Sound familiar?

A hopeless case. Surely it's time to abandon the people to their fate:

...
If intervention was supposed to bring about development, which optimists see as a prelude to civility, it has not been a success...Despite the creation of a small millionaire class, 45 per cent of its inhabitants are below the poverty level (unable to meet basic needs). Around 15 per cent live in extreme poverty, earning less than a euro a day. Most of [X]’s poor are supported by networks of extended family and clan, more important by far than the structures of organised politics or religion...

...Roughly 40 per cent of [X's people] – closer to 50 by a UNDP guesstimate in 2006 – are without work....

No one would have imagined that a...protectorate..., stuffed with NGOs and awash with donor receipts, could perform so badly. [X] has low growth, no inflation, and few signs of an emerging economy. The roads are bad, the water supply is subject to cuts – the water is contaminated in any case...

Every indigenous administration that’s governed since 2001 has been more or less corrupt. Procurement, public tenders and privatisations have been the main sources of temptation, setting local politicians and civil servants on a collision course with wealth opportunities from which they’ve failed to veer away in time. Ministry budgets begin to look baggy at close range, with rich pickings for contractor and client...

Nato will remain indefinitely in [X]...

Guess the country.

No pipeline shoot!

This is the headline the Globe and Mail gives a CP story:

Not in Afghanistan to guard pipelines, MacKay says

No kidding. This is the meat of the story, near the end:

...
The proposed pipeline would run through Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India.

Construction is scheduled to start in 2010, one year before Canada's Afghan mission is expected to end...

Not that CP is any better--the style of its story carries the suggestion, as in the Globe headline, that the minister may be, horrors, covering something up. The first paragraph (note that inaccurate "being built"):

Defence Minister Peter MacKay insisted Wednesday that Canadian troops are not in Afghanistan to guard a new natural gas pipeline being built through the southern part of the country...

What are the odds that: a) the pipeline's construction will not slip; and b) anybody is building parts of it in Kandahar before our scheduled departure from the area?

In any case, what the hell is going on? Is "pipeline" a dirty word (especially one regarding which US companies will only have a subsidiary role) ? And so what if the CF somehow played some role in protecting a pipeline that will benefit Afstan. What total Halliburton-hating hooey. And, by the way, there are no plans for any oil pipeline through Afstan; but who cares about facts when there's a boogey-man (where are you, Dick?) to be feared?

HIP helicopters for Afstan soon/UAVs next year

Babbling's recent post is pretty damn prescient. From MND Mackay today (note six, not eight, CH-47Ds though, and six to eight leased Mi-8s; also note the Poles at end):

Defence Minister Peter MacKay says Canada will lease six to eight Russian-built helicopters to ferry troops around the battlefield in Afghanistan until it can purchase new U.S. aircraft.

He describes it as a stopgap measure. Securing helicopter transport to get soldiers off the bomb-laced roads of Kandahar was a principal condition when Parliament extended the combat mission until 2011.

MacKay says a deal to purchase six CH-47-D Chinooks from the U.S. Army has been worked out, but those heavy-lift aircraft will not arrive until late this year - or early next [late this year would be a speed-up - MC].

In the meantime, MacKay says the Defence Department has worked out a lease involving Russian-made Mi-8 choppers.

He did not say what country - or company - would provide the aircraft, nor was the cost of the lease made public.

Last winter, Poland offered Canada access to two of its Mi-17 battlefield transport helicopters, part of its increased commitment to the Afghan mission.

They were expected to arrive this summer, but military officials have privately expressed concern about availability.

Polish special forces soldiers operating in Kandahar would have first call on the choppers.

Mi-17s have previously been mentioned as the possible Canadian lease (see Babbling's post mentioned about). Actually they would seem to make sense for Kandahar as the aircraft is simply the "hot and high version" of the Mi-8. Also worth noting: the HIP has considerably less capacity than the Chinook (they do not have a "similar capacity" as Mr Mackay said). And who'll crew the HIPs? Mercenaries, gasp?

Video of the minister here.

Earlier in the day on "Canada AM":

An increase to Canada's troop commitment in Afghanistan to 2,700 would represent the additional boots on the ground needed to run aerial drones and six Chinook helicopters, said Defence Minister Peter MacKay...

"And this will also importantly provide the ability to transport troops and equipment inside Afghanistan's Kandahar province, as well as giving that all important eye in the sky perspective for the UAVs."..

I wonder what Air Force personnel think of being called "boots on the ground"! Except the minister didn't say it--it's what the news staff wrote (video here). And no mention of what type of UAV will be going to Afstan.

Update: The US is looking at supplying Mi-17s to the Afghan National Army's Air Corps.

Upperdate: Brits thinking along our lines--note also restrictions on their Lynx helicopters--probably similar to the situation our Griffons would be in should we send them (via milnewstbay):

British forces are so short of helicopters in Afghanistan and Iraq that they are considering renting them from other countries, or even from the controversial US security contractor Blackwater...

The British force in Helmand is supported by eight Chinooks (up to 40 passengers) and four Royal Navy Sea Kings (up to 10). Four Army Air Corps Lynx helicopters are also based in Helmand, but cannot fly between 11am and 11pm in the summer, the traditional fighting season, because of the effect the heat has on their engines. There are also eight Apache gunships, but they cannot carry passengers. When the USSR occupied Afghanistan it had 1,000 helicopters to support and supply its troops...

Uppestdate: A comment at Milnet.ca:

An "aviation regiment" is forming up for deployment with TF 1/09..... flying Griffons & Chinooks....

Here's a story on one part of that Task Force.

Steady Eddie Greenspon's urge for journalistic "glory"

Something I've been saying for some time:

...
Much of the Globe and Mail's recent slanted coverage of Afghanistan can be traced to their editor in chief [Edward Greenspon], who has decided some time ago that Afghanistan was going to be Canada's Vietnam and is not about to let inconvenient facts dissuade him...

The whole comment, by an experienced reservist reporter, makes points Babbling has for some time. As for Steady Eddie Greenspon:

Afstan: more misleading "reporting" from the Globe and Mail

Eddie the Ego: Up to no good?

Afstan: Steady Eddie Greenspon spins--and does not squirm

The second post above deals with Vietnam. I think the last post listed may be relevant to Mr Greenspon's, er, mission.

"The Canada First Defence Strategy of 2008 And The 20 Year Defence Budget"

A helpful anaysis by Brian MacDonald, Senior Defence Analyst, Conference of Defence Associations. I think though it may be rather optimistic to think that "...a de facto bi-partisan agreement between the Liberal and Conservative parties that the cuts in the defence budget during the post-Cold War period had gone too deeply and had to be reversed, and reversed quickly..." will continue (p. 9).

Here's the "Strategy". The thing is, there is no strategy. The substance of the paper is basically all about equipment acquisition, total CF personnel strength, budgets, industrial benefits, etc. There is nothing about what level of strength each service may be expected to commit to various types of missions nor what overall individual service strengths are required. The paper is essentially a status quo document.

Moreover, there is no detailed analysis of the nature of domestic and international missions the CF may be asked to conduct and why the CF need to be configured and equipped as planned to carry out those missions. Nor is there any assessment of the nature of the opponents/threats they are to deal with abroad--or off our coasts or in our airspace. Steady as she goes...

I ask: why do we require the forces composed as outlined?

Redemption? Better journalism?

Brigadier-General Labbe as seen by a colleague:

INJUSTICE PERPETUATED IS JUSTICE DENIED
So much for belief in redemption
By George Petrolekas

Montreal, Quebec (25 July 2008) - Negative coverage of Serge Labbe's promotion to Brigadier-General was certainly inevitable. But it is surprising that a man cannot achieve some sort of redemption in our society whatever good he might do. And thus the coverage of his promotion is noteworthy for the volume of its omissions and inaccuracies both with respect to Somalia and Labbe's career fifteen years on.

Labbe did not command the Airborne Regiment, nor was Labbe ever censured for anything that the Airborne Regiment, and specifically, that one of its commando's did.

