'Cost' is a four-letter word
I was conversing recently with someone involved with the F-35 JSF project, and asked him specifically about the affordability of these aircraft. Given some of the speculation surrounding the aircraft's eventual costs, as highlighted here, I figured it wasn't an unreasonable question. So he asked someone at LockMart about it, and here's what they told him: "The unit cost will be about the same as current generation multi-role fighters, but the capability will be far greater."
When someone answers a pretty clear question - I'm looking for a number, here! - with something that nebulous, there's no real point in asking "What the hell does that mean?"
Just try tracking down figures on what any mil-spec equipment costs, but especially fighter aircraft. Are you including R&D costs? Service and spares? Are you looking at just the initial production run, or the incremental cost of follow-on orders? For domestic or foreign purchasers?
My inquiry about the JSF was brought about by the publicly available variations I'd seen in pricing recently. GlobalSecurity.org put the unit cost at $100M, CDI puts it at $122M, but Defence Tech puts it at only $63M. When reputable defence observers vary by close to 100% in cost estimates, how is the average Joe Canuck supposed to judge whether he's going to get good value for his tax dollar on the F-35?
And like I said earlier, it's not just the JSF that has this problem, as this article about the Rafale illustrates:
Pricing combat aircraft is notoriously complex, with deals often involving industrial offsets and seldom reflecting full aircraft development costs. While Dufour put the average cost of a Rafale at €50 million, or $64 million, and the Typhoon - a collaboration grouping Italy, Germany, Spain and Britain - at about £65 million, or $120 million, Kemp said both aircraft had been offered to Singapore and South Korea at about $95 million each, compared with a basic price tag of $45 million to $50 million for the Gripen.
That $45-50M for the Gripen intrigued me, since I'd seen a per unit cost of $76M here. Not to mention a per unit cost of $50M for the Rafale here. And just look at how the Eurofighter Typhoon people graphically sell their product's cost-effectiveness here. Confused yet?
The best explanation for these variations I've seen to date comes from Defense-Aerospace.com, in a 2006 piece entitled "Sticker Shock: Estimating the Real Cost of Modern Fighter Aircraft (pdf)." In that article, they make an important distinction between "Program Unit Cost" and "Unit Procurement Cost," which they define as follows:
- Program Unit Cost, obtained by dividing the total program cost by the number of aircraft produced. This is possibly the most significant benchmark, as it includes research and development costs as well as all related ancillary costs (support equipment, spare parts, documentation etc.);
- Unit Procurement Cost, obtained by dividing the cost of the latest production contract (thus excluding most R&D and support costs) by the number of aircraft contracted. In some respects, this can also be defined as the marginal cost of additional aircraft, and provides a benchmark for comparisons.
Their frustration in pursuing this exercise was evident in the study's Highlights and Conclusions:
The first and most obvious conclusion from this study (see Table 1) is that, in practice, it is virtually impossible to compare aircraft costs with a meaningful degree of accuracy.
Even government auditors, with access to classified data, are unable to agree on actual costs. For example, the officially quoted prices for the Eurofighter Typhoon vary by as much as 10% between Britain and Germany, while price estimates by the GAO, the Department of Defense and the US Air Force for both the JSF and the F-22 vary by as much as 50%.
Still, with that caveat, they were able to produce a very interesting chart (remembering it's from 2006 - click the graphic for a larger version):
I say 'interesting' because of the huge variation between the estimated marginal cost of obtaining aircraft once the production line is running and the total cost of putting a new aircraft from scratch, which is much, much higher. This should be to the benefit of Canada, which will apparently be buying 65 F-35's to replace our aging F-18 fleet. For the narrow purposes of this post, I'll refrain from commenting on whether 65 fighters will be adequate for our future needs, or whether we can even trust contract figures for future delivery (ahem, and ahem)...
So, my take-away from this little research project of mine is that I won't put too much faith in any costing estimates I see in the MSM reporting until a contract is signed. And even then, I'll have to look at what's included in the pricing (spares, service, training, etc) in order to make a fair assessment of whether it's a good deal or not.
Welcome to the spin-cycle, Damian...
Addendum: The one final point I forgot to make...
When LockMart says the F-35 will cost "about the same as current generation multi-role fighters," does that mean its Unit Procurement Cost will be around $62M, like the Rafale's Unit Procurement Cost? Or does it mean $118M like the Eurofighter? Because that's a pretty significant difference.
