirming and itching to do since their Army friends started deploying over there in the first place.

I wish them the best of luck. They're headed to the Two-Way Firing Range: they'll need it.

Update: Hmm. Just got some boilerplate stuff from the Air Force on this:

To support the helicopter escort role, February 2009, the Griffon will be equipped with an enhanced weapon system that will provide a higher rate-of-fire and a greater ability to sustain such fire than the existing armament. There will be further enhancements several months later that will include an advanced electro-optical sensor and a significantly enhanced weapon system with increased calibre and higher rate-of fire than the exisiting armament.

OK, I'm guessing that "enhanced weapon system" is the gatling gun I linked to above, but I'm not sure if there's another weapon system enhancement to come later that I'm missing here. But hey, when you're picking up e-mail at 5:00 on a Friday, you only get so much of a follow-up window, eh?

One other point from the e-mail that I thought interesting:

For more than a year, Griffon crews have been conducting extensive integration training with Canadian army units that they would support in Afghanistan. This training includes aerial fire support and airborne control of other aerial weapon systems in direct support of army personnel on the ground. Additional to this army integration training, Griffon crews have also conducted "hot and high" flying training at locations in the United States that replicate the conditions in the Afghanistan theatre of operations. This training included advanced tactics, night vision goggle training, mountain flying and practice with 'dust-ball' landings commonly experienced by aircrew operating in Afghanistan. As well, personnel training has included mission rehearsal exercises and scenario simulations that have emphasized command and control, leadership and decision-making in support of integrated air-land operations, in particular, the tactical integration of Griffon and Chinook helicopters together in Afghanistan.

So it seems the Griffons will be doing CCS work, at least if what they were practicing for is any prediction. Ready yourself for the outraged screams of "attack helicopter!"

Fear and loathing--and the Canadian Forces

If the Conservatives are a spectre haunting the CF, these guys would be horror made material--especially for the Afghan mission (see Mr Dosanjh around the middle of this post).

But maybe the monster won't gain the breath of life:

Plan to slash party funding won't be in key motion

Sorry about the politics, but Torch-relevant I think.

Update: Lots of updating at the links above.

"Afghanistan In Perspective"

A very helpful post by Raphael Alexander (exactly as at his site):

The BBC has a very interesting and varied webpage showing all sorts of graphs and charts and statistics [if you like that sort of thing, which I sort of do]. It's difficult sometimes to get bogged down in the language of the mission in Afghanistan, based on the pros and cons, the hawks and the doves, and so one sometimes forgets that behind it all is a much more colourful world than the black and white views we get presented. The truth is that despite all the bad news, there is much good we don't think about all that often.

The Taliban continue to wreak the main havoc in the lives of ordinary Afghanis, which needs to be remembered in any discussion about the mission. This continued insurgency, along with the illegal opium trade, has made it difficult to pursue even the most basic semblance of the rule of law and democratic leadership. Some of the statistics:

Refugees

Five million Afghans have returned since Afghanistan was liberated of the Taliban in 2001, while three million remain in exile. The refugee crisis has been enormous, and nowhere greater than in the south where the Canadian are deployed. The worst part of the refugee crisis is the displacement of people that leads to inevitable collateral casualties: a disturbing 1,445 civilians killed in the first 8 months of 2008.

That's 180 civilians a month. Most deaths have been perpetrated by the Taliban. But think of those five million exiles who have returned to their country because of a hope for something better than the Taliban.

Health

For some of you reading this, the idea that the average life expectancy in Afghanistan is 43 will be shocking. It is for me. That's only 9 years from now in my own life span, and quite disturbing to think of. Other than the war, the main problems are based on water, sanitation, disease, malnutrition, poverty, and displacement. Worse yet, because of corruption in government, it's been difficult to administer the kind of aid that is really needed here. Robert Fisk elaborates on this.

Education

For those who want western forces to leave Afghanistan to the Taliban, consider this fact: "4.2 million children" have returned to school since the fall of the Taliban. 4.2 million. That statistic alone is absolutely incredible, as it would represent 12.7% of the population of our entire nation. There is an obvious burning desire, a need, for children to get a proper education in Afghanistan. Of those children going to school, girls now make up 35% of the population. That is a staggering number of girls who would have been otherwise disenfranchised from what has been considered by the U.N. as a basic right to life.

Economy

War and drought has led to the increase in poppy cultivation, fueling the war with the Taliban. There are two extremely fascinating maps attributed to the problems facing food and poppy cultivation here:





You can see there are enormous problems facing the country, but many of them are based on the insurgency attempting to disrupt the rebuilding and reconstruction of the country. Despite it all, there is slow progress being made there. In 2007 it was reported that 1.73 million girls attended primary school, a statistic that would disappear in the return of the Taliban. It isn't that western forces aren't making a difference there, but the benefits appear too small over the length of time we have been there. As you can see, the most important part of rebuilding Afghanistan isn't just security [although it's major], but the difficult part of finding crops for farmers, an economy for the people, health care and immunizations against disease, sanitation, improvements to education, and major crackdowns on the corruption that robs the people of the little gains they make.

Many Canadians want us to leave Afghanistan [and we will, inevitably, in 2011 as part of a multipartisan decision in Parliament], but where would we go after that? As the Torch writes, "no Western country is going to send any serious number of troops to Congo, and Sudan simply won't voluntarily allow in any Western contributions to the hybrid AU/UN Darfur force that might help make that force effective in a real way." Are we moving on from Afghanistan because we've "done enough"? Or just to mix things up for a bit, and find a new hopeless mission to get half-finished and leave again?

Meanwhile, in Afghanistan . . .

Cross-posted from The Phantom Observer.

Seems a bit of a shame that, in all this political brouhaha, this news story should fall off the radar. Let me quote a bit from the NATO press release:

To the southeast in Panjwayi district, elements of the 3rd Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment Battle Group, carried out Operation Mutafiq Tander 6, which involved aggressive patrolling and preventing insurgents from withdrawing into the desert.

