CF-18 Hornet replacement: Fix in for F-35?

Further to this post,

CF-18 Hornet replacement update: Can Canada afford the F-35? (Can anyone?)

things may be moving a lot faster than suggested in the May 29 story covered at this post. The latest from Le Devoir (via Norman's Spectator, edited Google translation):

Fighters: the air force has made its choice
The six billion contract is to be awarded to Lockheed Martin without proper bidding. There is surprise in defence circles.

Photo: Lockheed Martin
The Canadian Forces want to acquire the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter made by the U.S. multinational Lockheed Martin. The company would be willing to ensure to Canada a price just under 100 million dollars each. The plane, which is not yet in production, will feature the latest technology and will be stealthy (difficult to detect by radar).

The issue of replacement aircraft for the CF-18 is moving faster than expected. According to information obtained by Le Devoir, the Canadian Forces recommend that the government purchase the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, made by Lockheed Martin the U.S. multinational. The tender would be drafted so that other manufacturers will find it difficult to qualify.

There is surprise in defence circles. The purchase of new Canadian fighter planes was not expected until 2013, since the Air Force wants new planes in 2017. Generally, the government signs contracts three or four years before receiving aircraft.

The cabinet committee on economic growth should address the issue on Wednesday. If all goes well, the powerful cabinet plans and priorities committee, headed by the Prime Minister, would be seized of the matter next week. The Cabinet could then take a decision before the summer holidays and an announcement could be made this summer, according to our sources.

The document to be submitted to the government this week contains a recommendation to proceed with an advance contract award notice (ACAN). This procedure shows that the government intends to contract to a particular supplier [more here]...

Other companies therefore have few weeks to demonstrate their interest and to demonstrate that they can also meet the selection criteria--the latter very rarely happens since the government sets the criteria to suit a specific product.

The office of Defence Minister Peter MacKay refused to comment yesterday...

According to our information, the government is moving ahead on this issue for two reasons. First of all, Lockheed Martin is ready to guarantee a fixed price for each aircraft that will be acquired between 2013 and 2017. All cost overruns would be borne by the U.S. multinational. A tantalizing promise for Ottawa, since the F-35 is in its final stages of development, which has sputtered. Reports from the U.S. Department of Defense claimed that the aircraft could cost more than $120 million unit once production started [see earlier post mentioned above]. However, Lockheed Martin would be willing to guarantee a price in Canada - kept secret for now - of just under 100 million each [emphasis added]. For 65 fighters a bill of nearly six billion [more actually] to the Canadian government [that's fly-away cost only, not life-cycle].

Then, if Ottawa quickly proves its interest to buy the F-35, Lockheed Martin could allow more Canadian companies to participate in the assembly of the aircraft, mass production of which is to begin in 2012. It is also with this possibility in mind that the Canadian Forces will submit the issue this week to the cabinet committee on economic growth, not the one responsible for security and defense, which was the natural way [indeed].

Canada is an economic partner of the F-35 since 1997, in collaboration with other countries (U.S., Great Britain, Australia, etc..) [more here]. Ottawa has promised to inject $710 million in the project over a period of 40 years to allow Canadian companies to win contracts in developing this new generation of aircraft. So far, 80 companies have received contracts totaling 325 million dollars.

On May 27 in a Commons' committee, Minister Peter MacKay made several slips which gave the impression that the government's choice is made. "The Joint Strike Fighter, in which Canada has already made significant investments, will the next generation of combat capability. Canada will participate in this program and provide a device whose capacity will exceed current capacity. It's a beautiful device," he said, before adding:" This fighter will be subject to an open, competitive and transparent acquisiton process. " [This below is from the May 29 story noted above:

...MacKay went on to suggest the decision would be between the Joint Strike Fighter and another aircraft he didn't name [lots more here, with info on possible competitors--another one?]...]

Lockheed Martin is not alone in the race. The most serious competitor is Boeing and its new [sic] F-18 Super Hornet (USA), in production since 1999. Boeing estimates that the price of the device to Canada between $55 and $70 million. For 65 fighters, it would cost about four billion [fly-away again].

European EADS and its Eurofighter Typhoon are also under consideration, like the Saab Gripen. One of these three manufacturers, whose name was not disclosed at this time, promises to assemble the aircraft in Canada [!?!], which would be a sizeable economic argument, officials said.

The Canadian Forces estimate that in 2014 no other plane on the market will be comparable, hence the interest in an ACAN to accelerate the process. The military believe that the Typhoon will be too expensive (it is over 120 million dollars per unit) and that Boeing will no longer produce its Super Hornet, as the company expects its backlog will be empty in 2014 [maybe 2015]. If the assembly is closed, no need to consider, says a military source. But Boeing disagreed. Starting today, a letter will be sent to the Canadian government to ensure delivery capacity after 2014, because other orders should be added in coming months [Brazil? India? Australia has already bought 24, see end of this story] .

The Devoir piece looks pretty solid. In response to a question in the Commons today, obviously based on it, the MND replied "Stay tuned"--clearly implying a decision soon.

One wonders how the US Congress will feel if Canada gets F-35s at a lower price than the Americans are paying. One also wonders how our government will be able to afford the considerably advanced and very sizeable up-front purchase costs if a contract is signed for much earlier delivery than previously planned (budget crunch stuff here and here--figures at second link do not even include the new fighter; and then there's that mythical $35 billion for shipbuilding). And one wonders to what extent our Air Force--clearly in love with the plane--really needs the F-35's stealthy bomb truck capabilities for its most likely missions. After all its name, Joint Strike Fighter, reflects its primary role.

If the government goes ahead with an ACAN there will certainly be quite a political ruckus--well deserved in my view in the absence of a true competition based on realistically required mission capabilities. I mean, there is no rush for new fighters (the Hornets having just been upgraded): other than to be able to promise those politically delightful industrial and regional (Quebec esp.?) benefits sooner--and for the Air Force to lock in the plane it craves.

D-Day

A pretty comprehensive post from last year:

D-Day: 65th anniversary

Advocating what?

