DND Seeks "E-Terps"

In MERX-speak:

“This requirement is for the Department of National Defence (DND) to procure a portable Voice Response Translators (VRT). This device provides soldiers the capability to communicate basis (sic.) commands and phrases allowing them to conduct tasks proficient manner in the Contemporary Operating Environment and Future Security Environment.”

Plain language?

What hardware can we buy for CF troops to let them "talk" to Afghans, in military and medical situations, when an interpreter's not around?

Great idea, but what took you so long?

More here.

ANSF realities

Two more from BruceR at Flit; the first should be a must-read for those concerned about the issue:

On ANSF pederasty

Tomorrow's essential Afghan reading, today
...

I [a Brit] grabbed my radio: 'Stevo, what the hell is going on?'

'They've shot the prisoner. The Afghans - they've bloody shot him.'

The western Allies, from a review (full text subscriber only) of D-Day: The Battle for Normandy, by Antony Beevor, in the London Review of Books:

...The Canadians quickly discovered that 187 of their colleagues, taken prisoner, had been executed by the Hitler Jugend division – 30 mutilated Canadian bodies were found by a French civilian. Reports such as these – there were more – travelled like wildfire through the armies and many Allied soldiers, not only Canadians, had as little compunction about killing SS men as they would have had putting down rabid dogs...

...A British army report acknowledged that its troops were in the habit of shooting SS men out of hand, adding baldly: ‘Many of them probably deserve to be shot in any case and know it.’ These practices often extended to the ordinary Wehrmacht soldiery as well, especially since many Allied commanders had told their troops at D-Day that German prisoners would be an embarrassment they could do without, for they would only slow up the essential breakout from the beach-head. Orders might still be given not to kill prisoners, but once it happened there was no fuss and no further questions were asked...

What's Obama to do about Afstan? And what about the Afghans?

Further to this post,

Gates and the generals, and admirals/McChrystal Update

how long will the president's consideration of Afghan strategy, er, drone on

The White House began its review of the Afghan war strategy in earnest Tuesday, with senior administration officials meeting via videoconference with the top commander in Kabul, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, at the start of what could be weeks of debate over whether to send thousands of reinforcements.

White House officials said President Barack Obama will join in the discussions Wednesday, when he is expected to meet with Vice President Joe Biden and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, among other top officials.

The White House unexpectedly decided to review its strategy in Afghanistan after a series of recent setbacks in the war, including allegations of fraud following last month's presidential elections and surging violence throughout the country. It begins just days after Gen. McChrystal submitted his request for as many as 40,000 additional troops to the Pentagon.

Some in the administration, notably Mr. Biden, have argued for a smaller military footprint and a tighter focus on counterterrorism [emphasis added] as the best way forward.

Advocates of such a shift point to the effective use of Predator drone strikes to kill Taliban leaders in Pakistan. Two additional Predators are expected to be shifted soon to the region to patrol the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, according to people familiar with the decision, a move that would bring the total drones in the theater to a number the military has wanted for years.

Mr. Obama gave voice to a possible shift in emphasis on Tuesday when he spoke of "dismantling, disrupting, destroying the al Qaeda network" as the mission, without mentioning the Taliban [emphasis added]. He also said the U.S. is working with the Afghans to bring security to the country...

After years of pressing European allies for additional forces in Afghanistan, Mr. Obama made no mention of having discussed NATO contributions to the war effort after his meeting with Mr. Rasmussen.

But in an address Monday night to the Atlantic Council in Washington, the NATO secretary general said he believed the alliance must send more trainers to Afghanistan quickly or it will be impossible to draw down foreign troops in the future.

What the president said:

...it is absolutely critical that we are successful in dismantling, disrupting, destroying the Al Qaeda network, and that we are effectively working with the Afghan government to provide the security necessary for that country...

Not much there to give Afghans confidence in a real US commitment to the country. Terry Glavin gets to the nub of the matter from the Canadian angle in the National Post (done earlier at his blog, see this post, but worth repeating):

It is heartening to see that the consensus of silence that has united Canada's political leaders on the Afghanistan question is at long last receiving some public notice [more here]. The sound of crickets is pretty well all we've been hearing ever since the January 2008 release of John Manley's sobering, no-nonsense report about Canada's purposes in that faraway country.

The report should have provided the basis for a proper public debate about what Canada's role might be at the 2011 end-date of the 52-nation Afghanistan Compact. Instead, the Conservatives, Liberals and New Democrats have used the opportunity as an excuse to keep schtum about the whole thing...

The problem isn't the resolve of the Afghan people. For Afghans, the big fear isn't the spectre of Taliban militias rolling across the landscape and recapturing Kabul. It's the stink of a looming betrayal that emanates from the language of defeatism abroad in rich countries like Canada. It paralyzes the bravest Afghans --if it's all coming to an end, there's no point in sticking one's neck out. It also fuels the "corruption" that plagues the country -- if this isn't going to last, then you might as well get it while the getting's good.

The language we speak is at least as important to the Afghan cause as bread or roses, or guns or butter. More than all else, what the Afghan people need to hear from us is plain words spoken in clear language:We will not betray you. We will not abandon you. We will not surrender. We will not retreat.

Until Canada's politicians can find it in themselves to speak that kind of language, perhaps they should do us all a favour and just keep their mouths shut. - Terry Glavin is an author, journalist and adjunct professor at the University of British Columbia.

Obama? Betrayal...? See end of this post.

Here's one constraint on our government's being very clear about the future of Canada's military mission,

Afstan mission planning--"Gotcha!"?

but this is just a wee bit encouraging:

CAN Troops to Stay Post-2011?

But, of course, if President Obama effectively downgrades the American commitment it will, to my mind, be politically impossible for any Canadian military mission to continue after 2011.

Update: Bouhammer's Afghan Blog (senior Army National Guard NCO, 16 month tour as an ETT leader in Afghanistan) lays out key statements by major American military and administration figures and concludes:

It is Time to Lead, Follow, or get the hell out of the War

(Via The Thunder Run's very helpful daily round-up.)

Should President Obama turn down any substantial increase in forces, what's a poor Afghan to conclude? The top US military man in country say more forces are needed or mission failure is possible. The president disagrees. What faith is that Afghan to have that the Taliban won't be back sooner or later? Which horse may he lay side bets on, at a minimum? The PR impact of the US decision-making stinks from an Afghan standpoint--even if those forces are sent, it certainly looks like this administration's commitment is increasingly grudging. Not a happy longer-term prospect for those Afghans unless the ANSF really do get built up and really effective pretty soon.

CAN Troops to Stay Post-2011?

This, from the Canadian Press, on the latest bits of information from Defence Minister Peter MacKay, on what Canada's going to be doing post-2011 in Afghanistan:

"The government is considering many options for continuing to help the Afghan population - including security, which would undoubtedly involve an unspecified number of soldiers, said Defence Minister Peter MacKay.

"It involves securing, but working to develop the countryside, working to invest in infrastructure," said MacKay.

"Working to help build capacity, immunizing children, educating children, building democratic institutions - all of which Canada is involved in now."

Much of that development, medical aid and reconstruction work falls to Canada's provincial reconstruction team, or PRT, based in Kandahar.

When specifically asked Tuesday whether Canada's PRT would remain in the volatile region, MacKay would not rule it out.

"We're considering a number of options," MacKay said after being questioned by reporters about the PRT."

Well, according to the motion passed by Parliament in March 2008, does this mean Canadian troops would be somewhere OUTSIDE Kandahar? If so, kinda difficult keeping Canadian troops in the PRT, no?

A bit more here.

2010: Canadian Navy centennial

Pity about that "Royal". A nice website from the Navy:

Sept. 30: "CANADIAN NAVY CENTENNIAL BELL TO BE CAST IN ESQUIMALT"

E-mail from Maritime Forces Pacific:

ESQUIMALT, BC - Media are invited to attend when the Canadian Navy Centennial Bell will be cast at the Fleet Maintenance Facility (FMF) Cape Breton Foundry in HMC Dockyard on Wednesday (Sept.30) at 10 a.m. The bell, that will be presented to the people of Canada at a ceremony on Parliament Hill in Ottawa, May 4, 2010 will be cast from hundreds of artefacts that represent the century of naval served that the bell celebrates.