Serge Labbe was promoted to BGen on 2 July redressing for many in uniform what had come to be seen as a continuing and unjust condemnation. Whilst Labbe was censured by the Somalia tribunal for supposed acts of omission in command, specifically in not having verified the status of Rules of Engagement and the training in the Geneva Conventions for the force under his command, there was never any censure for acts of commission; nor any mention that these omissions occurred long before Labbe ever had command of the overall mission. And Peter Desbarats on 8 Mar 2007 said "In many respects apart from the one I've mentioned, the rules of engagement issue, he did a pretty good job in Somalia, and he certainly was admired by his soldiers. And there was no doubt about his intelligence." As opposed to his newly found pique.

And therefore, to publish as fact allegations of "champagne for the first dead Somali" are repetitions of hearsay at best, scandal-mongering at worst, especially when the various articles fail to inform the reader that the Commission did not find it pertinent to address these alleged statements in its findings. And further fails to mention that the then Colonel had also passed lie-detector exams specifically addressing those comments, mention of which was conveniently expunged from the official record let alone that the hearings did not permit him to present evidence in his defence. That these elemental principals of justice were denied should make Canadians shudder.

But such off-hand treatment continues by using partisan political commentary to buttress as insignificant or inappropriate Labbe's contributions to Canada's international stature in the years since Somalia.

I first met Serge Labbe in 2003 in NATO where he already was if not the most decorated, then one of the most decorated officers in Canada's service. In NATO circles, as I told the BQ's defence critic on the telephone yesterday, he was considered a "general" by every high ranking member of the alliance who continually sought out his advice and counsel. The list is so long it can barely be listed in this article save to say that every NATO operational commander and every single commander of the ISAF mission in Kabul sought out his opinions and advice. And whilst some articles toss out in an offhand manner his actions in Kosovo, they also fail to mention that Labbe was honoured with a NATO Meritorious Service Medal for not only Kosovo, but also for his actions in Turkey and the former Soviet republics in promoting dialogue between East and West in the partnership for peace. I wrote my superiors in Ottawa in late 2003, mentioning that whilst I understood the fallout of Somalia, I could not understand why he could not be promoted. "Everyone understands how extraordinary he is" I was answered, "but to promote him is just not politically palatable".

In Kabul, as deputy chief of staff to Gen Hillier, he was recognized in word and deed by the Afghans, the United States, the United Kingdom and others. In fact, a US General called him the "most outstanding officer I have seen in over 31 years of service". And such recognition, even extended to the so-called failed mission in Somalia where Labbe was given the United States Presidential Legion of Merit; a rare award indeed.

But notwithstanding the Somalia Commission (which was cut short) it begs the question of redemption. In Canada's apology for the native residential schools, or the acknowledgement of failure in the case of Mahar Arar, there is a tacit admission that maybe the facts of a generation ago may not have been entirely correct and in Labbe's case begs the question; are our futures consigned to be prisoners of our past from which there is no escape? I think most Canadians would agree that they're not.

Finally, the coverage of his promotion does no justice to the inherent nobility of the man as I know him. He has always been driven by three precepts; "my mission, my country, my soldiers". In the six years I've known him, I never heard him once complain or dwell in despondency but rather I saw a man who took extraordinary care of his soldiers, cared for this nation like few others, and accomplished more in this country's name than most. I would without reservation entrust my life to his care, and soldiers I know who have served with him would not hesitate to do so as well. And for soldiers, that speaks volumes far beyond mentions of a stellar career.

In recycling tired decades old comments and in making no effort to speak to those whom Labbe worked for, worked with or commanded ensured that coverage would be inevitably negative. The hidden casualty in all this is objectivity, justice and fairness. Canadians deserve better journalism, and so does Labbe.

Here's Babbling's BBS' initial reaction to the promotion.

More from Col. Petrolekas here, here, here, and here.

Babbler's Update: More perspective on the promotion from another professional source disconnected from Canadian politics entirely:

What is undoubtedly true is that Serge accepted the decisions of the inquiry with a dignity and determination to continue to serve Canada, at whatever level and in whatever role he was permitted, that is quite simply extraordinary given the circumstances that prevailed. Lesser men would have been broken by what happened to him. But his attitude, utter professionalism, loyalty both to his country and to the missions and commanders he subsequently served in NATO were inspirational to servicemen and women from other nations in the Alliance who served with him. The comments on the perceived 'benefits' of his service overseas, financial and other, are particularly unfair; he continuously worked his heart out in the name of his country while never losing the pain of knowing he would not be able to serve again with the Canadian soldiers he so loves.

