Thursday, February 01, 2007

Trick your ride: customizing the LAVIII

Earlier this month, I noticed an article online by Captain Nicole Meszaros, an Air Force PAffO, that talked about a sky-blue engineering unit being used to cut steel armour for use on the Army's LAVIII:

More than 100 Light Armoured Vehicles (LAV III) had their existing armour improved thanks to the addition of specially cut pieces of steel.

"Based on mission changes, a natural phenomenon, the Army asked us to help manage their changing needs," said Lieutenant-Colonel Frances Allen, Commanding Officer of ATESS [Aerospace and Telecommunications Engineering Support Squadron]." Generally, we support Air Force initiatives, but in this case the Army has turned to the Air Force and the Navy to improve their deployed equipment."

This is the first time ATESS has been involved in such a tri-service initiative. "The focus within the Canadian Forces has been adjusted to a CF-first focus so as the CF prioritizes, we could get involved in such future projects away from those that are strictly Air Force," said LCol Allen.


I didn't post about it, because the subject invites misinterpretation. I'll explain how in a moment.

Today, I've received information from the east coast that some journalists have been sniffing around the shipyards on what is either a similar project or an extension of this one. Which means that information on this project is going to be out there in a couple of days. And I'd bet good money that the way that information is presented is going to be wrong.

When I first saw the Air Force piece, I realized that someone wanted to talk about how one branch of the military is helping another. I suspect that's why the folks who wear the deep blue uniform on the east coast granted interviews on this project as well - to remind everyone that no matter which colour of uniform they wear, the Canadian Forces work together.

The problem, as I saw it at the time, is that neither the Air Force or Navy officers who are promoting their own branch's work understand that inter-element cooperation isn't the story anyone outside the military will read.

They'll read that our LAVIII's didn't have enough armour prior to now. They'll read that maybe - just maybe - a life or a limb could have been spared if they'd had these augmentations earlier.

And that's why I'm addressing the subject now: because this isn't about more armour or not enough armour, it's about the right armour for the job, delivered as soon as possible.

Before we delve into this topic any further, a brief explanation of a dynamic central to the discussion is in order. Putting armour on a vehicle is all about achieving the optimal balance, since the entire concept of mobile protection is plagued by conflicting interests. More armour means more protection, period. But more armour also means more weight, which means less mobility, higher wear, and lower load capacity, just to name a few of the issues. It also often means reduced visibility and more difficulty with maintenance and operation. It means boosted logistical requirements, from transport into theatre to fuel consumption. And so deciding how much protection to put on a fighting vehicle is all about trade-offs.

This is where the LAV platform excels. You see, the platform is built to be customized. Look at the variations on a single basic frame shown at the General Dynamics Land Systems site (click Products, then Armoured Fighting Vehicles, and browse). Beyond the different vehicle variations, there are threat-specific modular armour kits that can be used to upgrade the vehicle for a particular mission.

So while a LAVIII used in Canada for training purposes might be stripped down to the lowest weight possible to minimize operating cost rates per hour or kilometre driven, a U.S. Army Stryker might have an RPG-defeating cage on it for operations in Iraq, where RPG's are a predominant threat.

While I'm obviously not privy to the exact details, since that would be a gross and irresponsible breach of OPSEC, I understand that at least some of the work done by the engineering shops is for upgraded sentry protection. You'll note that soldiers riding inside the vehicles have been well-protected up until now against small-arms fire and explosives (both IED's and traditional mines). But there have been casualties among the sentries, who by the nature of their job are required to expose themselves outside the protection of the main hull.

That the Canadian Forces is tweaking protection quickly based upon specific experience with threats encountered in the field is a success story you won't hear about on the nightly news or read in the paper. Because, unlike previous missions, in Afghanistan the Army "Lessons Learned" teams are actually deploying into the field with front-line soldiers instead of waiting for them to come home before debriefing. This means that the cycle of improvement is much tighter in the CF than ever before - the time between the CF doing things one way (kit, tactics, anything), observing opportunities for improvement, and investigating the best way to improve, and executing the changes is shortening.

The fact that the LAVIII can be modified this way is a testament to the utility of the vehicle. The fact that the Canadian Forces is taking full advantage of that flexibility is a testament to the professionalism of our troops and their leaders.

This is a 'good news' story. We'll see if it gets presented that way to the Canadian public at large.

Update: Congratulations to Chris Lambie of the Halifax Chronicle Herald for running against my own expectations and putting up a good story on this.

I wish we could say the same thing about his colleagues at the CBC. Why go for the real story when you can manufacture controversy?

The light armoured vehicle (LAV) is the army's backbone in Afghanistan, used for patrols and in combat. But its weakness has led to injuries and deaths among Canadian soldiers.
...
In a background briefing with CBC News, army officials confirmed that several soldiers have been killed and an unspecified number have been injured because of the lack of armour plating in the LAV.


Upperdate: For anyone interested in more detail on the intricacies of modern armour development, this article is a good read.

4 Comments:

Blogger WE Speak said...

This comment has been removed by the author.

3:42 a.m., February 02, 2007  
Blogger WE Speak said...

Here's a related video from the Army website talking about FMG Esquimalt manufacturing equipment for the Army. I think you're right, the Halifax interviews were probably done with the same thought in mind.

3:46 a.m., February 02, 2007  
Blogger Babbling Brooks said...

Good find, BBS. Thanks for the augmentation... :)

7:28 a.m., February 02, 2007  
Blogger Ronald J. Jack said...

A superb piece of reporting; well thought out and paced. The fact that you took it one step further and got the daily press to carry some water, will pay dividends as it will prevent some skewing of the story at least. I try to support the Forces with as much content as my mixed format will allow.
http://therunagatesclub.blogspot.com/
Pardon me if I revisit and even "scrape" a little from The Torch.
Cheers Ron in Vancouver

4:02 p.m., February 02, 2007  

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