Buy some Blue

As I did last year, I'm going to recommend you all go out and buy a case of Labatt Blue for Canada Day tomorrow, for two reasons:

On July 1st, Labatt will be making a special Canada Day delivery of Labatt Blue to our troops in Afghanistan...The Labatt Blue Bottle Drive will raise money for Military Families Fund, an agile and responsive fund that responds to the special-case needs of the Canadian Forces members and their families.

While you're at the Labatt site, be sure to click on the "Send a Message" button to convey your Canada Day wishes to the troops in Kandahar. This "Message in a Blue Bottle" campaign is a Good Thing^TM, and the company should be supported for doing it.

It's never as simple as a 3:31 piece on The National

Brian Stewart did a piece a few nights ago on accountability for "night raids" in Afghanistan by Canadian and allied special forces, and I've been meaning to write something about it ever since.

Stewart and Mansbridge ask a lot of questions, but don't provide many good answers. But that certainly doesn't stop them from making insinuations and giving inaccurate impressions to their viewers.

For starters, look at Mansbridge's introduction to the segment:

Canadians are told their soldiers are rebuilding Afghanistan, fighting to defend the lives of the Afghan people. But elite Canadian soldiers are also carrying out secret military raids, raids which have resulted in the deaths of Afghan civilians. The United Nations is demanding answers. But the Canadian military is neither talking nor offering any accountability...

There's so much spin packed into so few words, it's going to take some effort to unpack it. Stay with me, here.

First off, Canadian soldiers are rebuilding Afghanistan, and they are defending the lives of ordinary Afghans. Yet the CBC questions it, by prefacing their statement with "Canadians are told..."

They then attempt to juxtapose those facts against the reality of targeted raids, highlighting the idea of civilian deaths. What's missed in those two sentences is that, in killing or capturing key insurgents in those "night raids," the CF is actually rebuilding Afghanistan by systematically removing those who would destabilize and regress it and protecting Afghans by removing those who would subjugate and terrorize them.

Remember, the insurgents kill more Afghans than any other group operating in the country:

Tallying records from nongovernmental organizations and the media, Human Rights Watch counted 189 bombings in 2006 that killed 492 civilians. An additional 177 civilians were killed in other attacks including ambushes and executions.

"The insurgents are increasingly committing war crimes, often by directly targeting civilians," said Joanne Mariner, terrorism and counterterrorism director at the rights group, which is based in New York.

Even when targeting security forces, "they generally kill many, many more civilians than they do military personnel," she added.

It's also worth remembering that the CBC has also highlighted the obvious drawbacks to the main alternative to night raids, airstrikes:

The insurgents used civilian houses for cover, and in doing so, put villagers at risk, said ISAF spokesman Lt.-Col. Mike Smith.

The dead included nine women and three children, according to the provincial police chief, Mohammad Hussein Andiwal.

...

"A compound was assessed to have been occupied by up to 30 insurgent fighters, most of whom were killed in the engagement," a NATO statement said.

"We are concerned about reports that some civilians may have lost their lives during this attack," Smith said.

Afghan President Hamid Karzai criticized the mounting civilian toll from NATO and U.S.-led military operations as "difficult for us to accept or understand."

So if Canadian soldiers come in with overwhelming force - artillery or airstrikes - they're criticized for being too indiscriminate in their attacks. But when they send in special forces, which greatly increase the chances of hitting a specific insurgent target surgically, they're criticized for a lack of accountability.

Seems to me like they're 'damned if they do, damned if they don't' by Stewart and his newsroom cronies.

Back to Mansbridge's introduction, though, and specifically to his statement that the U.N. is demanding answers. It would be more useful to specify that the Special Rapporteur to the U.N. Human Rights Council, professor and lawyer Philip Alston, is demanding answers. The U.N. Security Council obviously has enough answers to support the U.N. mandate for the mission.

And finally, to the assertion that the CF isn't talking or offering any accountability, I can only say 'yes' to the first point and 'accountability to whom?' to the second. I wish the CF was given more free rein to address their own press demands, but unfortunately the government has decided to clamp down on the CF's ability to respond to even the most innocuous of requests, let alone those of this sensitivity. So yes, the CF isn't talking.

But the idea that the CF isn't accountable is not only ridiculous, it's flat out wrong.

The Canadian military is the most accountable organization in the Canadian government, and perhaps in the entire country. Every single person serving in uniform knows who they report to, and who reports to them. Although some responsibilities and missions are more clearly defined than others, CF personnel are far more likely to seek out a clear mandate from their superiors than just about anyone else I know, right down to the private carrying a rifle.

Just ask a soldier about the concept of 'arcs of fire' and what that means in terms of personal accountability.

Ask Rick Hillier or Walt Natynczuk who is accountable for the actions of any soldier, sailor, or airman in the CF, and if you give them a few minutes on the phone, they'll be able to tell you: "Pte Bloggins reports to MCpl Smith, who reports to WO Jones, who reports to Capt Black, who reports to LCol White, who reports to...who reports to me." Ask the Minister of National Defence or the Prime Minister whether or not the CF is accountable, and to whom.

No, what CBC is complaining about is that the CF isn't accountable to the press. Boo-frickin'-hoo.

And folks, that's just the first twenty-five seconds of the the clip.

Stewart takes over with even more incomplete information, implication and insinuation, and spin. I use the term 'spin' advisedly here, because I can't think of how a paid journalist with decades in his craft could put something so lop-sided together and present it on air if he wasn't deliberately trying to guide his viewers to a predetermined conclusion.

The best example of this in the piece comes at the 2:14 mark. Stewart shows a copy of Alston's report, and says that Alston "complains that 200 civilians have been killed in operations this year by NATO forces, some in raids."

Too true. Here's the report where the complaint is made (Word file).

But here's what Stewart doesn't tell you, on pages 5 and 6 of the document:

Taliban and other anti-Government elements

27. Over the past four months, the Taliban and other anti-government elements have killed approximately 300 civilians. Roughly three quarters of these civilians were killed in suicide attacks. While the majority of suicide attacks appear to target legitimate military objectives, many of these attacks are nonetheless unlawful because it should be obvious that they will result in far more civilian than military deaths.

28. Most of the other civilians killed by the Taliban die as a result of targeted assassinations. While these killings are fewer in number, they are significant in terms of intimidating and repressing the population. Often, killing one teacher will close an entire area’s schools, killing one proponent of the Government will intimidate many others, and killing one worker will end humanitarian access to a district. These assassinations are completely unlawful, and their consequences are dramatic. The Taliban have also engaged in a high level of unlawful killing of non-civilians. [Babbler's emphasis]

But hey, if Stewart says it's all about JTF 2 and international military forces, it must be true, right?

As I read the report, Alston saves his fiercest condemnation for the Taliban and those who kill women. In his own words:

I saw no evidence of widespread intentional killings in violation of human rights or humanitarian law by international military forces.

Stewart also gets himself into trouble speaking with Mansbridge at the end of the story:

M: Well, who controls Canada's JTF 2?

S: Well, Canada, of course, overwhelmingly does control it. The problem is it's a very unclear line of command all the time. It serves with the Americans in Operation Enduring Freedom, and it goes on special operations but it also has told parliament, insisted to parliament it does OK every mission with the senior Canadian officer in Afghanistan. And that's about all it's prepared to tell parliament right now.

M: Who are they accountable to?

S: Really, the Canadian government. But as again, it goes around working through the Americans, working with various international groups, so by the time the reports get to the Canadian government, it could be some time, it could be rather unclear.

If Stewart knew more about the military, he'd know that the line of command is crystal clear to those in the chain of command - it has to be. When he says it's "very unclear," what he's really saying is that it's unclear to him. And that makes him uncomfortable, since journalists are supposed to have clear access to everything. Just ask them, they'll tell you.

Again, boo-frickin'-hoo, Brian.

The truth is that JTF 2 is fully accountable to the CF chain of command, and the civilian government. The truth is that there is no easy way to fight a counterinsurgency war. And the truth is that the CF, including its special operators, is doing a commendable job of it, despite the difficulty of the task.

