The Torch: America's war (II)

Further to this post, a Canadian view on future conduct of the campaign:

To win, we must separate the Afghan people from the enemy
Wanted in Afghanistan: surprise and innovation [McChrystal update: e.g. "Pentagon Quietly Sending 1,000 Special Operators to Afghanistan in Strategy Revamp"]

A conventional wisdom has developed among some Canadians who follow developments in Afghanistan: There is no military solution.

This belief is simplistic. It does not take into account the nature of the struggle, the aims of the Taliban and al-Qaeda, or even the meaning of the word “solution” in a counterinsurgency campaign.

And although it is absolutely true that those who aim to win a war such as this one must blend smart “soft” power with “hard” military operations, the enemy must be dominated by armed force and rooted out before co-ordinated soft-power strategies can have a chance to work.

There is no complete military solution to the war in Afghanistan because the enemy is not trying to win the allegiance of most Afghans. Instead, the Taliban and al-Qaeda are trying to destroy those security forces - ours and those of the current government of Afghanistan - who stand in the way of their attempt to force a religious dictatorship on a population that mostly doesn't want it.

This means that, for the most part, the “enemy” in Afghanistan, even in most parts of the country's south and east, isn't the people.

In such situations, there's no great secret about how a counterinsurgency can be won; dozens of military analysts and historians have studied counterinsurgencies dating back to biblical times. The elements that always emerge as necessary factors for success are to separate the people from the enemy, to protect them, to treat them with respect and to help them get on their economic feet.

The first two steps in this process can be accomplished only by military power. And that power must rest on intelligence, destruction of the insurgents' command structure (including their operational leadership), disruption of the insurgents' logistical and communications networks, and systematic elimination of the insurgents' bases of operation inside Afghanistan and disruption operations (by air, if necessary) directed at their bases in Pakistan.

This sort of a military campaign must be pursued with both special operations forces and highly mobile regular troops. It must be conducted in such a fashion that every significant move seizes the initiative, forces the enemy to respond, keeps the enemy off balance. Surprise and innovation are the keys to success.

Repeating the same old thing - the same patrols, the same tactics, operating from the same bases, using the same size units, deployed in the same way - means failure. Most important, the soldiers and their leaders must keep reminding themselves that the enemy is smart, has a very good intelligence system, knows the ground and has proved time and again that he can innovate. They must also remember that any army, regular or guerrilla, must have a command and control system, an intelligence system and a supply system, even if those systems bear little resemblance to those used by a modern technologically advanced army. And they are vulnerable.

The problem isn't that these challenges are unknown; it's that a very divided allied force has largely failed to meet them [emphasis added]. Counterinsurgency can't be done on a part-time basis, with divided leadership and contingents restricted by caveats, and without complete co-ordination and planning in the use of both hard and soft power.

From the split NATO-U.S. command on down, unity of effort driven by a single commander's intent and intelligence-based aggressiveness has been sorely missing in Afghanistan. Even American troops in the eastern part of the country have been content to stay on their side of the valley - as their forebears did in Korea more than 50 years ago - and watch the enemy through binoculars.

There are many signs that the Americans are taking control of the war and shifting tactics [emphasis added]. The United States will soon have double NATO's troops in-country - soldiers who will pursue the war with singleness of purpose and far more aggression.

After 2011, when Canada's combat mission ends in Afghanistan, Ottawa can turn its attention to building schools and digging wells - worthy in themselves - but only under the protection of a U.S. military effort that is pledged to seize back the initiative from the Taliban and al-Qaeda no later than the fall of 2010.

David Bercuson is director of the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary.

U.S. troop buildup in Afghanistan is in full force
Most of the 17,000 combat troops ordered by Obama will be in place by mid-July -- nearly all of them in southern Afghanistan, the heartland of the Taliban insurgency.

And the total US increase since the start of the year will be a lot more than 17,000. Meanwhile, the Canadian approach:

...
The excursion of the general [Brig.-Gen. Jon Vance], who took over the mission in February, yields an insight into an evolving counterinsurgency strategy. He spoke of deploying smaller, more nimble squads, and of gathering better intelligence from Afghans, and of putting local police, soldiers and leaders front and centre...

From mid-April: