Taliban and al Qaeda: US vs. Pakistani views

Compare and contrast:

1) American:

Pakistan’s Planned Accord With Militants Alarms U.S.

2) Pakistan's prime minister:

Pakistan's Moment
We Will Fight Terrorism -- Our Way

Context, please

I hope that Graeme Smith wrote more than appeared in this Globe & Mail article on Afghan hunger:

Afghanistan's food crisis may turn into a festering problem as prices remain stubbornly high, a United Nations official says, and local authorities are already complaining that emergency measures are not enough to handle the rising hunger.

The World Food Program has launched a $77-million program to provide extra food for Afghans who found themselves shut out of the market as prices climbed sharply in recent months.

But during a tour of food distribution points in Kandahar yesterday, the WFP's top official in the region said he's hearing complaints that the new help is not enough, and expressed concerns about what will happen if the crisis continues.

Because the piece lacks a critical bit of context:

The United Nations' top brass gathered in Switzerland on Monday to chart a solution to the dramatic food price increases that have caused hunger, riots and hoarding in poor countries around the world.

***

The Food and Agriculture Organisation's (FAO) Food Price Index, which measures the market prices of cereals, dairy, meat, sugar and oils, was 57 percent higher in March 2008 than the same month last year.

Anger over those increases -- which have squeezed the world's poorest people hardest -- have sparked protests, strikes and riots in countries including Cameroon, Mozambique, Senegal, Haiti, Peru, Bangladesh, Indonesia and Afghanistan.

This isn't just an Afghan crisis, it's a worldwide crisis, and it's hitting the poorest people in the world first and hardest:

Famine traditionally means mass starvation. The measures of today's crisis are misery and malnutrition. The middle classes in poor countries are giving up health care and cutting out meat so they can eat three meals a day. The middling poor, those on $2 a day, are pulling children from school and cutting back on vegetables so they can still afford rice. Those on $1 a day are cutting back on meat, vegetables and one or two meals, so they can afford one bowl. The desperate—those on 50 cents a day—face disaster.

Roughly a billion people live on $1 a day. If, on a conservative estimate, the cost of their food rises 20% (and in some places, it has risen a lot more), 100m people could be forced back to this level, the common measure of absolute poverty. In some countries, that would undo all the gains in poverty reduction they have made during the past decade of growth. Because food markets are in turmoil, civil strife is growing; and because trade and openness itself could be undermined, the food crisis of 2008 may become a challenge to globalisation.

Here's a question for you: if September 11th, 2001 had come and gone without thousands of people in New York, Pennsylvania, and Washington getting incinerated in a fireball of jet fuel and crushed under tons of concrete, steel, and rubble; if the nations of the West hadn't helped the Northern Alliance overthrow the Taliban; if Afghanistan was still under the rule of Mullah Omar and his cabal, would this crisis be hitting the average Afghan any less hard?

I don't think so.

Conclusion? Either Smith or his editors at the G&M want us to think this is an Afghan problem, another failure of Canada's policy toward that nation, when it is not.

I fail to see how that qualifies as responsible journalism.

Afghan National Army and Canadian advisers in action

Interesting to find this major story in the Christian Science Monitor (would be nice if some Canadian papers reprinted it). I'd wager that if a Canadian reporter had written the story the air strikes would be near the top, not the end:

ZHARI DISTRICT, Afghanistan

It is just after dawn when the Afghan soldiers creep into lush fields splashed with morning light. Their job is to turn back an insurgency whose members lurk among the grapevines, almond trees, and red-flowered poppy fields that border their military compound. Today, that means stopping a stream of attacks that has disrupted supply routes here in Kandahar Province, in the troubled southern reaches of Afghanistan.

As the men move through the vegetation, only a rooster's crowing breaks the enduring silence, suggesting that the mission may prove a bust. But then gunfire shatters an otherwise pristine morning – and Lt. Col. Sheren Shah, the Afghan commander, grabs the phone strapped to his radio operator and starts barking orders in Pashto.

In the tug of war between the increasingly robust Afghan Army and a potent – if much smaller – enemy, Colonel Shah is the kind of commander that his Canadian advisers like. Shah has earned a reputation for moving quickly, sometimes spearheading a mission just after receiving last-minute intelligence. In response, the Canadians have given him considerable latitude, deferring to him as commander even as they provide essential support.

On this day, after a brief lull in the gunfire, Shah directs his men to send a barrage of small arms fire and rocket-propelled grenades that fills the morning air as they move toward what they believe is an insurgent safe house.

As they observe Shah's operation, the dozen or so Canadians advising this mission say the Army has come far in the past five years. But while wars in Afghanistan have imbued at least two generations of Afghans with a warrior spirit and strong sense of nationalism, the soldiers still lack key discipline and organizational skills. And, as the summer season approaches, opening the door to more aggressive fighting, the Afghans are fighting as a modern army trying to fight an opponent schooled in very different ways.

"The [Afghan National Army] has potential to face the challenges of face-to-face war if the spring offensive happens to have the form of conventional war," says Ahmad Idrees Rahmani, a cofounder of Afghanistan's Center for Research and Policy Studies in Kabul. "The problem of the war against the Taliban is that [conventional warfare] is not their fighting strategy. Each time they take over a district, the ANA and other forces can easily take them out in a few days."

Trouble begins, he adds, "when they retreat and attack in the form of guerrilla fighters. Then it becomes hard to find a fish in the sea of people."

But with disagreement persisting over NATO force levels and longer-term commitments, the Canadians here in Kandahar are under pressure to "stand up" an effective Afghan force that can ultimately step into Western forces' shoes...

Critics say the approach to training here under the embedded training teams is still uneven. Despite efforts to ensure uniformity across the training teams, each of the militaries nonetheless approaches mentoring from different perspectives. And US officers who have spent time here say there is little effort to share information, or in military parlance, spread "lessons learned" based on each teams' experiences. "Everyone does something a little different," says one Canadian officer.

The Afghan Army, for example, still is not able to perform many logistical functions like using its nascent intelligence service, fully planning a mission, or providing its ground forces the air support it needs. The intelligence that comes from the Afghan service, for example, can fall prey to political vendettas as Army or police commanders settle debts by politicizing what they put out.

Still, in the middle of a hodgepodge of foreign forces, the Afghan National Army has quietly grown more capable. Coalition forces say part of their job is to make that point to average Afghans – instilling a confidence in them that their national Army is up to the task...

The insurgent safe house they target is thought to have six men inside. Later, it's found to be a small bombmaking factory. Directing his men by radio from an abandoned earthen compound less than a mile away, Shah aligns two rifle companies around the building.

With the help of the Canadians, Shah orders his men to flush out the house. At his side is Major Ritchie, who tips the battle on the ground by calling in an airstrike. In minutes, an unmanned US plane known as a Reaper drops a 300-pound bomb on the house, killing five men. The firefight continues as the soldiers pursue a sixth man who has run away.

It is later learned that one of the dead men is Loy Lala, whom the Canadians and Afghans had been looking for for some time. Shah's men find motorcycles used by the dead insurgents and Shah decides they should be burned...

Later, as Shah's men reposition themselves, another group of Taliban is found in the green thicket. But the Afghan forces don't move quickly enough. Ritchie makes another call and a British Harrier Jump Jet arrives, flying low in a show of force, but fails to flush them out.

Ritchie, who has been talking almost nonstop on his radio to his men and coordinating troop movements and airstrikes, marvels that British, US, Canadian, and Afghan forces have all worked on this mission. "Four countries contributing to do the right thing," he says.

Shah's men ultimately find a cache of weapons, including two recoilless rifles used to harass Canadian-Afghan police substations in the area. Shah is ecstatic.

"This is good, Colonel," Ritchie says...

Update: Much more on the ANA here:

Is Afghanistan worth it? A brigadier general answers
...
In April, 2007, I joined the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, a coalition comprising military personnel from Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, Poland, Albania, Germany, France and Romania, as well as contracted civilian advisers, all working together as mentors and trainers. Our mission is to partner with the government of Afghanistan and the international community to organize, train, equip, advise and mentor the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police. As deputy commanding general for Afghan National Army Development, I am focused on development of the army...

Brigadier General Dennis Tabbernor is deputy commanding general, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan.

Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan is not under ISAF, rather it's US-led under Central Command:

...
A military strength of more than 1,000, CSTC-A is under the control of United States Central Command (CENTCOM). Under CSTC-A’s operational control is Task Force Phoenix, with military strength of more than 6,000, responsible for training, mentoring and advising the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police.

And note this about Combined Joint Task Force Phoenix:

...
CJTF Phoenix mentors ANA and ANP to conduct sustained, independent Counter Insurgency operations in Afghanistan to assist the ANA to defeat terrorism within its borders.

Upperdate: The official description of OPERATION ARCHER:

Since July 2005, Canada’s participation in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan has been conducted under Operation ARCHER.

The primary activity under Operation ARCHER is the deployment of about 12 senior CF members in Kabul with the Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A), a U.S.-led multinational organization that provides mentors and trainers to help Afghanistan’s Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Interior organize, train, equip, employ and support the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police.

The military nature and coalition structure of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM makes it adaptable to a wide range of multinational projects, such as the CSTC-A, designed to help the Afghan authorities build the components of a new security infrastructure: operational forces and their sustaining institutions, and the general staff and ministries to direct these organizations. These projects are part of the long-term international effort to rebuild Afghanistan’s infrastructure, government and national institutions, including the army and police, that began with the fall of the Taliban in December 2001.

Cyclones: Cancellation?

From a Globe and Mail story, to build on this earlier post:

Federal officials are threatening to cancel a $5-billion contract with Sikorsky Inc. because the U.S.-based helicopter maker is asking for up to $500-million in extra funds to replace Canada's 40-year-old Sea Kings.

Senior sources said the relationship between Ottawa and Sikorsky took a turn for the worse after the firm acknowledged this year that it was running late in its plans to provide 28 high-tech Cyclone helicopters to the Canadian Forces.

The government's controversial efforts to replace the Sea Kings, which go back to the early 1990s, are now complicated by Sikorsky's request for more funds to deliver replacement helicopters.

Sikorsky officials refused to comment on the current negotiations, but senior federal officials said the company has requested between $250-million and $500-million in new funding.

Sources said there is talk in government that the Cyclones need a "more powerful engine" to meet Canada's requirements, and that delivery could be delayed by nearly two years even with additional money. High-ranking sources said the contract dispute is causing concerns at the highest levels of the government, and that cancellation of the contract is a possibility. If new funding were to be offered, the government would be seeking ironclad guarantees that Sikorsky would deliver the aircraft at the new agreed-upon time.

"All of the options are on the table," a federal official said.

"We can cancel or come to a compromise."..

Sikorsky won a competition in 2004 to provide 28 helicopters to replace the fleet of Sea Kings. At contract signing, Sikorsky agreed to deliver the first helicopter in January of next year.

The maximum penalty on the contract for late delivery is $36-million...

Update: Latest:

MacKay won’t axe Cyclone deal — yet
Delays, cost overruns put replacement project in jeopardy
...
The military "started getting vague signals" from Sikorsky last fall about delays in delivery, Mr. MacKay said.

"We’ve now had one major sit-down with Sikorsky to hash out some of the potential problems here," he said...

Mr. MacKay said he’s worried further delays could cost the military pilots.

"Am I concerned? Absolutely," he said. "Am I concerned that we’ve, in fact, already lost qualified people because of the delays? Of course I am. I’m very concerned."

Any more bad news could be devastating for the "fragile" Sea King community, said Larry McWha, a retired colonel who used to fly the helicopters.

He’s heard from people who are still in uniform that some air force personnel are considering leaving the military due to the delays...

Then there's this:

The Harper government refused yesterday to fork over any extra cash to Sikorsky Inc., which has asked for hundreds of millions in additional funds to deliver promised helicopters to the Canadian Forces.

Issuing a warning that applies to all federal suppliers, Public Works Minister Michael Fortier said Sikorsky has to live up to its $5-billion contracts to provide 28 Cyclone helicopters to replace Canada's 40-year-old Sea Kings.

"When the government signs a deal with a supplier for a specific good at price X, that's the price the government should pay for that good," said Mr. Fortier, a lawyer and former banker.

"Where I come from, a price is not an approximation, it's not an estimate. ... In this case, the price was set at contract signing."..

...Mr. Fortier said the U.S.-based firm has to find a way to meet its contract. If that doesn't happen, he made a thinly veiled threat to cancel the deal and find another way to replace the Sea Kings, which are nearing the end of their life cycle.

"I gave clear direction to my deputy minister that he was to try and break the logjam and find a solution, but at the same time, we are working, as we should be, on alternative solutions if we can't come to an agreement with the supplier [emphasis added]," Mr. Fortier said in an interview...

Government officials have been told that the prototypes for the Cyclones are struggling to reach key requirements set out by National Defence, such as conducting a typical anti-submarine mission in two hours and 50 minutes.

There is speculation in the aircraft industry that Sikorsky wants to provide the Canadian Forces with a helicopter that has a more powerful engine, a bigger gearbox and a fifth rotor, which would allow it to meet all requirements.

However, such a helicopter would be more costly than the original four-bladed version proposed by Sikorsky...

Pretty high stakes standoff, in which there sure don't seem to be any easy or very good results. If we're desperate would there be any argument for buying Sikorsky S-70B Seahawks (more here)? More on US plans for new Seahawks here and here. If it's good enough to be the USN's standard helicopter...?

The aircraft was considered for the maritime helicopter for a while in the 90s after the EH-101 contract was cancelled. Indeed the Seahawk was initially thought of for the competition the EH-101 won in 1987:

...Three contenders were singled out as possible replacement for the Sea King: Sikorsky's S-70 SeaHawk (called the SH-60 Seahawk in the US Navy), Aérospatiale’s AS332F Super Puma and finally, AgustaWestland's new EH-101, of which the latter was purposely designed to be a Sea King replacement[8]

However, in a surprise move, Sikorsky then withdrew from the contest, the reason being that the SeaHawk was seen by the CF to be too small...

I still wonder if an HMC ship will turn up at Shanghai

Further to this post, more from MARPAC:

Canadian Navy Makes History In The Far East During Westploy’08

HMC Ships Regina and Ottawa arrive in Okinawa, Japan, this week to participate in Westploy, a naval deployment in the Western Pacific which will run throughout the month of May. Westploy is part of the Canadian Navy’s strategy to build strong bilateral and multilateral ties between the Canadian Navy and the navies of Asia-Pacific countries, thereby promoting peace and security in this dynamic region.

This year, sailors on Regina and Ottawa will blaze a trail for Westploys to come when they exercise with the Japanese Maritime Self Defence Force and the United States Navy.

“Westploy ‘08 is more ground-breaking than previous deployments of this kind,” said Lt.-Cmdr. Melisa LaFleur, Operations Officer with Canadian Fleet Pacific. “For the first time, Canada will participate in a trilateral naval exercise with Japan and the United States.”

Throughout the exercise, personnel will be exchanged between the three navies to enhance interoperability and to gain insight on combined operations. Shipborne helicopter detachments will meet similar challenges, again to test interoperability at sea. “This exercise provides an opportunity for the Canadian Navy to exercise with our Pacific partners in an effort to build mutual confidence and understanding,” said Lt.-Cmdr. LaFleur. “It is also a tangible representation of Canada’s commitment to global maritime security in an increasingly important part of the world.”

Between the two ships, port visits will be made in six Northeast Asian ports including China, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Singapore and Vietnam.

HMC Ships Regina and Ottawa are two of the Canadian Navy’s 12 multi-purpose Halifax Class frigates. The workhorses of Canada’s Navy, these ships provide security to Canadians by safeguarding our maritime approaches and exercise sovereignty over national waters. Abroad, the Navy helps to safeguard Canada’s vital national interests all over the world. Naval ships are a valuable instrument of Canada’s foreign policy with the capacity to advance diplomatic, defence, and developmental objectives.

Buzz Guelph anytime

A letter in the Guelph Mercury, April 29 (the link to the paper itself in the quote isn't working--the story mentioned in the letter follows at the preceding link):

Canadian Forces pilot welcome back anytime

Dear Editor - Re: "Guelph native provided aerial show" (Guelph Mercury, April 9).