And, I might add, despite the misguided attentions of Brian Stewart and the CBC.

Hillier retires

John Ward captures what will most likely be remembered as one of Hillier's greatest successes during his term as CDS - re-connecting Canada with it's military.

That continuing effort now belongs not only to his successor, but to Prime Minister Harper and Defence Minister McKay. Damian has often blogged about it here, and unfortunately, the situation hasn't changed much.

We are but one or two elections and a different government mindset away from a return to the past. It doesn't matter what political stripe the government is, they're all politicians at heart. The military has been sacrificed for political expediency in the past and will be in the future - if we allow it.

The current government must better communicate the who, what, where, when and why of our military to the Canadian public. Tell us the stories of the average member of the CF. Better yet, let them tell it. Stop burying information under operational security or national defence excuses. Much like the boy who cried wolf, overuse of these reasons for denying information will eventually dilute their actual purpose.

He rallied the troops – and the Canadian public

JOHN WARD

The Canadian Press

June 28, 2008 at 1:04 AM EDT

OTTAWA — Rick Hillier brought a refreshing bluntness to the country's top military job, but his legacy may be that he reintroduced Canadians to their soldiers and instilled a pride in both.

Cross posted to BBS

NATO: capabilities and timelines

This article on force generation at NATO makes an interesting point about coalition warfare:

Force Generation is a continuous process involving two main factors. First: requirements, or capabilities. Second: a time line as to when those capabilities will be required. It could be described as filling in a large spreadsheet with capabilities up the left hand column, and time across the top row. For example, the first line would be the commander of the mission, and across the columns would be the nation contributing and when. This aggregate information is called the Combined Joint Statement of Requirements, or CJSOR.

It’s important to note that NATO doesn’t generally request specific numbers or types of troops or equipment, it identifies capabilities. For example, a requirement might be determined for infantry battalions as opposed to groups of 800 or 1000 troops. Air support would not specify aircraft types and numbers, but the ability to generate the support required at any given time. Understanding this is key to avoiding incorrect information regarding specific numbers. It’s up to the nations to translate the capabilities requested to numbers based on their national unit composition, equipment types and capabilities, doctrine and other factors. [my highlight]

This is why the Manley panel's recommendation (pdf) was worded as follows:

This commitment is contingent on the assignment of an additional battle group (of about 1,000 soldiers) to Kandahar by NATO and/or other allies before February 2009. [my emphasis]

The panel asked for a capability (a battle group) and put an approximate troop number to it just to clarify things for the reading public.

I don't envy the folks at NATO; when participation is voluntary, getting hard commitments must be like herding cats, or nailing Jello to a wall. This seems like the only way - short of standardizing everyone's training and equipment, and compelling them to employ it as NATO sees fit - to cobble all the pieces of the coalition puzzle together.

Hiller to Memorial...

...this is going to be fun.

Noreen Golfman, call your agent. After you're done puking in your garbage can, of course.

Pride

Good on Lt (N) Stephen Churm:

The Canadian Forces will be on the march Sunday, but on a different kind of mission. For the first time, men and women in uniform from across the country will represent the military in Toronto's Pride parade.

"This will send out a national message that the Canadian Forces is an employer of choice for all people," Lieut. Stephen Churm said yesterday. The naval officer will be among 17 military personnel walking and interacting with the crowd.

...

A diversity officer with the Hamilton recruitment centre, Churm has been openly gay at work since 2001. In 2004, he led the charge to create a military presence in Hamilton's annual Pride festival, and began with four soldiers at an information booth. Last year, he and a small group of soldiers marched in the parade for the first time.

He wanted to correct a perception in the gay community that the Canadian military "had a policy of `Don't ask, don't tell.'"

I especially liked his spanking of the Hamilton pride parade organizers:

Churm said Hamilton Pride officials consulted neither that community nor the military before making a "political decision" to ban the military from this year's parade.

Hamilton Pride organizers imposed the ban because of a complaint from a recent immigrant who feared the military because of persecution by soldiers in their own country. They also allege the Canadian Forces is responsible for worldwide human rights abuses.

Churm said that while the Canadian Forces respects Hamilton Pride officials' right to decide who is a part of the parade, "we would have liked to the opportunity to discuss it with organizers.

"The irony here is we had no intention of attending because we were concentrating on Toronto," which has a higher profile, he said. [Babbler's emphasis]

I love that dis.

Just for the record, and speaking only for myself here: I don't care if you're gay or straight, if you're black, white, or polka-dotted, if you're a woman or a man. If you can meet the performance standards in the CF - not diversity quotas or social engineering experiments foisted upon a results-driven, life and death organization like the CF - then I say you should be welcome to serve.

Envious much, Damian?

OK, this is me turning green with serious envy.

Fuzzybear Lioness, a U.S. milblogger who frequents John Donovan's place as I do, just had a day on USS John C. Stennis, a Nimitz-class aircraft carrier. Not in port, mind you, but at sea.

I'm happy for her. No, really...

Guides to "the human terrain"

I know a Canadian anthropologist who would answer the question posed at the end of this article in the affirmative. As in, with a loud "Damn f***ing right, it does!":

The program is still in the experimental and testing stages, but if it turns out that anthropologists and other social scientists are providing a real service by helping soldiers to cut through the fog and reduce violence, if their services truly are unique and unavailable elsewhere, then the objections of professional associations would start to seem a little arcane. In other words, doesn't a reduced death toll, if indeed there is one as a result of Human Terrain Teams, take precedence over professional ethics?

The U.S. HTT concept is an interesting one, although as the article indicates, a largely unproven one at this point. But anything that allows us to understand and interact with the Afghans more effectively is a Good Thing^TM in my book, and should receive some consideration.

If anyone at DND is interested, I know just the fellow to lay out the parameters of such a program and get you pointed in the right direction...

FOB Spider

Master Corporal Travis Good gives those of us back in Canada some perspective on what it's like to work out of a rough Forward Operating Base in Panjwayii district, as part of the 2PPCLI Battle Group:

As night approaches, tired bodies with a belly full of rations start the familiar trek to their bunks to get some well-deserved rack for the evening. The familiar routines of the nightly spider check are carried out before decent shuteye can be obtained. Flashlights go on almost in unison, and the beams dance across cots and ceilings, hoping to catch the spiders before they descend into our sleeping bags. Sandals at the ready, smaller soldiers on the shoulders of larger soldiers swing wildly at the arachnids as others watch intently before shutting down their senses for the night.

While those not on shift snore the night away, soldiers tip-toe cautiously around their slumbering bodies on their way to the tower for a shift on observation post (OP). Familiar rustling sounds emit from the kitchen area: it’s our local celebrity, Sonic the Hedgehog, taking advantage of the quiet night to feast on Cheerios that have been left out for him. Local music plays in the sea-can (shipping container) where the ANP have made their home. The smells of chai and barbecued goat fill the air amid conversation and laughter. The ANP men’s shadows dance on the walls as they horse around and joke with each other until the wee hours of morning. Do these people ever sleep?

Thanks to MCpl Good for taking the time to put his thoughts to paper - or electrons, I guess - and share his experience with the rest of us. And thanks to CEFCOM for giving him a forum to tell that story.

The Royal Military College of St. John

Reprinted with the kind permission of Andrew Cusack

WHAT BETTER WAY to celebrate this, the feast of St. John the Baptist and the national day of Quebec, than to bring you news of the reëstablishment of the Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean. The site in the town of Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu was first put to a military use in 1666 when the French soldiers of the Carignan-Salières Regiment. The Collège militaire royal, however, was only founded in 1952 when it was inaugurated by the Rt. Hon. Vincent Massey, CC, CH, GCStJ, CD, PC as a classical college to increase the number of French-speaking officers in the Army, the Royal Canadian Navy, and the Royal Canadian Air Force.

An artillery salute is fired as the Governor General arrives to re-open the Collège.

The end of the Cold War, however, resulted in massive cuts to Canada’s armed forces, and both the Collège militaire royal in Quebec and Royal Roads Military College in British Columbia faced the axe, as a traditional military education became the exclusive preserve of the old Royal Military College of Canada in Kingston, Ontario.

Lt. Gen. the Hon. Roméo Dallaire, OC, CMM, GOQ, MSC, CD — a Senator and alumnus of the Collège — said “The decision to close the Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean was particularly ill-advised,” and urged its re-opening. The Hon. Marcel Prud’homme echoed the retired general’s sentiments, rising in the Senate to say “Honourable senators, the closing of Collège militaire royale de Saint-Jean is one error of the past that I find unforgivable. Given the very important role the new administration wants to give to the armed forces, could the government now consider reopening Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean as soon as possible?”

The band of the Royal 22eme Regiment lead the march-past for the Governor General.

The government decided last year to re-establish the Collège, though not as the full university it was when it closed in 1995. Instead, the CMR will be a CEGEP or Collège d’enseignement général et professionnel. CEGEPs are two-year programs, unique to Quebec, that are equivalent to the last year of American high school and the first year of university studies. For Québécois students, they are mandatory if one desires to proceed to university. The re-founded Collège militaire royal will act, in part, as a feeder school for the Royal Military College in Kingston as well as a place of education for those who desire a Francophone education in the military tradition.

The new cadets on parade.

Assembled and ready for inspection.

Her Excellency inspects the cadets.

After reviewing the troops, Her Excellency the Governor General unveiled the grant of arms from the Canadian Heraldic Authority alongside Colonel J.U.F. Pion, head of the Collège…

… while representations of the arms & flag, the Queen’s Colour, and the College Colour were also unveiled.

Col. Pion admires the resurrected arms.

So we wish a très bonne St-Jean-Baptiste to all the Québécois, and may St. John the Baptist continue to bless his Royal Military College, his province of Quebec, and all the Dominion of Canada!

Sancto Ioanni Baptistae,
ora pro nobis

Cutting out the middleman as much as possible

Thanks to The Armorer at Castle Argghhh! for pointing out a Blogger's Roundtable with U.S. Army Colonel Thomas McGrath, where he discusses the recent Kandahar prison break and the ISAF and ANSF response. The transcript is well worth your reading time.

There are a couple of points I'd like to make about this.

First, the fact that a U.S. Army colonel is doing conference calls from KAF exclusively for bloggers is notable. It falls in line with the approach I've been agitating for for a couple of years with the powers that be at CEFCOM and NDHQ in Ottawa. The Blogger's Roundtable is an idea that should be adopted by DND as a whole if possible, and by CEFCOM specifically if not.

Why? Well, that's the second point I wanted to make - you should really read the information COL McGrath was able to put out. Here are some snippets:

COL. MCGRATH: No, not at the time. I really don't want to get into, you know, troop locations and stuff like that. They did not have freedom of movement, though, in that area. The stories that were picked up that they were blowing up bridges and laying mines and things like that proved not to be true. They did, as -- they made their way from the prison, and they also were able to infiltrate from other regions into that area, but it was very shortlived.

...

...you know, the question that I'd really hope to ask, after the obligatory thank-you for taking the time with us, was basically the media impressions of this were that it was a fairly large, well-organized raid on the part of the Taliban. And the impression I'm getting from listening to you is pretty substantially different. Am I correct in that?

COL. MCGRATH: Yeah, I mean, listen, I'll give them credit. They pulled it off. It was successful. So you know, it's all about the results. And they got what they wanted. But I don't think it was that big of a success, because we pursued them up into the district and we were able to kill them and capture them and push them out of the district very quickly within a matter of days -- (inaudible) -- weeks or months, which has happened before. [Babbler's emphasis]

McGrath was able to not only directly refute some of the press reports that had come out of the prison break - bridges being blown up and vast numbers of Taliban in control of Arghandab - but he was also able to introduce some extremely encouraging information that we wouldn't have known about otherwise. Like the fact that this is the first time ANSF have been supported by Afghan helicopters. Or the fact that thousands of them moved into Kandahar from other areas in the country very, very quickly - in a matter of hours in some cases. Or the fact that the ANSF was able to plan the cleanup operation themselves, and support it with their own logistics. All of those are huge steps forward.

As the colonel said:

COL. MCGRATH: Well, I think if you look at it operationally, it was a heck of a movement of forces. Thousands of forces were able to fly in and drive into the region within hours.

Actually, after the prison exploded, there were police and army on the scene within an hour. So that was a good response -- not a good thing to have a good response, but the president and the chief of staff of the army, Bismullah Mohammed (sp) Khan, deployed down here, assisted in planning and the execution of the battle and bringing the forces to bear at the right place, got the troops downtown to re-instill the confidence of the people in the Afghan government -- (confidence down ?) -- they were very visible in what they did. This was a huge success. I don't think they could have done this last year, when I got here, or maybe even six or seven months ago. But in the constant training that we're doing in the train-up, and it shows the flexibility and the agility that they have.

Also logistically, you know, the army -- you know, they're not organized like we are, with huge -- you know, lots of trucks and aircraft and things like that. But they were able to stage the necessary supplies -- ammunition, food, water and things of that nature, and then push that -- classes of supply forward to sustain the forces during the days of the fight.

Although, like I said, the first couple of days were -- I mean, the first few hours were very difficult, not a good thing, I think the response from the government of Afghanistan was tremendous, very positive, very overwhelming, very decisive also. [Babbler's emphasis]

I hate to say it, but the American DoD is way, way ahead of DND on the use of new media and bypassing the MSM filter.

The silver lining in all this...are you listening, CEFCOM, NDHQ, MND's Office, PCO, PMO?...is that you don't have to reinvent the wheel. Your colleagues in the States have already broken that ground for you.

On what it means to actually support the troops

Paul at Celestial Junk puts some people's expression of "support" for our troops in perspective:

...in fact, they try to hide their hatred behind shallow slogans like, "We support the troops by wanting to bring them home."

Of course, any thinking person understands right away that "wanting to bring home" volunteers who wish to be where they are, is insulting to those very same volunteers.

"I support firemen by preventing them from fighting fires ... because it's dangerous" "I support police officers by keeping them from fighting crime ... because it's dangerous."

I do think you can support the troops without supporting the mission - it's a fine line to walk, but it's possible.

But I also believe that most of those who say they do, don't. Not really. They don't support the use of armed force - which is what the troops signed up for. Or they support it in the abstract, but would have such ridiculous ROE in place as to completely handcuff the commanders on the ground - hence this ongoing myth propagated by the likes of Stephane Dion and Jack Layton that you can separate security and reconstruction in Kandahar.

No, before you tell me you "support the troops," I need to be convinced you a) understand what they can and can't do in real life, and b) are willing to let them do it when the situation warrants. Because only then can you convince me that you just don't think they should be doing it in this particular case.

Anything else is empty and misleading rhetoric.

Life intrudes...

...inconveniently upon my blogging duties. I had meant to read and comment upon the Canada First Defence Policy document that we've finally been given by the Harper government. Unfortunately, other things have gotten in the way, like paid employment.

So, with no further lame apologies, I refer you to Paul Wells, and a commenter over at his place:

So I was really grateful to get an email this morning from Inkless comment-board regular MikeG, who — puttering in his spare time on a sunny weekend — has produced the most detailed analysis of the Harper defence plan’s spending projections that I have seen. He even made charts and graphs. And what they show is curious: while $490 billion sure looks like a heck of a number, it amounts to a gentle budgeted decline in Canada’s defence effort, compared against major allies, over time.

If I can find a 25th hour in my day, I'd love to dig into this a bit myself. Until then, thanks to MikeG for his analysis.

Update: The discussion at Army.ca can be found at this link. E.R. Campbell does some digging of his own:

Using the government’s own data: the graph (Chart 1) on page 11 of the ”Canada First” document and GDP (for 1st quarter of 2008) as reported by Statistics Canada* we can see that:

• Defence spending in 2008/09 (about $18 Billion according to page 4 of the document) will be 1.14% of GDP;


• It will rise to 1.16% of GDP in 2013/14 (when the defence budget is projected (page 11, again) to rise to $20 Billion);


• To 1.29% in 2019/20; and then


• Finally, to 1.34% in 2026/27.