There has been much speculation recently regarding the possibility of maintaining some sort of Canadian Forces presence in Afghanistan post-2011. From what has been reported, one could be forgiven for believing the Liberals on the Afghanistan parliamentary committee have had some sort of epiphany.

But Bob Rae angrily clarified his party's position today on CTV's Question Period, and what's being proposed is hardly heavy lifting. Specifically, he said that committee members were open to considering the idea of having some Canadian soldiers training Afghans, but solely "inside the wire."

Perhaps there's a role there for us. Perhaps there's value to the Afghans in having trainers who teach theory only, and don't accompany them into the field. Perhaps there's value to our allies in freeing up non-combat troops - backfilling personnel, as it were. I don't know.

What I do know is that our current trainers - CF, police, correctional services, even diplomatic mentors - all go outside the wire regularly to do their work. Many of them want to get out into the field with the Afghans they teach even more. Because the work of building Afghanistan really takes place outside the wire.

None of that is even on the table, apparently.

So much for the grand move towards compromise of our Official Opposition, and the stubborn intransigence of our government. This is an argument over half-measures at best.

Even the Toronto Star looking favourably at CF role in Afstan post-2011

Dear Mr Harper,

Please get with the program. The Dutch may do it. Do you want Canada to be the first NATO member to bug out completely?

Update: Adrian MacNair looks at the politics and reality of it all and concludes (judicious fellow):

...
The truth is that Bob Rae does deserve a considerable amount of heat for his about-face, if only because he and his party has been determined to undermine the mission in every way possible for the past year with the “torture-rendition-war crimes” inquisition of our military. Nobody has worked harder to control a negative perception of the mission in Afghanistan than the Liberal Party...

...it’s not difficult to see why the sudden offering of support for a post-2011 role would be met with mistrust and skepticism. But that does not mean we can ignore the branch that has been offered. This is an opportunity too valuable to scoff at. And though the professionalism, maturity, and sensibility appear to have arrived at a most tardy moment, it would be wrong-headed to simply turn away...

It is positively surreal to see Bob Rae sitting on CTV’s Question Period, making sensible comments and suggestions about the importance of providing ongoing security training for the Afghan police and army [my reaction to Mr Rae's slap down of Craig Oliver in second comment here-- at Babbling's post on the matter]. We can either mock him for his late arrival to table, or we can take this opportunity to spur on a much-needed discussion about our post-2011 role in Afghanistan, and maintain our commitments to our allies. If the comments of Conservative MP James Rajotte are any indication, there is at least some willingness to do that from within the government...

Upperdate: A good recap of some of the political nonsense that has been going on at The Canada - Afghanistan Blog--with this apposite comment by milnews.ca:

Rae seemed to have a good grip on the issue last fall, when he spoke during debate in Parliament on the issue - PDF of 5 Oct 09 Hansard excerpt at Scribd.com here. Well worth the read.

Now, what'll it take to get anybody from the Government side to speak in this level of detail and clarity.

Operation K2K

"I've seen the X-rays of my ankles and it looks like a bad junk-yard in there with all the screws and pins..."
- OCdt Shaun Fevens

Read. It. All.

Update: Those in the know believe $80,000 was raised - to be split between Soldier On and Providence Care Rehab hospital in Kingston. BZ to all involved.

Our first C-130J delivered, more fairly soon

Further to this post,

First C-130J to arrive Trenton Friday, June 4

the Jerc has landed (official news release):

New generation of CC-130J Hercules arrives in Canada

June 4, 2010

The first of 17 new CC-130J Hercules tactical airlift aircraft landed at 8 Wing Trenton, Ont. today, contributing to the modernization and strengthening of the Canadian Forces.

Defence Minister Peter MacKay arrives in Trenton onboard the new CC-130J Hercules.
Credit: WO Carole Morissette [bringing back the open cockpit, Peter?].

The Minister of National Defence, the Honourable Peter MacKay, and the Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, the Honourable Rona Ambrose, were present to mark this important milestone...

"The arrival of the first CC-130J Hercules aircraft marks a new era in the Canadian military, bringing with it lasting economic benefits to Canada's aerospace and defence industries," said the Honourable Tony Clement, Minister of Industry. “The Industrial and Regional Benefits related to this airlift fleet, at $2.3 billion, will bring high value and high paying jobs, and economic growth to communities across the country [pork, pork and more pork--see also here and here].”

The delivery of the first CC-130J is six months ahead of the original scheduled delivery and under budget [emphasis added: good on LM and the US government, not so much our government, more here--and remember those who argued we should consider the A400M (more here)? note its first delivery now planned for "early 2013"]; it is another example of how the improved military procurement process ensures that the men and women of the Canadian Forces get the equipment they need faster, while ensuring best value and results for Canadians [tell it to la marine].

CC-130s are used in a wide variety of roles, including transporting equipment, troops and supplies to, within and from a theatre of operations.

“The new J-model Hercules is both proven and improved,” said Major-General Tom Lawson, Assistant Chief of Air Staff. “The value of versatile tactical airlift has been clearly demonstrated in recent operations, including Afghanistan and Haiti. We will be putting these new aircraft to good use without delay.”

Up to four other aircraft are expected this year with the final one to be delivered by 2012 [emphasis added, good work]. All 17 CC-130Js will be based at 8 Wing Trenton, thus obtaining maximum operational and financial efficiencies from common training, maintenance and infrastructure requirements...

The new CC-130J Hercules arrives in Trenton.
Photo Credit: WO Carole Morissette.

For comprehensive information, consult the backgrounder at:

http://www.airforce.forces.gc.ca/8w-8e/nr-sp/index-eng.asp?x=1&id=10623

For more information on technical specifications and imagery, visit the Air Force Webpage at:

www.airforce.forces.gc.ca/v2/equip/cc130j/specs-eng.asp

For high resolution imagery of the CC-130J: http://cc-130j.ca/

Update: Lots more from the Trentonian with photos, including a lovely one of fresh-air Peter.

Kandahar: Brig.-Gen. Vance back/Major US Army reinforcements coming

Americans going large for this fall's activities (whatever one calls them, see para before Update comment here for timing--links added to quote below):

Brig.-Gen. Jon Vance arrived in Kandahar on Friday morning to take over command of Canada's 2,800 troops in Afghanistan and South Asia.