Rear Admiral Tyrone Pile, Commander Maritime Forces Pacific will be joined by Commodore Jennifer Bennett, Commander of the Naval Reserve to add the last items to the cauldron. As ship's bells have both practical and religious uses and meaning, the short ceremony will include the Naval Prayer and blessing by Padre, the Reverend navy Lt. John Jolliffe. Navy Capt. Martin Adamson Commanding Officer, FMF Cape Breton will describe the casting process...

THE CENTENNIAL BELL PROJECT

The Making of the Centennial Bell: The Canadian Navy Centennial Bell is a 12-inch bell normally installed in a frigate or destroyer. Weighing about 90-pounds, it will be suitably engraved in celebration of the Canadian Naval Centennial. Adding special meaning and history to the bell is that it is cast from material collected and donated to represent the century of naval service that the bell celebrates. Included amongst the artefacts are navigation tools, cap badges, shell casings, uniform buttons, boatswains call, ship's fittings and equipment and even flammable items such as pieces of uniform, letters and photographs that will vaporize and add essence with the metal items. The artefacts represent ships, submarines, naval air and the men and women of the entire period from 1910 to 2010.

The bell will be cast by sailors at the Fleet Maintenance Facility Cape Breton Foundry located in HMC Dockyard at Canadian Forces Base Esquimalt in Victoria, during a ceremony on Sept. 30, 2009. The casting will be polished and engraved by the artisans at the Fleet Maintenance Facility and is will serve as a piece d'art when the Navy celebrates it second century in 2110.

The Bell Rope: The Bell will be decorated with a colourful rope chosen from amongst several created by sailors across Canada in a national competition.

The Bell Book: A book will accompany the Centennial Bell to highlight the history of the bell and list the variety of artefacts it is made from. The book will record the participants at the casting and dedication ceremonies, the winner of the bell rope contest, and a description of the events supported by photographs and art.

Navy Waters Collection: Throughout 2009 Canadian Navy ships and submarines were tasked to collect water from Canada's three oceans - Atlantic, Pacific
and Arctic, as well the Gulf of St. Lawrence, the Great Lakes, and international theatres of operations. The water samples reflect the country's domestic maritime interests and the Navy's international operations. On Battle of Atlantic weekend in Halifax (April 30 - May 1, 2010) there will be a ceremony aboard the Second World War Corvette, HMCS SACKVILLE, when the six water samples, symbolic of the navy's history and missions, will be combined together as a national collection. The combined waters and a video of its collection will be an important aspect of the
dedication ceremony in Ottawa on May 4, 2010.

Centennial Bell Ceremony: On the 100th anniversary of the Naval Service Act, May 4, 2010, the bell will be the center piece of a ceremony in Ottawa to rededicate the Navy to the next 100 years of service to Canada. The bell will be christened with the combined waters and presented to the people of Canada as a gift in perpetuity, and sounded as a promise of loyal service for the next 100 years. The bell with its rope and book will be a permanent reminder to all Canadians that Canada is a Maritime Nation dependant upon the oceans for our national prosperity.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SHIP'S BELL

For centuries, ships' bells have played both a practical and symbolic role in the life of ships and their crews. The ship's bell takes on special historical significance over time. It is prized as one of the ships most valued pieces of original equipment and is often all that remains when a ship is scrapped.

From as early as the 13th century the ship's bell has been used to mark the passage of time. Before chronometers, the bell was used in conjunction with a half-hour glass. The ship's boy would turn the glass as the sand ran out every half hour and ring the ship's bell to show that he had done so. Eight bells indicated the end of a four hour watch...

More here:

"Afghanistats" and "strategery"

Two more excellent posts by BruceR at Flit, read all of them:

1) Afghanistats, 2009 version

We've run the stats on combat KIAs in Afghanistan here several times before. These are the updated versions.

This graph shows the daily rate of coalition combat-related fatalities, on a 12-month moving average basis to exclude seasonal effects. The actual seasonal effect has been increasingly minor, as the recent McChrystal review concluded correctly, "there is no fighting season." What this appears to indicate is an insurgency really appearing in the summer of 2005, and increasing steadily in strength since then. Most recently, in the last 3 months there has been a rapid increase in coalition casualties to an entirely new level. This is largely due to increased-tempo U.S. and British operations in Helmand province, which have taken high casualties. But consistently, every summer has been worse than the last summer, every winter has been worse than the last winter, and we are now approaching 400 coalition combat KIAs per year, and still increasing.

What may be more revealing is when you break those stats out by province and year.

The following charts [emphasis added] show combat KIAs per province, starting in 2006. It indicates where the truly heavy fighting is, and where insurgents are making inroads...

UPDATE: Some inferences one might wish to see as supported by the provincial diagrams above, in no particular order:

**Many provinces, particularly in the Hazara-dominated center and the Uzbek-Tajik-dominated north, remain immune to significant Taliban influence. This is no surprise, given they are overwhelmingly a Pashtun insurgency. The exception is Kunduz.
**Uruzgan province, which has been managed by the Dutch and to a lesser extent the Australians, seems to have consistently resisted any increase in Taliban effectiveness, for whatever reason.
**The border areas around Jalalabad, east of Kabul, are seeing marginally less fighting on the whole than in the past. However, there does seem to be a concerted attempt to increase pressure on the environs of Kabul...

2) Associated strategery musings

Okay, I'm tired of talking about T.E. Lawrence, but he does constitute a common frame of reference of sorts, so I'm going to do it one more time.

Lawrence, you'll recall, had three great insights worth remembering in the Afghan context. He advised both British and Arabs that the large Turk garrison in Medina, which was exerting no effect on anything, could be safely ignored; that the long rail line to Medina could be savagely interdicted, and that the port of Aqaba, if taken, could secure Arab logistics and their participation in the war. Hence, his early strategy of bypassing Medina, attriting the Turks along the railline, and seizing Aqaba.

In the Afghan context, one might ask, where is the insurgents' Medina? Where is their Aqaba? The rail line equivalent, one would argue, is fairly obvious: the long ring road Western and Afghan forces keep free of IEDs and ambushes at great cost every day. But where are they trying to tie us down, and where are they aiming to strike to expand their campaign to a new level of effectiveness?

The maps in the post below, showing the provincial breakdown of coalition fatalities, lend themselves to one interpretation.

That interpretation would be the increasingly compelling theory that the Taliban have little interest in controlling or even fighting in the country's major population centres any time soon, as that would highlight their deficiencies in governance and compromise urban sanctuaries where they can currently organize covertly so long as they remain unarmed and unthreatening (the best place to hide from UAVs being a city).

What they want to dominate militarily are the environs to those urban areas, the area within the sound of artillery fire (15-25km) in any populated direction from the city: close enough so the population feels threatened. In these environs areas, through rapid, destructive attacks on security infrastructure, targetted assassinations both in and outside the city, and intimidation-type information ops at night (and the occasional spectacular attack, like the one on Sarpoza prison), they keep the city population cowed and lacking confidence in their own government and the coalition without ever having to physically enter it or intentionally target the populace. This has already succeeded to a great degree in the Kandahar City environs [emphasis added, see start of this post and Update] ...

Read on, "security sponges".

Touched by tragedy

Long-time contributor and former sailor BBS is dealing with a family crisis right now. All we can do from the other end of an internet connection is offer our thoughts and prayers. But I'm sure I speak for all those who write or read The Torch when I say we're pulling for him and his parents.

Some AfPak constraints, or, the Indian elephant in the room

Ahmed Rashid sets some parameters in the New York Review of Books (do read the whole article):

...
Senior Pakistani officials say they will only be able to adopt a new strategy against the Taliban when India changes its current policy toward Pakistan and Kashmir. In Swat the army succeeded because it made use of Pakistani troops transferred from the Indian border, where 80 percent of the army is based. The key to launching a Pakistani offensive in the tribal areas is for the Americans to help improve Pakistan's relations with New Delhi, so that the army can move more of its troops to the Afghan border.