Now, that is a real increase in the measure that matters, so kudos to the Conservative government for that.

We should be able to compare those rates to those of other big spending “envelopes” but, sadly, other ministers are, generally, unable, to project their budgets as far forward as DND is doing. We can, however, compare historical trends. For example, according to one (US) source, Canada’s health care spending increased at an average annual rate of 3.1% per years from 1980 to 2003. That is a rate which is higher than the average annual rate of GDP growth – in other words, health spending was a high priority because it grew at a rate that (slightly) exceeded the rate of GDP growth (which was about 3% for much of that period). Defence spending was a lower priority for much of that period (see page 11, yet again) having, for the 1986-2005 period an average annual rate of real growth of -0.4%.

More linky goodness over there, especially to The Ruxted Group pieces that have dealt with defence spending in this country.

When will they speak for themselves?

Right now, there are only two notable public champions of a stronger, more capable Canadian navy.

The first is Colin Kenny, a Liberal senator with no military experience that I can discern, who has become arguably the most competent and well-informed parliamentarian on the defence file - including the MND.

The second is Jack Granatstein, a former army officer, a historian, an author and a university professor.

In this month's CDFAI article, Dr. Granatstein advocates (pdf) for the ladies and gents wearing our country's navy blue:

The Canadian Navy doesn’t make the headlines very often. Ships at sea are always far over the horizon doing essential tasks, but not in the news—unless there is a disaster or, as is sometimes the case, a botched contract at home or a government plan to build expensive new vessels. But Canada needs a navy, a quietly professional service that projects power abroad, that can respond quickly to a crisis and, just as important, depart silently when the mission is over.

That's just the first paragraph - it gets better from there: he excoriates the Chretien Liberals, explains why we need a continuous-build policy, ties ocean trade to naval capacity, calls for a 60-ship navy (we currently have half that) that can operate in all three of our oceans, throws in a plug for the Coast Guard, and even makes some recommendations regarding specific classes of ship:

Twelve to fifteen of the planned Surface Combatant Ships [to replace destroyers and eventually frigates] on each coast would meet the need for 2025 and beyond. Then Canada needs a credible naval and Coast Guard presence in the melting Arctic where the international scramble for resources is likely to be fierce and where the Northwest Passage has the potential to alter traditional trade routes and pose huge environmental and security challenges. The Conservative government’s Canada First policy is the right one; however, it needs more ships and more sailors to adequately protect the homeland.

But Canada First also means protecting national interests abroad. Our sailors must be able to transport and support Canadian troops operating overseas, sometimes perhaps on a hostile shore. The presently planned three Joint Support Ships can’t do this; four might be able to manage, but six would be better, along with what General Rick Hillier called “a big honking ship” that could transport four to six helicopters and a battalion-sized expeditionary force. Such ships can also do humanitarian work—in tsunami-hit Indonesia, for example—that we can scarcely tackle today. [Babbler's emphasis]

And unlike our politicians, Granatstein's not squeamish about laying out the costs of such a force. To be fair, his job doesn't require having voters agree with his spending priorities...but the candour is still refreshing:

All this will cost. The inflation rate is running high for steel, electronics, weapons, and for skilled labour. The cost of oil for the navy to put to sea has doubled and might double again. But nations have interests, and interests must be protected. Canada needs a navy that can do the job for the next quarter century and more. [my emphasis]

I love that line: nations have interests, and interests must be protected. I'm stealing it, and will be using it frequently. The first time I say it to someone, I'll preface it with "You know, Jack Granatstein says..." The second time, it will be "It's been said that..." And by the third time, my introduction will be "Like I always say..."

Here's one I've already used enough to qualify: like I always say, the navy - in and out of uniform - needs to be making this case on an ongoing basis until the public starts agreeing with them. Just because you have a silent service doesn't mean you need to be a silent service.

When a Liberal senator and a former army officer are your chief advocates in the public sphere, it's time to step up your efforts some.

A policy! On paper, no less!

OK, maybe not a policy paper per se, but at least some written plans (pdf) to go along with the much-panned Canada First Defence Strategy announcement.

I have yet to read it, but Paul Wells says what jumps to my mind as well:

One thing is for sure. It would not have killed this government to release its policy on the day it announced it, nor to hold a technical briefing after the policy details had been released, instead of before. There remain a lot of questions, and one gets the sneaking suspicion that’s precisely how the prime minister wants it.

I'm sure I'll have more to say shortly.

A conflict of principles

"Never pass a fault" versus "Don't let the 'perfect' be the enemy of the 'good.'"

The discussion that has taken place at Army.ca over the Man Love Thursdays problem in Kandahar is an interesting one, and I'd encourage you to grab a cup of coffee and read the whole thing.

My contribution at the end boils down to this:

None of us could stand by and listen or watch while a child was abused. But it's much easier for each of us to decide what we would do individually if the situation were right in front of us than it is to decide how, as a nation, we're to deal with such a problem systemically, as but one facet of an already overcomplicated mission.

The answers at the extremes are easy to find. It's the grey middle ground, the task of drawing lines and standards and rules to apply to more than just one case that poses the real problem.

To the editors at the Globe & Mail:

Ahem:

The day began with rebels firing at Canadian, Afghan and international forces from the bushes across a river just outside the country's second-largest city.

It ended with coalition forces marching unopposed across the Arghandab district with their aircraft buzzing overhead, their missiles exploding into the ground and their opponents slinking back into obscurity.

"Where we want to go, we're going," said Col. Jamie Cade, deputy commander of the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan.

I can get towels provided for you at a very reasonable rate. Handy for wiping that egg off your face, I hear.

Combat load

There's a never-ending debate in the infantry: how much can a soldier hump before he or she is carrying too much to fight? Or, more technically, what's the optimal combat load?

Interestingly, someone at The Canadian Press thought the topic interesting enough to write a decent article about it, in the context of modernizing the Canadian soldier:

Palmer, a former infantry officer with 35 years in the Canadian Armed Forces, now works in the army's Directorate of Land Requirements unit that develops equipment for foot soldiers -- everything from boots to helmets and all the gee-whiz stuff such as visors with jet fighter-style heads-up displays and holographic gun sights.

He is closely involved with the directorate's Integrated Soldier System Project, which aims to create that futuristic warrior before the end of the next decade.

The federal Treasury Board is to decide this month whether to approve release of the first slice of money to fund the $310-million program, which would involve defining what the system's initial capability should be and testing the solutions with Canadian soldiers.

The project envisions the soldier at the centre of a personal network, electronically linking everything from his radio and global-positioning unit, a PDA, remote sensors and vision aids, even the electronic sighting device on his weapon.

...

"If the soldier does not believe that the item that you're giving him is worth carrying, he'll chuck it. It will get left behind," says Palmer.

"So in the context of soldier acceptance, all of these pieces of electronic equipment have to pass the litmus test of 'Is it worth my personal energy and effort to carry it for the advantage that it's going to give me."

Here's something the folks at The CP didn't catch, though. At the beginning of May this year, PWGSC put out an Opportunity Abstract on MERX:

Title: DEVELOPMENT OF TECHNOLOGIES FOR IMPROVING SOLDIER MOBILITY

Defence R&D Canada - Atlantic (DRDC Atlantic) requires a contractor to examine various technologies for improving soldier mobility, such as exoskeletons, and demonstrate the technologies through the development of components and systems. The use of smart materials in these systems will also be considered.

The work will begin immediately upon award and completion is expected on or before 31 January 2011.

The requirement is subject to a preference for Canadian goods and/or services.

Bid evaluation will be based on point rated evaluation criteria. The responsive bid with the highest total overall points will be recommended for award of a contract, provided that the price does not exceed the budget available for the requirement, i.e. $25,000.00 (applicable taxes extra) for the Task 1 - Literature Review and Way Ahead Plan and $179,000.00 (applicable taxes extra) for the balance of the requirement... [Babbler's emphasis]

For those who haven't already seen it, this isn't science fiction - check out the Raytheon Sarcos exoskeleton:



From the Raytheon website:

Raytheon Company’s newest research facility in Salt Lake City, Utah, is developing a robotic suit for the soldier of tomorrow. Known as the Exoskeleton, it’s essentially a wearable robot that amplifies its wearer’s strength, endurance, and agility. In its May issue, Popular Science magazine likens the Exoskeleton to the “Iron Man”® in the movie of the same name and suggests a blurring of the lines between science fiction and reality.

Built from a combination of sensors, actuators and controllers, the futuristic suit enables a user to easily carry a man on his back or lift 200 pounds several hundred times without tiring. Yet the suit, which is being developed for the U.S. Army, is also agile enough to let its wearer kick a soccer ball, punch a speed bag, and climb stairs and ramps with ease.

Dr. Stephen Jacobsen leads this project and the Raytheon Sarcos team. He feels his work is a combination of art, science, engineering and design. “People call it different things. Sometimes they call it inventing, sometimes they call it engineering. Sometimes they call it being a mad scientist. To us, it’s the process of getting together, understanding the problems, goals, and then designing something to satisfy the need.” Development of the Exoskeleton has been underway since 2000, when Jacobsen realized that if humans could work alongside robots, they should also be able to work inside robots.

Fascinating stuff. And providing it actually facilitates a more effective infantry soldier by increasing essential capabilities, instead of just adding one more piece of kit that can break down and screw up a mission, then I'm all for looking into it.

"On second thought, don't help to reconstruct Afghanistan"

A post by Damian Penny on another effort by the Globe and Mail to subvert our Afghan mission. See also my comments giving some details of the gas pipeline project the Globe somehow managed to overlook until now, and on the paper's "journalism".

They just can't resist reaching for the sensational

Further to Mark's post below, I've come to the frustrated conclusion that all too many of our supposedly sober and professional press in this country are so desperate for The! Big! Story! that they can't resist sensationalizing to get it.

Exhibit A, from the Globe and bloody Mail - here's the text:

Tuesday, the Taliban moved into villages just outside Kandahar city, as Canadian officials played down suggestions that combat was imminent between the insurgents and NATO troops.

Reports that the Taliban took over villages are greatly exaggerated, officials say.

The officials do not dispute reports of an increased insurgent presence in the Arghandab region, or reports of bombed-out culverts and planted land mines.

But they say a more accurate description of the situation in Arghandab is that the Taliban have entered a handful of villages to make their presence felt.

But look, just look at the graphic they put up beside it!



"Heavily armed Taliban fighters drove trucks, motorbikes, and other vehicles into Arghandab district, taking control of the lush valley after only minor skirmishes" (my emphasis) the header says, and a shaded section of the map says "Taliban-controlled area."

Are you f-ing kidding me?

If the Talibs have "control" of the valley, how is it that LCol Dave Corbould, CO of the 2PPCLI Battle Group in Kandahar was able to personally go in and out of Arghandab and live to tell reporters about it?

Coalition troops on Tuesday were increasing their presence in Arghandab, according to Lt.-Col. Dave Corbould, commanding officer of the battle group of 2nd Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry.

"It is clear that Kandahar City remains firmly under the control of the Afghan government and its people," he said.

"Indeed, having just returned from the Arghandab district centre, I can tell you that there were no obvious signs of insurgent activity," Corbould said.

"While this does not mean the Taliban are not there, they just do not appear to have the foothold that they have apparently claimed."

The gleeful exaggeration at the G&M continued with the bloviating Jeffrey Simpson stuffing both feet in his mouth at once:

In Kandahar, a brilliantly executed attack on Sarpoza Provincial Prison liberated hundreds of Taliban fighters and common criminals. A few former prisoners were later rounded up, but most now are safely scattered around the province. Subsequently, the Taliban and its supporters captured whole villages near Kandahar. [my emphasis]

Whole villages, eh, Jeffrey? Care to tell us which ones? Come on: you're asserting it as a fact, right? In direct contradiction to a light colonel who's actually on the ground, going into Arghandab himself.

I won't hold my breath waiting for the retraction.

You want to know what responsible reporting reads like? Try Rosie DiManno on for size:

One local tribal elder reported that the Taliban had taken control of 18 villages northwest of the Arghandab River and had started digging trenches for combat cover.

Certainly, the Taliban's ubiquitous spokespeople have been saying quite a lot, claiming 450 Taliban were among the fugitives who escaped from Sarposa and that nearly all have joined up with Taliban units to engage anew in jihad.

...

Although insurgents have infiltrated – rather than seized – villages in the Arghandab valley before, as recently as a year ago, they've always been repelled by ISAF and Afghan troops rumbling to the rescue.

And the National Post puts up a far more honest graphic:



So to the idiots at the Globe & Mail: show me where exactly Canadian and Afghan troops can't go in Arghandab. Because the Taliban can't be said to control a damned thing otherwise...

...except maybe a Toronto newsroom.

Arghandab: Did ANA troops "flee"?

On CBC Newsworld today the CBC's reporter, Paul Hunter, said "About half the Afghans turned and fled, so there's clearly some work to be done [see box at right in link below]." But now he's rather changed the words he uses in print--see bolded bit below.

Canadian and Afghan troops moved into the forests and orchards surrounding the city of Kandahar on Wednesday, battling with Taliban fighters who infiltrated the area, officials said.

At least two Afghan soldiers were killed in the hour-long firefight, said the CBC's Paul Hunter, who witnessed the battle in the Arghandab region, about 15 kilometres northwest of Kandahar. Thirty-six Taliban fighters were also reported dead.

"We watched the soldiers march towards these orchards. Shooting broke out. The Taliban fired at them, they fired back. You had a helicopter overhead, firing toward the ground," Hunter said.

While NATO spokesman Mark Laity said Afghan and Canadian troops only had a "a few minor contacts" with Taliban fighters during the battle, the Afghan Defence Ministry indicated the fighting was much heavier, claiming that 20 Taliban fighters were killed in the Arghandab village of Tabin, and 16 were killed in the nearby village of Khohak.

Hunter said Canadians are playing a secondary role in the battle, acting as mentors to soldiers in the Afghan National Army, which is in a building process. Two Afghan battalions participated in the Arghandab attack, but one of them was forced to retreat after coming under heavy fire [emphasis added].

"This whole process is about teaching the Afghans how to set up an army. About half the Afghans turned and fled, so there's clearly some work to be done," Hunter said. "It wasn't a complete success today, but I suspect they'll be back at it again. It was quite an operation by the Afghans and supported by the Canadians."

NATO spokesman James Appathurai said the Afghan army has come a long way. Last year, it would not have had the ability to mobilize as it did for Wednesday's battle, flying in hundreds of troops from across Afghanistan, Appathurai said.

"Their capability to do this, to lead this operation, is so much more advanced than we saw a year and a half ago. I think we should be encouraged by that," Appathurai told CBC News in an interview from Brussels on Wednesday morning...

What gives? Why the two versions? No other report I've seen mentions the ANA fleeing, e.g. here and here. There's no excuse for Mr Hunter's use of the word "fled", with its severely negative connotations about the troops' bravery and/or competence if in fact the manoeuvre was simply an ordered retreat, even if a bit disorderly.

Please listen to this interview this morning with Lt.-Gen (ret'd) Lewis MacKenzie by Steve Madely of CFRA, Ottawa, for a good discussion of how our media commit "journalism" in Afstan, especially their use of Taliban-sourced material virtually at face value. Plus about the war, and our mission, overall.

Update: Reaction at Milnet.ca.

Upperdate: CBC's "The National" on June 18 ran video with Mr Hunter still saying the ANA fled (03:03 here).

Now two headlines from June 19, neither front page:

NATO-backed offensive holds Taliban at bay
Incursion into rebel-held strongholds yields weaker resistance than expected

Allies rout Taliban
Canadian and Afghan troops push insurgents back from fringe of Kandahar city

Rather an interesting difference of emphasis in those headlines, don't you think? Especially as the stories are basically the same: the Taliban look to have suffered a serious defeat with fairly heavy casualties, while the ANA had few casualties and the ISAF forces, mainly Canadian, none at all. Meanwhile Babbling lets loose, especially on the Globe and Mail.