Each operation was a success in its own right, and their synchronized execution resulted in a disruption that overwhelmed the insurgents in an area where they normally enjoy a degree of freedom of movement.

I find it interesting that, apart from CTV and the Canadian Press, so few Canadian media sites are picking this story up, preferring to speculate on the Chrétien-Broadbent coalition idea instead.

Incidentally, so far we've managed to go 82 days without a Canadian combat death in Afghanistan. Not the longest stretch, by any means, but you have to admit we've had a very lucky autumn in that region.

"Canada's Engagement in Afghanistan, Report to Parliament, September 2008"

Text is here, haven't had a chance to read. This is at the end of a Toronto Star story on the Griffons for Afstan:

...a new Canadian report warned that overall security in Afghanistan is worse now than a year ago, with more, better-organized, and increasingly spectacular insurgent attacks and higher civilian and military casualties than any time since the Taliban were overthrown in 2001.

The quarterly report suggests slow progress is being made on training Afghan troops, as well as on humanitarian efforts like inoculating children against polio, or completing development projects like building schools.

Although the report claims progress, it also makes clear the government is far off many of the targets Ottawa has set before the withdrawal of Canadian troops in 2011.

So far, only one of five Afghan army battalions that have been trained are at a high level of "effective strength," and capable of taking over security for one of six key districts.

From Canwest News:

Security in Afghanistan has deteriorated to a seven-year low, Canada admitted Wednesday, as President Hamid Karzai continued to vent frustration at the slow pace of progress and accidental civilian deaths caused by Western forces...

International Trade Minister Stockwell Day, chair of the cabinet committee on Afghanistan, acknowledged, "there's been a deterioration" but insisted - just as the government's progress report stated - that Canada could still reach a series of benchmarks such as training enough Afghan army and police personnel before the Canadian Forces leave Kandahar in 2011.

Despite Day's best efforts to highlight the gains made in children's health and education, the construction of roads, and the optimism of launching the major Dhala Dam irrigation project, the government did not attempt to sugar-coat the grim security situation...

"Afghanistan and intl security trends"

Conference of Defence Associations media round-up.

Why bother trying to get C-130Js soonest...

...when there are decisions to be made about larding out the pork (that's my inference from this story, could be wrong)?

The U.S. has offered Canada early delivery on new C-130J military transport aircraft, but the Defence Department has taken months to decide whether it will accept.

Just last year, a Defence Department official said Canada was hoping for early delivery of the planes, but now that the Pentagon has made the offer, Canada has yet to make a decision.

Canada signed a contract with Lockheed Martin in December 2007 for 17 C-130Js, with the first aircraft to be delivered by December 2010 [see: Backgrounder...1. Tactical Airlift (C-130J Hercules)...Schedule here].

But the U.S. air force has agreed to free up two of the C-130Js from an ongoing order of its own with the manufacturer. That would allow the aircraft to be delivered to Canada six months earlier than scheduled so the Canadian Forces could get a head start in introducing the planes into the system...

Lockheed Martin spokesman Peter Simmons said the firm is standing by to hear how Canada wants to proceed.

According to an e-mail from the Defence Department's procurement branch, the Canadian Forces is "currently investigating options to expedite the delivery of the first aircraft."

"Therefore a possible date for early delivery has not yet been determined," the e-mail added.

Just last year, Dan Ross, the head of the Defence Department's procurement branch, confirmed that Canada had asked the Pentagon if it could pave the way for early delivery...

The assembly of the first Canadian aircraft is expected to start in the middle of next year, according to Lockheed Martin. The last aircraft will be delivered by the end of 2012.

Mr. Simmons said Lockheed Martin is now >running a competition for Canadian firms to supply various segments of the C-130J's in-service support package. That package, to run over the next 20 years, includes the various services needed to keep the planes operational. That would involve everything from the handling of spare parts to providing the electronic manuals needed by mechanics to work on the aircraft.

Once it has its Canadian team together, Lockheed Martin will take its in-service support proposal to the Canadian government for approval [emphasis added]...

By the way, Mr Ross said this in June 2007 (see 2)):

Dan Ross, the Defence Department's assistant deputy minister for materiel, said..."Once you're at contract you can negotiate delivery slots with other customers that would be earlier than 2010, maybe significantly earlier [emphasis added]," Mr. Ross said of the C-130J.

Missing opportunities it would seem.

Meanwhile, I see nothing wrong with a good sole-source contract (and I'm sure since it's to a Canadian firm based in Quebec--though its website rather downplays its Canadian nature--that the politicians didn't have too much trouble swallowing it):

CAE set to land federal training contract

The Conservative government is getting set to approve a $500-million program that would see the creation of aerospace training facilities to teach Canadian Forces aircrews how to fly new transport planes and helicopters, as well as aircraft to be bought in the future for search and rescue [see here for supposed schedule]

A team of Canadian companies led by CAE of Montreal will be awarded the contract for what is known as the Operational Training Systems Provider or "OTSP."

Montreal-based CAE, one of the world's largest aviation simulation firms, had been deemed by the federal government as the only qualified bidder for the program. Awarding the contract, however, had been delayed by the federal election in October...

Eight Griffons to Afstan

Been under consideration for quite some time (see 2)):

Canada to send Griffon attack helicopters to Afghanistan [they are utility helicopters, upgraded; this is an "attack helicopter"]

Specially modified helicopter gunships will escort Canada's new Chinook transport helicopters on operations in Afghanistan when they come into service in the new year, Defence Minister Peter MacKay said Wednesday.

The eight specially modified CH-146 Griffon utility helicopters will be equipped with large [not .50] machine-guns and sensors.

They will escort and protect six new CH-47 Chinooks, heavy-lift choppers already stationed at the Kandahar airfield [How many right now? Lousy reporting].

