"stigma is a leadership issue"

Well, the Big Brass is at least saying some of the right things about mental health issues in the CF. Good for Natynczyk. You can see him speak about his “Be the Difference” Mental Health Awareness Campaign here, and read the transcript here.

Some of it seemed like uninspired boilerplate, to be honest, but there was one important point made that impressed me. First, from the backgrounder on the issue:

It has been said that military culture is not subject to quick or easy change, but in the CF, there is evidence that initiatives targeting the stigma surrounding mental health issues have been working. The CF have recognized for some time that stigma is a leadership issue, and leadership has increased its involvement accordingly. Now, the “Be the Difference” campaign will extend awareness across the CF, encouraging personnel of all ranks and at every level to become personally engaged in building strength and understanding. [Babbler's emphasis]

This is reiterated even more strongly in Natynczyk's speech:

We know that clinical and peer based interventions are effective and that the earlier they occur the better the chances are for recovery. Those who receive the support of unit co- workers and leaders have the greatest chance of returning to duty.

Therefore, I expect leaders at all levels to create a command climate that allows those who need help to get it. I also expect all CF personnel to foster a social climate of understanding, acceptance and support. Don’t under estimate the impact you can have on someone affected by mental health difficulties. [Babbler's emphasis]

The phrase "I expect" coming from the senior uniformed officer in the CF is not to be taken lightly.

Let's just hope the follow through lives up to the rhetoric.

"Because some Liberals think it's good politics"

What he said.

Ugh-date: Blech. I just finished reading yesterday's "debate" in Hansard and I'm ready to scrub myself with Javex - immersing myself in such a fetid rhetorical swamp for an hour can't be good for the immune system.

A line-by-line refutation would be useless. Most of the stuffed suits whose only purpose seems to be to consume oxygen, collect a paycheque from the Canadian taxpayer, and congest the halls of parliament from time to time were far too busy posturing to actually engage in substantive debate on the serious issues surrounding the mission. Going line-by-line to correct the misrepresentations, inaccuracies, and irresponsible subversions of the truth would take me a week. A week of my life I could never get back, much like the hour I just spent reading their endless bloviating.

The Afghan mission requires rational, deliberate, informed debate. That's why I propose our parliamentarians ignore the subject completely for the foreseeable future.

On-a-less-bitter-note-date: Lesson from the previous rant? Don't sit down at the keyboard with that much frustration in your heart, Damian. Here's a more serious take on the parliamentary discussion.

Dawn Black continues to outperform her colleagues. But her party's position is execrable. Immediate withdrawal isn't a strategy, it's a knee-jerk reaction from the party's anti-war base, and it illustrates quite clearly why the NDP have no credibility on military affairs.

The Bloc MP's, as usual in any discussion of foreign policy, were like a fish out of water. Their raison-d'etre is separatism, and when they venture outside that narrow specialty, their spectacular lack of depth is revealed. A precis of their views would seem to be that the mission is doomed to failure, but we should stick it out until 2009 because we committed to it. Into the meat-grinder with you, soldiers! Down the drain with you, tax-dollars! I need not continue - the fact that they believe there is value in cutting off one's nose to spite one's face is indictment enough.

The Conservatives summoned all the outrage and hyperbole they could muster, and hurled it across the Commons. They were offended. They were righteous. They were patriotic. They were mostly buffoons.

Look, there are reasonable questions to be asked about this mission. Are we achieving the right balance between the 3D's? How can we measure our progress or lack thereof? Should we determine our contribution based upon our results, or based upon our efforts?

If the Conservatives won't volunteer the information in order to have an informed debate, they should be made to discuss the terms of our engagement publicly and so educate the Canadian public. That's the job of the Official Opposition.

Unfortunately, the Liberals seem totally unable to master any skill other than the cheap and partisan stabbing thrust. This resolution that was being debated was a farce, for all the reasons outlined in the Bercuson article I've linked to above.

Besides, if the Liberals don't think we can make the mission in Kandahar work, why did they send the CF there in the first place? And if they do think it can work, then why don't they focus on fixing what they feel we're doing wrong instead of advocating a military withdrawal from the south?

I'm with Bercuson: this isn't a serious foreign policy issue to the Liberals, it's a wedge issue with the electorate. It's a move in a big political game. They should be ashamed.

Government: Afghan mission incremental costs $11.3 billion

Lower than some have suggested:

Canadians can expect a $11.3-billion pricetag once the government wraps up its decade-long effort in Afghanistan, the Department of National Defence says.