UK tops US as arms exporter, Canada high on import list

Heck, the UK under a Labour government is now doing better than the US under George Bush:

The UK was the top global defence exporter in 2007, winning a UK record £10 billion ($19bn) of new business and a 33% market share, according to figures announced by UK Trade & Investment’s Defence and Security Organisation (UKTI DSO) today.

Commenting on the figures, Lord Digby Jones, Minister for Trade and Investment said, “As demonstrated by this outstanding export performance, the UK has a first class defence industry, with some of the world’s most technologically sophisticated companies...

The top global exporters over the last five years, based on cumulative export values, are the United States with $63bn, the UK ($53bn), Russia ($33bn), France ($17bn), and Germany and Israel with ($9bn).

Comparatively, on imports over the last five years, Saudi Arabia has imported the most ($31bn); India second ($18bn); the US ($17bn), and three countries - Australia ($11bn), Canada ($10bn) [emphasis added] and Pakistan - ($6bn) moving up the import rankings...

I think one can thank the Conservative government's military re-equipment actions for our high import rank (now if only we would import some naval vessels)--but can you imagine the Conservatives, much less the Liberals, boasting about Canadian arms exports?

As for the naval vessels, build the AORs ourself and import all or most of one or two big honkers (see the penultimate paragraph here). Like the Aussies.

H/t to Jack MacLeod.

MUAV use a throwback

The Canadian and American approaches to the use of micro-UAV's (MUAV) are contrasted in a very brief piece at Strategy Page:

So the Canadian system takes advantage of existing experience and procedure, to introduce a new technology (which replaces the artillery spotting aircraft that have been around since World War II). But the MUAV "belongs" to the artillery observer team, that team is in turn attacked to an infantry company or battalion. Thus these infantry units now have their own air force, and it's being run by someone familiar with how aircraft overhead operate, and what they can do.

With thanks to JMH for the pointer.

One additional point I'd make is that the army is so deeply involved in the use of UAV's by the CF partly because the air force dragged its feet for so long in embracing the concept of unoccupied aircraft. At least, that's what I've heard from a number of people in both sky-blue and green uniforms.

"When will the government allow our infantry soldiers to do the job they have trained for?"

An Aussie journalist, formerly a soldier, thinks the non-special forces Diggers in Afstan should be allowed by their government to fight like the Canadians (nice post, Mr Pugliese).

Predate: More on Aussie troop attitudes here:

Australian troops want to see real action in Iraq [and Afstan--"We Were Soldiers Once"]

Keep on truckin'

Our defence procurement process seems to be regressing to its usual mess. Can't the government take serious reform steps? Or is it simply unwilling to provide the money needed and to put slightly less emphasis on pork (aka industrial regional benefits)?

A Defence Department project intended to be a straightforward and relatively quick purchase of commercial trucks for the army has gone off the rails after only one firm bid on the multimillion-dollar program and the government determined its proposal didn't meet requirements.

The contract to buy 800 commercial trucks, slightly modified for military use, was originally announced in June 2006 and labelled by then-defence minister Gordon O'Connor as one of the Harper government's top priorities.

Military officials expected the purchase to run smoothly since the vehicles would be based on a commercial design with only minor modifications needed. But vehicle firms shunned the program and only one company, International Truck of the U.S., put in a bid. That company's bid, however, has now been deemed "non-compliant," and it's unclear how the Defence Department will proceed.

The truck project is the latest large-scale military procurement to run into difficulties, with firms either deciding the hassle they face in dealing with the Canadian Forces is not worth the effort, or others being disqualified or deciding not to bid because of what they say are unreasonable requirements set out by the military and Public Works.

In the last month, two companies withdrew from a $100-million project to lease aerial drones for the Afghanistan mission. Officials with both firms have said the financial risk to industry on the project was just too great to entice them to compete. The government then decided that the remaining two firms in the competition didn't meet the requirements, so the bidding has been extended.

Around the same time, General Dynamics of Canada withdrew from the $1.1-billion project to upgrade the navy's frigates after the firm determined the program was not commercially viable. That left only one company in the running, but Public Works and the Defence Department have extended the bidding process as they try to figure out what to do next.

Earlier this year, the $2.9-billion project to build a fleet of supply and transport ships for the navy ran aground after the industry consortiums involved informed the Defence Department that not enough money had been set aside to build the vessels. The military is now asking the government for more funding...

Afstan: UK increasing forces to over 8,000

Plus some force restructuring, along with Tornados to replace Harriers:

More British troops are to be deployed to southern Afghanistan to give the soldiers there better protection, to step up training of the local security forces and to increase development projects. The move, which is likely to coincide with a cut in the number of British troops in Iraq, will bring the total in Afghanistan next spring to more than 8,000. There are 7,800 there now.

The move, set out to MPs by the defence secretary, Des Browne, involves up to 600 troops earmarked for priority tasks, including manning new armoured vehicles and flying Chinook and Apache helicopters. Tornado aircraft will replace Harrier jets whose airframes and crews are showing the strain of nearly four years of engagement in difficult operations.

Browne said: "It does not mean our mission is expanding. It means we are taking the steps necessary to take our mission forward as effectively as we can." He said the Taliban leadership had reduced "their ambition from insurgency to terrorism", referring to roadside bombs and suicide attacks which killed three British paratroopers last week. But the Taliban's new tactics posed a "different, but very serious challenge" to British troops...

Mr Browne's speech, with more detail, is here.

"Afghanistan: jailbreaks and drug bust"

Latest summary from the Conference of Defence Associations.

'Cost' is a four-letter word

I was conversing recently with someone involved with the F-35 JSF project, and asked him specifically about the affordability of these aircraft. Given some of the speculation surrounding the aircraft's eventual costs, as highlighted here, I figured it wasn't an unreasonable question. So he asked someone at LockMart about it, and here's what they told him: "The unit cost will be about the same as current generation multi-role fighters, but the capability will be far greater."

When someone answers a pretty clear question - I'm looking for a number, here! - with something that nebulous, there's no real point in asking "What the hell does that mean?"

Just try tracking down figures on what any mil-spec equipment costs, but especially fighter aircraft. Are you including R&D costs? Service and spares? Are you looking at just the initial production run, or the incremental cost of follow-on orders? For domestic or foreign purchasers?

My inquiry about the JSF was brought about by the publicly available variations I'd seen in pricing recently. GlobalSecurity.org put the unit cost at $100M, CDI puts it at $122M, but Defence Tech puts it at only $63M. When reputable defence observers vary by close to 100% in cost estimates, how is the average Joe Canuck supposed to judge whether he's going to get good value for his tax dollar on the F-35?

And like I said earlier, it's not just the JSF that has this problem, as this article about the Rafale illustrates:

Pricing combat aircraft is notoriously complex, with deals often involving industrial offsets and seldom reflecting full aircraft development costs. While Dufour put the average cost of a Rafale at €50 million, or $64 million, and the Typhoon - a collaboration grouping Italy, Germany, Spain and Britain - at about £65 million, or $120 million, Kemp said both aircraft had been offered to Singapore and South Korea at about $95 million each, compared with a basic price tag of $45 million to $50 million for the Gripen.

That $45-50M for the Gripen intrigued me, since I'd seen a per unit cost of $76M here. Not to mention a per unit cost of $50M for the Rafale here. And just look at how the Eurofighter Typhoon people graphically sell their product's cost-effectiveness here. Confused yet?

The best explanation for these variations I've seen to date comes from Defense-Aerospace.com, in a 2006 piece entitled "Sticker Shock: Estimating the Real Cost of Modern Fighter Aircraft (pdf)." In that article, they make an important distinction between "Program Unit Cost" and "Unit Procurement Cost," which they define as follows:

• Program Unit Cost, obtained by dividing the total program cost by the number of aircraft produced. This is possibly the most significant benchmark, as it includes research and development costs as well as all related ancillary costs (support equipment, spare parts, documentation etc.);


• Unit Procurement Cost, obtained by dividing the cost of the latest production contract (thus excluding most R&D and support costs) by the number of aircraft contracted. In some respects, this can also be defined as the marginal cost of additional aircraft, and provides a benchmark for comparisons.