Whatever the truth of Somalia, the Canadian Army lost the service of an outstanding officer as a result. But Canada's loss was NATO's gain. Serge set standards wherever he served in the Alliance that were a benchmark for excellence that others strived to achieve. It is a pity that ordinary Canadians don't know what a superb ambassador he has been for his country.

It was my privilege to have soldiered with and learned so much from such an outstanding and inspirational soldier and gentleman. I cannot hide my heartfelt pleasure that his service since the events in Somalia has now been recognized. A proud Canadian, he has served his country with quiet pride and dignity - which is all the reward he ever sought!

Life or death in a split second...

...and a lifetime to deal with your decision, right or wrong.

Here's what someone who's been there and done that as a LAV gunner in Kandahar has to say about the incident:

LAV Gunners take these kinds of situations very seriously and they put alot of thought into their convoy SOPs. No one wants to kill kids and innocents - every one of us knows that we will live with the choices that we make on the roads in Kandahar. But the point at which warning shots turn into lethal force is a grey area, with each situation dependant on the circumstances. It's impossible to armchair this one.

In fall 06 I was a LAV gunner involved in a convoy op in southern Afghanistan. At one point a vehicle pulled out and began speeding towards us, and I fired my COAX in accordance with ROEs. When the dust cleared the battle aiming mark on my daysight was sitting right in the middle of some kid's head as I looked through the windshield at him sitting on the driver's lap. The driver decided to stop just in time, and I checked fire just in time. No one was hurt, but I was seriously pissed off. How the frig could the driver have been so stupid? Risking his life and his family's life like that? Doesn't he know that this game is for keeps? If the timing had been a half second off I would have wasted every single ******* person in that car. And I would have had to live with that.

In the early spring 07 another car was speeding towards us. He got the drop on us, and the ****** exploded himself on the side of my LAV. No one was hurt thankfully, aside from the suicide bomber. But what if someone was hurt? Maybe I should have been just a split second quicker on the trigger. frig, I don't know.

These are the decisions made every day by our guys in Afghanistan and it pisses me off to see this crap armchaired. Guys do enough second guessing of their own actions. They don't need john smith on army.ca or on the CBC adding to it.

Maybe the soldier who pulled the trigger screwed up. Maybe he or she didn't. We'll find out in due course as the incident is investigated.

In the meantime, each and every one of us should be glad we weren't the one who had to make that split-second decision.

News of Canadian helos from the Brits

Further to my previous post, in which I mentioned I'd noted a few things that merited further digging...

The excellent British milblog Defence of the Realm recently put up an interesting post about helo support in Afghanistan. It was relevant to this blog because of this particular passage:

It was Sir Nicholas Winterton's turn at defence questions today (link to follow) when he took up the theme of helicopter availability in Afghanistan.

After his anodyne opener (as is the tradition) with a stock answer from secretary of state Des Browne, he got to the meat, asking whether the MoD had "indicated to any of our armed services its willingness to procure light helicopters on their behalf? If so, what response has it had?"

The question was, shall we say, not ill-informed, the rumour machine suggesting that the military had been offered light assault helicopters – and indeed leased Mi-17s – but had turned them down.

Perhaps conscious of this, Browne volunteered an unexpectedly full answer, telling us:

For completeness, the House should know that to support operations in Afghanistan, the Canadians — I spoke to their Defence Minister recently — have bought six additional Chinooks and eight Griffin helicopters. In the interim, while fitting out those Chinooks for deployment, they are leasing eight Mi-17s. Therefore, the number of frames, and consequently the hours available, will be subject to a significant uplift in Afghanistan.

That's a lot of information in just a few sentences. I thought it worth looking into. Unfortunately, from what I can gather, it's not quite as clear-cut as Des Browne makes it out to be.