The general's return came only five and a half days after he was named by Canadian Expeditionary Force Command as an emergency replacement for Brig.-Gen. Daniel Menard, who was abruptly fired last Saturday for alleged sexual misconduct with a female soldier under his command...

Thanks to an influx of American troops ordered by President Barack Obama, Vance has a fresh cavalry squadron from the 10th Mountain Division under his command in Dand District [see final para of this quote], as well as far more American military policemen in Kandahar City and the first wave of a brigade of troops from the 101st Airborne Division to the north and west of the provincial capital [I'm pretty certain this brigade combat team is not actually under Brig.-Gen. Vance].

Over the next couple of months several more American brigades are expected, at least doubling the number of troops in Kandahar from perhaps 7,000 today. As the American forces arrive, it is expected that Canada's military focus will narrow considerably, eventually concentrating almost entirely on Panjwaii District to the west of Kandahar City.

For the moment, however, Vance remains in charge of a powerful joint Canadian-American force [Task Force Kandahar (TFK--1st Squadron of US Army's 71st Cavalry Regiment has now been included with US units; the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry is no longer listed, likely replaced by a battalion from the 101st Airborne brigade not under TFK--see sixth para of quote here)] responsible for much of the province, which the Taliban regard as their spiritual homeland...

I doubt "several more American brigades" will be arriving at Kandahar over the next few months; I would imagine two more to be the limit. The US Army has had the 5th Stryker Brigade Combat Team in the region since last summer (the 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment, some 4,000 troops, will replace it this summer). The 2nd BCT, 101st Airborne is now arriving. That is two US brigades of ground troops; two more would make four, five brigades with TFK which is now about brigade strength. Then there is the US Army's combat aviation brigade at KAF.

So maybe six brigades in all, and some units not attached to the brigades. Now a division has traditionally had three brigades. So U.S. Major General James Terry and his 10th Mountain Division HQ will have their hands rather full when they take charge of reconfigured ISAF Regional Command (South) this fall.

Update: Note comment by Starbuck; time--and the US Army organizationally--marches on.

Upperdate: June 14--US Army orbat changes:

1) Zhari district:

With the combat boot prints of First Strike soldiers now upon the rugged terrain of the Kandahar province, Afghanistan, the 1st Battalion, 502nd Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division, has officially taken control of operations in the Zhari District within the Kandahar province during a transfer of authority ceremony held at Forward Operating Base Wilson, May 29 .

The 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry Regiment, relinquished its control and responsibility of Zhari [the new battalion is under US command, not CF's Task Force Kandahar as the 1-12 was]...

2) KAF

...Pegasus soldiers are from the 82nd Combat Aviation Brigade and Destiny is from the 101st Combat Aviation Brigade. The 82nd is transferring authority to the 101st in Regional Command South [more here, here and here].

"Afghanistan and the Turkish Flotilla Incident"

Start of Conference of Defence Associations' media round-up:

...
Peter Goodspeed for The National Post writes that ISAF’s approaching campaign in Kandahar, the heartland of the Taliban insurgency, will be a decisive battle in the mission.
http://www.nationalpost.com/news/world/story.html?id=3084975

Russell Hampsey and Sean P. McKenna for the Armed Forces Journal argue that COIN practitioners in Afghanistan need to listen and respond to Afghan concerns instead of telling them what they need.
http://www.afji.com/2010/06/4646076

The Strategy Page reports that all services operating in Afghanistan have been ordered to adopt the COIN strategy developed by General Stanley McChrystal and informed by generations of US Army Special Forces experience.
http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htsf/articles/20100528.aspx

Miles Amoore for Times interviews Naimatullah, a Taliban bomb maker and trainer, who explains the process and the will behind their determination to murder ‘Western infidels.’
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/afghanistan/article7140135.ece

Anthony Lloyd for Times writes that Afghan Intelligence believes million of dollars from Saudi Arabia have sponsored terrorism in the country.
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/afghanistan/article7140745.ece

Radio Free Europe interviews General Stanley McChrystal who reconfirms his commitment to security in Afghanistan.
http://www.rferl.org/content/Top_NATO_Commander_Talks_Of_Recent_Taliban_Gains...

Global Security argues that the omission of Taliban members at the upcoming Consultative Peace Jirga coupled with a search for quick fixes represents a flawed strategy and according to Afghan expert Khalil Roman, “We must know the price for peace.”
http://news.globaltv.com/world/story.html?id=3095114...

CF in Afstan post-2011? PM still "the biggest stumbling block"

That's what he may be, as Matthew Fisher of Canwest News put it--see this post:

Maybe the CF could stay in Afstan post-2011 after all

Looks like some opposition politicos may be getting reasonable...

Mr Harper's latest:

...“I think we’ve been very clear. We’re working according to the parliamentary resolution that was adopted in 2008 by which Canada’s military mission will end and will transition to a civilian and development mission at the end of 2011. And that continues to be our workplan according to the resolution adopted by Parliament.”..

But he's not telling the truth:

...

The problem is the Commons' motion (not a "parliamentary" one) of March 12, 2008, makes no mention of the CF's leaving Afghanistan; it refers only to Kandahar:

...this extension of Canada’s military presence in Afghanistan is approved by this House expressly on the condition that:

...

(c) the government of Canada notify NATO that Canada will end its presence in Kandahar as of July 2011, and, as of that date, the redeployment of Canadian Forces troops out of Kandahar and their replacement by Afghan forces start as soon as possible, so that it will have been completed by December 2011...

The government is simply lying--there is sadly no other word--when it says the motion demands "the military mission will come to an end in 2011".

Update thought: Can't the fellow even try to get "Yes" for an answer? What must Secretary of State Clinton think?

Upperdate: One colonel's view:

Canadians could train Afghans after 2011: military

The Canadian military is capable of training Afghan security forces past 2011, but it could be a challenging task depending on the number of experienced personnel required, the leader of Canada's mentoring teams in Afghanistan said Friday.