Their frustration in pursuing this exercise was evident in the study's Highlights and Conclusions:

The first and most obvious conclusion from this study (see Table 1) is that, in practice, it is virtually impossible to compare aircraft costs with a meaningful degree of accuracy.

Even government auditors, with access to classified data, are unable to agree on actual costs. For example, the officially quoted prices for the Eurofighter Typhoon vary by as much as 10% between Britain and Germany, while price estimates by the GAO, the Department of Defense and the US Air Force for both the JSF and the F-22 vary by as much as 50%.

Still, with that caveat, they were able to produce a very interesting chart (remembering it's from 2006 - click the graphic for a larger version):



I say 'interesting' because of the huge variation between the estimated marginal cost of obtaining aircraft once the production line is running and the total cost of putting a new aircraft from scratch, which is much, much higher. This should be to the benefit of Canada, which will apparently be buying 65 F-35's to replace our aging F-18 fleet. For the narrow purposes of this post, I'll refrain from commenting on whether 65 fighters will be adequate for our future needs, or whether we can even trust contract figures for future delivery (ahem, and ahem)...

So, my take-away from this little research project of mine is that I won't put too much faith in any costing estimates I see in the MSM reporting until a contract is signed. And even then, I'll have to look at what's included in the pricing (spares, service, training, etc) in order to make a fair assessment of whether it's a good deal or not.

Welcome to the spin-cycle, Damian...

Addendum: The one final point I forgot to make...

When LockMart says the F-35 will cost "about the same as current generation multi-role fighters," does that mean its Unit Procurement Cost will be around $62M, like the Rafale's Unit Procurement Cost? Or does it mean $118M like the Eurofighter? Because that's a pretty significant difference.

Or - and pardon my overt suspicion here - does it mean the F-35's Unit Procurement Cost (UPC) will be comparable to other fighters' Program Unit Cost (PUC)? That is to say, an apples-to-oranges sleight of hand that would hypothetically put a $115M (UPC) Lightning II up against a $95M (PUC) Super Hornet and call it a lot more plane for only a bit more money?

Enquiring minds want to know. And I doubt we'll get an answer any time soon.

Out of left field

The naming of Denis Rouleau as VCDS comes as a complete surprise to me. I hadn't heard his name mentioned for the job at all prior to this:

Today, the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), General Rick Hillier, announced that Rear-Admiral Denis Rouleau will be the new Vice Chief of Defence Staff (VCDS) and will be promoted to the rank of Vice-Admiral. He will replace Lieutenant-General Walt Natynczyk, who will become the new CDS in the coming weeks.

"Rear-Admiral Rouleau is a strong leader and an officer of great integrity and experience," stated Minister MacKay. "I support General Hillier's choice wholeheartedly and take this opportunity to wish RAdm Rouleau the best of luck in his new functions."

“Rear-Admiral Rouleau’s experience in operations and more recently as Chief of Programme at National Defence Headquarters, makes him the right person to assume the role of VCDS and to help shape the future and priorities of Canada’s military,” said General Rick Hillier.

You can read RAdm Rouleau's official bio here.

I find a couple of things about this appointment notable. First, the brass figured a way to get a naval officer into the mix. Given some of the griping I've heard from the navy about the dominance of the guys in green, followed by those in sky-blue, this is important, if only from a symbolic standpoint. Second, they're promoting the VCDS into the job - Rouleau was a Commodore (BGen equivalent) eighteen months ago, and is now going to be 2IC of the entire Canadian Forces. To me, that means that he's either a serious rising star, or that he has no real shot at the brass ring, so he's a non-threatening appointment to the serious heavy-hitters at the LGen/VAdm level like Leslie and Watt.

We live in interesting times...

Regardless of the reasons, best of luck from this corner to the soon-to-be-VAdm Rouleau in his new position.

"Prison break"

Bruce Rolston does a nice job on a certain professor:

Well, that's one way to close the Afghan detainee file.

Reports that Canadian law professor Amir Attaran has criticized the Taliban for not correctly filling out the 1,005 copies of prisoner release paperwork correctly are, unfortunately, completely untrue.

Prof. Attaran, in an interview on CTV's "Question Period" today by Craig Oliver--together with his comrade in journalistic arms Paul Koring of the Globe and Mail, had the chutzpa to say he is "a Canadian Forces sympathizer" (05:37 on the video here). Hurl to the bloody max. Mr Oliver, at the end of the show, was idiotic enough to compare the break with the Vietcong's 1968 Tet Offensive (read this on the American media and Tet). All you need to know about how much of our major media "think"--and how shallow is their knowledge.

While the break is certainly extremely embarrassing, at the least, it hardly indicates that all our efforts at Kandahar have been for naught, as the good professor would have one believe. Just as the attack on president Karzai at a Kabul ceremony several weeks ago did not indicate his government is in imminent danger of collapse. Rather these assaults indicate that there is still a long way to go, which we all knew very well anyway.

Update: On a smaller scale, but should we think that Brazil might be consigned to the dustbin of history? But do read the whole link.

Upperdate: See Norman Spector's TODAY'S DISHONESTY, June 16.

Afstan: Up, down--and across?

1) Brits in Helmand (sounds like what we are trying to do, as well as American forces):

...
Whatever grinding progress is now being made in Helmand – and there are real grounds for being optimistic – it is hard to argue that its people have been made better off as a result of the war that erupted when British troops first arrived in the province in the summer of 2006.

With thinking derived from the counter-insurgency campaign in Malaya in the 1950s, a careful and modest British plan was in place in 2006 to secure a development zone in the centre of the province to create an “ink-spot” of security within which development – rebuilding schools, roads, hospitals, etc – could take place and from which government influence could spread.

Unfortunately this was not how it happened. Soldiers told me how they were instead sent to remote “platoon houses” across the province. Initially they had only the fighting strength of nine platoons, which was completely inadequate for the fierce onslaught they faced from the Taliban. The ill-equipped British force ended up scattered and pinned down in fixed town-centre locations, living in sometimes unbearable conditions and fighting fiercely.

To beat off Taliban attacks, British soldiers defended themselves by calling in airstrikes and using artillery and mortars to smash urban areas. A T-shirt on sale at Kandahar airport, and worn by some soldiers I met in Helmand, announced membership of the “Taliban Hunting Club”. In Helmand there has been plenty of killing. You can measure the escalation of violence by the bullets and bombs. Successive deployments expended ammunition in ever greater quantities.

The grim truth, soldiers in Helmand tell you, is that much of the bloodshed has been to no effect. Although a central zone of stability in the province has been gradually expanded, whole parts of the countryside have been “cleared” time and again, only for the Taliban to return. Brigadier John Lorimer, a former British commander, bluntly called it “mowing the lawn”. A score card from all of this might read simply: “Many Taliban dead; precious little territory gained.”

This “mowing the lawn” approach unsurprisingly alienated local people. The idea then that the British were creating security to allow development was risible...

There is room for optimism, however, and from what I have seen the lessons are being learnt. Last October, when a new British brigade took command in Helmand, its commander, Brigadier Andrew Mackay, declared “a concept of operations” where the death of enemy soldiers was no longer a measure of success. “The population is the prize,” Mackay wrote.

A campaign based on counter-insurgency principles, he said, needed operations designed not so much for “kinetic effect” (inflicting physical damage on the enemy) but calibrated to “influence” the population: decreasing support for the enemy and increasing the standing of the Afghan government.

I found morale among the troops high. There is a sense that a strategy for a victory of sorts is at last evolving. Now, rather than battling the Taliban head-on, they have decided their job must be to “hold the line” and createa space where development can happen. There is a recognition that killing the Taliban and smashing towns will not help in the longer struggle to stabilise Afghanistan; the only workable strategy is to convince the locals that the coalition is there to help.

This concept, that “the population is the prize”, had its greatest effect during last December’s operation to retake Musa Qala, which had been handed back to the Taliban a year earlier. The deployment of hundreds of British, American and Afghan troops around the town achieved such an “overmatch” of forces that, after initial fierce fighting, the Taliban were forced to flee – and the town was recaptured without being destroyed.