"This is going to give us increased … aerial capacity, it will also save lives," MacKay said.

"If we have people not travelling on roads, being able to get to forward operating bases and other parts outside the wire, this is absolutely going to impact on our operational ability in theatre."

Big transport helicopters such as Chinooks are vulnerable to attack by ground fire and rocket-propelled grenades when operating in war zones and usually travel with smaller, armed cousins along for protection.

The military didn't indicate whether the Griffons will be outfitted with missiles, or if they'll be limited to an escort role.

"[The helicopters] can be used for other purposes as well, but that's its primary purpose," MacKay said.

Some, however, have raised concerns the Griffons could be used to launch aerial attacks.

Afghan President Hamid Karzai has repeatedly decried NATO's use of aerial bombings because of the high risk of civilian casualties, saying as recently as yesterday that such attacks by international military forces must end.

Liberal MP Ujjal Dosanjh also expressed concern Wednesday, calling on the military to rule out any attack role for the new choppers.

"We need to put absolute restrictions on these escort helicopters…they cannot be used for attack purposes. They should be purely for defensive purposes, for escorting," he said.

As many as 250 more Canadian troops [Air Force personnel are, er, not usually described as "troops"] will be sent to Afghanistan to maintain and fly the Griffons.

Does the egregious Ujjal not recognize that, in the course of escorting, some return fire may be needed? Or that, even when not escorting, suppressive fire might just be helpful to our troops.? But then Mr Dosanjh is a Liberal. Forgive the politics; I don't think the Conservative government will readily acknowledge any non-escort role either. The official news release is here; the Griffons will be from 408 Tactical Helicopter Squadron, Edmonton.

The usual journalistic and political dealing with military matters. Bah! Humbug!

Thoughts for after 2011. How about keeping the PRT and a fair number of troops to mentor the ANA. But focus the mission on the Air Force, using the CH-47Ds and also new build CH-47Fs as and when we ever get them, Griffons, Heron UAVs, and C-17s and C-130Js to support our force and allies. Troops at KAF to provide force protection and support the mentors in the field when necessary, with required armour, and some JTF2 too. Probably a maximum of around 1,000 from the Army (about what the Aussies now have). No real idea of Air Force numbers but should be I imagine in the mid-hundreds actually in country (then there's Camp Mirage).

That would be a significant and useful contribution that the CF should be able to implement, and that I think would be welcomed by NATO and President Obama. I don't see why, in principle, the Canadian public could not be convinced to go along.

Moving from Kandahar would be very expensive and forgo all the local knowledge and familiarity acquired.

Update: The greater Air Force role now:

Joint Task Force Afghanistan Air Wing

A400M still downdate

The perverse pleasure continues: a post by AW&ST's London bureau chief (via Haletown at Milnet.ca):

Late, Later, Latest...

Software development is proving the latest in a growing list of culprits responsible for the delay in the first flight of the Airbus Military A400M.

A senior Airbus executive now suggests a first flight in the latter half of 2009 – a near three year slip on when the aircraft was due to fly. Development and verification of the software for the full authority digital engine control system for the TP400-D6 engine is proving a harder challenge than originally anticipated.

The A400M appears to be suffering from a “conspiracy of optimism” – though it is far from the only military project to have been beset by such.

Getting the program back on track – albeit one with a credibly revised time frame – is of fundamental importance: the partner nations need to know when they will actually get the aircraft, and Airbus – and EADS and other companies involved – need to figure out the extent of the financial hit they may have yet to take.

And there also remains the small issue of European credibility in the military transport arena.

More:

"When can we fly the damn thing?": Enders on A400M

Following on from Douglas' post yesterday [Nov. 24, above], I can reveal that Airbus itself is more than a little irritated at the delays on the A400M program, if CEO Tom Enders' reactions to persistent questioning from journalists last night can be used as a barometer.

Enders was the guest at a dinner hosted by the French Association of Professional Air and Space Journalists (AJPAE) but neither his lack of any comment at all about the A400M in his 30 minute long opening remarks nor the champagne aperitif were enough to push the A400M out of reporters' minds.

The second question from the floor “what about the A400M?” elicited the following comment from Enders: “right now we are asking when can we fly the damn thing! If it had reliable engines we could have flown it in September.” He added later that the engine test-bed – a C-130 with three of its own engines and one of the A400M's – would fly in the next three to four weeks in Britain. In response to persistent questioning about whether or not the A400M had an engine, he responded that once the engine was qualified then the A400M would be considered as having one.

Enders said “we are no longer daredevils as they were in the early days of aviation and we need some proof that this engine can fly.” He added that the FADEC electronic engine control was the problem. The A400M, he said, was a very complex airplane, “more complex than the Eurofighter or the Rafale,” and he refused to put any date at all on a possible first flight.

Afstan: Exit planning/Hoping more Yanks are coming

CDS Gen. Walt Natynczyk seems rather downbeat (and about the Navy too--for reasons see here):

...in windblown and landlocked Afghanistan, Canada and its military allies are dusting themselves off from a summer of stepped-up Taliban attacks, including the recent acid assault on schoolgirls and a prison break in Kandahar [more here], and the unprecedented targeting of Kabul's only luxury hotel and the Indian Embassy there [if you really think about it, not that many "sensational" actions over almost eleven months this year].

"Security has not improved, ladies and gentlemen, as the insurgents operated from sanctuaries along the Pakistan border and the attacks this summer became more sophisticated," Gen. Natynczyk told a military, business and diplomatic audience [at a Canadian Club luncheon].

"Quite simply, there aren't enough troops to secure the entire country," he added.

"The upcoming surge by the U.S. forces [see here and here] is essential to expand the security area, to hold the ground, to enable the Afghans to vote next fall."..

He also acknowledged the high cost of the mission, which the parliamentary budget officer recently projected as $18.1 billion by 2011.

