Tuesday, January 22, 2008

The Afghan mission is a noble one

Here's my selection of major points made (by John Manley unless otherwise noted), with a bit of comment, at the press conference on the Afghanistan panel's report. Mr Manley and the whole panel were clearly passionate about the importance of our mission; they gave a very convincing presentation of their case. What a pity that Mr Manley is not the Liberal leader. The title of this post is my summary of the panel's message.

*NATO must provide a 1,000-strong battle group to help us at Kandahar (comment: our actual combat forces there are about that number). We need a fighting partner, like the Danes with the Brits and the Aussies with the Dutch. If NATO does not come through by February 2009 the some 2,000 Canadian troops in Afghanistan should be withdrawn. If we withdraw, and NATO does not replace us, the whole international Afghan mission faces failure.

Comment: A strong piece of diplomatic blackmail. Not exactly honourable to my mind, given the stress on the importance of our mission--but perhaps effective negotiating hardball.

*The new US troop commitment, if not temporary as now, could satisfy our requirement

*Prime Minister Harper must take charge of the issue domestically, and take a forceful personal lead with the allies; no Parliamentary vote on the future of the mission should be held until after NATO's early April summit meeting in Bucharest.

*The government must do a much better and franker job of explaining the mission and the situation in Afghanistan to the public.

*The security situation in the south is not improving; the government needs to admit this.

*The training of the Afghan National Army is a "great success". The exit strategy is gradually to shift the combat load to them with our troops as backup. But that backup role still involves some combat. So does training since trainers need to go into the field with their ANA units and fight alongside them.

*Derek Burney: It's not only NATO that needs to get its act together but also those doing civilian work. A powerful UN coordinator is required for international aid, reconstruction, governance etc. efforts.

*When Mr Manley became foreign minister "Not a lot of people listened when Canada talked." Now, because of what we have done, they listen to us about Afghanistan.

*Canada can't just retreat from international engagement to North America, under the umbrella of US protection.

*The mission is authorized by the UN and firmly in the tradition of Lester Pearson. It would be nice to have a peacekeeping mission at Kandahar--but "there is no peace to keep."

*As for Darfur: the Sudanese government doesn't want us and such a mission would be a combat one anyway.

Comment: I think you've read that at this blog.

Liberal leader Stéphane Dion anwered a few press questions, by chance right after the Manley press conference. He said he wouldn't comment on the report until after he'd read it--and then seemed to say the Liberal position on ending our combat role in 2009 was firm. So why bother reading the report? I'm going to read the whole darned 94-page thing.

Here's the CTV story, with video of the press conference.

Update: Reaction by the Conference of Defence Associations (from an e-mail):
The Conference of Defence Associations (CDA) welcomes this very important document. After reviewing the report, the CDA has concluded that it is a sober and even-handed assessment of Canada's role thus far in the Afghan mission, and provides a compelling vision for the future. It presents a set of important recommendations, many in line with the CDA's own proposals made in the past and in its own submission to the panel, that build upon the goodwork already accomplished in Afghanistan...

The report both praises and is critical of several components of Canada's mission in Afghanistan. Its recommendations that Canada continue its good work are also accompanied by specific suggestions for improving Canada's and the international community's efforts in that country. Most notable are:

- Canada should "continue with its responsibility for security in Kandahar beyond February 2009 . . . including its combat role, but with increasing emphasis on training the Afghan National Security Forces expeditiously to take lead responsibility for security in Kandahar and Afghanistan as a whole" (p. 37). However, the report notes that it is impossible to separate "training" and "combat" roles: ". . . in reality, training and mentoring Afghan forces means sometimes conducting combat operations with them" (p. 30).

- That Canada's role in Afghanistan should give greater emphasis to diplomacy,
reconstruction and governance;

- A greater and more comprehensive political-military strategy and commitment from NATO;

- Avoiding the use of artificial deadlines: "Ending Canada's military contribution in Kandahar is therefore not a matter of setting artificial deadlines in time. It is a matter of making real progress in the context of events on the ground" (p. 32);

- A call for the Prime Minister to take personal charge of the Afghan file, supported by a cabinet-level committee and a single task force directing and coordinating the activities of all departments involved (p. 37), injecting greater political and bureaucratic commitment into the file.

We hope that the Government and its departments will take this report as constructive criticism. We also hope that political leaders, civil society and Canadians in general use the report to inform themselves of the complexity of the mission. Notably, the report views Afghanistan as a test of Canada's commitment to the international community:

"For the first time in many years, we have brought a level of commitment to an international problem that gives us real weight and credibility . . . We like to talk about Canada's role in the world. Well, we have a meaningful one in Afghanistan."
p. 5)
Plus a nice post by Bruce Rolston:
This is an excellent document. Everyone who cares about the Canadian Afghan mission should read it front to back. Wouldn't quibble with a word, really. It will be hard for Ottawa to swallow, though. Manley didn't even try and triangulate between the Government (stay) and Opposition (get out) positions on Afghanistan... he went way the OTHER SIDE of the Government, and implicitly criticizes them throughout for not yet doing enough for Afghans.

Most interesting quotes:

The take that, Robert Gates, moment: "Neither do we accept any parallel between the Afghanistan mission and the U.S.-led war in Iraq. To confuse the two is to overlook the authority of the UN, the collective decisions of NATO and the legitimacy of the Afghan government that has sought Canada’s engagement."

The we don't know what the hell Paul Martin was thinking, either, moment: "In 2005 Canada chose, for whatever reason, to assume leadership of a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Kandahar City and the security obligations that went with it."

1 Comments:

Blogger TonyGuitar said...

A powerful point Manley could have made . . [I missed some of it], is the need to be on hand if Osama*s boys swarm Mushariff*s military and get control of Pakistan*s nuclear weapons.

The risk of nukes falling into Taliban control is reason enough to keep a grip on Afghanistan.

Providing security so that teachers and schools can deliver the children out of rote mind control, is priority one.

Education is needed for kids in Pakistan too. School only exists for the wealthy there.

Poverty stricken youth are the fuel for the Taleban hate machinery. = TG

5:48 p.m., January 22, 2008  

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