Col. Ian Creighton, who became commander of Canada's Operational and Mentoring Liaison Teams [they go outside the wire and fight alongside the Afghans--see middle of this post, plus here and here--not what is now envisaged for a post-2011 training mission, see following para] a month ago, said the Canadian Forces could continue training the Afghan police and army if Ottawa decided in favour of it.

"Could we do training up in Kabul or some place like that at some training centre [we are in fact already sending a fairly small number of "inside the wire" trainers to Kabul]? Sure, absolutely, if that's where the government wants to go," Creighton said. "How many? Not sure."

Creighton said maintaining a training role could be difficult depending on the number of Canadian military leaders who would be needed.

"If you've got a force of 200 trainers ... that's like two battalions' worth of leaders," he said...

Government's "National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy": Numbers don't make sense, esp. for Coast Guard

More sound and fury, smoke and mirrors, from the government--and our media bought it hook, line and sinker (more stories here, and here):

Shipbuilding strategy will leave yards 'humming': MacKay

Canada's ship yards will be "humming like they haven't hummed since the Second World War" under a $35 billion, 30-year federal shipbuilding strategy announced Thursday, says Defence Minister Peter MacKay.

The government will select two Canadian shipyards — one to construct large combat vessels, the other for non-combat ships — within the next two years [emphasis added, so no new vessels likely to start construction before 2013, some progress!], and contracts for smaller ships would be open to bids by other Canadian shipyards. Competition would be national and overseen by a "fairness monitor."..

MacKay said the priority is the construction of joint supply ships for the Canadian navy, a project that has been delayed for two years since the government halted the procurement process due to bidders' non-compliance with requirements and costs...

"This strategy will be the framework through which the government invests $35 billion over the next thirty years to acquire twenty-eight large vessels for the Canadian Coast Guard and the Canadian navy [emphasis added], as well as more than a hundred smaller ships," MacKay said.

Where did Mr MacKay get those figures? The official news release makes no mention of either funding or numbers of ships. The CBC story is the only one to smell some smoke:

...
It is unclear how much of the $35-billion price tag is new money as the Canada First Defence strategy (first outlined by the Harper government in May 2008) called for spending $20 billion to replace destroyers and frigates and other vehicles in the Canadian Forces fleet between now and 2028.

It also called for $15 billion in previously announced purchases of vehicles, including offshore patrol ships...

In fact adding those two figures together is the only way to get a $35 billion figure, and they include a lot more than ships, do not mention the Joint Support Ship--and do not include vessels for the Coast Guard. The minister is indeed either blowing smoke, or else doesn't know what he's talking about. From the "Canada First Defence Strategy", see first two under "equipment":

...


[Lots on current budgeting here]...

This government has been in power for over four years and still has signed no contract for any new Navy ship. No contract will be signed for at least another two years. No ship in service for at least three years after that. From 2006 to 2015 to get a new boat. Great work, eh?

Some key details about Navy building from another news release:

...
Two shipyards will be selected to build the large vessels (1000 tonnes displacement or more [must apply for CCG ships too]), through a fair, transparent and competitive process...

One shipyard will be selected to build combat vessels. This will enable the procurement of the Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC) and Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ships (AOPS). The surface combatant project will renew the Navy's surface fleet by replacing various warfare capabilities of the destroyers (Iroquois-class) and multi-role patrol frigate (Halifax-class) ships. The primary tasks of the Arctic ships will be to: conduct sea-borne surveillance operations in Canada's Economic Exclusion Zones (EEZs), including the Arctic; provide awareness of activities and events to various departments; and cooperate with other elements of the Canadian Forces and other federal government departments to assert and enforce Canadian sovereignty, whenever and wherever necessary [not "blue-water" vessels].

Another competitively selected shipyard will build non-combat vessels, such as the Joint Support Ships (JSS) [emphasis added]. The capabilities required of these ships are crucial to the Canadian Forces. The Joint Support Ship increases the range and sustainment of a Naval Task Group , permitting it to remain at sea for significant periods of time without going alongside for replenishment. These vessels will also provide capacity for sealift and support to troops ashore...

Now for some real fun with figures that show the government is not up to very much in reality.

We are promised 28 large ships over 30 years. Well, the Navy is already allocated 3 JSS and 6-8 AOPS, supposed to be built over the next few years, total cost $4.6 billion (look them up here). That's eleven ships max. Then there are supposed to be 15 new Canadian Surface Combatants to replace our detroyers and frigates--the first is not likely to appear before 2020 (see "What's the time frame for a new surface combatant?" here). These, especially if all 15 are built, will be hugely expensive, far beyond the price of the other two types. But, far in the future as they are, no specific funding has been allocated for their construction.

Thus planned large Navy ships: 24-26. And the government says it will build in total 28 large ships for both the Navy and the Coast Guard over the next 30 years!

What about the Coast Guard? The government is now committed to 5 large vessels--see this news release on their share in the shipbuilding strategy, total cost some $1.2 billion.

So the number of large vessels specifically planned for over the next 20 or so years is 29-31--already over the 28 promised in 30 years.

But wait! There's more! The CCG now has 28 ships over 1,000 tonnes. Of those 15 will soon be over 30 years old (see preceding link), the youngest will soon be 25 years old, and only 5 replacements are in train. That leaves 23 other ships to be replaced, one would surely hope and expect, as part of the government's shipbuilding strategy.

So let's recount. The government says it will build 28 large ships over 30 years. It already has public plans for 29-31, Navy and CCG. Yet the CCG still has those 23 more old and older vessels about which nothing is being said. That is a huge shortfall in the government's numbers; as things now stand the CCG is sailing towards oblivion--even if somewhat fewer new and better ships might do for the aging 23.

Where is the money and schedule to rebuild the Coast Guard? I guess, since only $5.8 billion has been committed so far for large ships ($4.6 billion Navy plus $1.2 billion CCG, see above), there's around $29 billion of mythical government money left of that $35 billion the MND mentioned to build a whole lot of ships for the CCG--plus the Navy's surface combatants.

Sure.