"Most of these costs occurred because we allowed the Forces' capability to erode," said Gen. Natynczyk, who added that the infusions in recent years of billions of dollars to the defence budget have provided the equipment needed to protect Canadian soldiers and Afghans.

Federal spending estimates released yesterday [make what sense you can of them] showed that the incremental costs of the Afghanistan mission overshot projections by $331.1 million to hit a total of $848.6 million for 2008-09 to cover equipment, ammunition, repair and overhaul, immediate care, and engineering support.

Canadian soldiers, along with diplomats and aid workers, are racing to train enough Afghan police and army officers "despite the deterioration in the security situation" before the country withdraws its 2,500 troops in 2011 as scheduled.

"We're planning on this exit strategy with our NATO allies to ensure a seamless transfer of security responsibilities to other contingents [emphasis added]," he said, but refused to speculate afterward whether other NATO countries not serving in Afghanistan's troubled south would have to contribute troops.

He said "three years is a long time" for Canada to achieve its goals of training enough Afghan security forces to assume responsibility for their own people.

Gen. Natynczyk said the navy is his "greatest equipment concern" because it has not launched a new warship since the mid-1990s [emphasis added].

In yesterday's estimates, the navy also requested $54.6 million to modernize its Halifax-class frigates [part of this program, one assumes].

Gen. Natynczyk said eight years is the quickest time Canada has taken to design, build and commission a ship.

"Decisions we make now will have an impact," he said.

Afstan: MND MacKay's miserable failure to communicate

Here are some more interesting questions. During Question Period today recycled Liberal national defence critic Ujjal Dosanjh (there's a green joke there somewhere, Conservatives) twice asked Mr MacKay to identify the country providing the 1,000-strong battle group for Kandahar that the Manley panel insisted was necessary to support the CF's mission. The question was posed in a reasonable manner, not as a "gotcha!" The minister twice gave no direct reply.

My bloody questions. Why for pity's sake could Mr MacKay not simply have named the US Army battalion that has been helping us since August? Their presence is no secret. Is there something unspeakable about the "Ramrods"? Does the minister not in fact know they are there?

A disgraceful performance.

Some interesting questions

Peter Worthington's column in yesterday's Toronto Sun raised some interesting questions.

First, is General Natynczyk more reserved than General Hillier was because of pressure from the politicians and bureaucrats who threaten to make his life miserable if he speaks out - or worse, to take it out on his troops by punitively restricting his budget? Or is it just that he has a different personal style?

My guess is that it's a bit of both. I believe the most senior civil servants and Conservative political mavens have threatened in the past to hit the CF where it hurts most - in the pocketbook - if they didn't toe the communications line coming out of the PMO and PCO. I don't see why they wouldn't think they could get away with that again if they wanted to put Natynczyk on a shorter leash than his predecessor.

Remember, on one of his first forays into the media glare as CDS, he got his knuckles rapped pretty badly for this statement:

CBC's Tobias Fisher reports that Natynczyk has "close associations with the Americans," having attended the U.S. Army War College and served with the Americans in Iraq on an exchange posting.

Natynczyk said the posting taught him lessons applicable to Afghanistan.

"The tactics and techniques and procedures are exactly the same and the risks are identical." [Babbler's emphasis]

On the other hand, Walt Natynczyk had a front-row seat to the Rick Hillier show these past few years. He knows quite well all the feathers that were ruffled by Hillier's force-of-nature personality. And he also knows he's not Rick Hillier. So he's likely taken a different route than Hillier partly of his own volition as well as because of implied pressure from other quarters in Ottawa.

Worthington also wonders if a drop in Canadian casualties means the CF is being less aggressive in the field right now:

With the war in Afghanistan intensifying by the day, there's the oddity of Canadian battle casualties dropping, or in limbo. From one point of view that's good, but it also makes one wonder where our troops are, and what they're doing.

Until recently (and maybe even now) Canada's Afghanistan troops have punched far above their weight. We've endured casualties, but we've also been effective in the field.

The implication that our soldiers are sitting on their duffs instead of taking the fight to the enemy has raised some hackles among some of the folks who wear our country's uniform. To his credit, Worthington followed it up with this line later in the column:

Is this reality, or is it just imagination? Dunno. In the past, Gen. Hillier would give clues by his public utterances, but his successor is zipper-lipped -- a good thing at times, but leadership sometimes needs the public informed and supportive.

Worthington is a veteran of both WWII and Korea, and has been a stalwart public supporter of the CF for decades. So I sincerely doubt he was trying to demean Canadian soldiers in Afghanistan with his remarks. My impression is that he's concerned about a couple of things: political control of the CF that might have us taking a step back from going after the Taliban in Afghanistan, and the lack of communication from our military leaders. How can the public support a mission that it doesn't hear about?

Frankly, I'm in agreement with those concerns. The government needs to let the CF tell our soldiers' stories to the Canadian public. Every effort they make to stand in the way of that elemental connection makes them look ever more petty, manipulative, and short-sighted. And the CF needs to continue to tell the stories it thinks are important.

With fewer casualties, what are our soldiers doing?

Well, just to cite one example, our soldiers are taking the fight to the opposing forces:

Brig.-Gen. Denis Thompson, commander of Task Force Kandahar, is taking the approach that the best defence is a good offence.

There have been a number of operations, both big and small in the volatile Zhari, Panjwaii and Arbhandab districts in the regions surrounding Kandahar city in recent months.

The latest Canadian-led operation in the Zhari district involved a battalion of British Royal Commandos, a mechanized brigade from the Royal Canadian Regiment and troops from the 22 Infantry from the United States.

"They went into an area where the insurgents typically enjoy partial or full freedom of movement. The method in which we deployed forces in the area essentially overwhelmed the insurgency too," explained Canadian Maj. Fraser Auld, the operations officer for Task Force Kandahar.