India is not helping. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said on August 17 that Pakistan-based terrorist groups were plotting more attacks against India. Last November the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Pure) carried out attacks in Mumbai that killed 166 people. Lashkar is a group that is distinct from the Taliban and has been particularly active against targets in India and Kashmir. Indian officials now say that Hafiz Saeed, the Lashkar leader who lives undisturbed in Lahore, was "the brain" behind the Mumbai attack. They demand that he be put on trial.

Pakistan is refusing to clamp down on Lashkar or put Saeed behind bars. Lashkar is the best disciplined, organized, and loyal of the jihadi groups that the ISI has trained and sponsored since the 1980s, and it has always targeted India rather than the Pakistani army. The army will do everything to preserve Lashkar, as long as it believes there is a threat from India. Similarly, Pakistan's continued support for the Afghan Taliban is based on countering India's influence in Afghanistan and on having an alternative force that Pakistan can count on, in case the Americans leave Afghanistan...[More on things Indo-Pak here, here and here.]

...For the first time, polling shows that a majority of Americans do not approve of Obama's handling of Afghanistan. Yet if it is to have any chance of success, the Obama plan for Afghanistan needs a serious long-term commitment—at least for the next three years. Democratic politicians are demanding results before next year's congressional elections, which is neither realistic nor possible. Moreover, the Taliban are quite aware of the Democrats' timetable. With Obama's plan the US will be taking Afghanistan seriously for the first time since 2001; if it is to be successful it will need not only time but international and US support—both open to question...

Across the region many people fear that the US and NATO may start to pull out of Afghanistan during the next twelve months despite their uncompleted mission. That would almost certainly result in the Taliban walking into Kabul. Al-Qaeda would be in a stronger position to launch global terrorist attacks. The Pakistani Taliban would be able to "liberate" large parts of Pakistan. The Taliban's game plan of waiting out the Americans now looks more plausible than ever.

For all these reasons it is important to recognize that if Western forces are to regain the initiative in Afghanistan, they must deal with the situation in Pakistan, which needs to eliminate sanctuaries of both the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban forces within the country. The Pakistani military will bide its time until the Americans are really desperate, and then the army will demand its price from the US—a price to be measured in financial and military support...

Ahmed Rashid, a Pakistani journalist and writer, is the author of Taliban and, most recently, Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia. He writes for The Washington Post, El Mundo, BBC Online, and other newspapers. (October 2009)

While the end of his article deals with Baluchistan, he does not deal with this matter:

US finally to target Quetta Taliban?

More from Mr Rashid at 3) here and here.

Bringing It All Together for WMD Incident Commanders

Interesting tidbit from MERX:

"This Request for Information (RFI) is issued to determine the extent to which there exists or is in-development an integrated CBRN planning, hazard prediction, warning and reporting, decision support, and CBRN incident management capability ....”

Non-techie translation: Who out there has some sort of software that'll bring all sorts of information (both classified and open source) together in one place to help folks in charge predict and manage CBRN incidents more easily?

A bit more here.

Hard words

Speaking of frustration, BGen Vance's words in this story positively reek of it:

As General Jonathan Vance was driving this morning into the village of Deh-e-Bagh in the Dand district, southwest of Kandahar city, the shrapnel from a rocket-propelled grenade hit one of the armoured vehicles in his convoy. And, when Gen. Vance had travelled about a kilometre past the village on the way to another community where the Canadians hope to implement the same secure-and-stay policy they have used in Deh-e-Bagh, an oncoming Canadian military vehicle was ripped by a bomb planted in the road.

A Canadian soldier had to be airlifted to hospital with multiple fractures to his leg. The troops who tended to him said his wounds will heal.

But Gen. Vance was steaming.

“It infuriates me," he said after ordering the convoy to return to Deh-E-Bagh so he could lambaste the local people for not warning the Canadians about the explosive trap set by the Taliban. “A determined person can still get through," the general said of the safety perimeter that the Canadian troops have established at the village. “But we rely on the work of the local population."

Gen. Vance called an immediate meeting, known as a shura, with Deh-E-Bagh's elders. “It's a sad and serious day," he told the 24 Afghan men who turned out to the district centre to hear what the general had to say. “Why is it I feel that I am the only one, with my soldiers, who is taking responsibility for security?" Gen. Vance asked. “I am saddened sometimes on days when I feel I am more concerned about Dand district than you are." [Babbler's emphasis]

That's a tough message, but I think sometimes we forget that Afghanistan is a tough country and that perhaps a tough message or two is needed. I know we've been delivering them for awhile now, but at lower levels. For Vance to say this, especially with a bit of passion in his voice would have been pretty powerful, I'd expect.

Of course, the proof is in the pudding, right? We'll see what - if any - effect this has going forward.

US finally to target Quetta Taliban? Update: More on Paks and QST, ISI

Keep in mind that the Quetta Taliban are those directing the counterinsurgency at Kandahar and Helmand. In April:

US UAV attacks in Baluchistan?

Now:

US threatens to escalate operations inside Pakistan
The US has told Pakistan that it may start launching drone attacks against the Taliban leadership in the city of Quetta in a major escalation of its operations in the country.

Washington has long been frustrated at Islamabad's reluctance to target the Afghan Taliban's ruling council, the Quetta Shura, which is accused of directing large parts of the insurgency across the border in Afghanistan.

State department and intelligence officials delivered the ultimatum to Asif Ali Zardari, Pakistan's president, last week as he visited the US for the United Nations' security council sessions and the G20 economic summit.

Pakistan's government has argued the Quetta Shura, led by Mullah Mohammad Omar, does not harm Pakistan. It has said that dealing with other militants such as those in the Swat valley was a higher priority.

But last week Anne Patterson, America's ambassador to Islamabad, told the Daily Telegraph that the offensive in Swat was not targeting the insurgents posing the greatest danger to Nato forces in Afghanistan...

US unmanned drone strikes have so far been confined to Pakistan's federally administrated tribal border regions where Islamabad holds little sway. But attacks in or around Quetta, in Baluchistan, would strike deep into the Pakistan government's territory and are likely to cause a huge outcry in the country...

From Gen. McChrystal's "Initial Assessment":

...
The major insurgent groups in order of their threat to the mission are: the Quetta Shura Taliban (QST)...

The key geographical objectives of the major insurgent groups are Kandahar City and Khowst Province. The QST has been working to control Kandahar and its approaches for several years and there are indications that their influence over the city and neighboring districts is significant and growing [emphasis added, see start of this post and Update]...

The QST's main efforts focus on the governance line of operations. Security and information operations support these efforts. IsAF's tendency to measure the enemy predominantly by kinetic events masks the true extent of insurgent activity and prevents an accurate assessment of the insurgents' intentions, progress, and level of control of the population. Governance. The QST has a governing structure in Afghanistan under the rubric of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. They appoint shadow governors for most provinces, review their performance, and replace them periodically. They established a body to receive complaints against their own "officials" and to act on them. They install "shari'a" courts to deliver swift and enforced justice in contested and controlled areas. They levy taxes and conscript fighters and laborers. They claim to provide security against a corrupt government, ISAF forces, criminality, and local power brokers. They also claim to protect Afghan and Muslim identity against foreign encroachment. In short, the QST provides major elements of governance and a national and religious narrative...

Update: More on the US, Pakistan, and the Quetta Taliban:

...
As American troops move deeper into southern Afghanistan to fight Taliban insurgents, U.S. officials are expressing new concerns about the role of fugitive Taliban leader Mohammad Omar and his council of lieutenants, who reportedly plan and launch cross-border strikes from safe havens around the southwestern Pakistani city of Quetta.

But U.S. officials acknowledge they know relatively little about the remote and arid Pakistani border region, have no capacity to strike there, and have few windows into the turbulent mix of Pashtun tribal and religious politics that has turned the area into a sanctuary for the Taliban leaders, who are known collectively as the Quetta Shura.

Pakistani officials, in turn, have been accused of allowing the Taliban movement to regroup in the Quetta area, viewing it as a strategic asset rather than a domestic threat, while the army has been heavily focused on curbing violent Islamist extremists in the northwest border region hundreds of miles away...