Or - and pardon my overt suspicion here - does it mean the F-35's Unit Procurement Cost (UPC) will be comparable to other fighters' Program Unit Cost (PUC)? That is to say, an apples-to-oranges sleight of hand that would hypothetically put a $115M (UPC) Lightning II up against a $95M (PUC) Super Hornet and call it a lot more plane for only a bit more money?
Enquiring minds want to know. And I doubt we'll get an answer any time soon.
8 Comments:
Babbling" Brilliant post. I'd say buy Super Hornets or Gripens--if they're still in production by the time we make a buy. Otherwise the F-35 looks almost reasonable, but as you point out, who knows?
Mark
Ottawa
Apples & oranges now make dollars & cents !!
The other thing to consider is the costs over the total life of the aircraft.
One engine is generally cheaper than two and a large production run with possibly some alternative suppliers usually produces cheaper spares. All these would be something in favour of the F35, eventually.
In the short term though, I probably agree that the Super Hornet would be the cheapest and easiest comparative fighter that Canada could introduce for much the same reason it was all those things for Australia (as an interim aircraft). Not the same aircraft as a classic Hornet by any means, but similar enough that you don't have to reinvent the wheel and contracting via FMS removes whole layers of bureaucratic cost and delay.
It's wishful thinking, but wouldn't it be nice if defense contractors were REQUIRED to quote costs by a standard, transparent calculation methodology? (As banks are required to quote loan and savings rates by a standard methodology.) And then having defense contractor corporation CEOs, CFOs and other top corporate officers sign off on mandatory formal price documents to their Governments, under penalty of perjury.
I think deriving such a methodology (akin to the UPC and PUC formulas) is mathematically and financially do-able, just not politically/porkly do-able.
Other F-35 news:
The F-35B STOVL made it's first flight at the Ft. Worth, Texas factory on June 11th.
Beautiful takeoff photo here. Click on the photo for a larger image. Another photo, this showing the "3 Bearing Swivel Nozzle" exhaust.
Below are some interesting specs on the planned A, B and C models. It'd seem the B model is the least capable, at least in terms of quoted fuel capacity, range and weapons payload. And the B and C models aren't even planned to carry an internal cannon, but be "external cannon-capable". (I presume that means the B and C models need the Canadian Tire Cannon Adapter Kit to carry a gun. :-)
Anybody have any comments on these relative differences?
F-35A - Conventional takeoff and landing
Users: U.S. and foreign Air Forces
Specifications: Top speed, Mach 1.6 (1,200+ mph); empty weight, 29,300 pounds; maximum weight, 68,000 pounds; fuel, 18,000 pounds; range, about 1,200 nautical miles; payload, 2 air-to-air missiles, 2 precision guided air-to-ground weapons, total 5,000 pounds; internal 25 mm cannon
F-35B - Short takeoff-vertical landing
Users: U.S. Marines, British and Italian Navies
Specifications: Top speed, Mach 1.6; empty weight, 32,300 pounds; maximum weight, 60,000 pounds; fuel, 14,000 pounds; range, about 900 nautical miles; payload, 2 air-to-air missiles, 2 precision guided air-to-ground weapons, total 3,500 pounds; external cannon-capable
F-35C - Carrier-based
User: US Navy
Specifications: Top speed, Mach 1.6; empty weight, 34,800 pounds; maximum weight, 70,000 pounds; fuel, 19,000 pounds; range, about 1,400 nautical miles; payload, 2 air-to-air missiles, 2 precision guided air-to-ground weapons, total 5,000 pounds; external cannon-capable
As per Dave's invitation...
The various F-35 models are optimised for different missions but share three critical similarities: very low observability (VLO), time-critical mission efficiency through supersonic cruising (Supercruise), and integrated flight systems and sensors for optimum pilot situational awareness (SA). VLO is probably the most important attribute since it figures into the design of the entire aircraft. By comparison, supercruising (useful for time critical interception or interdiction by "Gettin' there first-est with the most-est") and integrated systems can be fitted to some existing designs and therefore aren't unique to the F-35 (although this plane will have them to the ultimate degree). As it is often the most misunderstood and underestimated, I'll focus on VLO. I'm confident that Dave and most of you understand all this, but for those who haven't followed the developement of LO/VLO, I'm also going to include some of the basics.
In a nutshell, VLO is a drastic reduction in the amount of radio-frequency energy returning to a hostile radar, as well as the amount of heat energy emitted that can be detected by infra-red search and track (IRST) detectors. Its practical effect is a dramatic reduction in detection and engagement distances for hostile fighters and air defenses (AD) (during offensive operations) and also for enemy aircraft that penetrate your own airspace (during defensive operations).