"We know it took them by surprise and we know the insurgents were unable to cope with the synchronized approach in this operation."

The operation yielded an IED factory (improvised explosive device), 24 barrels of home made explosives, numerous anti-personnel mines, a motorcycle rigged with explosives, several 107 mm rockets, small arms, weapons and ammunition and 500 kilograms of hashish.

...

"His goal is to deny them the ability to reconstitute over the winter," said Auld. "He doesn't want them to be able to rest and the intent of all this is when we come into next summer, we've spent the winter degrading them so next summer is better.

An operation in the Zhari district in August also yielded IED making facilities and huge caches of explosives and weapons. Just three months later, insurgents in the area seem to have managed to resupply. That is a concern.

Keeping on top of the Taliban is the key according to those involved in planning these operations.

"If you always have them on the run then they can't keep making these IEDs, so we've actually seen a drop in kinetic activity over the past few weeks since we've stepped up the operational tempo," added Maj. Jason Guinui, operations officer for 3 RCR Battlegroup.

Don't worry, Mr. Worthington: our troops are still punching above their weight.

Haji Beach

Legion Magazine's Adam Day spent some time with Canadian soldiers at Police Sub-station Haji, aka Haji Beach, this past April. He's put together a front-line story with good pictures and a video, and posted it at the Legion Magazine site, and it's worth a read.

In general, the further you get from the main NATO base at Kandahar Airfield, the more ragged things become. At KAF you can have Pizza Hut and all the warm showers you want. At Haji Beach, you’ll go to the toilet in a bag and even the rations are being rationed.

They call it Haji Beach because, at least in theory, there’s a sandy bit of riverbed down by the Arghandab that does look temptingly hospitable. In actual fact though, it is not. When a small group of soldiers from B Company, 2nd Battalion of the Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry tried to go swimming down at the beach just after arriving in Haji, they were promptly shot at by the Taliban, who in this case the soldiers describe as “the hillbillies across the river.”

Adam obviously sympathizes with the soldiers he covers, which is to his credit, because soldiers in the field are a collection of extremes: the bravest, rudest, toughest, most tightly wound, most juvenile, most world-weary and cynical, most gallant and self-sacrificing a bunch you'll ever meet. It's tough to reconcile all that in a piece of journalism.

I found it refreshing to see a professional scribe not try to reach too far: this piece is a snapshot of one small group of soldiers in one outpost for one short period of time. Day largely avoids the impulse to draw grand conclusions about the geopolitics of the conflict from this one window into it.

I'll admit I found myself laughing at one particular line Day quotes in the piece:

They talk about other things too. They talk about watching Canadian Parliament on television and laugh how the politicians behave, about how they boo each other. “Grow the f—k up, you’re running the country,” laughed one soldier.

I hope the parliamentarians and their staffers who read this blog take note of that. And I thank Day for making sure that comment, along with all the other insights into the lives of our deployed soldiers contained in the article, made it to the light of day.

Exercise Trillium Response: Globemaster III landing

From the Thunder Bay News Source:

Colossal aircraft lands at Thunder Bay airport

West Jet and Air Canada Jazz passengers might have had a little wingspan envy Thursday morning, cowering in the shadow of the behemoth Canadian Air Force’s CC-177 Globemaster 3 that lumbered onto the tarmac at Thunder Bay International Airport.



Its four engines generate 40,400 pounds of thrust apiece.

The plane is capable of carrying a payload as high 72,500 kilograms – the equivalent of 12 of the largest male African elephants on the planet – and burns through more than 11,000 litres of jet fuel an hour.

Lt.-Col. John Tringali of the United States air force, has spent 10 years at the helm of a Globemaster, which in recent years the 8 Wing Trenton's 429 Transport Squadron has used to provide humanitarian aid to Jamaican hurricane victims and helped rotate entire battalions in and out of Afghanistan.

He's been embedded with the 429 since 2007, part of an exchange program with the American military. This week he's in Thunder Bay as part of Operation Trillium Response, a mock ice storm designed to test the province's ability to react to a disaster. Tringali said the plane offers the best of several worlds to its pilots...

Via: Tony Prudori
MILNEWS.ca - Military News for Canadians
News - http://milnews.ca
tony@milnews.ca

More from DirtyDog at Milnet.ca:

The landing in T-Bay was a blast.



...

Here's the whole topic thread, lot's of stuff.

Well, don't that beat all?

Stunning news from Canwest News:

The Canadian Forces will continue to play an active role in world hot spots even after troops are withdrawn from Kandahar in southern Afghanistan in 2011, Defence Minister Peter MacKay says...

The story naturally trots out the hardy perennial alternative missions to Afstan, without any indication of how realistic they might be:

Canada has been criticized for focusing all of its military efforts on Afghanistan at the expense of other world crises zones, particularly in Africa, where ongoing violence in the Darfur region of the Sudan and in the eastern Congo has demanded attention...

Lots of attention, sure. But no Western country is going to send any serious number of troops to Congo, and Sudan simply won't voluntarily allow in any Western contributions to the hybrid AU/UN Darfur force that might help make that force effective in a real way (here's the latest on UNAMID). So, is invasion of Sudan the answer?

More here:

The unfathomable lightness of UN-run peacekeeping

Capt Greene - an update

A welcome update from Alan of GenX at 40 on Capt Trevor Greene's condition. For those who don't remember, the Seaforth Highlander was blindsided during a shura by a fanatic who buried an axe in his skull.