We happened to be outside when Canadian Forces Captain Graham Morgan, in a CF-18 Hornet, flew over, and although we live out beside Guelph Lake, my nine-year-old son picked it out in the sky (the noise brought it to our attention) and yelled, "Dad, that's a Hornet!"

He watched all of the recent Jetstream shows on the Discovery Channel and is constantly bringing home library book after library book on aircraft, military or otherwise.

How could this flyover be bad, as your paper recently editorialized?

Knowing what I know as a taxpayer, the fun and excitement that came to my son's eyes -- and thinking of all the other young people who might've been watching and expressing the same joy -- was worth whatever time and effort it cost both the Canadian Forces and Captain Morgan.

I hope he had a nice visit with his folks, and if he ever wants to come for another visit, he is welcome to land -- and park -- in our front field. Just tell him to watch out for the hydro wires!

Scot Lougheed, RR 1, Guelph

http://news.guelphmercury.com/printArticle/321809

Update: A link to the Mercury that works.

"Afghanistan: spring movements"

Latest round-up from the Conference of Defence Associations.

Crap hits Cyclone's rotor! Opening for AugustaWestland?

This is beyond ridiculous; it's scandalous:

The long-awaited arrival of new military helicopters to replace Canada's worn-out Sea King fleet has been delayed by as many as three years, CanWest News Service has learned.

The obsolete, 1960s-era Sea Kings were due to be phased out starting this year with the arrival of new CH 148 Cyclone helicopters, designed to be flown off the decks of the navy's warships.

The first of 28 Cyclones - ordered in 2004 from Sikorsky International in Connecticut, at a cost of $1.8 billion - was scheduled to arrive at the Shearwater air base near Halifax in November this year, with additional aircraft coming one per month thereafter.

But military staff at Shearwater have been told that the first new Cyclone won't arrive until 2010 or 2011 - two to three years later than promised.

The team of pilots, mechanics and technicians assembled to do trials on the first new helicopter has also been put on hold because of the delay.

That means the military will have to keep the old Sea Kings flying - already a difficult task - another two or three years until the Cyclones are delivered and made operational...

Myrhaugen [ retired air force colonel, Sea King pilot, and former deputy commander of the military's maritime air group], one of a number of retired officers who have campaigned hard to have the Sea Kings replaced, says negotiations are currently underway between Ottawa and Sikorsky, the prime contractor, to rewrite portions of the Cyclone procurement contract.

He says new engineering requirements - likely a result of technology advances in certain aircraft components, which weren't foreseen in 2004 - mean the original contract must now be reworked.

"Manufacturers may well have new equipment or upgrades available. And as a result of it, they've come to a situation where the original contract is undeliverable," Myrhaugen says. "What's being negotiated between Sikorsky and the Crown is how we get the end product in view of that situation.

"This is not abnormal," he says, "but when contracts change it has an impact on arrival time and cost, and it's almost like starting over in some respects."

The original 2004 contract included penalties against the manufacturer in the event of delivery delays.

Myrhaugen says he isn't aware of any penalties being levied yet, and no official announcement has been made about any delays. Sikorsky's website still says the first Cyclone is due for delivery in November.

Officials at Sikorsky and the Department of Defence did not answer requests for interviews on the matter...

Myrhaugen says Sikorsky may still find a way to deliver the aircraft on time, but warns that if a delay occurs, "the likelihood of making the Sea Kings survive is extremely limited."

The Sea King's primary job is flying off Canada's frigates and destroyers. It is a valuable tool for surveillance, search and rescue, and transport .

But some Canadian warships no longer sail on overseas missions with helicopters - or with their full detachment of helicopters - because there aren't enough reliable Sea Kings available...

Myrhaugen says helicopter crews are only getting a fraction of the flying hours they were once required to have to maintain proficiency [emphasis added--pilot proficiency was also a major issue in the 2006 Cormorant crash].

"It's sinful. They've cut back to the absolute essentials," he says.

The Sea Kings were going to be replaced more than a decade ago with new helicopters purchased by the Brian Mulroney government but, in 1993, then-incoming prime minister Jean Chretien cancelled the contract. A new contract was not signed until 2004, after Paul Martin came to power [the Conservatives are stupidly trying to link the 1993 cancellation with the current Cyclone problems]...

If the original contract is undeliverable because of the manufacturer's design changes then all available penalties should be fully exercised. This deal looks like an utter lemon and shows the huge risks of being the first--and so far only--customer of a military version of a civilian aircraft (much more here).

Would there be any point in just canceling the contract if we could get EADS Eurocopter naval NH-90s earlier? It's similar in size to the Cyclone but a bit smaller. But that aircraft is also having problems (the army version is in service). From an Aviation Week & Space Technology story Feb. 18 (text subscriber only):

The NH90 helicopter consortium is scrambling to offset delays that have held back deliveries of the naval NFH (NATO Frigate Helicopter) variant ordered by France, Italy, the Netherlands and Norway.

But certification issues, lingering mission system deficiencies and a possible shortage of flight-test personnel still pose major challenges, industry and naval sources say.

“With NH90 final assembly now ramping up, we expect the volume of delivered aircraft to expand rapidly by 2009-10,” says Hans Buthker, aerostructures business director at Stork Aerospace of the Netherlands. Together with Franco-German Eurocopter (62.5%) and Italy’s AgustaWestland (32%), Stork forms NH Industries, the consortium behind the NH90 program...

New fly-by-wire systems are a problem for both the CH-148 and NH-90.

Note in the AW&ST piece that AugustaWestland is a major minority stakeholder in the NH-90 program. AW settled a law suit with the government last fall over the rejection of the EH-101 in the competition that the Cyclone won. Could AW have sensed an opportunity arising from the Cyclone woes?

AgustaWestland, a major international helicopter and vertical lift company, has been quietly keeping its footprint in the Canadian procurement lobby since settling its lawsuit with the federal government last fall.

As the leader of the former European consortium Team Cormorant, AgustaWestland took the government to Federal Court over a procurement decision in 2004. The federal government quietly settled with AgustaWestland last November.

Curiously, the terms of the settlement did not involve a cash payment, and since both parties essentially "walked away" from the lawsuit, the resolution has opened the door for further deals in Canada for AgustaWestland, one industry insider told The Hill Times last week.

"Only time will tell," the insider, who is close to AgustaWestland, said when asked whether the lawsuit has affected the company's ability to secure future government contracts. The insider has not detected any wariness on the part of the government in doing business with the company, he said...

The article goes on to focus on the possibility of AW's trying to supply attack/escort helicopters (AW129?) for our new Chinooks. But...

Predate: A recent post of Babbling's about the ever-more likely Griffon deployment to Afstan for the "escort" role.

Afstan: Two negatives and a positive

1) Christian Science Monitor:

Afghanistan's insurgency spreading north

Militant attacks are increasing outside the Taliban's southern stronghold, such as Sunday's on President Hamid Karzai.

2) Daily Telegraph

Nato's Afghan mission in trouble, says Brown

3) Wall St. Journal (opinion piece)

We're Not Losing Afghanistan

Marines in Afstan: The Globe and Mail catches up...

...and starts with a clanger. Here's the first paragraph of today's front-page story (note the dreaded "I" word in the headline, and the threat of "Americanization"):

U.S. brings Iraq-like surge to Afghan conflict

LASH KARGAH, AFGHANISTAN -- A force of 3,500 U.S. Marines charged into southern Afghanistan this morning in an effort to reduce the heavy casualties suffered by Canadian and British soldiers in the region, bringing with them new pressures on Canada and its allies to adapt to U.S. tactics and methods.

Hardly all charging in this morning. And the force referred to in southern Afstan is not 3,500 strong but rather is the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit of some 2,300 personnel (around another 1,000 Marines are being sent where needed, mainly to help train Afghan police). Almost everything in the Globe's story is covered in these Torch posts; amazing that the Globe story reads as if it's full of hot new stuff--but that's journalism at "Canada's National Newspaper" I guess:

March 10, 2008

Marines arriving at Kandahar

March 13, 2008

What the Marines will do in Afstan

April 10, 2008

101st Airborne replaces 82nd Airborne in Afstan

April 11, 2008

Marines operational under ISAF

April 11, 2008

Marines in Afstan and command problems

April 17, 2008

First Marine fatalities in southern Afstan (the Canadian media missed that)

April 27, 2008

Marines in Helmand/US Afghan role overall

Here are a couple of other stories running today.