In a newly released accounting, the federal government said that DND estimates a 10-year pricetag of $9-billion while other departments including the international development agency, foreign affairs and veteran's affairs will be on the hook for $2.3-billion.

The estimated costs do not include the costs of disability and healthcare for veterans once the mission is finished, something that parliamentary budget officer Kevin Page factored in when he calculated total costs in 2011 at $18.1-billion [No! That was an upper limit].

Page's report, released in the final days of last fall's federal election, suggested up to 7,000 Canadian soldiers who have passed through the war torn country could make disability or healthcare claims.

This is the first time that the federal government has released a total estimated cost of the Afghan effort, which Canada has been engaged in since 2001.

The Tories had previously pegged costs at about $8-billion.

The new information from DND was tied to the release yesterday of estimated spending for 2009-10, in which total spending on Afghanistan is projected to run to $1.9-billion.

The estimates point to a new civilian push in Afghanistan, but also more controversy around the execution of the mission. There is an extra $4.1-million to put 50 Royal Canadian Mounted Police officers in Kandahar in the coming year to help train the country's rag-tag police forces [a Good Thing, no?]...

Just for comparison, DND's 2008-2009 expenditures have been put at $18,293,756. Not that an expensive mission for the government as a whole, over ten years, in my view.

I'm waiting...

...for the apology. I mean, an upstanding straight-shooter like Amir Attaran should have no problem coming out and saying up front that his calculated attack upon the reputation of the Canadian Forces was completely unjustified, right?

A military investigation two years in the making has cleared Canadian soldiers of any wrongdoing in the handling of captured Taliban fighters in Kandahar.

A board of inquiry report into allegations that troops mistreat and beat prisoners taken during heavy fighting in April 2006 found, instead, they were treated "professionally and humanely."

After talking to hundreds of witnesses and examining thousands of pages of documentation it was determined the conduct of soldiers during those early bloody days of the mission was "consistently above reproach," said the inquiry’s final report, which was completed on Feb. 6, 2009, but only released on Tuesday.

The inquiry "heard no evidence suggesting that members of the Canadian Forces have mistreated detainees in Afghanistan," the document said.

"Indeed, we heard of several instances where CF members went far beyond what was expected of them to protect the lives of Afghan detainees, even though doing so dramatically increased the risk to themselves and their allies."

Here's where you can read the BOI report for yourself, by the way. Always better to go to the source document than let a reporter or...ahem...activist lawyer interpret it for you.

For those who don't remember what I had to say at the time about Attaran's spurious allegations that CF members had abused Afghan detainees:

Let me be perfectly clear: I believe that Attaran's entire motivation in pushing this story into the press was to get the CF on the ropes so he could hammer them over detainee transfer policy. That was the impetus for his initial Access to Information requests. I doubt that he particularly cares that the reputation of the CF is being unceremoniously dragged through the mud in order to facilitate his attack on a Government of Canada policy implemented by the CF. I don't know that it would even occur to him that he doesn't really want the military picking and choosing which government directives it will or will not follow.

What all this means is that even if the abuse by Canadian soldiers story is still-born after the investigations conclude there was no wrongdoing by CF members, he can still push the 'but you're turning prisoners over to known torturers' angle and keep the story above the fold on page one of the newspapers. It's a classic 'bait and switch': hook the public on the idea of soldiers abusing detainees, and even if that's proven false, feed them the completely separate issue of detainee transfers to the Afghan government.

I've reread my original piece, and I can't see any point I've gotten wrong: it was, and continues to be a 'bait and switch'; just look at where Attaran's name pops up in the news these days:

The effectiveness of a rare public probe into Canada's treatment of Afghan detainees is being challenged by the Ottawa lawyer who first called for the Military Police Complaints Commission to investigate.

Amir Attaran, a University of Ottawa law professor who raised concerns with the commission more than two years ago over the issue of Afghan detainees, said the process outlined in Monday's opening hearing is unacceptable.

...

“If the Military Police Complaints Commission proves, in this week particularly but also in coming months, that the best it can muster is a non-adversarial process in which it won't use its subpoena powers, well, then one wonders why it exists,” Mr. Attaran said.

Surprise, surprise: it's all about the detainee transfer agreement.

Oh, and as far as that apology he owes our men and women in uniform, here's what he had to say:

The disagreement left Amir Attaran, an Ottawa lawyer and human-rights advocate whose complaints about potential abuse sparked the investigation into the handling of the three detainees, wondering how top officials can disagree over the fundamental question of why the detainee transfer program exists. He called it “quite a major disagreement.”