As it turns out, that's not enough to stop such an extraordinary individual:

When we arrived at the Rehab Centre in Alberta, we were told there was very little chance of recovery and that he would be offered medication trials only and wouldn’t participate in rehab. Fortunately, I had become very good at selective listening by this stage. I had read many stories of people overcoming the odds and I knew Trevor was capable of being one of those stories especially since modern research has found the brain to be “plastic” and able to reprogram itself if given proper cues. In my head I would think, “we’ll see”. Knowing Trevor’s spirit, I felt that he would respond and step up to the challenge rather than languish in this huge body for the rest of his life. I knew he would rather die than live in a wheelchair in a long-term care facility. If this was to happen, someone had to give him a chance to succeed. Thankfully, the Centennial Centre gave him that chance. He proved me right. He did succeed and surprised everyone. When we were admitted to the Centre, he had little to no purposeful movement. He is now able to do bench presses, leg presses and more functional activities like eating, shaving and brushing his teeth. His technique isn’t perfect and he requires a little help with each task but he gets better with each month that passes. When we entered the Centre he barely had a voice. He is now able to speak clearly and articulately and almost at his original level. On September 12, 2008 after 14 months in rehabilitation, we left the Centennial Centre and all our friends in Ponoka for our new home in Nanaimo, BC.

It's worth reading the whole inspiring tale. Seeing all the different names of people who helped along the way - soldiers and civilians, Canadians and Americans, all doing what they could - just made my heart swell.

And apparently that story won't just be told on the internet:

On Dec 13, 2008 at 7pm PST CTV will air a documentary on Trevor’s recovery. The story follows Trevor after release from 13 months at Vancouver General Hospital until we moved back home to BC. Trevor and I can be reached on facebook for anyone that doesn’t have our contact information.

Cuidich 'n Righ!

Update: As usual, The Donovan proves classier than me, and says what needs to be said by all who read this story:

If you'd like some good news and a good saga of True Grit, go to Alan's place and read the update on Trevor's progress, and meet a man who stood tall, but just as importantly, the woman who helps him stand - she really doesn't appear in the story, directly, because she suffuses it. She's everywhere, yet mentioned nowhere. Captain Green has gotten lots of support, and "Well dones!" and helping hands.

I'm going to take Alan's role, and be the contrarian of sorts.

Well done, Debbie. You are a shining point of light. [Babbler's emphasis]

Hear, hear! BZ, Debbie!

"UNITY OF COMMAND IN AFGHANISTAN: A FORSAKEN PRINCIPLE OF WAR"

For the really serious, a paper by Canadian Col. Ian Hope (via Spotlight on Military News and International Affairs). The author:

Colonel Ian Hope is an instructor at the U.S. Army War College. Previous assignments included commander of the 1st Battalion Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry Battle Group (Task Force Orion) under Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Kandahar, Afghanistan, from January to August 2006, during which his soldiers experienced intense and sustained combat...

The result of Col. Hope's analysis (sorry about all the acronyms):

...It is, therefore, the conclusion of this research that we must amend the UCP and invest supreme command over Afghanistan in SACEUR. In order to galvanize NATO Alliance partners and begin the difficult process of coalition building around a NATO-run fight, while keeping parallel American capabilities in-theater, the entire OEF joint operating area (JOA) must be realigned under EUCOM [US EUCOM's commander is always double-hatted as NATO SACEUR], and EUCOM must be designated as a supported combatant command. The ISAF Headquarters in Kabul should be designated as an integrated sub-unified command under EUCOM to report directly to SHAPE [within SHAPE, "...Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) ... [is] responsible for all Alliance operations, ranging from the Straits of Gibraltar to Afghanistan]...While hardly efficient from an American perspective, it is the only way that NATO partners can be integrated to fight under their traditional supreme commander, and under the alliance’s normal strategic war-management system...

This is what the Americans have ended up with (for now):

Afstan: New US command structure

Still split between SACEUR and CENTCOM.

The campaign during the upcoming "brutal Afghan winter"

Two reports:

1) LA Times:

Militants and military brace for a winter of war in Afghanistan

2) Canadian Press:

Canada plans to exploit Taliban's winter weakness

My goodness, for once our press is doing the looking on the "bright side" (just a bit of dark humour there, people). Meanwhile, an article on Pakistanis' paranoia:

Ringed by Foes, Pakistanis Fear the U.S., Too
...
Recently, in the officer’s mess in Bajaur, the northern tribal region where the Pakistani Army is tied down fighting the militants [note that NY Times' "tied down"], one officer offered his own theory: Osama bin Laden did not exist, he told a visiting journalist.

Rather, he was a creation of the Americans, who needed an excuse to invade Afghanistan and encroach on Pakistan.

If the US surge in Afstan does go forward...

...it will triple the number of Army Brigade Combat Teams the Americans have there for actual combat (there are also the Marines and the Army battalion at Kandahar noted here). As best I can determine the US now has two infantry BCTs in-country, the 4th Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division and the 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division--both part of Combined Joint Task Force - 101 (more order of battle details on US and other forces in Afstan here and here). By the way, the 2-2 Battalion at Kandahar is organizationally part of the 3rd BCT just mentioned.

If, over the next several months, four more ground BCTs are sent to Afstan that will be a proportionately very large increase in combat capability indeed. Enough? Who knows? Certainly quite a national effort, what with Iraq and all.

The BCT concept is one thing Donald Rumsfeld seems to have got right:

...Rumsfeld did press for one of the most significant shifts in Army organization since the Napoleonic era, changing the Army’s central maneuver unit from the division to the brigade combat team. A brigade was only half or a third the size of a division (which could have anywhere from 10,000 to 15,000 soldiers). Its headquarters element was less bureaucratic and less top-heavy with colonels. The size of a brigade could be fitted to the situation. Rumsfeld’s emphasis on brigades represented an organizational means for dealing with a more anarchic, unconventional world. He planned to increase the number of Army brigades by a third, even as he reduced the overhead staff at the division level...

Update: But maybe the Marines will supply many of the reinforcements:

Marines drafting plan to send more troops to Afghanistan

Upperdate: Where some of the first additional BCT are planned to go:

U.S. to Boost Presence Near Kabul
Hundreds of Troops Destined for Afghan Provinces With Few Western Forces, Top Army Official Says

2008 Canadian Blog Awards

Just a few clicks and you can register your vote for The Torch as Best Group Blog.