And how will having two monopoly shipyards for large vessels keep costs under control? The utter political madness of insisting we build ships in Canada rather than purchasing abroad--if not entire ships and systems, at least, say, hulls over even just designs. As we in fact have done for some new CCG vessels--more here regarding the JSS (note Dutch building their hulls in Romania), and here on the JSS and AOPS. Note also the Aussies buying Spanish, with some work in Australia.

A recent post in which I wonder about the government's ability to pay for promised future defence spending, about its inability refusal really to deal with a new defence strategy, and about whether Canada can continue to afford a blue-water fleet:

"Gov't shipbuilding strategy moving towards launch?"/Musings on the CF's future

While from Babbling:

Making the argument for our Navy

CF-18 Hornet replacement update: Can Canada afford the F-35? (Can anyone?)

Earlier:

CF-18 Hornet replacement update (sort of)...

Replacing Canadian fighter jets to cost $9B

...in April, Col. Randy Meiklejohn of the directorate of aerospace requirements told a gathering of defence industry representatives in Ottawa that the cost of the program would be about $9 billion...The air force, he pointed out, plans to have the new aircraft in service starting in 2017. The figure he used would include not only the 65 aircraft, but spare parts and long-term support...

Then the CDS:

...Wednesday [June 2], Natynczyk made a point of pitching for another anticipated big-ticket purchase, the replacement of the air force's nearly 30-year-old CF-18 jet fighters.

"The point is, these aircraft entered service in 1982. Despite upgrades [see here], they're getting old and need to be replaced soon," he said.

The price tag for buying new fighters is estimated to be anywhere between $5 and $10 billion, depending on the type of aircraft and the number being purchased.

Now down south:

Pentagon acquisition czar Ashton Carter recertified the embattled Lockheed Martin Joint Strike Fighter program to move forward after a major cost increase, but defense officials are now saying the total acquisition price of the multinational, triservice aircraft has increased by yet another $54.2 billion.

Carter sent his Nunn-McCurdy recertification letter to Congress on June 1. This recertification was widely expected, as Pentagon officials since last fall have been working to restructure the single-engine, stealthy fighter program through a series of rigorous reviews in anticipation of the cost breach. But the recertification documentation includes more detail about the extent of problems leading up to the most recent cost spike.

Since December, Pentagon officials anticipated the per-unit cost including the price of development to be $112 million; it is now expected to be $155.6 million. The number most closely associated with flyaway pricing was estimated at $92.4 million only a few months ago; it is now at $133 million [emphasis added]. Earlier this year, development was extended from Fiscal 2012 to Fiscal 2016 in an effort to reduce schedule risk and concurrency between testing and production...

Neither of those estimates seems to include in-service costs. But at $133 million--without those costs--65 for our Air Force would be some $8.7 billion (then there's the future exchange rate). That's already awfully close to our $9 billion which includes in-service costs.

Meanwhile others interested in the F-35 are having price problems:

UK:

...
One programme that will come under scrutiny is the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. Even assuming the planned purchase is cut from 150 to 60 aircraft, the programme could cost the UK £5bn or more, starting around 2017, with perhaps another £10bn-£15bn in lifetime support costs, says the report [by the Royal United Services Institute,
p. 15]...

Even with the Canadian dollar at 1.50 to the pound that's a minimum of $22.5 billion with lifetime support (is that comparable to our "spare parts and long-term support"?). For 60 aircraft, not 65. Hmmm.

Netherlands:

...

In the final debate of the current parliament before national elections to be conducted on 9 June, the Dutch Labour party announced its intention to withdraw from the programme's initial operational test and evaluation phase, and to return its one aircraft one order to Lockheed.

Labour party defence specialist Angelien Eijsink says the main reason for the decision is that "the price of the aircraft is still uncertain, and the project keeps on sliding on the agreed timescale"...

A majority of parliament voted to stop the project and ordered the defence secretary to do so. He has not executed this request, however, due to an earlier decision that the resigning government would not take any irreversible steps in its last days in power...

Lockheed was due to deliver the Netherlands' first test aircraft during 2011, and had been expecting a decision on whether it would buy a second example later this year [bit ahead of our timetable for a new fighter].

First C-130J to arrive Trenton Friday, June 4

Read all about it. Three months ago:

Our first Jerc flies

Further to this post,

Our first C-130J

one of several photos:


...

2010 Halifax International Fleet Review, June 26 to July 2

First the west coast,

International Fleet Review June 9 to 14, Esquimalt

then the east:

Halifax will be the gateway to the world as Canada’s Navy hosts an International Fleet Review as part of its Centennial celebrations [official page here]. As warships from various nations arrive, they will have on board more than 5,000 sailors who’ve come to enjoy our maritime hospitality. Halifax will definitely be the “place to be” in the summer of 2010.

Many of the ships will be open for visitors, so members of the general public can experience what it is like to be onboard a navy ship and get a chance to rub elbows with some Canadian or foreign sailors. Mark your calendars from June 26 to July 2 to participate in the event of the summer.

Latest News

Ship tours schedule announced

During the IFR several foreign and Canadian ships will be open for tours including the HMS ARK ROYAL and USS WASP. Visit the ship tours schedule for more info.

Volunteer for the IFR We are now recruiting for several different volunteer positions within the International Fleet Review’s Centennial Village. For more information please review the volunteer page and application form.

Schedule of Events [click on box]

Facebook page here, and ship list here (heck of a bunch, all with links--great work).

Afstan: Brits de-wobble, eventual shift to Kandahar still possible?

But don't always put that much stock in The Economist's musings:

The wars over the war
A new government gets to grips with another foreign-policy priority

...Officials said the Chequers meeting was not a “review” of policy, but only a “seminar” intended to “take stock”. Mr Cameron, it is said, told the gathering that his government was not about to change course, and would support America’s war. On the same day, the prime minister called the Afghan president, Hamid Karzai, for what officials say was a “warm” talk about the “peace jirga” being held in Kabul, and about preparations for military operations in Kandahar.

British qualms about the war—a poll by Com Res in April found that 77% of the British public wanted troops withdrawn from Afghanistan—take second place to Mr Cameron’s desire to forge close ties with the Obama administration. That message will delight Robert Gates, the American defence secretary, who will be visiting London to meet members of the new government before a NATO meeting in Brussels on June 10th and 11th.