The report also shows that one of the detainees – who was the most heavily injured, having been punched in the arms and head, kicked in the arms and torso, hit with a weapon in his torso and head, had a soldier's knee pressed into his head before he was “forced into compliance” by soldiers during an attempted arrest – wasn't questioned before being handed over to Afghan police.

The report suggests that was because of a pressure for rapid transfer (the military set a 96-hour window to capture a suspected insurgent and hand him over to Afghan forces) as well as a presumption that the man had been sedated for his injuries, which he had not.

It also notes that information and paperwork around the men's arrests was not passed on because of privacy concerns and a time crunch, and highlights a lack of communication with the Ottawa headquarters, CEFCOM, which didn't have around-the-clock operation at the time. Those procedures could be a breach of military protocol, Mr. Attaran believes.

“The repeated violation of basic, standard operating procedures, which the [Canadian Forces] now admit, is hardly professional or confidence-inspiring,” he said in an e-mail.

Professional? Confidence-inspiring?

What the hell does this insipid twit know about professionalism or inspirational leadership? When was the last time he was physically attacked, bombed and shot at, and then provided his attackers with medical attention and protected them from potential harm (the tender mercies of the ANSF troops they attacked), as Canadian soldiers have done?

That he's not apologetic in the slightest, that he continues to pick nits on administrative matters when the main thrust of his accusations were found to be completely baseless tells me all I need to know about this poor excuse of a man. For shame.

"Stalk and Strike"

Charles MacLachlan Magwood was born in Toronto on Nov. 27, 1913. He died of pneumonia at Sunnybrook War Veterans Residence in Toronto on July 9, 2007. He was 93. He is survived by his wife Marion and children John, Stephen and Mary. He also leaves seven grandchildren and three great-grandchildren.

Along the way, he was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross by King George VI. Read, and remember.

A great and honourable deserter

A delightful post (see the paintings) by Peter Worthington at the FrumForum:

Why We’re Thankful

I first spotted him at a banquet and awards ceremony in Seoul, marking the 50th anniversary of the Korean war – a grizzled old colonel with a white handlebar moustache and the Medal of Honor around his neck.

But what caught my attention was two Canadian war medals nestled among the 26 medal ribbons he wore – the Canadian Volunteer medal with overseas clasp, and Victory medal from WWII.

“How come?” I asked him.

A mischievous grin spread his face. He introduced himself – Col. Lewis Lee Millett, a storied American fighting soldier, although I didn’t know it at the time.


...he’d joined the U.S. army at age 21 in the summer of 1941 – and then deserted, because the U.S. wasn’t yet in the war. He came to Canada and joined our army to go overseas. He wanted to fight Nazis...

After Pearl Harbour, when the U.S. entered the war, he transferred back to the U.S. army...

Afstan: A "war of necessity"?

Robert Kagan has his doubts--conclusion of a piece in the Washington Post (it seems to me that Canadians have related moral scruples--wanting UN sanction/cover for military action, and then not considering it enough in Afstan):

The President and the 'Necessary War' Myth
...
The fact is, unless the nation is invaded or its very survival is imminently threatened, going to war is always a choice. So what is the point of trying to make this elusive distinction anyway? For many, including Obama, the present purpose is to distinguish Afghanistan from Iraq, Obama's "good" war from George W. Bush's "bad" war. But it won't work. As Haass correctly argues, right or wrong, they were both wars of choice.

But there is a deeper reason, as well, for Obama to claim necessity in Afghanistan. It is part of what increasingly seems to be a striving for moral purity in international affairs by this administration. Obama and his top advisers apologize for America's past sins, implicitly suggesting they will commit no new ones. And that goes for fighting wars. No one can blame you for fighting a war if it is a war of necessity, or so they may believe. All the inevitable ancillary casualties of war -- from civilian deaths to the occasional misbehavior of the troops to the errors of commanders -- are more easily forgiven if one has no choice. The claim of necessity wipes away the moral ambiguities inherent in the exercise of power. And it prevents scrutiny of one's own motives, which in nations, as in individuals, are rarely pure.

This hoped-for escape from moral burdens is, however, an illusion. Just because America declares something necessary doesn't mean that the rest of the world, and especially its victims, will believe it is just. The claim of necessity will not absolve the United States, and Obama, from responsibility for its actions.