1) AP (the para excerpted gets things right):

Marines launch operation in Afghanistan's Taliban territory
...
The assault — backed by U.S. artillery in the desert and fighter aircraft in the sky — is the first major task undertaken by the 2,300 Marines in the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, which arrived last month from Camp Lejuene, North Carolina for a seven-month deployment. Another 1,200 Marines arrived to train Afghan police.

2) The Times (the para excerpted makes the same mistake as the Globe):

US Marines to ‘stir things up’ in Helmand
...
General Dan McNeill, the commander of Nato forces in Afghanistan, said that the Marine expeditionary force of about 3,500 troops would “stir things up” in remote southern districts of Helmand, where few if any Nato troops have operated in the past seven years.

I'm sure the general did not give the MEU's strength as 3,500.

This leader, also in The Times, makes a key point about US operations that the Globe story rather underplays in its raising of the "Americanization" bogeyman:

...
As we report today, the coming of the Americans offers Britain a chance to think again about its strategy in southern Afghanistan. Contrary to some of the stereotypes initially made in Iraq, it is the United States Army, radically reshaped by General David Petraeus and his associate, General Dan MacNeill, that has been notably successful at combining offensive operations on the ground with the building of roads, schools and hospitals that win the hearts and minds of the local population. In Helmand, by contrast, Britain has been impressive on the battlefield but the track record on the humanitarian front has been patchy. Although General MacNeill, the overall commander in Afghanistan, is too diplomatic to put it so bluntly, there are lessons that Britain should learn from the way in which the US military conducts business...

Update: Following in the Globe's printprints, a column by Iain Hunter in the Victoria Times Colonist; one does despair sometimes. It seems that for far too many Canadians the very word "American" now has almost as negative a connotation as "Nazi". An exaggeration but...

Canadians enlisted in new American-style Afghan war

Bush has come to shove in southern Afghanistan. The U.S. commander-in-chief has sent in the marines...

Aussie robustness in face of the grim

Just remember their prime minister is from the Labour Party (like the British PM):

Prime Minister Kevin Rudd says the security situation in Afghanistan is "grim" and Australians need to prepare themselves for more casualties in a "difficult, dangerous and bloody" year ahead.

Mr Rudd was speaking in Canberra after an Australian special forces commando was killed and four of his comrades were wounded in a firefight with Taliban militants near their base in the southern Uruzgan province.

Twenty-seven-year-old Special Operations Task Group (SOTG) member Lance Corporal Jason Marks was killed early this morning during an attack on a "substantial number" of Taliban militants around 25 kilometres south of the Australian base at Tarin Kowt.

The death takes the Australian death toll since 2001 to five.

"The security situation in Afghanistan remains grim," Mr Rudd told a Canberra press conference.

"This is a dangerous and difficult operating environment for the Australian Defence Forces and it is likely to become more difficult in the period ahead.

"2008 will be difficult, dangerous and bloody and the Australian nation needs to prepare itself for further losses in the year ahead."

Mr Rudd said Australia's military commitment in Afghanistan was not open ended.

"I've committed this Australian government to being there for the long haul, but it's not a blank cheque - we'll continue to review this," he said.

Mr Rudd says there will be annual reviews of Australia's troop commitment in the country.

Opposition defence spokesman Nick Minchin says the attack should strengthen Australia's resolve to keep up the fight in Afghanistan [emphasis added]...

Meanwhile, the assassination attempt on Afghan President Karzai is being rather overblown. Recall that Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was assassinated by Sikh members of her own bodyguard, and her son, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, was assassinated by a Tamil Tiger suicide bomber.

"If I Ever Leave this World": The CF and Afstan

The strange contrasts of soldiering. A slide-show tribute set to the song, by Paul of Celestial Junk. Kind of broke me up:

Update thought: Of course a good Nazi propagandist might well have done something similar about the Wehrmacht in the Ukraine in 1941. But the CF are not the Wehrmacht; and Canadians are not, with few exceptions, Nazis.

Reality update: Though those in Mobilization Against War & Occupation (you really should explore their site) might have a different view. But then they know nothing about the Ukraine in World War II.

It's the little things that count

Helping Afghan children and the local economy at the same time.

Shoes-for-kids drive makes tracks

More than 4,000 pairs have been distributed so far to children who otherwise go barefoot in extreme weather. Credit goes to the squadron commander behind the project and to the Quebec schools that have raised funds

BZ to Major Pierre Huet and the Quebec schools involved in this project.

Perpetuating a myth

Scott Taylor, with the latest on the CDS speculation game, can't resist perpetuating the myth of a CDS rotation of some sort amongst the services.

"Although it was never set in stone, in the past, the post was rotated on a regular basis between the army, air force and navy officers. If that tradition were to have been upheld, an admiral would have served in Hillier’s place. Naturally enough, the slighted navy feels that after being jumped in the queue on the last go-round, it should definitely get its man in the top job this time."

Since unification, the order has been:

Army
Air Force
Army
Navy
Army
Air Force
Air Force
Army
Navy
Army
Air Force
Navy (acting)
Army
Air Force
Army

That's 7 Army, 5 Air Force and 3 Navy, with one of those an acting appointment. Let's put aside ridiculous assertions of some rotation and focus on the needs of the service.

Marines in Helmand/US Afghan role overall

1) Marines:

HELMAND PROVINCE, Afghanistan - U.S. Marines are crossing the sands of southern Afghanistan for the first time in years, providing a boost to a NATO coalition that is growing but still short on manpower.

They hope to retake the 10 percent of Afghanistan the Taliban holds.

Some of the Marines that make up the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit helped to tame a thriving insurgency in western Iraq. The newly arrived forces hope to move into regions of Afghanistan now controlled by the Taliban.

The troops are working alongside British forces in Helmand province [emphasis added] — the world's largest opium-poppy region and site of the fiercest Taliban resistance over the last two years. The director of U.S. intelligence has said the Taliban controls 10 percent of Afghanistan — much of that in Helmand.

"Our mission is to come here and essentially set the conditions, make Afghanistan a better place, provide some security, allow for the expansion of governance in those same areas," said Col. Peter Petronzio, the unit's commander.

Thirteen of the 19 Marines in the platoon of 1st Lt. Adam Lynch, 27, served in 2006 and 2007 in Ramadi, the capital of the Anbar province in western Iraq. The vast region was once al-Qaida in Iraq's stronghold before the militants were pushed out in early 2007...

The Marines' presence in southern Afghanistan is a clear sign that neither Britain nor Canada — which operates in nearby Kandahar province — have enough troops to control the region. But commanders and troops say the countries are working well together [emphasis added]...

The Marines are known as the theater task force, meaning they fall under the direct control of U.S. Gen. Dan McNeill, the commander of NATO troops in Afghanistan. McNeill can move the Marines to whatever flashpoint he wants [emphasis added]. Most other U.S. troops are stationed at permanent bases in the east.

The Marines have been moving supplies and forces through Helmand by ground convoys the last several weeks, a draining and dangerous task. Some convoys have taken more than 20 hours to complete, and two Marines were killed by a roadside bomb April 15...

Here's an earlier post on command problems regarding the Marines.

2) Role (a column by David Ignatius in the Washington Post)

KABUL -- For many Americans who are weary of Iraq, Afghanistan is the "good war" in which the United States and its European allies are destroying what's left of al-Qaeda and the Taliban. That view certainly holds with the Democratic presidential candidates, who talk of adding troops in Afghanistan next year even as they pull troops out of Iraq.

But "bad" Iraq has more in common with "good" Afghanistan than people sometimes realize. Both have evolved into classic counterinsurgencies with a "clear and hold" strategy for providing security; both show the benefits of a military surge; both run the risk of failure because of weak and corrupt host governments.

Soon, the same U.S. commander -- Gen. David Petraeus -- will be overseeing both battlefields. If confirmed in the new post as head of Central Command, Petraeus will have to balance U.S. military needs in Iraq with those in Afghanistan. Given that Petraeus literally wrote the book on counterinsurgency for the military, his oversight should be good for both theaters.