The American commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, is due to submit in December the results of a review that will set out how far and how quickly NATO can start drawing down forces next year. Barring a political or military disaster, British officials are assuming that, regardless of how many provinces “transition” to nominal Afghan control in the coming months, a substantial number of foreign troops will remain in Afghanistan until about 2014.

It may be a sign of the prevailing mood in Whitehall that rumours are now circulating about the possible demise of Sir Jock Stirrup, the chief of the defence staff, perhaps in favour of the Afghanophile army chief, General Sir David Richards [more here]. Behind the scenes, General Richards has promoted the idea that British troops should move from Helmand to Kandahar province. Kandahar, Afghanistan’s second-largest city and the Taliban’s ideological fount, has always seemed to ambitious British officers a more prestigious property than Helmand. The departure of the Canadian contingent next year would create the opening for the British to move in, play a central role in the next phase of the war, maximise Britain’s influence with the Americans and, perhaps, retain a permanent command for the British.

Such ideas, though, seem to have been blocked at the top. Britain has invested heavily in military infrastructure, and in developing contacts and intelligence sources in Helmand. As Dr Fox put it: “It would be crazy to go somewhere else and start all over again.”

Earlier:

Afstan: Brits going wobbly/Not shifting to Kandahar

As for the Canadian war over the war:

Maybe the CF could stay in Afstan post-2011 after all

Maybe the CF could stay in Afstan post-2011 after all

Looks like some opposition politicos may be getting reasonable; a ball with considerable pressure may end up in grumpy Stephen's court--can he do a 180? From Matthew Fisher of Canwest News:

Canada could fill training roll in Afghanistan post-2011, MPs say

KABUL — Liberal foreign affairs critic Bob Rae has provided the strongest indication yet that a deal may be possible between his party and the minority Harper government to keep some Canadian troops in Afghanistan after the combat mission in Kandahar ends next summer.

"The door is open to serious discussion in Canada and between Canada and NATO about what the future looks like," Rae said during a five-day fact-finding mission to Kandahar and Kabul by 10 members of Parliament from all the parties, who sit on the Commons’ special committee on the mission in Afghanistan.

One possibility being closely examined is whether to dispatch Canadian military trainers to help "increase the capacity of both the Afghan police and Afghan military," the former premier of Ontario said.

"There is no deal done, but there are elements that could be brought together to make a deal," Bryon Wilfert, the Liberal vice-chair of the committee, said after the delegation met Thursday in Kabul with U.S. Gen. Stanley McChrystal, who commands more than 100,000 NATO troops, and another American, Lt.-Gen. William Caldwell, whose remit it is to train Afghan forces [as head of a newish NATO mission] to a level that would permit alliance forces to leave the country.

At a meeting with the MPs on Thursday, Afghan Foreign Minister Zalmai Rasoul also requested that if Canada’s combat troops were leaving, that some of them be replaced by military trainers.

Prime Minister Stephen Harper may represent the biggest stumbling block to such a deal [emphasis added]. He has repeatedly stated that all Canadian soldiers would leave Afghanistan next year [more here].

However, there have been private discussions for some time in Ottawa, with both Liberal and Conservative MPs and senators putting out discrete feelers about what Canada might do militarily when its combat mission ends [lots more here].

While not as specific as Rae or Wilfert, Kevin Sorenson, the Tory who heads the Afghan committee, said, "We all realize the Afghan police, as well as the military, are going to have to increase capacity if they are going to secure their own country. Canada may have a role in that."

Laurie Hawn, a Conservative and parliamentary secretary to the minister of national defence, said that "we heard loud and clear from NATO and the Afghans here their desire for Canada to stay in a substantial military training and police training role."..

The outlines of a new arrangement might involve Canada sending as many as 600 military trainers to an academy in Afghanistan, if Parliament approves. Caldwell indicated in an interview with Canwest News Service last month that any trainers sent by Canada would work within a heavily fortified base where they would not even have to wear body army [see here].

Senior Canadian officers believe that providing 600 trainers at a time would likely be too much for the army, because so many of the instructors would have to be highly experienced sergeants and warrant officers. Asked if the Armed Forces could generate a force of 400 or 450 trainers, they said, that was possible [emphasis added], particularly if some of the trainers were logisticians, signalers, medics and mechanics. That would lessen the strain on the infantry, armour and combat engineering regiments which have already served many dangerous tours in Afghanistan...

"We have an obligation to see this thing through,” Rae said. “We came in with NATO and I think that we want to work through with NATO what our future will be, based upon the resolution of Parliament . . .

"I just want to say on behalf of the Liberal party that we are very committed to a role post-2011. We believe that that is very important."

NDP Defence critic Jack Harris, who sits on the Afghan committee, was less sure about Canada doing anything more in Afghanistan militarily.

"Obviously, there are considerable humanitarian and institution-building concerns about Afghanistan," Harris said Monday in Kandahar. "Whether that involves the military or not is another question, indeed...

Harris and the other nine committee members spoke with one voice about the need for what the New Democrat MP called "an open-ended debate in Parliament on the issue" of what Canada should do in Afghanistan in the future.

Whatever is decided, it has to be done "in a timely fashion" and "must be put to bed" by the end of this year, Wilfert said. "This is not a Liberal mission or a Conservative mission. This is a Canadian mission . . .

"It is our committee's responsibility to make a recommendation to Parliament but ultimately, it is up to the government to put something forward [emphasis added]."..

Listen up, Mr Harper.

2010 True Patriot Love Foundation gala: Nov. 10

Last year. And now (links added):

True Patriot Love raises funds with military precision
Second annual gala aims to garner $2.4M for war veterans

Rick Hillier, former chief of defence staff, was in Toronto yesterday to promote military fundraiser True Patriot Love, which raised $2.3-million last year. Hillier's Military Families Fund charity received the largest portion.
Photo Credit: Brett Gundlock, National Post, National Post

The push behind Canada's largest military fundraiser began in earnest yesterday, as former chief of defence staff Rick Hillier announced the return of the True Patriot Love Foundation gala.