As Reinhold Niebuhr pointed out long ago, Americans find it hard to acknowledge this moral ambiguity of power. They are reluctant to face the fact that it is only through the morally ambiguous exercise of their power that any good can be accomplished. Obama is right to be prosecuting the war in Afghanistan, and he should do so even more vigorously. But he will not avoid the moral and practical burdens of fighting this war by claiming he has no choice. An action can be right or just without being necessary. Like great presidents in the past, Barack Obama will have to explain why his choice, while difficult and fraught with complexity, is right and better than the alternatives.

Robert Kagan, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, writes a monthly column for The Post.

I think one could argue that no Canadian war since 1867 has been one of necessity--except World War II and in 1939 it did not actually appear to be one. A relevant post:

Thinking about Afstan

Meanwhile:

Well, it could have been worse
Intimidation, attacks and disenchantment suppressed turnout but did not abort voting

The Election [impassioned yet reasoned post by Brian at The Canada-Afghanistan Blog]

Marines Fight Taliban With Little Aid From Afghans

Update thoughts: An amplification of Mr Kagan's analysis: I think that in Western countries it has come be widely accepted that war/combat is somehow illegitimate save in the direst circumstances--Mr Kagan's definition of a true "necessary war". Moreover Western societies seem increasingly unwilling to accept casualty levels in conflict that are risible by any historical standard.

Over the next one or two centuries the above realities (if so they be) bear rather badly for the future of our societies. Given: 1) our demographic decline; and 2) human nature as seen through history. Since many people in other societies still believe in the "strong horse" ("..when people see a strong horse and a weak horse, by nature, they will like the strong horse..."). As we once did, also believing in our own (for want of a better word) righteousness--severely undermined by events and behaviour in Europe during the first half of the twentieth century.

Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King said this in October 1939, just under 80 years ago; how far we have come (source website):

Canada is engaged in a war which is a crusade to save Christian civiilization and the
liberty of mankind, Prime Minister Mackenzie King declared in a radio address last night.

The present struggle, he asserted, is for the preservation not alone of national and personal freedom but of freedom also of the mind and of the soul .

Stating he had always had a positive hatred of war, Premier King, said no other course but the overthrow by arms of Nazi Germany would prevent Naziism extending its tyrannical power over all nations and descent of the whole world into a new and terrible age of barbarism...

We're certainly not now facing Hitler or anything similar. But we have lost faith in ourselves.

National Security: Obamaspeak that might almost be Canadian

Our sort of bafflegab:

...how does the NSS [text here] propose to achieve such wonders? The administration claims credit for expanding the Group of Eight to the G-20 and paying up America's United Nations dues. In the future, America will "invest in strengthening the international system" and work "from inside international institutions," and build "frameworks to face their imperfections head on and to mobilize transnational cooperation" and "enhance international capacity," and facilitate "broad and effective global cooperation" and develop "integrated plans and approaches that leverage . . . capabilities." This type of writing is a net subtraction from public understanding...

More questions about vehicle use

The three Canadian soldiers killed in an IED blast early today were travelling by Gator, an unarmoured six-wheel-drive ATV with a small flatbed on the back.

Already, the media are questioning the use of such a vehicle in that area, led by Graeme Smith of the Globe & Mail:

Three Canadian soldiers died this morning when a roadside bomb detonated under a small all-terrain vehicle they were using to ferry supplies between checkpoints.

The explosion happened around 8 a.m. local time, about six kilometres west of Sperwan Ghar, a hilltop outpost southwest of Kandahar city.

That location had been a sleepy observation position for Canadian troops for most of this year, after major battles pushed the Taliban away from the area last year.

Canadian commanders have recently pointed to that district, Panjwai, as a model for pacifying the restive south because the Taliban presence had been reduced to minor skirmishing on the western edge of the district and the newfound peace has allowed the establishment of local government and a flood of aid projects.

Last fall, Canadian troops would only have travelled that swath of farmland in heavily armoured troop carriers. At the time of the blast, however, the soldiers were moving between checkpoints in an open-top vehicle known as a Gator, manufactured by John Deere. The military regularly uses such vehicles within safe areas.

The soldiers were travelling between two checkpoints less than a kilometre apart, a military spokesman said, but visibility in that region is restricted by high walls and other obstacles.

“A determined enemy could evade observation in that terrain,” said Major Dale MacEachern.

In Kandahar, Brigadier General Tim Grant told reporters called the blast “an unfortunate accident” and defended the use of the un-armoured vehicle.

"We look at this as an unfortunate accident. The vehicle was appropriate to the task at hand and the terrain they were travelling in," he told reporters in Kandahar, the southern city where Canada has a 2,500-strong mission.