/shameless plug off

US Marines, National Guard in Afstan/Future US strength increases

Some significant developments.

Marines.

In spring 2008 some 3,200 Marines arrived [see 2) at link] in Afstan: the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit in Regional Command South (2,300) and the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment (900--numbers in both case approximate) in Farah Province, Regional Command West, the latter mainly supposed to train the Afghan police. In the event, however...

Marines with 2/7 handled operations in the Helmand (RC South) districts of Sangin, Gereskh, Musa Qaleh and Now Zad, and the Farah province districts of Delaram, Golestan, Bakwa and Bala Baluk, Frushour said. Afghan forces and International Security Assistance Forces commanded by Army Gen. Robert Cone have since taken over Sangin, Gereskh and Bala Baluk, Marine officials said.

And during the Marine deployments:

...The 24th MEU and another Marine unit in Afghanistan — Twentynine Palms, Calif.-based 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines — realigned to form a special purpose MAGTF [Marine Air Ground Task Force] of their own this summer to mirror the organization of the Marines taking over...

About those taking over:

The commander of the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit handed over control of a Marine task force deployed to southern Afghanistan to train police and provide security against insurgents, a Marine spokesman said.

Col. Duffy White, commander of Hawaii-based 3rd Marines, took over for Col. Peter Petronzio, 24th MEU commander, in a ceremony at Kandahar Air Field, Marine officials said.

White will lead Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force — Afghanistan, a 2,000-strong unit made up of elements from North Carolina, California and Hawaii. It is expected to be based at Camp Bastion, a British military base in volatile Helmand province [emphasis added]...

Elements taking over in Afghanistan include headquarters elements of 3rd Marines; Camp Lejeune, N.C.-based 3rd Battalion 8th Marines; Hawaii-based Combat Logistics Battalion 3; and Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 466, [CH-53s] which is based at Marine Corps Air Station Miramar, Calif. The unit will handle five districts in Helmand and Farah provinces...

More on the change-over here--note:

The two battalions celebrated together as TF 2/7 prepares to be replaced by 3/8. While operating throughout the Helmand and Farah provinces, TF 2/7 has carried out the mission of conducting counterinsurgency operations with an emphasis on training the Afghan National Police [emphasis added].

So in the end some 3,200 Marines in RC South and West ended up in one Task Force operating in both RC South and West--but with this weird bifurcation of command:

...
For example, about 2,200 U.S. servicemembers assigned to the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit now report to ISAF [i.e. really under US General McKiernan--not RC South], while the 1,000 or so Marines [the 2/7] assigned to the Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan report to U.S. Central Command [not ISAF at all]...

Hence the new HQ for all US forces in Afstan: U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A).

Meanwhile, there are still some 1,200 fewer Marines in Afstan than there were. But, with the earlier deployment of a US Army battalion to RC South, total US troops in the south and west remain about what they were in summer 2008 before the Army battalion arrived.

Lots more on what the 2/7 ended up doing in Afstan here:

...when they were sent here in April as a stopgap measure to help an overwhelmed NATO force, the plan had been to spend the time mentoring Afghan national police.

It didn't turn out that way.

Instead of training policemen, the lightly equipped 2nd Battalion, 7th Regiment of the 1st Marine Division found itself engaged in firefights with insurgent units of 100 or more fighters. They faced Taliban snipers and roadside bombs.

Twenty members of the 1,000-member battalion died in combat [By comparison sixteen members of the CF' mission died during the same period].

"It definitely was a lot worse than we expected," said Cpl. James Flores, 22, of Thousand Oaks. "A lot more active." [That tells a tale, does it not -- more here.]

The Two-Seven has begun returning to its desert base in Twentynine Palms; the bulk will be home by early December. The members take credit for leaving behind 800 trained Afghan police, hundreds of dead Taliban fighters and nascent diplomacy with village leaders.

They also served notice that the Marines were back in Afghanistan to stay.

Based in part on the experiences of the Two-Seven and the grit of its individual members, Marine Corps officials are planning to greatly expand their numbers here -- an unexpected result of a deployment that wasn't even supposed to be...

An unspecified number of Marine special operators are also in Afghanistan...

National Guard.

...
The Guard soldiers at Ft. Bragg are the main body of a 2,700-strong force of Illinois Guardsmen and are nearly done with a 57-day training cycle before heading to Afghanistan. They leave in December, when they will join 65,000 American and NATO forces battling Al Qaeda and a resurgent Taliban...

Hoping to break a building stalemate in Afghanistan, the military has requested 20,000 troops to follow Illinois' 33rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team. The Illinois troops have reached Afghanistan in stages, with the critical assignment to advise the police and Afghan National Army. Three Illinois soldiers already have died there...

Only about 300 of the Illinois troops will live and work in the 16-person teams that train Afghanis, and have already begun their mission. An additional 2,400 will support that effort, said Illinois Guard Col. Scott Thoele, the force deputy commander.

The Illinois soldiers will be spread around the country. Trainers who advised Afghan forces in the past say the situation has only grown more complicated...

As for future US efforts:

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates said yesterday [Nov. 21] that he supports a fresh troop buildup in Afghanistan -- officially estimated at more than 20,000 U.S. troops in the next 12 to 18 months -- to fight a growing insurgency and to safeguard the 2009 Afghan elections. But he stressed that in the long run the conflict should be "Afghanistan's war."..

Gates said he intends to meet the requests of top U.S. commanders in Afghanistan for an increase of four more combat brigades and an aviation brigade, as well as thousands of support troops -- a total reinforcement of "well north of 20,000" in the coming year and a half, said Pentagon press secretary Geoff Morrell.

The troops would deploy primarily to eastern Afghanistan along the Pakistan border, where the 3rd Brigade of the 10th Mountain Division is headed in January, as well as to southern Afghanistan, where the Taliban insurgency is based.

