Are NATO (and the UN) failing in Afstan?

Paddy Ashdown thinks failure may very well be in the picture. He spent thirteen years in the Royal Marines (including in the Special Boat Service), served as leader of the UK Liberal Democrats, and also as High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina; he has a very good idea about what he is writing--unlike Canadian politicians of all stripes, and pundits. Unlike opposition politicians here, and those damned pundits, he has a keen appreciation of the price of failure.

Failure is not yet inevitable. But it is now likely, and will remain likely until we increase resources and redress the disastrous failure of the international community to get its act together. The tragedy is that this is happening despite a high level of professionalism and a lot of raw courage among our soldiers. And it is happening despite some outstanding reconstruction successes outside the hot conflict areas of Helmand province.

I recently had a rather heated conversation with a government minister who assured me that we were winning in Afghanistan because "we were killing more Taliban". But success is not measured in dead Taliban. It's measured in how many more water supplies are being reconnected; how many more people now have the benefit of the rule of law and good governance; how many have the prospect of a job; and, above all, whether we are winning or losing the battle for public opinion, which is central to successful reconstruction...

A number of factors have placed us in this perilous situation. We have been left with too few resources - above all, as yesterday's report underlines, too few soldiers' boots on the ground. A balkanisation of strategy has muddled our focus - the British are obsessed with Helmand, but arguably Kandahar and Kabul are the crucial areas. Sharply deteriorating relations between President Karzai's government and that of President Musharaff have hardly helped. But the paramount reason for our failing grip lies with ourselves.

In the task of post-conflict reconstruction, the international community's tendency to repeat what fails is quite bewildering. The fundamental principles are a coherent strategy, unity of voice, and coordinated international action. All three are almost totally lacking in Afghanistan.

One can normally at least rely on the military to understand the importance of unity of command. But in Afghanistan, even this is absent. The US military are not exclusively under the command of Nato's mission in Afghanistan, and frequently conduct operations that run counter to the Nato force's basic doctrine of minimising civilian deaths. Worse, US special forces and CIA operations are run not from the theatre but from Washington. This is exactly the fractured command structure that led to the US disaster in Somalia.

On civilian reconstruction, the situation is worse still. There is no effective coordination. Individual nations' obsession with their own bilateral plans produce duplication, waste and confusion. Our partners in the Afghan government are baffled by the stream of contradictory instructions and the absence of an international partner with a clear view of what must be done. The hapless UN special representative in Kabul, Tom Koenigs, who might have the task of coordinating international effort, has neither the power nor the support from major capitals to do so....

The costs of failure in Afghanistan are much more dangerous than Iraq. Failure would mean a hugely increased risk of instability in Pakistan, with dangerous implications for the security of the region - and for the internal security of Britain. One result could be the beginning of a wider conflict that would start with war-lordism but end with a Sunni-Shia civil war on a regional scale. And then there is the effect on Nato. One highly respected UK general has told me that he believes failure in Afghanistan could do the same damage to the Atlantic alliance as the UN's failures in Bosnia did to that organisation. What we could be looking at is not just damage to the Atlantic relationship but perhaps eventually even to the US security guarantee for Europe...

Mr Ashdown is certainly right about the problems caused by the lack of a unified military command and strategy. He is also right about the ridiculous lack of coordination in aid and development efforts (the UK has been trying to give the UN a major coordination role here which might be a good idea).

Certainly more combat troops could be used in the south. But I think Mr Ashdown may be too pessimistic. I suspect the very difficult situation the Brits face in Helmand province (they have suffered about the same number of fatalities as the CF have) may be colouring his views--just as the Canadian situation in Kandahar province colours our views. The much more secure situation in most of the rest of the country must always be kept in mind.

Moreover, even with the troop levels now in the south, NATO certainly is not losing militarily. I recently wrote this about tactics against Canadians:

This year IEDs seem to be virtually the sole successful killing tactic of the Taliban. From this I conclude that we have had overwhelming operational success against them. They seem to have concluded that if they just keep killing some more Canadians (especially in bunches), regardless of the lack of real impact on our operations, they will win. And it appears that they have almost done so. Canadian public opinion is their target and they are zeroed.

Over the next few months UK-led operations may have a similar impact in Helmand. But how much security is being created in the south--even without more troops from the allies, how well reconstuction can proceed, and how the attitude of the people there will develop towards the Taliban, the Kabul government, and ISAF, cannot really be judged for some time yet. But if it becomes clear that a key ISAF element--Canada--is intent on bailing out, the outlook on the ground can only become worse. And can only discourage other NATO members from reinforcing us in the south.

I'm quite an amateur compared to Mr Ashdown. If things are essentially as they are at this time next year, in all the various aspects of dealing with the Afghan situation, then I think his pessimism would be much more justified. But not yet.

As for bailing out:

[Foreign Minister Peter MacKay] also dropped further hints Canada's combat role could be finished by February, 2009, when parliamentary approval runs out...