And so, yet again, we're left second-guessing the choice of vehicles used by our troops.

While it won't relieve the terrible burden of grief the families of the deceased must bear now, the rest of us should remember that the CF doesn't have unlimited resources in Afghanistan. Choices must be made every day on which assets and tactics are best employed for which missions to combat which foreseeable hazards. Those choices are made by every single member of the CF who goes outside the wire, from the Lieutenant Colonel who decides the Battle Group's overall stance and dictates which units go where, to the Private who looks down at the path ahead and decides where to put his right boot next.

The Globe's Smith seems to imply that someone in the chain of command screwed up by letting these soldiers drive an unarmoured vehicle in a dangerous area.

He may be right, which is why BGen Grant said JTF-Afg will review procedures in the wake of this incident:

"We look at this as an unfortunate accident. The vehicle was appropriate to the task at hand and the terrain they were travelling in," he told reporters in Kandahar, the southern city where Canada has a 2,500-strong mission.

But “we will review how the re-supply is done, the equipment that we use and the procedures that are in place. If we determine that we need to change our tactics, techniques and procedures, well do that,” he added.

But here's an alternative to Smith's angle: soldiering outside the wire in Afghanistan, no matter where, is a dangerous job, and these soldiers were simply unlucky. No blame, just victims of cruel odds.

Remember, nobody knows yet how the IED was triggered. If it was a pressure plate, one of the preferred methods these days, it might have been set only to detonate when a vehicle weight went over it - in which case the protection of a LAVIII might not have done these brave souls any good. If such a trigger were to be set at a high enough weight, the safest way to transit the area might have been on foot.

But you wouldn't rewrite SOP based upon that contingency, second-guessing the use of heavily armoured vehicles in favour of light or no armour at all, would you?

The truth is that no one tactic can anticipate every contingency. Sometimes surviving combat comes down to luck. Tragically, these fine soldiers had their luck run out. Rest in peace.

Update: Welcome to the accusatory world of Paul Workman. Why don't we just sack BGen Grant, give Paulie a field commission, and let him decide which vehicles are used for which missions? Let him be responsible for security and reconstruction in an area the size of Nova Scotia, and let him write the letters home to grieving families when tragedy strikes. Maybe I can be the one pulling in the big paycheque standing in front of the camera pretending I know what the hell I'm talking about, while he tries to politely and professionally answer my thinly-veiled accusations of negligence.

Hornets at work

Just one of the jobs:

Fighter jets escort Hong Kong flight to Vancouver after bomb threat

A Cathay Pacific Airbus passenger jet sits on the tarmac at Richmond, BC's YVR airport after it was escorted by two Canadian CF-18 fighter jets May 15.
Photograph by: Jason Payne, PNG

A Cathay Pacific Airbus from Hong Kong was escorted by two CF18 Hornet fighter jets to Vancouver International Airport after a bomb threat Saturday.

North American Aerospace Defence Command officials sent the fighter jets to intercept a Vancouver-bound Cathay Pacific flight Saturday afternoon after receiving reports of a security threat involving the plane.

Major Holly Apostoliuk, with the Canadian NORAD Region headquarters, said the two jets were scrambled under NORAD command from a forward operating base at Canadian Forces Base Comox [the Hornets are based at CFB Cold Lake, temporarily at Comox, three photos here] as a precaution.

"In this case only as a precaution did we intercept and escort the aircraft until it landed safely," Apostoliuk said.

Alisa Cooper, spokeswoman for Vancouver International Airport, said RCMP confirmed it was a bomb threat after the passengers had safely disembarked from the plane. Cooper said no one was injured and RCMP deemed the aircraft to be safe...

More photos,

...
A CF18 Hornet fighter jet, acting under the North American Aerospace Defence Command, intercept a Cathay Pacific passenger plane headed for Vancouver on Saturday May 15, 2010. (Patrick Beaton / THE CANADIAN PRESS)...

plus video:

Afstan: RAAF leases UAVs in cooperation with CF

One wonders if our media will notice, or if our goverment will make any announcement regarding what would seem a nice success for a Canadian company (via an Australian friend of The Torch):

AIR FORCE TO BEGIN OPERATING ITS FIRST UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEM

Minister for Defence, Senator John Faulkner, today announced that the Royal Australian Air Force has acquired Heron Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in close collaboration with Canadian Defence forces.