Let's deal with the out-and-out error: the CF is not buying more Griffons, just upgrading some of the ones we already fly. It is, however, considering sending them to Afghanistan, but that's not final by any stretch of the imagination. I spoke with various people who had conflicting takes on which way the decision-makers are leaning on that one - some said no way in hell are they going, and others advised me not to stick my neck out too far on that opinion. The official line seems to be that INGRESS is intended to make the Griffons more capable for a whole spectrum of operations, especially domestic ones (Olympics, anyone?). Contrary to what we've all been guessing about, it's not specifically for Afghanistan.

We'll see about that. I'd say it's even odds that we'll be seeing Griffons doing CCS (Close Combat Support) or escort duties on heavier choppers by February 2009. Flip a coin on which way it's going to go.

Speaking of heavies, that brings me to Browne's next point: the Chinooks. We are buying eight 47-D's from the U.S., ones that are already flying in Afghanistan. Paint a new flag on the tails, put a new bum in the pilot's seat, and off we go. I asked what we were going to do with those particular whirlybirds once the 47-F's come through, and was told no decision has been made about that. This isn't really news. Well, other than the fact that we're getting close to IOC on these - they should be flying for us come the fall.

It was the supposed lease of "eight Mi-17's" that really got my antennae twitching, though. I thought maybe Browne was referring to the Polish rotary wing help we were offered. Not so, I was told. It turns out that while the Polish help is most welcome, it's more of a symbolic gesture than anything - extra hours on frames that aren't even based at KAF. As I said, welcome, but not super-useful.

So I asked if we're leasing Mi-17's at all. I was told we're not...but that Browne might have simply erred on the designation. There's scuttlebut that we might be leasing Mi-8's. Eight of them, and just for hauling cargo until they can get certified to transport personnel, or so the rumour goes. Starting quite soon, if not already over there on the QT. Why this isn't being announced is beyond me, unless it's not true and I'm simply hearing wishful thinking.

It will be fascinating to see what comes of this helicopter intrigue. I hope it's all true - Griffons, Chinooks, and contracted heavy-lift all working together to support the Afghan operation. The boots on the ground need all the help from above they can get.

Of course, it's frustrating that it took prompting from a UK source to find out about it all.

Update: From private correspondence, a friend has been told that...

...travel orders and other docs have already been signed, sealed and delivered for deployment [date redacted]. Sounds a lot more definite than Fort Confusion seems to think. Perhaps the left hand is sneaking ahead on the right...

My bet is that they’ll go, mainly because the AF has been screaming to get something into K’har other than cargo carriers and the BG’s need the helos desperately. It’s a national disgrace that we haven’t been able to get Chinooks or something out there by now.

Wait, out.

SAT-A to be demilitarized

I read a couple of things this past week that surprised me, so I thought I'd do a bit of digging, and see if I could figure out if what I'd read was true.

First was the news from Dr. Nipa Banerjee that the Strategic Advisory Team - Afghanistan (Op Argus) was getting "demilitarized."

Before SAT could prove if it would leave a permanent imprint on the building of sustainable capacity, its life was cut short as the Canadian government took the decision to replace the DND SAT with a civilian crew. While there is the potential of the inclusion of a few of our CF colleagues in the new team, the strength of a well-disciplined commander-led team will be missed. The value added of a DND team lay in the deployment of disciplined teams, well-trained and supervised to deliver at the operational levels. Based on my personal experience, such high standards are not expected from civil servants or contracted civilian personnel, and even less encouraged. In addition, the reality is that CF personnel, for obvious reasons, are less reticent to being deployed in posts with difficult security. It has not been easy for CIDA to recruit seasoned and experienced staff for Afghanistan. On the other hand, SAT has not had a dearth of experienced officers for placement.

Unfortunately, this decision seems to be in the works: I expect something official in the next few weeks that Op Argus is being scaled back, changed, or completely wound down - likely the latter. However the Powers That Be phrase it, it's doubtful that SAT-A will continue in anything resembling its current format, which is a terrible shame as I see it.