"It's important that we have a surge of forces before the election. And my speculation would be that people will want to focus that surge in areas like RC [Regional Command] South to ensure that people can register and vote," Gates said at a news conference in Cornwallis, Canada, where he attended a two-day meeting with defense ministers from Canada, Britain, Australia, the Netherlands, Estonia and other countries [Denmark and Romania - MC] that have a total of about 18,000 troops in southern Afghanistan...

In south Afghanistan, additional U.S. combat units are also needed to move throughout the region and prevent insurgents from exploiting the boundaries between British, Canadian and other allied forces that now concentrate their operations in different provinces, officials said. "The enemy we are dealing with in Afghanistan does not respect . . . boundaries," said a senior defense official traveling with Gates, pointing to the movement of fighters and the trafficking of weapons and drugs across provincial lines...

I'll bet new US forces in RC South will really be under U.S. Forces-Afghanistan and not the commander of RC South. At least until the US takes over command of RC South in late 2010 as Mr Gates said it would at the news conference (I've seen no coverage of that--my prediction was right).

As for those "four more combat brigades"--I'd assume they include the 3rd Brigate Combat Team, 10th Mountain but not the Illinois Guard brigade. Anyone else have any ideas/insights?

It will be up to Mr Obama to take the decisions when he becomes president on January 20. I'm pretty optimistic he'll agree (it would be a Good Thing if he kept Mr Gates on too). By the way, can you imagine Canadian general officers publicly saying what strength increases they think they need when the government has not yet agreed to them?

Update: Another surge, one the Canadian media will not notice (via Moby Media Updates):

KABUL, Nov. 22 (Xinhua) -- The visiting Danish Foreign Minister Per Stig Moller on Saturday announced furthering financial and military support to Afghanistan.

"We will double the amount of money which goes to the reconstruction and development. We also send more troops to Afghanistan [emphasis added]," Moller told reporters here after meeting his Afghan counterpart Rangin Dadfar Spanta.

However, Moller did not specify the number of troops which will be sent to the war-torn country in January 2009, but added his country's parliament is passing a "new strategy for support of Afghanistan."

Denmark has contributed 249 million U.S. dollars to the war-battered Afghanistan since 2002.

Some 780 Danish troops have been serving in Afghanistan [at Helmand with the Brits] mostly in the shape of the civilian-military units of Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) within the framework of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

The Danish Foreign Minister also asserted that the royal European state would continue to help Afghanistan in the field of education, health and giving training to Afghan police forces.

The Danes are making a very big effort given their population--more here, here and here (with tanks).

65 f-35

With a bit of a thud, I'd say, if one reads closely. This is what the Nov. 19 Speech from the Throne says about defence (Afstan aside--one para for that too):

Our Government will also continue to rebuild and arm the Canadian Forces with the best possible equipment. We will renew all of our major air, sea and surface fleets over the next two decades, creating new, high-technology jobs in Canada in the process.

That's by 2028, people! A pledge moreover that this government is in no position to keep. It looks to me as if budget problems will be hitting the CF fairly soon, and pretty hard.

Any bets on which of the major equipments listed below will, during those two decades, fall to the end of the line, are pushed back from the currently envisaged in-service date, or are have their specifications seriously modified to be less expensive (and less capable)? Or are dropped completely?

*Joint Support Ships (contracting process now halted; first ship was originally to be delivered in 2012)

*Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships (no contracting process yet underway, no in-service date)

*Destroyer/frigate replacement (formerly called Single Class Surface Combatant, now "Destroyer Replacement Project"; our three destroyers will start coming out of service over the coming years, the frigates are being modernized, notional in-service date for destroyer replacement is 2017, for frigate replacement is 2024)

*Submarine replacement (will it even happen?)

*Maritime Coastal Defence Vessel replacement (will they be replaced? Arctic Offshore vessels seem likely to take on much of their role)

*CH-47Fs (still no contract signed)

*JUSTAS high-altitude medium endurance UAVs (first delivery planned for 2012)

*Fixed-wing Search and Rescue aircraft replacement (2015 possible in-service date)

*CF-18 replacement (only 65 will be acquired while we know have 80 Hornets; expected around 2017) (Meanwhile, Norway has already decided to buy 48 F-35s.)

*CP-140 Aurora replacement (our maritime partrol aircraft are to be flying until 2020)

*Update thought: Griffon helicopter replacement (acquired 1995-97)

*Armoured vehicles (government approval wanted quickly)

*Leopard 2 replacement (if ever)

I do believe that some future government will be forced to conclude that procuring all the types of equipment above for the three services is simply unaffordable, and that a serious review of the services' missions must be undertaken to determine which capablities can be eliminated or reduced. Unless the services are to, er, soldier on with clapped-out, increasingly ineffective, equipment.

In other words, some government must decide what operational capabilities of the CF are vital to the national interest and therefore must be funded. And which capabilities are not essential. Otherwise Canada will end up with three services, each of which is trying to be as close as it can be to all-singing and all-dancing (the "multi-purpose, combat-capable forces" mantra--boy is a new White Paper needed). But those services will in fact end up increasingly off-tune and out of step. Because the money will not be there to let the show go on.

Let us all gather together for further reading of the tea leaves in the finance minister's Nov. 27 economic statement.

The Speech from the Throne also said this about defence procurement:

Fixing procurement will be a top priority. Simpler and streamlined processes will make it easier for businesses to provide products and services to the government and will deliver better results for Canadians. Military procurement in particular is critical: Canada cannot afford to have cumbersome processes delay the purchase and delivery of equipment needed by our men and women in uniform.

It would have been nice to hear a few specifics--especially as to how speedier procurement will be reconciled with the time it takes deciding how to spread out the pork, aka industrial and regional benefits (the main reason, I think, the C-130J contract took a year and a half to sign).