“This high resolution intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capability will enhance the capability of Australian forces in Afghanistan,” Senator Faulkner said.

The Heron UAV is a one tonne aircraft capable of medium altitude, long endurance flights. Under Project NANKEEN, the Defence Materiel Organisation has signed a contract with Canadian company MacDonald, Dettwiler and Associates Ltd. (MDA) to lease Heron UAV services which will provide high resolution intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capability.

The Australian Defence Force has signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Canadian Forces which already operates Heron UAVs in Afghanistan [more here].

In July 2009 Royal Australian Air Force and Australian Army personnel undertook Heron training in Canada. These personnel have now been absorbed within the Canadian Heron UAV Detachment at Kandahar airfield conducting combat operations in support of ISAF [not, one imagines, how our government would put the role of our Herons].

This has meant the ADF has rapidly established its Heron capability by drawing on the Canadians’ operational knowledge, experience and facilities.

“The Australian Government greatly appreciates the assistance of the Canadian Defence Force in this project,” Senator Faulkner said...

Media Note:

Imagery is available at:
http://www.defence.gov.au/media/download/2009/Sep/20090907/index.htm



A Heron fact sheet is available at:
http://www.defence.gov.au/publications/HeronFactSheet.pdf...

More on Aussie forces in Afstan here, here and here.

Fulcrum CF/DND Advertising Ban - Letters tto the Editor

Fulcrum CF/DND Ad Ban - Letters to the Editor of the Fulcrum:

Letter One - against the ban

Letter Two - against the ban

Letter Three - against the ban

Letter Four - against the ban

Letter Five - against the ban

Letter Six - for the ban

Letter Seven - for the ban

Why they fly (in part)

A fighter pilot in training is on the phone with his fiancee. She hears a loud noise (a plane passing nearby) and asks what that was. The pilot replies: "The sound of freedom."

Afstan: The odd view of our media about their sources

Christie Blatchford of the Globe and Mail reflects following the killing of reporter Michelle Lang:

...
The Canadian Forces are not slick manipulators of truth – rather the opposite, I say politely – and the mere fact of its embedding program, where reporters are invited to live and work alongside soldiers and are subject in my experience to almost zero interference or censorship, alone should speak to that.

And the Taliban, however simple or uneducated its lowest-ranking members may be, are adept at the most basic propaganda; they know very well that the shortest route to sap the will of countries like Canada and Britain is a rising casualty toll. Canadian soldiers who speak to the press are named and accountable for their remarks, both to their superiors and to the public; but for a few top leaders, Taliban and supporters are interviewed anonymously, through interpreters and sometimes fixers, and are usually photographed with covered faces.

It is an odd commentary upon the world we live in that a named and identified Canadian general is often viewed in this country with more suspicion than a masked thug with an AK at his side, yet precisely that view persists in newsrooms and journalism schools both [emphasis added]...

A post along similar lines from this August, with further links:

Dr Goebbels on the line

US Marine Expeditionary Brigade-Afghanistan at Helmand

More on the American war--US Marines in their part of Regional Command South a week ago:

MEB-Afghanistan assumes control of Marine battle space

5/29/2009
By Cpl. Aaron Rooks, 2nd MEB

CAMP LEATHERNECK, Helmand Province, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan —

Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force-Afghanistan transferred control of Marine battle space in southern Afghanistan to Marine Expeditionary Brigade-Afghanistan [to be 10,000 strong, see this post] during a transfer of authority ceremony here May 29.

The event, in which Brig. Gen. Larry Nicholson, commanding general of MEB-Afghanistan, assumed authority of Marine battle space and forces in Helmand Province from Col. Duffy White, commanding officer of SPMAGTF-Afghanistan, began with an invocation from Navy Cmdr. Phil Pelikan, brigade chaplain, that echoed hope for the future, as representatives from the United States, United Kingdom and Afghanistan gathered in support of the brigade.

“Use us now,” Pelikan said during his prayer, “to partner with and help the people of Afghanistan and preserve justice and freedom in their land.”

That partnership has been built upon by SPMAGTF-Afghanistan. The unit deployed in late 2008 as a bridging force, White said, to maintain a strong Marine Corps presence in southern Afghanistan, following the efforts of the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit and Task Force 2/7, composed of 2nd Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment [see this post for more on the Marines in 2008]. MEB-Afghanistan, he said, was the force they were waiting for...

The SPMAGTF has now been absorbed by MEB-Afghanistan and today became Regimental Combat Team 3, the brigade’s ground combat element [will have five battalions]...