At least one person I spoke with at DND was toeing the party line: the CF has accomplished what it set out to do with the SAT-A, which was to get certain Afghan ministries up to IOC (Initial Operating Capability). Now that the capacity has been built, it's time for the teachers to step back and take the training wheels off. And better for the CF to pull out when they might still be missed, rather than overstaying their welcome. Especially if the diplomatic intrigue and politics is going to start ramping up, and we need people in these roles who can play that new game; our people are technical advisers only, and not well suited to that environment.

Yadda, yadda.

In my opinion, that's pretty much shinola. The bureaucrats at DFAIT and CIDA have had their noses out of joint about this mission from the beginning, and earlier this year they finally had complained long and loud enough that the government and DND - specifically Rick Hillier - caved in. Pick your battles, and all that. So in April of this year, the CDS apparently advised the Ottawa mandarins that DND wouldn't be extending Argus beyond the end of the current rotation (can you imagine that phone call? - "It's all yours, boys!" followed by a loud gulp on the other end of the line).

I can only imagine how pleased the Karzai government was about that development, since they struck this deal with Hillier specifically because they wanted Canadian military help. Oh well, who cares what the Afghan government needs when there's a civil service turf war to fight?

The problem was, at that point the Ottawa mandarins had to stop bitching and actually start planning to put live bodies on the ground to do what the uniformed ones have been up until now. I'm reliably informed that in June, they flinched hard and asked if DND would extend the current deployment or send in a new rotation for a couple of months to tide them over until they could get their poop in a pile. Hillier informed them that that wasn't an option. Translation: you wanted us out of "your" AOR, so we're out - suck it up.

This situation points to one of the key issues favouring the CF in this advisory role in the first place: you have a decent-sized pool of ready and willing talent that you can deploy continuously through multiple rotations. Which other federal government department can say that? How many volunteers with the right skill sets will be forthcoming from DFAIT and CIDA for these roles, on a twelve-month rotation?

I'm only guessing here, but from the silences I received on the other end of the line talking with a couple of people about it, I'd wager many of these positions will be contracted out. They got really silent when I pointed out this job posting with an organization called CANADEM:

Deadline: Aug 08, 2008

CANADEM is seeking a senior education professional to go to Afghanistan and work as the Senior Policy Advisor to the Afghan Ministry of Education. The selected candidate will provide vital support to the Ministry for the overall rehabilitation of the Afghan education system. The terms of reference below are a point of departure for this assignment and will evolve in response to emerging needs and issues.

...

Major Responsibilities include:

1. Build capacity of the Ministry by providing mentoring and coaching support to departmental directors and other key staff members.


2. Provide independent advice for the Minister of Education on key organizational management and strategy development initiatives in the Ministry of Education.


3. Support Identification of research needs (for policy or programming purposes) and oversee partner institutions in undertaking research activities, situation analyses and preparation of research reports and papers.


4. Act as a focal point and liaison for existing education sector donor and NGO coordination group. and help establish practices that enhance other forms of donor coordination.


5. In partnership with other Ministry staff and donor organizations provide technical and programmatic advice to develop a five-year strategic plan for education incorporating key benchmarks of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy.


6. Support the organizational reform process of Public Administrative Reform in the Ministry.


7. Provide strategic guidance and technical assistance to initiatives to educational reform into Government development policies and planning frameworks at national and sub-national levels.


8. Provide strategic guidance and substantive technical assistance to Afghan Government (all levels) and civil society partners by establishing mechanisms for ongoing dialogue for policy dialogues on strategic issues related to education (i.e., leading forums).


9. Provide guidance and technical assistance in the development of capacity-building initiatives for Government and civil society.


10. Support efforts to establish systems and practices for harmonious and functional relations with Government agencies, civil society organizations, research institutions, universities and international organizations working in Afghanistan on educational reform issues.


11. Provide other support to the Minister as required.

Again, I can't profess any specific inside knowledge about this, but that sounds an awful lot like what our SAT-A men and women are doing right now.

So, to recap, it looks increasingly like Canada is going to pull an incredibly helpful mission that is easily staffed by uniformed officers, and replace it with an unwieldy and unproven one that will need to be at least partly filled by contractors because no other department than DND can staff such a mission from its own ranks. All to satisfy an Ottawa turf-war.

How screwed up is that?