...although Omar and his associates now keep a low profile and move constantly among villages and mosques in the lawless Pashtun strip between Quetta and the border, Pakistani and foreign experts said Baluchistan has reemerged as a Taliban sanctuary, recruiting ground and command post...

Unlike Pakistani Taliban groups based farther north in the rugged mountains on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, the Quetta Shura is considered uninterested in operations inside Pakistan [emphasis added]. Pakistani officials have discounted the shura's dominance and even its existence. But U.S. military officials describe it as "effective" and a "viable command and control organization."

Critics have long raised doubts about whether Pakistan's security forces are willing to seriously pursue Taliban leaders and activities in Baluchistan...

"From our judgment, there are no Taliban in Baluchistan," said Maj. Gen. Athar Abbas, Pakistan's military spokesman [emphasis added]...

And on the US, Pakistan, and the ISI:

...
The ISI agreed to open its protective curtain slightly for me [David Ignatius, Washington Post] last week. This unusual outreach included a long and animated conversation with Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha, the agency's director general, as well as a detailed briefing from its counterterrorism experts. Under the ground rules, I cannot quote Pasha directly, but I can offer a sense of how his agency looks at key issues -- including the Afghanistan war and the ISI's sometimes prickly relationship with America.

At an operational level, the ISI is a close partner of the CIA. Officers of the two services work together nearly every night on joint operations against al-Qaeda in Pakistan's tribal areas, perhaps the most dangerous region in the world. Information from the ISI has helped the CIA plan its Predator drone attacks, which have killed 14 of the top 20 targets over the past several years...

But on the political level, there is mistrust on both sides. The United States worries that the ISI isn't sharing all it knows about Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan. The Pakistanis, meanwhile, view the United States as an unreliable ally that starts fights it doesn't know how to finish [emphasis added]...

Gates and the generals, and admirals/McChrystal Update

Further to this post,

Obama and the generals, and admirals

I'd have to say the defense secretary seems to be leaning towards supporting Gen. McChrystal's request for considerably more US forces for Afstan. First, CNN's "State of the Union":

From the transcript (second part):

...
GATES: ...I think we have in General McChrystal the very best commanding officer we could possibly have there...

Is Afghanistan a quagmire?

GATES: I don't think so, and I think that, with a general like McChrystal, it won't become one...

...The reality is, failure in Afghanistan would be a huge setback for the United States. Taliban and Al Qaida, as far as they're concerned, defeated one superpower. For them to be seen to defeat a second, I think, would have catastrophic consequences in terms of energizing the extremist movement, Al Qaida recruitment, operations, fundraising, and so on. I think it would be a huge setback for the United States...

GATES: ...I think if the president were to decide to approve additional combat forces, they really probably could not begin to flow until some time in January...

More on "catastrophic consequences" here. Remember that...

...many people in other societies still believe in the "strong horse" ("...when people see a strong horse and a weak horse, by nature, they will like the strong horse...")...

And Secretary Gates on ABC's "This Week with George Stephanopoulos", video here. From the transcript:

...
GATES: ...I talked with -- I had an extensive conversation on the telephone with both General McChrystal and General Petraeus on -- on Wednesday. General McChrystal was very explicit in saying that he thinks this assessment, this review that's going on right now is exactly the right thing to do. He obviously doesn't want it to be open-ended or be a protracted kind of thing...

GATES: ...it's a matter of a few weeks. And people should remember that the debate within the Bush administration on the surge lasted three months, from October to December, 2006...

GATES: ...I haven't even given him General McChrystal's request for resources. I have the -- I -- I'm receiving the -- the report. I'm going to sit on it until I think -- or the president thinks -- it's appropriate to bring that into the discussion of the national security principles...

STEPHANOPOULOS: This first required a surge in Iraq.

GATES: It did require a surge. And that's the issue that we will be looking at over the next several weeks -- the next couple of weeks or so, is do we have the right strategy?..

Gen. McChrystal will be on CBS' "Sixty Minutes" tonight. Tune in.

Update: From an almost transcript:

... "There's an awful lot of bad habits we've got to deprogram."

McChrystal's compulsion for shaking up the system even includes the flags outside his headquarters. They used to fly at half staff every time a soldier was killed. He ordered them raised.

"We had gotten to the point where the flags were at half mast all the time, and I believe that a force that's fighting a war can't spend all it's time looking back at what the costs have been. They've got to look ahead and they've got to have their confidence. And I thought it was important that the flags be up where they belong," McChrystal explained...

Asked if he's confident he'll get what he is asking for, McChrystal said, "I'm confident that I will have an absolute chance to provide my assessment and to make my recommendations."

"But you're already under pressure not to ask for more. I mean, how's that affect what you do?" Martin asked.

"Doesn't affect me at all. And David, I take this extraordinarily seriously. I believe that what I am responsible to do is to give my best assessment," McChrystal said.

Asked how often he talks to the president, McChrystal said, "I've talked to the president since I've been here once on a VTC."

"You talked to him once in 70 days?" Martin asked.

"That's correct," McChrystal replied.

"Can you imagine ever saying to the president of the United States, 'Sir, we just can't do it,'?" Martin asked.

"Yes I can," McChrystal said. "And if I felt that way, the day I feel that way, the day I'm sure I feel that way, I'll tell him that."

Predate: The essential McChrystal here and here.

Air Force heavy lift

As it were:

Cobourg strongman sets world record by pulling 416,000 lb. airplane

TRENTON -- Cobourg strongman Reverend Kevin Fast has set a new Guinness World Record for Heaviest Aircraft Pulled by an Individual [not on the website yet].

The Cobourg resident pulled a 416,299 lb. CC-177 Globemaster 8.8 metres across the tarmac of CFB Trenton, on Thursday, Sept. 17. Rev. Fast broke the previous Australian record set in 1997 by David Huxley, who pulled a 412,000 pound Boeing 747-400. The Globemaster weighs 282,499 lbs. and was carrying about 133,000 lbs. of fuel...

Video here. Via Spotlight on Military News and International Affairs.

Canada and ballistic missile defence

A letter sent to the Globe and Mail and not published:

Lawrence Martin (On many vital issues, the NDP have been on the mark, Sept. 24) highlights President Obama's decision to kill the American missile defence system that was planned for Poland and the Czech Republic. He then uses this example to applaud the NDP for their supposedly far-sighted opposition to missile defence in general.

But there's a problem with this line of reasoning. The president didn't actually kill American plans for missile defence involving Europe. He simply abandoned one system and intends to replace it with another using different types of missiles, initially sea-based but subsequently to be land-based in Europe itself. So missile defence itself is still alive and well.

It's also worth noting something about which most Canadians, including Mr. Martin, seem unaware. NATO itself is fully committed to creating various missile defence systems, one planned to be operational by 2010. It's only in Canada that there appears to be a practically fetishistic opposition to the concept.

References:
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/20/opinion/20gates.html
http://www.nato.int/issues/missile_defence/index.html

Sen. Kenny's committee was on target in 2006:

...
On missile defence, the report criticizes the decision by former prime minister Paul Martin to reject Canadian participation in the program.

"The government should not make the mistake that the last government made by refusing to support the United States in this project."

The report concludes that an effective anti-missile system has the potential to save "hundreds of thousands of Canadian lives."

It dismisses critics who say the system is unworkable, saying there have been recent tests that show promising results.

The report also argues that the system, which is being developed at no cost to Canadians, offers a defence that will act solely as a deterrent and not lead to an arms race in space.

"If there is the tiniest chance that it could [work], why would we turn up our noses at the opportunity to be a partner in this project?"..

Obama and the generals, and admirals

Further to these posts,

Afstan: The McCrystal watch continues

Afstan: British general resigns

from the NY Times:

Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal met secretly in Germany on Friday with Adm. Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to discuss the general’s anticipated request for more troops for the war in Afghanistan, Pentagon officials said.

A Pentagon official said that Admiral Mullen had asked to meet face to face with General McChrystal, the top American and NATO commander in Afghanistan, “so that he could get a better understanding from General McChrystal directly about the resource requirement.”