The military surge in Afghanistan has largely gone unnoticed, in part because the U.S. commitment here is so much smaller. The 40-nation coalition force has increased to about 62,000 from about 42,000 in 2006. The American contribution is by far the largest, with more than 30,000 troops, including a new boost of 3,200 Marines just dispatched to southern Afghanistan, the area of the toughest fighting. Last year, the United States spent $4.9 billion on training and equipment for the Afghan army, after spending $3.5 billion during the preceding five years combined [emphasis added], according to a U.S. official.

"Without question, additional U.S. troops would be helpful in 2009," says Gen. Dan K. McNeill [emphasis added], the commander of coalition forces here. In particular, he's looking for new troops to take over from the 3,200 newly arrived Marines when they go home in October [more on Gen. McNeill's thinking about future prospects here].

The success of the Afghanistan surge is clear in the east [emphasis added], which has been the main area of U.S. responsibility. McNeill doubled U.S. troops and spending there last year and added some innovative counterinsurgency tactics using the so-called Provincial Reconstruction Teams. These PRTs are building roads and schools and carrying out other development projects to help the Afghan government hold areas once they have been cleared by U.S. troops.

McNeill, like Petraeus in Iraq, has worked to isolate the hard-core enemy from those who can be co-opted. He describes his adversary not as the Taliban (some of whom have joined the Afghan parliament) but as extremist warlords who give support to al-Qaeda.

To bolster the Afghan police, McNeill adopted a new strategy for the country's 40 most violent districts, known as Focused District Development [emphasis added]. Each month, police are pulled from a half-dozen of these districts and replaced by an elite national force, while the local cops are retrained and the most corrupt and incompetent are purged...

And the US is also pondering command structure changes for its forces and ISAF.

On Cue

Responding to an story about CF recruiting targets for women, aboriginals and visible minorities, we get the Rideau Institute's "we need a kinder, gentler military". On the other hand, if the CF tried the Rideau's suggestion, they would be accused of minimizing the war in Afghanistan.

Non-white military might needs boost

Despite Canadian Forces ad campaigns targeting women, aboriginals and visible minorities, recruitment numbers remain stubbornly low

Anthony Salloum, program director for the Ottawa-based Rideau Institute, said it's "problematic" to have low representation of aboriginals and visible minorities in any key public sector. He believes many aren't signing up because they don't support the war in Afghanistan or are turned off by the "Fight" campaign ads.

"That might be appealing to some sectors of our society, but you're not speaking the language of many of our ethnic minorities, including those who come from war-torn regions," he said. "Many of them are coming to Canada for peace, so the idea of joining up to 'Fight' may not be an appealing message. It's a very aggressive word and that might be really muting the enthusiasm of our visible minority communities to join the armed forces."

ANA progress in Helmand

The CF have seen considerable Afghan National Army progress at Kandahar (more here). Similar things seem to happening with the Brits in Helmand province:

British troops in southern Afghanistan could hand control of key areas to Afghan forces within months, the commander of British forces said yesterday.

Brigadier Mark Carleton-Smith said he hoped the Afghan army would "deliver security" in the most dangerous parts of Helmand by the end of the year. He said the provincial governor was keen to see Afghan troops take over in three hotspot towns in "the heart of Helmand", and it was his job to help that happen.

"We may see, by the end of this year, or beginning of next, areas where security is delivered by the Afghan army," he said. "The priorities are Gereshk, Lashkar Gah and Sangin."..

Brigadier Carleton-Smith's strategy does not, however, mean an early exit for UK forces. Preparations are already under way for troops to be deployed beyond 2009, the projected time-frame for the end of the Helmand mission, which began in 2006.

Handing over security to Afghan security forces has its own risks. At Musa Qala, a town recently recovered from the Taliban, the Afghan police have been tasked with maintaining law and order while British forces stayed in the outskirts. A number of residents have complained bitterly about extortion by the police...

Speaking at a joint British, Australian and Danish outpost [emphasis added], he said his objective for the next six months was to improve "human security", which he said included physical security from threats such as criminals and insurgents, as well as economic and social security. "To my mind, that is better delivered by their own agencies than by the British," he added...

The Afghan National Army has been one of the country's few success stories since 2001, especially when compared to the corrupt and inept police force. There are three battalions of Afghan troops based in Helmand, but they depend on help from the British for logistics, medical treatment and air support [emphasis added]. That support will continue when they take control of the three key towns...

The US general commanding ISAF, for his part, has certainly waxed optimistic about longer-terms prospects for the ANA.

This on the other hand is a bit discouraging (but may in large part be motivated by politics concerning the 2009 Afghan presidential election):

Afghan Leader Criticizes U.S. on Conduct of War

In view of the above, one wonders how receptive President Karzai might be to an increased US command role in Afstan.

"The honest anti-war position: Support"

Taking on the mindless, hate-filled, hard-leftists (via a tip from Terry Glavin):

New B.C. group aims to laud, not decry, Afghan mission

Brian Hutchinson, National Post

VANCOUVER -The rabble will gather again today, outside this city's main public art gallery on a large, downtown square, near clothing shops and record stores. A good spot for an anti-war protest.

As they always do, leaders of the group Mobilization Against War and Occupation

will distribute propaganda-filled leaflets. MAWO's message: Canadian soldiers deployed in Afghanistan are criminals, "battling a popular resistance movement of regular Afghan people."

The recent decision in Parliament to extend Canada's mission in Afghanistan "means two more years of plunder, two more years of destruction … we must demand an end to this cruel war drive," reads MAWO's latest pamphlet.

A poorly formed view, but not uncommon. Similar sentiments are expressed throughout the country. But a new countermovement has formed, one that lauds the Canadian Forces and its efforts in Afghanistan. Strange as it might seem, it's based here in Vancouver, where the political landscape tilts sharply to the left.

Founders of the Canada Afghanistan Solidarity Committee [more here] include poets, environmentalists and local authors who will never be mistaken for conservatives, such as Terry Glavin and Stan Persky. Among the many books Mr. Pesky has written is Boyopolis: Sex and Politics in Gay Eastern Europe; one can assume it is not on Rick Hillier's bedside table.

Other founding members include "academics, gay rights activists, student activists, Afghan-Canadians and feminists," according to a recent CASC press release. "We are united under the premise that we must honour our obligations to the cause of solidarity with the people of Afghanistan … The only honest 'anti-war' position is to support Canada's military engagement in Afghanistan."

Not such an easy sell, admits CASC member Jonathon Narvey, a 33-year-old journalist and editor. "A lot of our members are lefties," he says, but "it's a bit of a grind" getting across the message that the war in Afghanistan is worth fighting. Much of the effort is used "reminding people of the facts."

The committee takes direct aim at MAWO, warning students and activists to steer clear of it, and describing it as "a bizarre cult-like group" whose demands for an immediate withdrawal of military from Afghanistan are "simplistic, ignorant and morally disgraceful."

Human-rights consultant and CASC founding member Lauryn Oates, 26, does not apologize for the strong language and condemnations; she says they are necessary and long overdue. MAWO, she says, "is despicable."..

MAWO members deny their organization resembles anything like a cult. "I am familiar with this kind of slander and gossip campaign," said Kira Koshelanyk in an interview this week. "This kind of thing, honestly, we don't pay a lot of heed to that."

But when it comes to Afghanistan, MAWO members do not speak from any direct experience. "We obviously have not been to Afghanistan," admitted Ms. Koshelanyk, in an interview this week. "Of course, we have met [Afghans who share MAWO's point of view]."

Unfortunately, she could not name any. Fellow MAWO member Janine Solanki jumped in to explain that Afghans living in Canada "don't feel comfortable getting involved because the country they are living in is occupying Afghanistan. As immigrants, it's a difficult thing in Canada to speak out against that."

Nonsense, says Afghan-Canadian Karim Qayumi, a CASC member and the director of research at the University of British Columbia's divisions of cardiovascular and thoracic surgery.

"I know many Afghans who are passionate about the military mission in Afghanistan but they are still critical of it," Dr. Qayumi said. "I am critical, but I support it, because I know that a withdrawal would lead to chaos. Civil war."