Patch:
Commander:

Brigadier General Lawrence D. Nicholson was promoted to Brigadier General September 2007 and is currently assigned as the Commanding General, 2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade.

Brigadier General Nicholson was born in Toronto, Canada...

Update: More details:

7,000 US Marines patrolling southern Afghan desert
...
Some 7,000 Marines from the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade, based at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, are now in the country, Marine spokesman 1st Lt. Abe Sipe said. The forces have brought fighter aircraft, transport helicopters, artillery and the infrastructure needed to support what will ultimately be a force of around 11,000 [emphasis added]...

Afstan aid mess

The "international community", and individual countries, just aren't getting their acts together according to Anne Applebaum in the Washington Post:

The scene is a small textile factory in a new industrial park on the outskirts of Kabul; the characters are an Afghan businessman, his American partner and a USAID official, the latter straight out of central casting: flustered, important, accompanied by gun-wielding bodyguards. She speaks of the U.S. Agency for International Development's plans for "small and medium-sized enterprise development," lauds the USAID-funded industrial park and alludes to the "$5.4 billion" the agency has spent in Afghanistan since 2002. She hands out an expensive-looking, glossy USAID brochure that describes, among other things, the goal of our meeting: "to show international media opinion leaders that progress is being made in economic growth in Afghanistan."

Unfortunately, the factory is half-empty that day: Prices for fuel and other inputs are so high in Kabul that no textile business can compete with those in India or Pakistan. The factory depends on Afghan army uniform orders, which come in irregularly. So does the fabric to make them, since the customs bureaucracy is still plagued by corruption and inefficiency. When the USAID official starts listing the assistance given to the Afghan customs service -- this includes training for officials, construction of border posts, even gifts of uniforms -- the American partner shrugs, unimpressed. "It would be good to move forwards instead of backwards," she says. "There's never any follow-through." Afterward, the Afghan businessman confides that he has been robbed by the police. It isn't the Taliban that Afghan entrepreneurs fear; it is their own government, corrupted by international money and now infiltrated by criminal networks, too.

This is the chaos that is foreign aid in Afghanistan, a place where every mistake ever made in an underdeveloped economy is being repeated. This is a country in which all the best people are being hired away from the national government by the alphabet soup of aid agencies on the ground; in which the same aid agencies are driving up real estate and food prices; in which millions are squandered on dubious contractors, both local and foreign; in which the minister for rural development admits he doesn't know what all of the NATO reconstruction teams in rural districts do; in which the top U.N. official, given a mandate to coordinate the donors, says the donors don't respond to his attempts to coordinate them [that's the new UN "super envoy, Kai Eide--more on aid problems here].

Conflicting agendas, overlapping projects, money badly spent: We've been here before, many times, and the conclusions are always the same. Some of them have recently been restated by a former Afghan minister of finance, Ashraf Ghani, and Clare Lockhart, director of the Institute for State Effectiveness, in their book, "Fixing Failed States." Its central argument: Well-meaning foreigners should not fix roads; they should teach the Afghan government to fix roads, thus helping it acquire legitimacy. Foreigners shouldn't feed Afghans but, rather, develop Afghan agriculture so that the Afghans can feed themselves, export their surplus and develop a stake in the rule of law too.

Some of this thinking has filtered down to the provinces, where "Afghanization" is now a buzzword and foreign construction projects now fly the Afghan flag. But the change in attitude may have come too late: A harsh winter, a bad drought and constant fighting mean that Afghanistan, which suffered a terrible famine in 2001, could well be on the brink of another one. Starving Afghans? Think about it: A greater indictment of the massive international aid and reconstruction effort would be hard to imagine.

And a famine here would not just constitute a humanitarian crisis. To put it bluntly, Afghans who have no food are easily purchased by the Taliban, al-Qaeda and other extremists who come over the border from Pakistan, looking to pay insurgents. Last weekend's bombing of the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad is an excellent reminder of just how sophisticated these groups have become. But you don't have to cross the border to find trouble. Recent attacks on NATO soldiers in previously peaceful parts of northern and western Afghanistan are evidence that poverty and insecurity are spreading, not shrinking, within the country as well.