The official said Admiral Mullen — who won Senate confirmation on Friday for a second term as chairman of the Joint Chiefs — did not deliver any specific message to the general at the meeting. The men met at Ramstein Air Base in Germany, which is roughly halfway between Washington and General McChrystal’s headquarters in Kabul, the Afghan capital.

The meeting occurred as General McChrystal’s formal request for a specific number of troops was expected to arrive at the Pentagon. As of Friday evening it had not, said Geoff Morrell, the Pentagon press secretary, who held out the possibility that the request would be on the desk of Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates by Saturday...

The Pentagon official said that Admiral Mullen and General McChrystal discussed the specific number of troops to be requested at the meeting in Germany.

The official said that after Mr. Gates received the formal request, he would keep the number secret until President Obama decided on a strategy [emphasis added] for Afghanistan that would, in turn, help determine how many troops to send.

“This will reside with him and maybe a couple of others,” Mr. Morrell said of Mr. Gates. “No one will do anything with it until he determines it is the appropriate time — no staff work, no contingencies.” Mr. Morrell declined to say by what method the troop request would be sent to Mr. Gates.

Others at the meeting in Germany included Gen. David H. Petraeus, the commander of American forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, and Adm. James G. Stavridis, NATO’s supreme allied commander [emphasis added].

Next week there are White House meetings on Afghanistan scheduled for Mr. Obama and his top national security advisers, including Mr. Gates and Admiral Mullen. Administration officials say they expect to reach a conclusion on how to proceed — and whether to send additional troops — by the end of October.

Army planners say they would have to start planning now to be able to get troops into the region by spring [emphasis added--ah, the curse of logistics].

On Sunday morning, Mr. Gates is to be interviewed on programs on CNN and ABC [emphasis added, I'd recommend watching - MC]].

While from the Washington Post:

...

The purpose of Friday's meeting was not for McChrystal to deliver the troop request, which Pentagon officials said will go through normal channels in being submitted to Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates by this weekend. However, officials said they expected that Mullen would return to Washington with a copy of the request. Senior military officials said the request will lay out options for Obama, along with the level of anticipated success for each [emphasis added]...

Some spin from the Christian Science Monitor:

US military united on Afghanistan troop request
Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the top US commander in Afghanistan, delivered his request for more troops to top military brass at a secret meeting in Germany this week.

The top US military officers now agree that more troops are needed to win the conflict in Afghanistan, leaving President Obama with potentially less wiggle room in making a decision about deepening America's involvement there.

This week, the Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman, Adm. Mike Mullen, received a troop request in a secret meeting in Germany with Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the top commander in Afghanistan, whose recently submitted strategy review concluded that a larger US force is necessary to win the counterinsurgency there. That request will arrive on Mr. Obama's desk in coming days, bringing debate on the way forward in Afghanistan to a head.

Should Mr. Obama turn down the request from his commander on the ground, he may risk alienating a military that is now publicly in favor of sending more troops. Earlier this week, Gen. David Petraeus voiced support for a troop increase in Afghanistan. General Petraeus oversaw the surge of forces in Iraq in 2007 that is widely held to be a counterinsurgency success story.

In a bid to keep options open, Obama administration officials have stressed that the military's perspective is "just one input" of many. Many of these officials have serious concerns about escalating the conflict in Afghanistan and question whether resourcing a counterinsurgency campaign would serve American interests. Vice President Joe Biden, for one, has backed an alternative counterterrorism strategy that would involve more targeted attacks on Al Qaeda and fewer troops.

Defense Secretary Robert Gates, a key player in the discussions, seems to be on the fence [emphasis added], so far.

Today's debate echoes the one that preceded the surge of forces in Iraq three years ago, but this time there is more consensus within the military, making Obama's situation more difficult in some ways [emphasis added]...

The president can only keep dancing away so long. From the LA Times:

Top general in Afghanistan asks Pentagon for more troops
Gen. Stanley McChrystal's request will not be submitted to the White House for 10 days. Obama officials have asked the military to devise options for pursuing other strategies.

Reporting from Kandahar, Afghanistan, and Washington -- The top general in Afghanistan submitted a request for additional troops to his Pentagon bosses Friday, defense officials said, a recommendation that will be evaluated by a White House that appears to be increasingly skittish about sending reinforcements into the war.

It is unclear how many troops Army Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal requested. Officials have estimated that he needs 20,000 to 40,000 additional combat troops to pursue an expanded counterinsurgency strategy.

McChrystal's request will be reviewed by Pentagon officials and is not likely to be submitted to the White House for at least 10 days [emphasis added], according to a Defense official...

Coming to a real showdown? I do wish we had reporting like the above in this country.

Michael Yon blasts British military public affairs--and the defence secretary

Michael Yon was recently, er, terminated unexpectedly as an embed with the British Army at Helmand. He now takes on the matter, and other issues regarding Afstan, all barrels blazing. He is especially outraged by the answer to a Parliamentary question by Bob Ainsworth, the Secretary of State for Defence, an answer that would appear exceptionally economical with the truth. The whole piece is a must-read, excerpts start with one that should really give Canadians pause to consider:

Bullshit Bob

...This dispatch is being written in downtown Kandahar City and I have not seen a soldier in days. The Taliban is slowing winning this city. There have been many bombings and shootings since I arrived in disguise [more here and here]...

Before going further, it is essential to underscore the importance of the “Media Ops” in the war. When Media Ops fails to help correspondents report from the front, the public misses necessary information to make informed decisions about the war. Many soldiers in the British Media Ops are true professionals who strive constantly to improve at their tasks and work very well with correspondents. Their professionalism and understanding of the larger mission—ultimate victory—provide an invaluable service to the war effort.

But there are a few who should not be in uniform and it takes only one roach leg to spoil a perfect soup...

... I was told that General Petraeus had some time if I wanted to talk.

I asked the good General some tough questions on Afghanistan—the kind that would end discussions with timid people—yet, like normal, he fielded those questions with the candor that I so respect in him and have come to expect. The same has happened to me with the Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, and other top military leaders. Gates and Petraeus will field challenging, difficult questions and will take what you throw at them. Yet the British Media Ops in Afghanistan wants correspondents to submit written questions so they can provide tidy answers. That’s a sad joke and there are many correspondents, including me, who are not laughing...

...They [some British Media Ops personnel] are clueless about the state of the war in Afghanistan. For instance, many of the Media Ops officers will insist that we have enough helicopters in Afghanistan. Those officers are either completely oblivious to the actuality of the situation or lying.

General Petraeus told me straight up that we don’t have enough and that we doubled our helicopters in the last four months and are in the process of fielding “two more fistfuls.” (He did not give specific numbers.) Those BS-filled officers who deny the obvious are, in fact, symptomatic to why we are losing the war.

When I deliver good news, out rolls the red carpet. Bad news, and it’s time to fight again. Only now it’s not Censoring Iraq, it’s Censoring Helmand. And it’s not the U.S. doing it this time, but the British government. The British people are demanding truth and they deserve accountability. They aren’t getting it from Camp Bastion...

Meanwhile, British citizens began demanding answers from their government.

A question was asked and Minister of Defence Bob Ainsworth made public his reply:

Ann Winterton (Congleton, Conservative)

To ask the Secretary of State for Defense for what reasons the journalist Michael Yon is no longer embedded with British armed forces in Afghanistan.

Hansard source (Citation: HC Deb, 14 September 2009, c2121W)

Bob Ainsworth (Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence; Coventry North East, Labour)

Opportunities to embed with Task Force Helmand are in high demand from across the media—national, regional, print, broadcast, specialist and new media. It is not possible to meet all requests and slots must be time-limited to ensure that the opportunities are shared as widely as possible. A normal embed for a national news organisation will last on average around two to three weeks, including time for travel.

Michael Yon had been embedded with British forces on a number of occasions before his recent visit—twice in Iraq in 2007, and once in Afghanistan in 2008. His latest embed had been scheduled to last for two weeks but it was extended to take account of delays to his arrival.

In all, his stay was extended twice and he was embedded for five weeks—much longer than is normally the case, and longer than had been agreed with him before he went. He was facilitated by British forces in a number of locations and given a high level of access both to the operations and to our personnel. At the end of this five-week period Task Force Helmand ended his embed as they were no longer able to support it given their other commitments, including other media visits.