Last year, on the night before Remembrance Day, 1,700 soldiers, entertainers, elected officials, corporate sponsors and Masters of the Universe squeezed into the Metro Toronto Convention Centre for the event's inaugural, raising $2.3-million for veterans and military families -- the most ever in Canada.

The goal for this year's event, again scheduled for Nov. 10, is $2.4-million.

"To be associated with these young men and women in uniform, and to be associated with their families is one of the -- actually, it's the only perk I had as chief of the defence staff -- and it's one of the things I enjoy most in life," Mr. Hillier told a Toronto news conference yesterday.

His charity, the Military Families Fund, received the largest portion of last year's total.

Other recipients included Soldier On, a program that seeks to rehabilitate wounded soldiers through sport, and Wounded Warriors, which works to provide wounded soldiers with segways and raise awareness of posttraumatic stress disorder, among other projects.

Gala founder Shaun Francis kicked off the news conference yesterday by outlining some of the projects funded by last year's gala. The list included sending 18 wounded soldiers to the Vancouver Paralympic Games as torchbearers, as well as sending 40 children with parents currently deployed in Afghanistan to Muskoka Woods camp this summer...

Future gala events are planned for Vancouver and New Brunswick, with another one expected to follow in Montreal.

Afstan: CSIS assisting the CF

A letter by the service's director:

CSIS and sidearms

A select few Canadian Security Intelligence Service employees abroad are authorized by the CSIS director to carry a firearm in dangerous operational environments such as Afghanistan (Undercover CSIS Agents Carry Guns in Foreign Flashpoints – May 26). CSIS personnel who are required to carry sidearms receive intensive training on the safe carriage and handling of a sidearm. They must also obtain a firearms certification prior to receiving the authority to carry a sidearm.

The fact that Canadian diplomats abroad are unarmed is not a model for CSIS officers. CSIS personnel in Afghanistan are often required to meet individuals – some of whom would be described as unfriendly at best – in very dangerous situations while carrying out their work in collecting security intelligence [more here] on threats to the Canadian Forces [emphasis added] and to Canada. They are not in Afghanistan to do administrative work. To send CSIS personnel into harm’s way in Afghanistan without adequate protection would be completely irresponsible.

The article leaves the impression that the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC) was not aware of the CSIS policy on sidearms. SIRC was, in fact, fully briefed on all aspects of this issue and provided with the CSIS policy some time ago.

CSIS firearms policies respect Canada’s Criminal Code, Firearms Act, National Defence Act, Public Agents Firearms Regulations and the Ministerial Direction for CSIS Operations.

Richard B. Fadden, director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS)

Earlier:

Canadian special forces ops in Afstan (and CSIS) [Torch]

Wrong-tree barking watch [Flit]

National Security: Obamaspeak that might almost be Canadian

Our sort of bafflegab:

...how does the NSS [text here] propose to achieve such wonders? The administration claims credit for expanding the Group of Eight to the G-20 and paying up America's United Nations dues. In the future, America will "invest in strengthening the international system" and work "from inside international institutions," and build "frameworks to face their imperfections head on and to mobilize transnational cooperation" and "enhance international capacity," and facilitate "broad and effective global cooperation" and develop "integrated plans and approaches that leverage . . . capabilities." This type of writing is a net subtraction from public understanding...

Tom Ricks retch of the day

Further to this post,

Brig.-Gen. Ménard: How low can the Toronto Star go? [the Globe and Mail actually went lower]

one of the better American military journalists just can't help himself. Fie:

...
Well, at least he wasn't into kidnapping, bondage, and murder, like that other Canadian officer is alleged to have been.

Afstan: Counterinsurgency 501/Predate update: "Once Upon a Time in Afghanistan" (with photos)

A thoughtful piece by Ann Marlowe (six-time embed) in the Wall St. Journal (via Moby Media Updates, June 2):

Strategy vs. Tactics in Afghanistan
Good counterinsurgency can't make up for the lack of a political plan.

Gen. Stanley McChrystal has embraced Hamid Karzai as part of the Obama administration's startling about-face on the Afghan president. Until recently, the Obama team seemed to understand that Mr. Karzai was "not an adequate strategic partner," in the well-chosen words of our ambassador (and former general) Karl Eikenberry. Mr. Karzai's refusal to name cabinet ministers in the wake of the August 2009 election (as required by the constitution) so angered his own parliament that for several days last month they refused to conduct any business, instead sitting silent in protest.

Mr. Karzai and the American commander are both following what Col. Gian Gentile, head of military history at West Point, has called "a strategy of tactics"—by which he means ground-level measures pursued on an ad hoc basis without an overall objective [more here].

Mr. Karzai has no vision of his country's future. But he's adept at playing off all the actors, including the U.S., against each other in the hope he will be the only one left standing. His strange lack of urgency about the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan, according to Abdullah Abdullah, the leader of the Afghan democratic opposition, stems from his underlying belief that the U.S. decision to gradually withdraw next summer is a bluff. Many Afghans think the U.S. is there for ulterior motives (Afghanistan's small oil and gas reserves, coal, taking Afghan farmland [!?!]) and will stay forever.

Gen. McChrystal of course wants the best for his country and for Afghanistan. But he has a constituency in the military to serve as well. To avoid being tagged as a "knuckledragger" (the military's term for an unreconstructed commander who "doesn't get it" about counterinsurgency), he constantly states that we're fighting a "war of perceptions" and that winning over the Afghan population is the key to victory. His tactics are those enshrined in his boss Gen. David Petraeus's Counterinsurgency Field Manual [more here with link to Manual].

The manual, which draws upon French counterinsurgency theorist David Galula and other military thinkers of the 1950s and '60s, urges stationing troops in small outposts close to the people, using the military to do armed social work, and measuring success in perceptions. The idea is that if you execute process correctly at the local level, you create spots of security that eventually grow to cover the disputed area. The population refuses to help the insurgents and allies itself with the government.

The press has bought Gen. McChrystal's line that now, finally, the American military will follow best-practice counterinsurgency and that now, finally, we will see good results.