Dr. Qayumi, 57, has an informed perspective. A year after the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, he joined the mujahedeen resistance; for three years, he treated wounded fighters in the Afghan countryside. He was targeted for assassination by pro-Soviet collaborators. Dr. Qayumi immigrated to Canada with his family in 1983 but returns to Afghanistan on a regular basis, to distribute medical supplies and to perform charity work.

"I am totally amazed by Canadians and their efforts to help in Afghanistan," he says. "Unfortunately, I have also encountered Canadians who do not understand the problems there."

Successive federal governments have failed to articulate clearly the mission's purpose, he adds. Meanwhile, some elements on the political left "have their own political motives for spreading what is obviously false information about Afghanistan," Dr. Qayumi said. "They say there are promoting peace, but what they advocate will lead to more war." Better than most of us, he knows that extremists cannot go unchallenged...

Disclosure: I'm a founding member of the CASC. More on Mr Glavin's blog:

Inside the cult that runs the "Mobilization Against War and Occupation"

Inside The Cult That Runs The "Mobilization Against War and Occupation": Part II
(Check the photo.)

When Tyrants Tremble In Their Fear, And Hear Their Death Knell Ringing. . .

Afghanistan: Do We Stay or Do We Go?

US wanting effectively to take command of combat areas in Afstan?

Here's a substantial update for this post. The US's trying to get what it looks like it wants will certainly knot a lot of NATO knickers. But if the Americans significantly increase their troop levels it will be hard to deny them--and they probably shouldn't be denied. NATO however will look an ever less effective organization.

The Pentagon is considering whether it should push to change the NATO mission in volatile southern Afghanistan to give the US greater control in the fight against a growing Taliban threat.

The move is one of many being assessed as fears rise that the collective effort of NATO forces there lacks coherence. The Taliban's comeback over the past two years has been marked by a spike in suicide bombings and other violence – at the same time that critics say the complex command structure governing NATO and US forces has stifled combat and reconstruction efforts.

American officials see a possible answer in modeling the southern region after the east, which falls under NATO but is led by a subordinate US command and viewed as relatively successful.

The issue is not a new one, but has been overshadowed by the need for more forces in Afghanistan. With new commitments by some allies in place, the focus now is on creating more workable relationships on the ground – without conjuring images of "American bullying," as one retired US officer puts it, among allies whose commitments already hang by a slender thread...

Support for change comes from outside the military as well. "I think there is a strong rationale for making that command and control much more efficient," Seth Jones, a political scientist at the Rand Corp., told a House panel this month. "We have multiple US chains of command that go through European Command, Central Command, Special Operations Command," he said. "I think there are a range of options on the table about making that arrangement more efficient."..

...a particularly thorny issue is the frequent rotations of commands. The southern sector rotates a new subordinate coalition command every nine months. The current Canadian commander, for example, will be replaced by a Dutch counterpart by the end of the year [the Brits, far and away the second largest contributor to combat, may have their own (US-supported) ideas]. The frequency of change allow the Taliban to exploit the seams of those transitions, critics say...

...discussion is ongoing about other options for improving the effectiveness of the command structure, in addition to the US assuming more responsibility in the south. Some Pentagon officials believe that the head of the NATO coalition in Afghanistan, a four-star general, should be "dual-hatted." In addition to reporting to the NATO leadership in Brussels, he should also have a direct link to Washington.

Supporters of this plan believe Washington's direct input would help to bring more unity of effort to the mission. Another, perhaps more politically palatable, option is to add a new American three-star general to oversee all American forces. That commander would serve as a deputy to the NATO commander but would also answer directly to Washington...

Perhaps also an American deputy to a British commander in RC South? Rather sidelining Canada--but then we're supposed to be de-emphasizing combat (or "counterinsurgency"), aren't we?

Just because it's subtle doesn't mean it's not effective

VW, over at his own blog, wrote a piece criticizing media coverage of the CF in Afghanistan that, taken on its own, seems like a bit of nitpicking. But to those of us who are careful observers of both the CF and the national media, it's just another example of a clear trend - one that was part of the reason I started this blog in the first place.

Take this headline, for example, from today’s Ottawa Citizen:

Forces heading toward ‘failure’ in Afghanistan

The thing is, most readers of the Citizen who see “Forces” and “Afghanistan” in the same headline will assume that what’s being talked about are the Canadian Forces, which happens to be the official English-language name for our military. But if you read the article by Richard Foot, you’ll see that he’s talking about an article in the American Interest which discusses NATO forces currently deployed in Afghanistan. (A brief excerpt of the article itself can be found here, and excerpts from an in-journal rebuttal are available here; full text is apparently behind a subscriber firewall.)

Is the headline misleading? Perhaps that’s not the right word; disingenous probably would be more accurate. But it’s a subtle, almost subconscious way to advance the idea that Canada isn’t doing well in Afghanistan, even though the content doesn’t really talk about Canada-specific activities at all.

Now it should be possible to write a more accurate headline: “NATO could still fail Afghanistan,” for example. But whoever does headlines for the Citizen on that page obviously chose not to do it that way, and as a result my respect for and trust in print media drops just that much more.

As Time magazine Managing Editor Richard Stengel said himself not a week ago:

...this notion that journalism is objective, or must be objective is something that has always bothered me - because the notion about objectivity is in some ways a fantasy. I don't know that there is as such a thing as objectivity.

Journalistic objectivity is a fairy-tale. Fairness may be possible, but objectivity in reporting simply isn't. And the more you watch the media, like we here at The Torch do, the more you'll realize that the vast majority of the Canadian media establishment have neither the understanding of military matters, nor the ideological predisposition to learn about them, that would be required to offer fair defence-related journalism to the public. Oh, they're getting better, thanks largely to the Afghan mission, and especially the embed program. But those who work in the newsrooms back in Canada are still pushing an agenda, whether they intend to or acknowledge it or not.

So why play whack-a-mole with a headline that twists perception so subtly? Because like a trickle of water left unchecked for long enough can produce a canyon in the rock, a trickle of misinformation and spin left uncountered for long enough can produce a chasm of understanding. The CF and the country simply can't afford to let that happen any longer.

Dislocating a shoulder to pat ourselves on the back...

...or, more precisely, to point you, gentle reader, to someone else patting us on the back, namely The Maple Leaf (23 April 2008, Vol. 11, No. 15):

Less than two years after its launch on the Internet, “The Torch” has received singular recognition within the Canadian blogosphere. The site was named the best military blog of 2007 at the Canadian Blog Awards, an annual event in which bloggers and blog readers vote on blog sites, overall or within categories.

***

Although “The Torch” is aimed at informing the general Canadian public on Defence issues, a significant proportion of its visitors consists of politicians, public servants, academics, journalists, current or retired military members, and bloggers from the US.

“Anytime we can contribute to the national dialogue on Defence issues, it is in the best interest of the Department of National Defence,” says Mr. Brooks, adding that all but one of the contributors have had some military experience in one form or another.

For Mr. Brooks, blogging for “The Torch” has proven to be a rewarding experience. “The award is great, but getting email from serving members or veterans that say ‘thanks for setting a particular story straight’ mean more to me. You wouldn’t volunteer this much time and this much effort for no return unless there’s something intangible that you’re getting out of it.”

My thanks to the author of the article, Ms. Josée Houde, for portraying my remarks accurately and in context. My thanks to The Maple Leaf for noticing our little corner of the internet at all.

And last, but certainly not least, my thanks to the readership of The Torch, who contribute in ways big and small to the essential discussion of defence issues in Canada. Together, we're having an effect.

Griffons one step closer to Afghanistan?

Sharon Hobson, writing in Jane's IDR seems to think so:

Canada's Department of National Defence (DND) is fitting its CH-146 Griffon helicopters with surveillance sensors and weapons for use in Afghanistan, and during the Vancouver 2010 Winter Olympics.

Under the Interoperable Griffon Reconnaissance Escort Surveillance System (INGRESS) project, the DND requires 19 electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) sensor systems for installation on the Griffons as a mission kit in two configurations. Four will be in the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) configuration and 15 in the escort configuration. Sixty-four Griffon helicopters will be modified to carry the new kit.