That’s hogwash, Mr. Ainsworth. Pure hogwash!

The fact that the British Minister of Defence (MoD) would go on record with hogwash is again symptomatic of a much larger problem. Mr. Ainsworth is lying to the British public about the helicopter issue in Afghanistan. Mr. Ainsworth tells the British public that British soldiers have enough helicopters. British troops are suffering—even dying—for those lies. Mr. Ainsworth is, in effect, murdering British soldiers by not resourcing them...

Via Thucydides at Milnet.ca.

Seeing as Canadian media at KAF rarely go outside the wire anymore [see Globe and Mail pieces here]--busy on the death watch and all that you know, far too few of them from our cheapskate media organizations--we have to rely on foreign media to get much feel about what it is like in the field, especially combat [e.g. this link and this]. Besides which most members of the Canadian media know so little about things military and are so inexperienced in covering conflict that they could never hope to come close to the reporting of many American and British journalists.

Update: More on Kandahar City:

Taliban ratchet up fear in Kandahar city

Afstan: British general resigns

There appear to be tensions between senior US military figures and top civilians (but Gen. McChrystal has said he has "not considered resigning at all"), and ditto in the UK (see end of this post regarding both countries). Now a British Army general with considerable Afghan experience has thrown in the towel:

Afghan critic quits top Army role
Leading general stands down just months after landing new UK command

A senior commander who led British troops in Afghanistan has resigned after bitter clashes with the Government over the war.

Major-General Andrew Mackay, recently appointed General Officer commanding Scotland, Northern Ireland and Northern England, had spoken of his dismay at the "inadequate support" given to troops and the "lack of clear policy" in the conflict.

General Mackay took part in one of the best known military operations of the war when he led a British, US and Afghan force to recapture the town of Musa Qala from the Taliban. The US had been highly critical when the town was taken over by insurgents after a deal between British authorities and local leaders, and retaking the town was seen as vital in repairing relations with Washington.

According to defence sources, General Mackay, then a brigadier, was astonished when it was suggested by No 10 that the timing of the operation should coincide with a visit by Gordon Brown to Helmand. After the town was retaken General Mackay and his team were said to be disappointed that despite requests from "stabilisation advisers" on the ground, not enough resources were put into place to win the hearts and minds of the people...

The commander was disillusioned with what he considered to be a failure to carry out adequate reconstruction and development in Helmand. He had said privately that British soldiers risking their lives in the conflict had been let down by the Government in carrying out the vital tasks necessary to win over the local population...

General Mackay was commander of Task Force Helmand from October 2007 until April 2008. During that time he signed a "ground truth" memorandum, sent to London, which listed serious problems with his troops' equipment. He pointed out that the engines were faulty in many of the ageing Scimitar reconnaissance tanks ["vehicle", not tank] of the Household Cavalry. Tanks which were supposed to be operational could not get into reverse gear without the engine being restarted. A quarter of the Mastiff armoured vehicles were out of action for weeks and the new Vector vehicles were not being used because "the wheels kept falling off".

The commander angered Downing Street by stating that he was astonished by the lack of clear direction at the top. There was, he said, a sense of "making it up as we go along"...

How not to debate Afstan

One has sympathized with Sen. Colin Kenny's desire that our politicians would discuss the Afghan situation seriously for the benefit of the public. The problem is that they just won't. Brian Platt at The Canada-Afghanistan Blog:

CKNW, Afghanistan, And Our Terrible Politicians

I attended a CKNW radio show today at the Afghan Horsemen restaurant, where they were doing a live town hall discussion on Canada and Afghanistan. Their interviews included a Canadian soldier, an Afghan-Canadian, and a poli-sci prof at SFU--but also Terry Glavin, who closed the show with a magnificent spiel that cut through all the bullshit and left us in speechless awe. The fact that Terry only got three minutes to speak out of a 2-hour show is criminal.

You can hear hour 1 of the show here. Hour 2 here. Yours truly has a short time at the mike at the 32:40 mark of the first hour. But if nothing else, make sure you hear the last five minutes of hour 2.

The bulk of the show was taken up by a panel discussion with three MPs: Andrew Saxton from the Tories, Ujjal Dosanjh from the Liberals, and Peter Julian from the NDP. The segment was mostly useless, with the MPs spouting their talking points and trying to score points off each other. Why on earth would CKNW think that was the best use of the show's time? Beats the hell out of me...

Update:

...
milnews.ca said...

P.S. - You were right about Terry's bit. Here's an .mp3 of his summation as a stand-alone - great radio! Well done TGG

"COMISAF's Initial Assessment ...Commander, United States Forces - Afghanistan/International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan"

AKA the McChrystal report. It isn't about numbers as such, it's about how to do the job. Numbers nonetheless are important. Media and politicians do not seem to have really grasped how revolutionary the assessment is. It is a real "state paper" as the British once described such documents. One does hope President Obama reads the whole thing (though the Annexes can get somewhat tedious); I'm pretty sure defence secretary Gates has.

The assessment is truly an ISAF, not simply American, paper. One does wonder how many senior politicians and government officials in contributing nations will bother to read it. I am pretty confident that Prime Minister Harper and Minister of National Defence MacKay will not.

The ultimate thrust of the assessment is quite simple: in the end, do ISAF members want the Afghan people to win?

Some excerpts that caught my eye:

...

Success is achievable, but it will not be attained simply by trying harder or "doubling down" on the previous strategy. Additional resources are required, but focusing on force or resource requirements misses the point entirely. The key take away from this assessment is the urgent need for a significant change to our strategy and the way that we think and operate.

NATO's International Security Assistance Force (lSAF) requires a new strategy that is credible to, and sustainable by, the Afghans. This new strategy must also be properly resourced and executed through an integrated civilian-military counterinsurgency campaign that earns the support of the Afghan people and provides them with a secure environment.

To execute the strategy, we must grow and improve the effectiveness of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and elevate the importance of governance. We must also prioritize resources to those areas where the population is threatened, gain the initiative from the insurgency, and signal unwavering commitment to see it through to success. Finally, we must redefine the nature of the fight...

...ISAF is a conventional force that is poorly configured for COIN, inexperienced in local languages and culture, and struggling with challenges inherent to coalition warfare. These intrinsic disadvantages are exacerbated by our current operational culture and how we operate.

Pre-occupied with protection of our own forces, we have operated in a manner that distances us -- physically and psychologically -- from the people we seek to protect. In addition, we run the risk of strategic defeat by pursuing tactical wins that cause civilian casualties or unnecessary collateral damage. The insurgents cannot defeat us militarily; but we can defeat ourselves...

Accomplishing this mission requires defeating the insurgency, which this paper defines as a condition where the insurgency no longer threatens the viability of the state.

GIRoA [Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan] must sufficiently control its territory to support regional stability and prevent its use for international terrorism. Accomplishing this mission also requires a better understanding of the nature of the conflict, a change in the basic operational culture, concepts and tactics, and a corresponding change in strategy...

The people of Afghanistan represent many things in this conflict -- an audience, an actor, and a source of leverage - but above all, they are the objective. The population can also be a source of strength and intelligence and provide resistance to the insurgency. Alternatively, they can often change sides and provide tacit or real support to the insurgents. Communities make deliberate choices to resist, support, or allow insurgent influence. The reasons for these choices must be better understood.

GIRoA and ISAF have both failed to focus on this objective [emphasis added]. The weakness of state institutions, malign actions of power-brokers, widespread corruption and abuse of power by various officials, and ISAF's own errors, have given Afghans little reason to support their government. These problems have alienated large segments of the Afghan population. They do not trust GIRoA to provide their essential needs, such as security, justice, and basic services. This crisis of confidence, coupled with a distinct lack of economic and educational opportunity, has created fertile ground for the insurgency.

ISAF's center of gravity is the will and ability to provide for the needs of the population "by, with, and through" the Afghan government. A foreign army alone cannot beat an insurgency; the insurgency in Afghanistan requires an Afghan solution. This is their war and, in the end, ISAF's competency will prove less decisive than GIRoA's; eventual success requires capable Afghan governance capabilities and security forces. While these institutions are still developing, ISAF and the international community must provide substantial assistance to Afghanistan until the Afghan people make the decision to support their government and are capable of providing for their own security...