I've seen our military do what the Field Manual says is right over the course of six embeds from the summer of 2007 onward, long before Gen. McChrystal took command on June 15, 2009. I've seen successes at the local and even provincial level—but nothing that has lasted even a year. In nearly every province and district of Regional Command East and Regional Command South, the security situation is either the same as it was in 2007 or significantly worse. The reason is that counterinsurgency is a set of tactics, not a strategy. It tells you how to persuade the population to embrace a good government, but it can't make a government acceptable to the people.

Anywhere counterinsurgency has worked there has been a good government in place. The Karzai government has become more egregiously corrupt and incompetent in the last three or four years. Fraud in the Aug. 20, 2009, election soured large segments of the population on the government and even the democratic process. Cynicism has replaced hope among young people, and conspiracy theories about American motives have gained ground.

Now Mr. Karzai and American leaders are pushing negotiations with the Taliban, a terrible idea for many reasons, practical and moral. It's part of the same confusion of process with vision that we're seeing from American leaders. Mr. Karzai and the Taliban aren't the only alternatives in Afghanistan. We have stupidly refused to show the Afghans that we take good governance seriously. Talking about the "war of perceptions" is not enough. We need a political strategy before we, and the Afghan people, lose.

Ms. Marlowe, a visiting fellow at the Hudson Institute, recently completed her sixth embed with American troops in Afghanistan. Her monograph on David Galula will be published by the Strategic Studies Institute at the Army War College this summer.

The problem remains: how in practice to effect (force?) "good governance" on the Afghan state when the Afghans are having rather a difficult time achieving it themselves? A hard enough thing to create at any time in a terribly poor and ethnically divided country (with a history of authoritarian central government that nonetheless had a light footprint in much of its territory), much more so in the midst of a civil war against a brutal and ruthless opponent.

In any event these things take time--see here and here, with problematic methods by Western standards; and remember the Taliban resurgence only really began in 2005/6.

Predate update: Keep in mind on the other hand that a half century ago there was movement towards a rather different Afghanistan (such as the Kabul I knew a bit in the mid-70s with slightly different clothes--and, yes, Kabul was and is not representative) than "a broken 13th-century country". Have a read and look:

Once Upon a Time in Afghanistan...
Record stores, Mad Men furniture, and pencil skirts -- when Kabul had rock 'n' roll, not rockets.


...

Taliban’s Lies o’ the Month for May

How many Canadian deaths did the Taliban take credit for in May?

33

How many Canadians were killed in Afghanistan in May?

4

Over the past 20 months, the Taliban Info-machine has been taking credit for more than 15 Canadian deaths for every one that has, in truth, occurred.

The Taliban’s lies continue.

More details here.

(Crossposted to Milnews.ca blog)

Aussies to be active at Kandahar

But confirm will not take lead at Uruzgan when Dutch depart (via Spotlight on Military News and International Affairs):

1) Diggers braced for push into Taliban heartland

A COALITION victory in a key operation to secure Afghanistan's Taliban heartland of southern Kandahar would "suck the life out of the insurgency", defence chief Angus Houston told a Senate estimates hearing yesterday.

In one of his most upbeat assessments of the war so far, Air Chief Marshal Houston indicated there would be a major role for Australian forces as the Kandahar operation gathered momentum.

The US-led operation is expected to involve thousands of Afghan and NATO troops, but would also include Australian special forces [more here] and newly trained Afghan troops and their Australian mentors, he said.

The new operation to secure lawless Kandahar would build on the success of an offensive in neighbouring Helmand province [well...].

"Kandahar city itself is not controlled by the Taliban but it does have a number of serious governance issues which the coalition intends to address [emphasis added, typical Aussie understatement, more on the city here]," Air Chief Marshal Houston said...

In 2006 when the ADF had a 1400-strong force deployed in Iraq and 500 in Afghanistan, East Timor exploded into violence requiring a 3200-strong taskforce to be deployed to Dili [that's 5,100 on expeditionary ops at one time, folks]...

There are 1550 ADF personnel deployed in Afghanistan [more here], including a 300-strong special forces task group -- the second-highest number of special forces after the US.

2) Australia to take greater Afghan training role

AUSTRALIA will dramatically increase its training role in Afghanistan in the coming months but will not take over from the Dutch as the lead nation in Oruzgan province because it would leave the nation exposed closer to home, defence chiefs have told a Senate committee.

The chief of the Australian Defence Force, Angus Houston, revealed that Australian troops would take over the training of the entire 4th Brigade of the Afghan National Army, as the occupying coalition strives to build an Afghan defence force that can stand on its own when foreign troops eventually leave.

More than 700 Australian troops have been mentoring two battalions - known as kandaks - from the 4th Brigade, but by the end of the year, they will have responsibility for training all six kandaks, some of which are expected to take part in the intensifying offensive against insurgents in Kandahar province [as with Canadian mentors and ANA going to Helmand this February for the Marjah operation--moving ANA units around, at last, more here]...

3) Australian defence chiefs say taking over Dutch role in Afghanistan could overstretch military

Australia will not take over the leadership role in restive southern Afghanistan from departing Dutch forces because the Australian military could become overstretched, national defence chiefs said Monday.

Most of Australia's 1,550 troops in Afghanistan are based in Uruzgan province where the Dutch lead the International Security Assistance Force.

Australia is regarded by some observers as a natural successor to the Dutch in the province, while retired Maj. Gen. Jim Molan, an Australian who served as the U.S.-led international forces' Chief of Operations in Iraq in 2004-2005, argues that Australia can and should commit hundreds more troops to the Afghanistan campaign.

Afghanistan will be among the top issues discussed when President Barack Obama visits Australia in June.

With the Netherlands set to withdraw its 1,600 troops from Afghanistan from August, Australian Defence Minister John Faulkner said on Monday "another first tier NATO nation" needed to take over the Dutch leadership role in Uruzgan.

Faulkner said Australia had to keep troops in reserve to deal with emergencies in its own region, and the United States had not asked him to fill the Dutch void...

Air Marshal Angus Houston, Australia's Defence Force Chief, said Australia was already making a "very reasonable contribution" from a [permanent] defence force of 58,00 personnel [emphasis added, cf. Update here]...