The guts of the Manley panel report

Beyond what's in my earlier post, below are some excerpts that strike me as fundamental to the panel's message (the substantive part of the report is just thirty-two pages). The best possible result, for the internal politics of both Canada and NATO, would be if France provided the 1,000 strong battle group to partner with us at Kandahar. With M. Sarkozy as Président de la République...

...But despite the violence and destruction of conflict, Afghans are achieving substantial development progress. The Afghan economy has been growing by about 10 per cent annually for the past five years, and per-capita incomes have doubled. More than five million refugees have returned to Afghanistan since 2002, a telling indicator of new hope for the future. Some six million children are in school, a third of them girls; school enrolment has tripled in six years. Child mortality rates are improving. Roads are being built, and power lines restored. In short, the evidence of real development is there to see...

...events in Afghanistan, and Canada’s participation in the outcomes, will directly affect Canada’s security, our reputation in the world, and our future ability to engage the international community in achieving objectives of peace, security and shared prosperity. Informed and fair-minded Canadians can differ on the policy choices before us. None need doubt that the future of Afghanistan matters to Canada...

...the international military and development presence in Afghanistan has been explicitly and repeatedly authorized by the UN Security Council—most recently in a Security Council resolution in September 2007; it has also been approved collectively by the 26 member countries of NATO. ISAF, which includes 13 countries along with all NATO members, is thereby defending and enforcing international law [emphasis added]. In this defining way, and in others, the international presence in Afghanistan differs from the later invasion and occupation of Iraq by the United States and its coalition partners in that war...

In the face of a serious and potentially strengthening Taliban insurgency, the Panel observed harmful shortcomings in the NATO/ISAF counterinsurgency campaign. The most damaging shortfalls include an insufficiency of forces in the field, especially in high-risk zones in the South; a top-heavy command structure at ISAF headquarters in Kabul; an absence of a comprehensive strategy directing all ISAF forces in collaboration with the Afghan government; limitations placed by some NATO governments on the operations of their units, which effectively keep those forces out of the conflict; and inadequate coordination between military and civilian programs for security, stabilization, reconstruction and development. One source of ISAF inefficiencies, cited by senior NATO officers, is the too frequent rotation of ISAF commanders at its Kabul headquarters and in the regional commands...

...To put things bluntly, Governments from the start of Canada’s Afghan involvement have failed to communicate with Canadians with balance and candour about the reasons for Canadian involvement, or about the risks, difficulties and expected results of that involvement. Almost the only Government accounts that Canadians have received have come from the Department of National Defence. Important issues of Canadian diplomacy and aid in Afghanistan have scarcely been acknowledged and seldom asserted in public by ministers or officials responsible. Canada’s ambassadors in Kabul, NATO and other capitals have had limited authority to explain Canadian policy. The Panel believes that this information deficit needs to be redressed immediately in a comprehensive and more balanced communication
strategy of open and continuous engagement with Canadians...

...A primary Canadian objective, while helping Afghans, has been to help ensure that Afghanistan itself does not again revert to the status of sanctuary and head office for global terrorism. Countries as fortunately endowed as Canada—and as interdependent with the rest of the world—owe obligations to the international community. Participating in the international intervention in Afghanistan, at the request of the Afghan government, has been one of those obligations. The consequences of international failure in Afghanistan—for Afghans and for the world—would be disastrous [emphasis added]...

...the Canadian aid program in Afghanistan has been impeded not only by the dangerous security environment in Kandahar but by CIDA’s own administrative constraints. More than half of CIDA funding in Afghanistan flows through multilateral agencies, and another 35 per cent is chanelled through national programs administered by the central government in Kabul. This leaves little for locally managed quick-action projects that bring immediate improvements to everyday life for Afghans, or for “signature” projects readily identifiable as supported by Canada. Funding allocations aside, CIDA staffers in Kandahar do not often venture beyond their base, in part, we were told, because of restrictive security regulations maintained by CIDA’s headquarters in Canada. While it is undeniably difficult to place civilians in a conflict zone, CIDA should delegate decisions about security of movement to civilian and military officials on the ground who are best placed to make such assessments. It makes little sense to post brave and talented professional staff to Kandahar only to restrict them from making regular contact with the people they are expected to help...

...The intensity of insurgency in the South, and the relatively large number of Canadian soldiers active there, together help to explain why Canadians have suffered high casualty rates (the highest in ISAF as a proportion of troops deployed). But the Panel could elicit no conclusive explanation for the disproportionately high casualty rates suffered by Canadians in Afghanistan. This issue warrants closer scrutiny by the Government...

The Panel has also heard that the safety and effectiveness of Canadian Forces in Kandahar would be markedly increased by the acquisition and deployment of new equipment. In particular, added helicopter airlift capacity and advanced unmanned aerial surveillance vehicles are needed now. No equipment can perfectly protect Canadian soldiers against improvised explosive devices. But helicopters can save lives by reducing reliance on transporting troops by road, and aerial surveillance can more effectively track insurgent movements...[comment: I see no way the Canadian Forces can themselves acquire, train on, and deploy these equipments (i.e. CH-47 Chinooks and Predator UAVs) in one year - MC]

In any event, the Panel could find no operational logic for choosing February 2009 as the end date for Canada’s military mission in Kandahar—and nothing to establish February 2009 as the date by which the mission would be completed. At its core, the aim of Canadian policy is to leave Afghanistan to Afghans, in a country better governed, more peaceful and more secure. How can Canada, with others, best contribute to accomplishing that result within the limits of Canadian capacity and influence?..

The Canadian combat mission should conclude when the Afghan National Army is ready to provide security in Kandahar province. Progress to that end will accelerate as training of the ANA intensifies; and without doubt, more military resources from other ISAF countries must be forthcoming. Ending Canada’s military contribution in Kandahar is therefore not a matter of setting artificial deadlines in time. It is a matter of making real progress in the context of events on the ground...

...to improve the safety and operational effectiveness of the Canadian Forces in Kandahar, the Government should secure for them, no later than February 2009, new medium-lift helicopters and high-performance unmanned aerial vehicles. Canadian soldiers currently must rely too much on allied forces for both of these
necessary assets. If no undertakings on the battle group are received from ISAF partner countries by February 2009, or if the necessary equipment is not procured, the Government should give appropriate notice to the Afghan and allied governments of its intention to transfer responsibility for security in Kandahar...

...the Afghan security forces should be able to assume the lead responsibility for some security operations in Kandahar well before 2011. The commitment of an additional battle group would certainly promote the speedy progress of the transition. And it is the success of the transition that will allow for a rapid reduction of Canada’s military contribution. The quicker the transition occurs, the faster the Canadian Forces can reduce their combat activity in Kandahar...