The major insurgent groups in order of their threat to the mission are: the Quetta Shura Taliban (QST), the Haqqani Network (HQN), and the Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HiG). These groups coordinate activities loosely, often achieving significant unity of purpose and even some unity of effort, but they do not share a formal command-and-control structure. They also do not have a single overarching strategy or campaign plan. Each individual group, however, has a specific strategy, develops annual plans, and allocates resources accordingly. Each group has its own methods of developing and executing these plans and each has adapted over time. Despite the best efforts of GIRoA and ISAF, the insurgents currently have the initiative.

Insurgent Strategy and campaign Design

The insurgents have two primary objectives: controlling the Afghan people and breaking the coalition's will. Their aim is to expel international forces and influences and to supplant GIRoA. At the operational level, the Quetta Shura conducts a formal campaign review each winter, after which Mullah Omar announces his guidance and intent for the coming year ..¿. REDACTION.

The key geographical objectives of the major insurgent groups are Kandahar City and Khowst Province. The QST has been working to control Kandahar and its approaches for several years and there are indications that their influence over the city and neighboring districts is significant and growing [emphasis added, see start of this post and Update]. HQN aims to regain eventually full control of its traditional base in Khowst, Paktia, and Paktika. HQN controls some ofthe key terrain around Khowst and can influence the population in the region. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's HiG maintains militant bases in Nangarhar, Nuristan, and Kunar, as well as Pakistan, but he also sustains political connections through HiG networks and aims to negotiate a major role in a future Taliban government. He does not currently have geographical objectives as is the case with the other groups...

The QST's main efforts focus on the governance line of operations. Security and information operations support these efforts. IsAF's tendency to measure the enemy predominantly by kinetic events masks the true extent of insurgent activity and prevents an accurate assessment of the insurgents' intentions, progress, and level of control of the population.

Governance. The QST has a governing structure in Afghanistan under the rubric of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. They appoint shadow governors for most provinces, review their performance, and replace them periodically. They established a body to receive complaints against their own "officials" and to act on them. They install "shari'a" courts to deliver swift and enforced justice in contested and controlled areas. They levy taxes and conscript fighters and laborers. They claim to provide security against a corrupt government, ISAF forces, criminality, and local power brokers. They also claim to protect Afghan and Muslim identity against foreign encroachment. In short, the QST provides major elements of governance and a national and religious narrative. HQN and HiG co-exist with, but do not necessarily accept, the QST governing framework and have yet to develop competing governing structures.

Information. Major insurgent groups outperform GIRoA and ISAF at information operations [emphasis added]. Information operations drive many insurgent operations as they work to shape the cultural and religious narrative. They have carefully analyzed their audience and target products accordingly. They use their Pashtun identity, physical proximity to the population, and violent intimidation to deliver immediate and enduring messages with which ISAF and GIRoA have been unable to compete. They leverage this advantage by projecting the inevitability of their victory, a key source of their strength.

Security. Major insurgent groups use violence, coercion and intimidation against civilians to control the population. They seek to inflict casualties on ISAF forces to break the will of individual ISAF countries and the coalition as a whole [emphasis added]...

ISAF Shortcomings. Afghan social, political. economic, and cultural affairs are complex and poorly understood. ISAF does not sufficiently appreciate the dynamics in local communities, nor how the insurgency, corruption, incompetent officials, power-brokers, and criminality all combine to affect the Afghan population. A focus by ISAF intelligence on kinetic targeting and a failure to bring together what is known about the political and social realm have hindered IsAF's comprehension of the critical aspects of Afghan society...

...While the existence of safe havens in Pakistan does not guarantee ISAF failure, Afghanistan does require Pakistani cooperation and action against violent militancy, particularly against those groups active in Afghanistan. Nonetheless, the insurgency in Afghanistan is predominantly Afghan [emphasis added]...

ISAF is not adequately executing the basics of COIN doctrine. Thus the first major recommendation of this assessment is to change and focus on that which ISAF has the most control of: ISAF. The coalition must hold itself accountable before it can attempt to do so with others. Specifically, ISAF will focus on two major changes to improve execution of COIN fundamentals and enhance organizational alignment and efficacy:

ISAF will change its operating culture to pursue a counterinsurgency approach that puts the Afghan people first. While the insurgency can afford to lose fighters and leaders, it cannot afford to lose control ofthe population.

ISAF will change the way it does business to improve unity of command within ISAF, seek to improve unity of effort with the international community, and to use resources more effectively [good luck, I must say sadly - MC]...

ISAF personnel must be seen as guests of the Afghan people and their government, not an occupying army. Key personnel in ISAF must receive training in local languages. Tour lengths should be long enough to build continuity and ownership of success [emphasis added, ditto - MC]...

...When ISAF forces travel through even the most secure areas of Afghanistan firmly ensconced in armored vehicles with body armor and turrets manned, they convey a sense of high risk and fear to the population. ISAF cannot expect unarmed Afghans to feel secure before heavily armed ISAF forces do. ISAF cannot succeed if it is unwilling to share risk, at least equally, with the people...

ISAF's subordinate headquarters must stop fighting separate campaigns. Under the existing structure, some components are not effectively organized and multiple headquarters fail to achieve either unity of command or unity of effort...

...The international community must address its own corrupt or counter-productive practices, including reducing the amount of development money that goes toward overhead and intermediaries rather than the Afghan people. A recent OXFAM report indicates that a significant percentage of such funding is diverted. ISAF must pay particular attention to how development projects are contracted and to whom. Too often these projects enrich power-brokers, corrupt officials, or international contractors and serve only limited segments of the population...

In a country as large and complex as Afghanistan, ISAF cannot be strong everywhere. ISAF must focus its full range of civilian and military resources where they will have the greatest effect on the people. This will generally be in those specjflc geographical areas that represent key terrain. For the counterinsurgent, the key terrain is generally where the population lives and works. This is also where the insurgents are typically focused; thus, it is here where the population is threatened by the enemy and that the two sides inevitably meet. ISAF will initially focus on critical high-population areas that are contested or controlled by insurgents, not because the enemy is present, but because it is here that the population is threatened by the insurgency.

The geographical deployment of forces may not be static; ISAF must retain the operational flexibility to adapt to changes in the environment [emphasis added]...

Proper resourcing will be critical. The campaign in Afghanistan has been historically under-resourced and remains so today -ISAF is operating in a culture of poverty. Consequently, ISAF requires more forces...The greater resources will not be sufficient to achieve success, but will enable implementation of the new strategy. Conversely, inadequate resources will likely result in failure. However, without a new strategy, the mission should not be resourced...

HQ ISAF must understand and adapt to the immediacy of the contemporary information environment through the employment of new/social media as well as cell phones, TV, and radio in order to promote interactive communication between Afghan and international audiences. This will involve a significant investment in technical architecture...

The growth of the ANA to 134k needs to be brought forward from December 2011 to October 2010 [emphasis added] in order to create sufficient ANA capacity to create conditions for rapid and sustainable progress in the current campaign; however, there is a requirement for further substantial growth (to an estimated endstrength of 240k) of COIN capable ANA troops in order to increase pressure on the insurgency in aU threatened areas in the country...

The ANP must increase in size in order to provide sufficient police needed to hold areas that have been cleared of insurgents, and to increase the capacity to secure the population. This assessment recommends further growth of the ANP to a total of 160k as soon as practicable with the right mix of capabilities that better satisfies the requirements of a counter-insurgency effort [i.e. not beat cops but gendarmerie]...

On 12 June, 2009 the North Atlantic Council endorsed the creation of NATO Training Mission - Afghanistan (NTM-A) to oversee higher level training for the ANA and for development of the ANP. CSTC-A and NTM-A will co-exist as a single HQ with fully integrated staff sections under a dual-hatted commander [emphasis added, more here]. As approved by the North Atlantic Council, the NTM-A will stand up in mid-September to generate forces and provide institutional training for the ANA and ANP...