The ISR configuration is to consist of cabin-mounted sensor controls, map and imagery displays, a cockpit-mounted multifunctional digital moving map display and imagery display, and a datalink. The sensor system will be configured to allow for installation and removal as an integrated mission kit, replacing the AN/AAQ-501 currently mounted on the Griffons. L-3 Wescam is expected to bid with a variant of its MX-15 system.

The escort configuration will consist of the same elements - minus the datalink - as well as a door-mounted Gatling gun to provide a suppressive fire capability.

Bell Helicopter Textron Canada will undertake the installation of the equipment on the helicopters. The winning contractor will have to enter into a long-term partnership with Bell to provide in-service support, as well as to develop future capabilities for the sensor system over the remaining life of the aircraft - currently estimated to run until 2021.

INGRESS provides an interim solution for providing armed escorts for the six CH-47D Chinooks being acquired from the US Army for deployment to Afghanistan. Over the longer term, the Royal Canadian Air Force intends to replace the Griffons, which were acquired in 1995-97, with a new tactical support helicopter. This will operate with the 16 new CH-47F model Chinooks to be delivered after 2011.

The contract for the systems is expected to be awarded in May 2008, with first deliveries in November and final delivery in mid-2009. The Canadian mission in Afghanistan was recently given a two-year extension, from 2009 to 2011.

More than half a year ago, now, I had a good chat with a Canadian rotary-wing pilot about the possibility of sending the CH-146 over to Kandahar. That pilot pointed me towards some rough performance figures that showed the possibilities, and some of the risks associated with such a deployment. Here's how I replied:

Thanks, *******. There's a lot of acronyms and jargon in there that I don't fully understand, but if I'm getting the gist of things, the writer believes it's worth stressing a few airframes in order to get even their most limited capabilities into the fight. Your idea of CCS [Close Combat Support], with the option of medevac if required/practical is an interesting one.

But is it worth trashing those choppers by riding them that hard in a situation they weren't designed for? I'm still on the fence on that one. At the end of the day, the CF doesn't exist solely to fight the Afghan mission, and as sure as God made little yellow politicians, you're going to need the whirlybirds somewhere else at some point - at which time, if they aren't there because we flew them too hard in Afg, somebody's going to throw a fit. Not to mention what happens if one goes down - remember the shit-storm over using the Iltis in Kabul? Best vehicle we had for the job at that point, just not the vehicle anyone wanted - which sounds suspiciously like the Griffon. And there's not a single politician who wants to be accused of sending over kit that's not up to the job. [emphasis mine]

Tough call on this one.

Good on you guys for wanting to get into the fight, though. Shows solid esprit de corps.

Look, if you need the capability badly enough, you make due with baling wire and gun tape, right? I just don't know how badly we need improvised gunships over there. And when I say "I don't know," I'm not making an editorial comment - I really don't know.

Photos of Canadian Army equipments in Afstan

Via Celestial Junk:

US considering command structure changes for Afstan

The problem of command structures in Afstan has been noted for some time. From the Manley panel report:

...a top-heavy command structure at ISAF headquarters in Kabul; an absence of a comprehensive strategy directing all ISAF forces in collaboration with the Afghan government; limitations placed by some NATO governments on the operations of their units, which effectively keep those forces out of the conflict; and inadequate coordination between military and civilian programs for security, stabilization, reconstruction and development. One source of ISAF inefficiencies, cited by senior NATO officers, is the too frequent rotation of ISAF commanders at its Kabul headquarters and in the regional commands...

And it's not just ISAF, it's the links between ISAF and US Operation Enduring Freedom; Paddy Ashdown wrote in July 2007:

One can normally at least rely on the military to understand the importance of unity of command. But in Afghanistan, even this is absent. The US military are not exclusively under the command of Nato's mission in Afghanistan...This is exactly the fractured command structure that led to the US disaster in Somalia.

As for US forces (see Update):

Combined Joint Task Force-82 (CJTF-82)[now Combined Joint Task Force-101] is a U.S.-led subordinate command of NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). CJTF-82 serves as both the National Command Element for U.S. forces in Afghanistan, reporting directly to the U.S. Central Command commander, and as ISAF’s Regional Command – East...

Now the US is thinking openly about the problem. But any proposed changes that would somehow give Centcom a greater direct role vis-a-vis ISAF, or that would weaken ISAF authority over US forces in Regional Command South, would certainly be "a sensitive matter in terms of the eyes of our allies". The cat's amongst the pigeons--as it should be--but real improvements will be a hard sell indeed.

...
Central Command normally supervises U.S. military involvement in both Iraq and Afghanistan. But a year and a half ago most of the international forces in Afghanistan, including most of the U.S. troops, were put under NATO control, leaving the Central Command chief outside their chain of command.

That is something Secretary Gates says U.S. officials might want to change.

"There's been a lot of discussion in this building about whether we have the best possible command arrangements in Afghanistan," said Secretary Gates. "I've made no decisions. I've made no recommendations to the president. We're still discussing it."

Afghanistan currently has a dual command structure, with some of the 35,000 U.S. troops, and some forces from other nations, still under the original U.S.-led coalition that invaded Afghanistan in 2001.

Some officers complain that the dual command is not as effective or coordinated as it should be. But Secretary Gates says it may be difficult to change.

"The command structure, I think, is a sensitive matter in terms of the eyes of our allies," he said. "And so if there were to be any discussion of changes in the command structure, it would require some pretty intensive consultations with our allies and discussion about what makes sense going forward."

Secretary Gates says there have been no such consultations so far.

But unless the structure is changed, General Petraeus' ability to impact the military effort in Afghanistan will likely be limited, as was the ability of his predecessor Admiral William Fallon. Still, Secretary Gates says he expects General Petraeus to have some focus on Afghanistan...

The questions about the Afghanistan command structure persist in spite of the fact that both the top NATO commander in the country and his superior at NATO military headquarters near Brussels are Americans. But those officers are limited by NATO policy decisions, made by consensus, and by restrictions most member states put on the use of their forces [that's not what a pernicious Canadian professor would have us believe].

New US Centcom commander and Afstan

The nomination of Gen. Petraeus could be good news for efforts there (note bolded bits--tension between Iraq and Afstan commitments):

...
The nomination of General Petraeus could...portend a renewed American focus on Afghanistan, where the American war effort is widely recognized to be lagging, with violence by the Taliban and Al Qaeda on the rise. Mr. Gates [Secretary of Defense] already has expressed the desire to send several thousand additional troops to Afghanistan next year, although that could require further reductions in troop commitments to Iraq [emphasis added]. General Petraeus would be expected to apply his views of counterinsurgency to Afghanistan, which may include a push toward increased troops.

Mr. Gates said he and President Bush settled on General Petraeus for the post because his counterinsurgency experience in Iraq made him best suited to oversee American operations across a region where the United States is engaged in “asymmetric” warfare, a euphemism for battling militants and nonuniformed combatants

The previous Central Command chief, Adm. William J. Fallon, chose early retirement in March after rankling the Bush administration with public comments that seemed to suggest differences with the White House. If General Petraeus and General Odierno [nominated to be senior commander in Iraq] were to win Senate confirmation to their new posts, Mr. Gates said, they would take over in late summer or early fall...

He [Petraeus] returned to Iraq to serve as commander of training Iraqi security forces, then commanded Fort Leavenworth, where he oversaw the writing of the Army’s new counterinsurgency manual [full text here], certain to influence his efforts in Afghanistan, too, if he is confirmed to the Central Command job.

General Petraeus’s challenge as leader of Central Command will be to avoid being trapped in continued, detailed management of the Iraq mission as he takes on vast geographical responsibilities across North Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia, which clearly are the focus of American policy today far and above Europe or East Asia...

The announcement that General Petraeus, 55, would head Central Command, and Mr. Gates’s emphasis on operations in Afghanistan as well as Iraq, reinforced the impression that Pentagon leaders expected the United States to have significant numbers of troops deployed in those two countries for some time to come...

More:

...
In his new job, Petraeus will have responsibility for overseeing military operations from the Horn of Africa through the Persian Gulf to Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Oversight of the war in Afghanistan is split between the U.S. Central Command and NATO.

Afghanistan will pose an interesting challenge for Petraeus. While U.S. and NATO commanders there have been requesting more troops, any additional U.S. forces for Afghanistan would have to come from Iraq [emphasis added].