The key moment was the arrival of the military development experts, a so-called stabilisation team. I watched as they unfolded precise blueprints for the construction of a mosque, for the rebuilding and reopening of a school and for roads and improvements to water and power.

Three months later, when I returned to Musa Qala, a small road had been built, the market was open, there was a new health clinic and a school teaching 800 pupils. On top of that a work scheme was employing 300 Afghans.

Ironically, it is in these very successes that the present danger to our troops lies. The more soldiers such as Gamble go out to talk to locals, or help them with development, the more vulnerable they make themselves to suicide bombers or roadside explosions as the Taliban – having been beaten in set-piece battles – switch to Iraqi insurgency-style tactics instead.

The main problem is that our troops can “hold the line”, creating a safe zone inside the front lines, but the government and other agencies are often not there to fulfil their part of the bargain. Despite the army’s good work in places such as Musa Qala, health and safety rules mean that Foreign Office officials find it hard to set foot outside their compounds and contractors are frequently unable to work. So at present there is a relatively safe space, created at high cost by British troops, where insufficient vital reconstruction is happening.

It takes immense nerve to take casualties yet still adopt a friendly pose to locals who could be the enemy. But if we are to stop Afghanistan once again being a lawless breeding ground for terrorists, there is no other way forward.

2) ISAF commander:

The outgoing top U.S. military commander in Afghanistan said Friday that attacks increased 50 percent in April in the country's eastern region, where U.S. troops primarily operate, as a spreading Taliban insurgency across the border in Pakistan fueled a surge in violence.

In a sober assessment, Gen. Dan K. McNeill, who departed June 3 after 16 months commanding NATO's International Security Assistance Force, or ISAF, said that although record levels of foreign and Afghan troops have constrained repeated Taliban offensives, stabilizing Afghanistan will be impossible without a more robust military campaign against insurgent havens in Pakistan.

The Taliban is "resurgent in the region," particularly in sanctuaries in Pakistan, and as a result "it's going to be difficult to take on this insurgent group . . . in the broader sort of way," McNeill said at a Pentagon news conference.

Clashes in the east pushed U.S. troop deaths in Afghanistan in May to 15, and total foreign troop deaths there to 23, the highest monthly figure since last August.

Indeed, comprehensive data released by the NATO-led command show a steady escalation in violence since NATO took charge of the Afghanistan mission in 2006, spurred in part by more aggressive operations by the alliance and most recently by U.S. Marine battalions in the heavily contested southern province of Helmand. ISAF troops in Afghanistan increased from 36,000 in early 2007 to 52,000 now, while the Afghan army grew from 20,000 to 58,000 soldiers.

Overall violence has increased and attacks have grown more complex, according to the data and U.S. military officials. The number of roadside bombs increased from 1,931 in 2006 to 2,615 last year. Attacks peaked during the months of the warm weather fighting season, with more than 400 in the peak month of 2005, more than 800 in 2006, and about 1,000 in 2007.

As violence has risen, it has remained concentrated geographically in a relatively small number of districts, the data show, in predominantly Pashtun areas. Afghanistan has 364 districts, and last year about 70 percent of all attacks took place in 40, or about 10 percent, of those districts, McNeill said. For the first half of this year, he said, about 76 percent of attacks took place in virtually the same 40 districts, with some shifts in Farah and Nimruz provinces [emphasis added--four US Marines training Afghan police were just killed in Farah].

The district data has helped drive the deployment of NATO forces, with the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit focusing on a district in southern Helmand that shows extensive enemy activity. "We knew it was a dark hole and we had to get to it; we simply didn't have the force," said McNeill, noting that ISAF remains short of combat troops, helicopters, and intelligence and surveillance equipment.

Troop numbers are low compared with the size of the insurgency, which includes many part-time fighters. There are an estimated 5,000 to 20,000 Taliban fighters in Afghanistan, plus an estimated 1,000 each for the insurgent groups led by Siraj Haqqani and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, according to ISAF intelligence.

More worrisome than the Taliban expansion in Pakistan is the threat of more cooperation between homegrown insurgents and outside extremist groups, McNeill said. "The greatest risk is the possibility of collusion between the insurgents who are indigenous to that region and the more intractable, the more extreme terrorists who are taking up residence there in the North-West Frontier" Province of Pakistan, he said...

3) Afghan president Karzai:

Afghan President Hamid Karzai threatened Sunday to send Afghan troops across the border to fight militants in Pakistan, a forceful warning to insurgents and the Pakistani government that his country is fed up with cross-border attacks [our government is not happy either].

Mr. Karzai said Afghanistan has the right to self defence, and because militants cross over from Pakistan “to come and kill Afghan and kill coalition troops, it exactly gives us the right to do the same.”

Speaking at a Sunday news conference, Mr. Karzai warned Pakistan-based Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud that Afghan forces would target him on his home turf. Mr. Mehsud is suspected in last year's assassination of former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto.

“Baitullah Mehsud should know that we will go after him now and hit him in his house,” Mr. Karzai said.
Afghan President Hamid Karzai after a news conference in Kabul Sunday. Mr. Karzai threatened to send troops into neighbouring Pakistan to kill Taliban militants if they continue cross-border attacks into Afghanistan.

“And the other fellow, (Taliban leader) Mullah Omar of Pakistan should know the same,” Mr. Karzai continued. “This is a two-way road in this case, and Afghans are good at the two-way road journey. We will complete the journey and we will get them and we will defeat them. We will avenge all that they have done to Afghanistan for the past so many years.”..

Did NATO "trespass" by bombing in Bosnia?

The Canadian legal system can certainly entertain ludicrous arguments:

The war in Bosnia stands among the dirtiest of modern conflicts, featuring torture, mass rape and genocide fuelled by ethnic rage that was hardly eased by the United Nations entering the fray. Against this backdrop, the ugly point of contact between two Canadians on that foreign battlefield highlights a divisiveness that still reverberates, with a new chapter set to open Monday in a Toronto courtroom.

Nicholas Ribic left Edmonton to join Serb forces and "fight Muslims." Canadian Forces Captain Patrick Rechner, from Digby, N. S., was assigned to the UN as a peacekeeper.

On May 26, 1995, Ribic kidnapped Capt. Rechner at gunpoint, shackling him to a lightning rod beside an ammunition bunker as a human shield to stop NATO bombers.

Pictures of the bespectacled Capt. Rechner, his hair tousled and face distressed, became an iconic image of the conflict.

That he faced this treatment at the hands of a fellow Canadian has led some to call Ribic Canada's John Walker Lindh, the American Taliban fighter captured in Afghanistan. Federal prosecutor Robin Parker calls Ribic a "war tourist."

On Monday, an apparently unrepentant Ribic will defend his actions -- claiming the NATO bombing was the crime, not his kidnapping.

Ribic's trial in Ottawa in 2005, which found him guilty of hostage-taking and threatening death, is called "one of the most unusual criminal trials in Canadian history" by D'Arcy DePoe, Ribic's lawyer. It was the first time a Canadian was charged for such a crime taking place abroad.

This appeal is equally confounding.

In it, Ribic characterizes the NATO bombing as an assault and an act of trespassing and points to the legal defence of justification: The Criminal Code allows someone to apply reasonable force to prevent an assault or eject a trespasser.

"While this is an unusual form of trespass, it is submitted that NATO dropping 2,000-pound bombs on this property was clearly a trespass," Mr. DePoe argues.

Despite that position, Ribic does not truly want to reduce the vast geo-political events in Bosnia in 1995 to the level of a common criminal charge. He is putting the politics of the war itself on trial.

"When Canadian criminal charges are laid in the context of a foreign civil war, the case may involve considerations of local and international politics as much as crime," Mr. De-Poe argues. The government wanted to make a statement by laying the charges and now Ribic has a chance to make a statement of his own...

It's hard to see how the NATO bombing can be put "on trial"; it was carried out pursuant to a UN Security Council resolution. One certainly hopes nonsense such as this does not happen:

If the argument gains traction with the Ontario Court of Appeal judges, it could set a striking precedent for activists and militants...