The practical way VLO works is by reducing RF (and IR somewhat) signature by, let's say 97%. Since each quartering of radar RF return cuts detection range in half, a 97% reduction in return will reduce detection range to one-fifth of its normal range. By way of example, a surveillance radar which could normally detect an F-15-sized aircraft at 250km, would only detect a comparable-size VLO aircraft at 50km. Now, lest someone underestimate the significance of this, remember that MOST AD surveillance radars CANNOT reliably detect an F-15 at 250km. In practice, only very modern radars will do this reliably...and there are NOT enough of those radars to cover the skies over most counties. This means that about 96% of airspace (500km diameter F-15 detection bubble vs. 100km diameter VLO aircraft detection bubble) would be wide-open for your VLO fighter.
Even in air-to-air (A2A) engagements, a 97% signature-reduced fighter will be detected by even powerful APG-63-class radars at only about 30-35km...and since an AIM-120C has a no-escape zone of about 50+km in a meeting engagement, this means that the opposing non-VLO aircraft will be engaged before he even knows the VLO aircraft is present. With longer-ranged AIM-120D or (eventually) Meteor missiles, the VLO attack advantage becomes even more pronounced...and this scenario applies even more so when the hostile aircraft is intruding into YOUR airspace without his radar operating at full power like a beacon.
So what if the hostile gets off a shot with an active radar-homing uber-missile (perhaps an R-77, if it works)? Again, the VLO detection range-reduction factor would mean that his shot MUST guide to within a few km of the VLO aircraft to have a chance of engaging it...which means his more powerful nose radar MUST remain engaged during the fight (to provide mid-course updates to his missile), depriving him of most evasive manuevers. All he can do is to pray that the VLO aircraft's missile malfunctions. Otherwise, his missile (launched after the VLO aircraft's missile) will not reach the VLO aircraft's closely-approximate location before the VLO aircraft's missile destroys him and the VLO aircraft alters its projected course out of his missile's on-board radar's detection range.
All of the foregoing points also bear on the ability of AD radar, missiles, and aircraft to attempt to engage a VLO aircraft, especially if the VLO aircraft bothers to engage the defenders in a suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) operation.
Suffice it to say, in a world of increasingly long-ranged A2A missiles, LO and VLO will not just be a "Gee whiz" technology; in a decade or so, aircraft will NEED these things just to survive the opening minutes of an engagement. 4th Generation multirole aircraft like the F-18E/F or Gripen are all-around deadly (and the "Generation 4.5" Typhoon is kick-**s in A2A!) but by 2020, they will no longer be dominant in an environment of very long-ranged AAMs and SAMs. At that point, 5th Generation fighters will be mandatory for aircraft (and airCREW) survival, and even more so for victory.
Goodnight, guys.
-Jay
Thanks, Jay, for your very informative remarks.
It seems that stealth capabilities are mandatory NOW even for survival, not to mention victory. And as Jay explained, only going to become moreso as counter-technology advances.
That explains why, among other things, the US Navy wasted no time in retiring their entire F-14 Tomcat fleet and replaced them with the new FA-18E and F. The increasing threat to surface ships- with the carrier as the top target- mandated jumping to this 4th gen bird ASAP. (I saw a 1 hr. program on that bird on the Military Channel. It definitely can run rings around a Tomcat or F-15, in all ways, allowing fleet force projection AND solid fleet defense in the present and short-and medium-term future.)
Even these F-18E and F are apparently only a relatively short-term (to 2020 or so) solution until the F-35C is mfg. in sufficiently large numbers.
For Air Forces, the F-35A will have big boots to fill, replacing the magnificent F-16. A statistic I read somewhere is that the F-16 (of all models) has been in 75 air to air engagements in it's history, winning ALL of them! That includes 4 victories by Israeli F-16s against Syrian Mig-29s. No F-16 has ever been shot down in a dogfight. Info at various websites also indicate the F-16 has been a pretty decent air to ground bird in Iraq, Af-stan (and Lebanon in 2006).
One thing to bear in mind is that the F-22 program paid for the development of a lot of the technology that will be in the F-35. In a way the F-22 program was almost a mini-DARPA, which is why its Program Unit Cost is so insane. Practical vectored thrust, supercruise, new alloys for the skin, etc were all developed or refined for that program. Frankly the US needs to Cowboy Up and buy more for the Air Force and figure out how to put a hook on it and use it with the Navy as well, since at present the Navy lacks a true interceptor. The F-35 and F-18E are both excellent multirole fighter-attack planes, but if you are fighting 10 to 1 odds over the South China Sea, you will need a real interceptor.
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