For once, the solution lies not in greater funding but in more intelligent use of the massive resources available. It may partly lie in smaller Afghan charities such as Afghan Health and Development Services, which sends family doctors (without security teams) out to the provinces, where they work in conjunction with the Ministry of Health; or with less demanding foreigners such as the Filipino aid workers who have set up a credit union-- following Islamic banking practices, of course -- in the provincial city of Tarin Kowt. They lack qualified staff, and they don't like the gunfire they hear at night. But, with the advantage of "looking Afghan" ("people think I am Tajik," one of them told me, laughing), they soldier on: Their credit union has 467 members and has made 83 loans. A little bit of money goes a long way in Afghanistan, they tell me. Too bad so many in the aid community still haven't learned this, after all these years.

Meawhile, for domestic political reasons in response to the Manley Panel report, Canada is now putting big emphasis on "signature projects". Babbling calls getting aid delivery right "a delicate balancing task."

Update: A good piece by Nipa Banerjee, currently professor of international development at the University of Ottawa, who served as Canada's head of aid in Kabul for three years:

Our job is nowhere near done

Signs of progress have been hard to find in Afghanistan lately, but with a change in strategy our mission there need not end in failure

Our Commander-in-Chief (at Kandahar)

Under the Constitution formally the Queen (Section 15), in devolved practice the Governor-General. As of 1947:

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I. We do hereby constitute, order, and declare that there shall be a Governor General and Commander-in-Chief in and over Canada...

In current reality, as Terry Glavin posts:

Our Governor General and Commander-in-Chief addresses the troops:

I was born in a country where for many years, the uniform had come to symbolize brutality, horror and tyranny.

I have come a long way from that child who grew up under a regime of terror, in Haiti, to become the woman who stands before you now.

Since the beginning of my mandate, I have worked alongside you every day. I have visited your places of work. I have seen you in action.

If you only knew how proud I am of you as I look out at you today; how proud I am to be your commander-in-chief. You have forever changed my perception of the men and women who don the uniform, and for that, I thank you, from the bottom of my heart.

Still something to be said for a regal, or vice-regal, head of state (though that "over"...). More on the Governor General's visit.

Update: Video here.

The price versus the prize

Soldiers I've spoken with are not of one mind on this issue, and I wouldn't pretend to speak for them in such a situation. But many of them have expressed to me their frustration that the media and public pay attention only to the costs of the mission, and not to what Canadian blood and treasure is accomplishing in Kandahar.

BGen Vance says what I believe should have been said from the first casualty, far more emphatically than it has been:

"Please do not think of this as a failure on the part of any person or of the mission itself," Vance said in a statement at Kandahar Airfield.

"Success in war is costly. We are determined to succeed so that Afghan lives improve, but the insurgents are equally determined to challenge and prevent Afghanistan from flourishing as the nation it so wants to be. Remember, the deaths of these superb Canadians occurred as Canadian Forces were bringing safety to those in peril. Today, they succeeded." [Babbler's emphasis]

They did indeed.

Blogshite to PR example in one post

Keelan Green, Thornley Fallis Vice-President, was recently franked for a supposed preferential relationship with the members here at the Torch.

A true PR pro - he turns “Blogshite: The Torch” into a relevant example of one of the services his firm provides it's clients.

Nicely done.

“PowerPoint makes us stupid,”/Update: "On PowerPoint rangers"

Quite:

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A PowerPoint diagram meant to portray the complexity of American strategy in Afghanistan certainly succeeded in that aim.

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I'm sure the CF are just about as PP-addicted. When I was in the federal bureaucracy I was utterly unable to cope with PP despite a couple of quick courses. Not sure if I should be stupidly proud or something. By the way, federal cabinet briefings are largely PP "decks", a certain path to better governance, eh?

Update: BruceR. at Flit:

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Another leader, a previous commander of Task Force Kandahar, had a habit of putting scans of his own hand-drawn back-of-an-envelope schematics, clear, well-drawn and content-rich, as the lead graphics in written documents outlining the way ahead in much greater detail. Comprehension benefited from the graphic, but didn't depend on it. The method underscored his own clarity of thought and purpose quite effectively, I thought, combining the intimacy of someone explaining his plan to you on a napkin one-on-one with the power of electronic mass transmission.

I guess what I'm saying is brilliant communicators are brilliant because they don't let the technology or others' expectations get in the way of their thoughts or their message...

...if you go straight to the slide deck without having done the analytical work up front, yes, odds are whatever you present will be junk: good presentation skills can prevent you degrading whatever clarity of thought you possess, but they can't augment it. I think T.X. Hammes' summary is dead-on: "PowerPoint [used alone] can be highly effective if used purely to convey information — as in a classroom or general background brief. It is particularly good if strong pictures or charts accompany the discussion of the material. But it is poorly suited to be an effective decision aid."