"The main question is will he be willing to see resources shift from Iraq to Afghanistan?" said Crowley, the retired Air Force colonel, who now advises the presidential campaign of Democrat Hillary Rodham Clinton.

Gates said Wednesday that Petraeus' role in Afghanistan would be somewhat limited.

But historian Crane said that as Centcom commander, Petraeus will have plenty of opportunities to inject new ideas into the Afghanistan fight. Petraeus knows how to work with allied commanders, and his reputation will ensure that people listen to his ideas, Crane said.

"This job will give Gen. Petraeus more of a chance to influence what is going on in Afghanistan," said Crane, a retired Army colonel who helped Petraeus write the Army's 2006 counterinsurgency field manual.

"If you were someone who thought Afghanistan was in need of a fresh approach, you should be excited about Gen. Petraeus' appointment."

And more:

...
Top U.S. commanders in Afghanistan, where a record 32,000 American troops are deployed, have asked for as many as three more brigades, which senior commanders say would be available only if drawdowns from Iraq continue [emphasis added]. Pentagon officials are weighing whether the command structure in Afghanistan should be changed, Gates said [emphasis added--post on this here], while the overall strategy for the country is also under review. Violence in Afghanistan increased sharply last year.

"One fascinating question will be the degree to which Petraeus's Iraq counterinsurgency doctrine will work in Afghanistan," said Michael E. O'Hanlon, a military analyst at the Brookings Institution...

"Too Few Hilliers: The general goes where Ottawa mandarins fear to tread"

Excerpts (rather extensive I'm afraid) from an excellent (though I be reluctant to say so) article by two usual suspects. I think it's is very relevant to this post of Babbling's (and the comments).

On the other hand...might the authors' final sentence be partisan encouragement of public servants' embarrassing the Conservative government? It should be remembered that the CDS has a unique, legislated, position very different from that of deputy ministers or other senior public servants:

Appointment, rank and duties of Chief of Defence Staff

18. (1) The Governor in Council may appoint an officer to be the Chief of the Defence Staff, who shall hold such rank as the Governor in Council may prescribe and who shall, subject to the regulations and under the direction of the Minister, be charged with the control and administration of the Canadian Forces.

Responsibility and channels of communication

(2) Unless the Governor in Council otherwise directs, all orders and instructions to the Canadian Forces that are required to give effect to the decisions and to carry out the directions of the Government of Canada or the Minister shall be issued by or through the Chief of the Defence Staff.

Now to the article itself:

Appointed by Prime Minister Paul Martin in early 2005 as chief of the defence staff (cds), Hillier is intelligent, strategic, honest, and charismatic, and he does something many Ottawa mandarins and politicians would rather he not do — talk directly to Canadians...

...as budget day [2003] approached, something unusual happened at National Defence Headquarters (ndhq) — the nerve centre of the defence establishment. Lieutenant-General Hillier, then the newly appointed assistant chief of land staff, wrote a confidential memo to his boss, cds Ray Henault. It was leaked, found its way into the national media, and caused a firestorm inside the cloistered confines of Canada’s senior officer class.

Traditionally, the army, navy, and air force shared cuts and rare budget increases roughly equally. To Hillier, this balance deprived Canada’s military of strategic focus, and he would try to break the pattern. His memo argued strenuously that the army be placed at the centre of Canada’s defence policy. Boots on the ground, Hillier insisted, represented the key contribution Canada could make to international peace and security operations in the post–Cold War period, and would give Canada influence and leverage in Washington, at the UN, and in nato. Soldiers were in terribly short supply in all the world’s trouble spots — from Afghanistan to Haiti to Africa — and would remain so well into the future. Through his unvarnished and determined advocacy, Hillier had unwittingly [?!?] declared war on his colleagues in the navy and air force...

...Although his memo failed to convince Henault of the need for an asymmetric allocation of resources, it did underline Hillier’s style. He was a leader with vision and focus, fully prepared to challenge conventional thinking and discard traditions. These qualities have now raised the badly misunderstood issue of “civilian control of the military.” Hillier represents a model of military leadership more akin to that of the US or Britain [emphasis added], but has he overstepped by inappropriately treading on the domain of elected leaders, Americanizing the leadership of the CF, and militarizing Canadian society?..

...In late 2007...he contradicted Prime Minister Harper about a military estimate, and he did so publicly. Harper had declared that Canada would be able to withdraw from Kandahar in 2011, because the Afghan National Army (ana) would be trained and ready in sufficient numbers to take over. A few days later, when asked about this during a visit to Kandahar, Hillier did not mince his words: training the ana would take at least ten years, he said. No doubt Hillier is correct — military experts know that to get the job done Canada’s engagement in Afghanistan will have to be long term — but his comments provoked allegations that the military leadership was out of control. If Hillier had reservations, a former minister of defence argued, he should express them in private.

Unpacking this contretemps is instructive. Hillier did exactly what a responsible military leader is supposed to do: provide his best estimate of operational conditions. History suggests that when generals fail to speak out, when they are reluctant to express reservations about the feasibility or progress of military operations, policy often goes badly off the rails...

...In the US, vigorous, well-funded, and well-staffed congressional committees routinely compel testimony by the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff and from military officers. (Arguably, this is easier in a political system built on checks and balances, but Britain’s parliamentary system also does a far better job than Canada’s.) Committee members with security clearances and substantial research budgets routinely ask tough questions and follow up when they are dissatisfied with the answers. Senators and members of Congress spend years on committees dealing with defence, national security, and foreign policy. They become recognized experts and can challenge government officials and military leaders authoritatively.

In Ottawa, by contrast, House committee memberships change frequently, well before MPs develop expertise in the subject matter. While both House and Senate committees hold hearings, summon witnesses, and write reports, the questioning tends to be less rigorous, and the absence of security clearances limits the quality and depth of information officials and officers can and do provide. “Committee sessions,” said a retired member of the Department of National Defence (dnd), “based on my own experience, provide very limited opportunities for real understanding.” Moreover, committee reports generally receive little attention from the media and less from the public [Commons' committees are useless; the (unelected) Senate one is pretty good...

...Hillier put together the package [for the Kandahar mission] of five military components that define it — in Kandahar, a provincial reconstruction team, command of the multinational headquarters, deployment of jtf 2 special forces, a combat infantry task force, and a strategic advisory team in Kabul. Hillier’s central role in designing and championing the Kandahar mission to both Martin and Harper has profoundly influenced the course of Canadian defence and foreign policy. It is more than curious that the responsibility for generating such a policy was not grabbed by senior civil servants — a move that would have certainly raised the issue of too little “civilian control.” This said, many of these same public servants were as frustrated by a sclerotic process of decision-making and micromanagement by the prime minister’s office. Hillier, in other words, was asked to fill a void in a dysfunctional policy-making system. He did not take control of policy from civilians; he was given control of policy by elected leaders...

General Hillier’s willingness to talk openly about when he is right and, equally, when he is wrong in his judgments and assessments is a refreshing change. It needs to be strongly encouraged. Conflicts today may be lower in intensity than “great wars” and more regional in nature, but they are highly problematic, complicated, pervasive; and the warfare itself, more often than not, is asymmetric and requires special training. The dangers are real, and when armies are being sent abroad to fight — rather than kept at home [the CF in France and West Germany, and then just W. Germany?] safely in the barracks, as they were throughout most of the Cold War — citizens need to be informed. Whether or not, and where, Canada’s military should go is a matter of policy, a decision only the elected leadership can make. But what the military can do, what financial and recruitment needs it has, and the constraints it bumps up against, are all properly a matter for the cds to discuss directly with the public. These are matters of fact and resources, and calls for civilian control over an outspoken cds eager to discuss them directly with Canadians reflect a unhealthy impulse to control information that belongs in the public domain...

Perhaps...the debate we are having in Canada about too little civilian control is badly off the mark. Likely we have the wrong end of the stick. Senior civil servants inside dnd and across the government are not challenging the military — or setting boundaries — the way they should. We have a growing democratic and intellectual deficit in Canada around foreign and defence policy, a deficit we can ill afford when the world has never been more important to us. The problem is not too many Hilliers in the military, but too few Hilliers across the government.

Update: A comment thread at Milnet.ca.