Afstan: Canadian Army general being realistic

As I wrote in August (end of this post):

...
It seems we're getting more realism and less spin--though the earlier spin was no doubt necessary for troop morale--and politically.

Now, from the CEFCOM commander:

Rough year ahead in Afghanistan: Canadian commander

View larger image

Lieutenant-General Marc Lessard, the commander of CEFCOM, speaks with reporters at Kandahar Airfield on Thursday, Sept. 24, 2009. (Bill Graveland / THE CANADIAN PRESS)

Coalition forces in Afghanistan face a difficult year in 2010: that's the blunt assessment delivered Thursday by the commander of Canadian soldiers stationed overseas.

"The thing of concern, and I'm not giving you a rosy-coloured outlook, is the level of violence has gone up," Lt.-Gen. Marc Lessard, commander of CEFCOM (Canadian Expeditionary Force Command) said in an interview at Kandahar Airfield.

"Definitely, next year is going to be a tough year. There'll be lots of military operations, no doubt, to degrade and isolate the Taliban -- isolate not just geographically, to push them to areas in the mountains, but to try and isolate them from the population."

Lessard has done a tour of duty in Afghanistan as the commander of Regional Command South, a geographic quadrant of the country which includes the provinces of Nimruz, Helmand, Kandahar, Zabol, Urozgan and Day Kundi.

He said he agrees with the assessment of Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the head of NATO forces in Afghanistan, who believes that the next year will be critical for Afghanistan's future.

"We are making tactical success in Kandahar [but what is that doing, right now, for the populace?], but overall in the country -- and that's what Gen. McChrystal's saying -- is if you're thinking long-term of establishing security, development and governance, we're a long way from establishing that," Lessard said.

Nor can commanders look at the situation exclusively through the prism of military success or failure, he added.

"When we look at it next fall, the fall of 2010, we will ask, `Are the Taliban degraded, yes or no?' But the important thing is, does the ordinary Afghan, man or woman, have confidence in the government of Afghanistan to deliver good enough security, good enough governance?"..

Previous attempts by Canadian troops in this region have initially succeeded but ultimately failed since the Taliban have returned to their old haunts once an operation comes to an end.

The Panjwaii district, a region just southwest of Kandahar city that's widely acknowledged as the birthplace of the Taliban, will continue to be a central focus for coalition troops in 2010 [well, mainly the CF, not the newly arrived Americans, see below], Lessard acknowledged.

Panjwaii, which has borne witness to a great many of Canada's military triumphs and tragedies over the last several years, remains an elusive prize. Coalition forces mount aggressive, successful operations in the area, but thanks to limited resources and personnel, struggle to keep it from falling back into Taliban hands.

"It's going to be a significant operation in Panjwaii (next year)," Lessard said. "So we are going one step at a time but we have to go there. There's a major population there and you gotta deliver."

That effort will involve moving in tandem with Afghan security forces -- permanent units of the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police --who can stay in position and stand their ground to keep insurgents out, he added...

With the arrival of the US Army Stryker brigade combat team at Kandahar, the CF will be able to put most of their effort into Panjwaii and Dand districts rather than being responsible for the whole province--a big improvement in force-to-space (the US Army battalion that is part of the CF's Task Force Kandahar looks like it has Zhari district now).

Interesting that there's no mention of possibly needing more reinforcements (American of course) for the province. And curious that there's no mention even of the American troops now there.

Afstan: The McCrystal watch continues

Further to this post,

...Gen. McChrystal and more about hitting the fan

1) From the Washington Post:

McChrystal Request to Reach Pentagon by End of the Week

Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal's request for more troops and other resources to fund the expanded counterinsurgency campaign he has proposed in Afghanistan will arrive at the Defense Department by the end of this week but will not be immediately turned over to the White House, a Pentagon spokesman said Wednesday.

"It is simply premature to consider additional resources until General McChrystal's assessment has been fully reviewed and discussed by the president and his team," spokesman Geoff Morrell said.

President Obama's national security team is still in the preliminary stages of considering the Aug. 30 assessment by McChrystal, the top U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan, that the war will probably be lost unless more troops are sent there within the next year.

Senior administration officials have said that McChrystal's report is only one "input" the White House is considering in a more wide-ranging review of strategy, including a possible shift from counterinsurgency in Afghanistan toward stepped-up attacks against al-Qaeda in Pakistan and elsewhere [emphasis added].

"There are many other considerations that we have to take into account," Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said on PBS's "NewsHour With Jim Lehrer" on Monday [see 2) here]. "There are other assessments from very expert military analysts who have worked in counterinsurgencies that are the exact opposite" of McChrystal's...

Obama's determination not to be rushed in deciding the way forward has led to frustration within the military, where many argue that McChrystal's request -- and trying to reverse the momentum gained by the Taliban this year -- is necessary and urgent...

Gen. David H. Petraeus, the head of U.S. Central Command, said Wednesday that he and the Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman, Adm. Mike Mullen, had endorsed "General McChrystal's assessment" of the situation in Afghanistan. Petraeus spoke at a counterinsurgency conference at the National Press Club.

Morrell, in a briefing for reporters at the Pentagon, said administration discussions on Afghanistan were awaiting the return of Obama and other senior officials from the U.N. General Assembly meeting in New York and the Group of 20 summit in Pittsburgh this week. "Once he gets back to town," Morrell said of the president, "the discussions will resume in earnest . . . but without rushing it."..

So Gen. Petraeus and Adm. Mullen are on Gen. McChystal's side. Moving towards a real showdown between the brass hats and frock coats? Things might get pretty serious.

2) While in the NY Times:

Top General Denies Rift With Obama on Afghan War [Well, he would wouldn't he?]

The senior American commander in Afghanistan on Wednesday rejected any suggestion that his grim assessment of the war had driven a wedge between the military and the Obama administration, but he warned against taking too long to settle on a final strategy [emphasis added, but see Morrell quote above]...

“A policy debate is warranted,” General McChrystal said in a telephone interview from his headquarters in Kabul.

“We should not have any ambiguities, as a nation or a coalition,” he added. “At the end of the day, we’re putting young people in harm’s way.”

President Obama’s top advisers are rethinking the strategy that Mr. Obama unveiled in March, amid a growing political divide in the United States over how to proceed and confusion among allies that have fighting forces in Afghanistan.

General McChrystal would not address how many additional combat troops he would seek in a request he is preparing to send to the Defense Department...

General McChrystal said he agreed to speak to The New York Times on Wednesday after he became increasingly concerned about reports of rifts between the military and the civilian leadership, and about rumors he was considering resigning if his assessment was not accepted.

The general denied that he had discussed — or even considered — resigning his command, as had been whispered about at the Pentagon, saying that he was committed to carrying out whatever mission Mr. Obama approved.

“I believe success is achievable,” he said. “I can tell you unequivocally that I have not considered resigning at all [emphasis added].”

The general said that after submitting his report, he had been directed to provide more information and respond to several questions, including on perhaps the thorniest issue: the impact of the flawed Afghan presidential election. Allegations of widespread ballot fraud have raised serious doubts about the legitimacy of President Hamid Karzai as a partner in the counterinsurgency campaign...

Even in advance of any decisions by the Obama administration, General McChrystal said he was taking steps to reshape the war effort in Afghanistan, including changing the way coalition forces develop Afghanistan’s own security forces.

While there are a range of opinions in Congress on whether to send more combat troops, there is broad support for making a priority of building up Afghanistan’s army and police force.

General McChrystal said he had ordered allied forces working with Afghan soldiers and police officers to go beyond organizing, training and equipping local forces; American and NATO units now try to build “a full-time partnership” with local forces, expanding the relationship to include living side by side, combining their planning efforts and going out on operations together [emphasis added, how many Euro ISAF members are going to be willing to do that?].

Note that "warning" and compare it with what the frocks are saying. Hmmm. Policy positioning like that by the senior Canadian military (even former CDS Gen. Hillier, and even the British, though they are being fairly vocal--see here, here and here) is simply inconceivable. And I'm a bit wary about the extent it is developing in the US. A real public showdown with serving officers can, it seems to me, only hurt the war effort overall.