A sensible idea

J.L. Granatstein has a couple of good ideas that should be seriously considered by today's MPs. A Defence Caucus is an excellent start to begin removing some of the partisan games that revolve around military issues.

It's time Canada develops a real defence policy
J.L. Granatstein, Special to The Windsor Star
Published: Tuesday, July 29, 2008

What is all too clear is that playing "gotcha" politics with defence has been, and is, a disaster. Canada is fighting a war today and doing it rather well despite 40 years of governmental neglect of defence. But if our parliamentarians could agree on the broad outlines of a defence policy for the next 25 years, and if individual members of Parliament could begin to develop the kind of expertise that they need to comment intelligently on the Canadian Forces' roles, equipment, personnel needs, and budgets, these would be long steps toward national maturity.

His assessment of a few of our defence critics, past and present, will certainly resonate with a few regular Torch readers. No surprises there.

Work to be done

17 weeks to get a pension he is entitled to is certainly an unacceptable wait.

Battle on homefront
Vet struggled to get pension, benefits

KINGSTON -- He has already bravely gone into battle for this country and should never have had to battle against it.

But that's what injured war veteran Petty Officer Robert Leroux, and others, have had to do to get their proper pension and medical care after serving so heroically in Afghanistan.

Their adversary this time wasn't bombs and bullets but red tape and regulations.

Knowing how difficult it is to obtain a family doctor and other medical services in Canada, it's also disturbing to find out that released veterans are on their own in obtaining medical care.

Veteran's Affairs could probably benefit from a visit by the Auditor General in addition to the continued work of the new Veteran's Ombudsman.

The CBC (and other media) and the military

Further to this post, I urge you to read subsequent comments at the Milnet.ca topic.

Changing the JSS--looking abroad

Since the sort of ship the Navy wants can't be designed and built in Canada for what the government is willing to pay (more here from Babbling) we now appear to be looking at foreign vesels "...for ideas such as purchase the plans and build in Canada, design and build (in Canada) something very similar or buy off the shelf."

Sounds like a good idea to me. Maybe we're learning from the Aussies.

"Afghanistan: enduring challenges"

Conference of Defence Associations' media round-up.

KISSing the troops

Gene Simmons pays tribute (via Damian Penny):

The head of the KISS Army shed a tear for Canada's army during a message for our troops.

(Tom Braid/Sun Media)

In town to marshal the Rexall Edmonton Indy, Gene Simmons took a moment after a press conference yesterday to send out a message to Canadian soldiers.

"Hi guys, it's Gene Simmons. We know you're in Afghanistan, we know it's a tough one, I just want you to know from my heart we love you," Simmons said for the camera just before he had to stop and wipe his eyes.

Sgt. Dan Milburn with Army News was in awe that someone of Simmons' stature would be moved to that extent for soldiers not even from his own country.

"I'm speechless. We had to pause the camera so he could have a moment. He's quite a person," said Milburn.

It was the second time that Simmons recognized the two soldiers filming for the military.

A well-known supporter of the American military, Simmons took time out of the press conference that had been focusing on his time in Edmonton and his association with the IndyCar series to salute the soldiers...

"The two powerful and attractive gentleman (pointing to the soldiers) back there are wearing your uniform. They're the ones who make your lives possible."

The room began clapping and when the applause wound down, Simmons continued.

"And they deserve your respect because they have earned it. The rest of us just yack, they walk the walk."

Army News was at the Indy races all three days gathering wishes from the drivers to soldiers overseas or at home.

"It's a big push for them to see someone like Gene Simmons or Paul Tracy. That's pretty cool," said Milburn.

A KISS fan himself, Milburn was impressed Simmons gave the soldiers so much recognition.

"I've never had something like that happen when he told everybody to stand up and clap for the guys in the back of the room in uniform. It was unreal. My year has been made."

Milburn ended the session by asking for Simmons's autograph for his wife, to which Simmons, upon hearing her name, replied, "Oh yeah, I remember her."

Big Cod, big splash

The Economist has run a most unlikely profile of Rick Hillier and his effect upon both the CF and the Canadian electorate. The only disappointment is that the piece is too short to do the topic real justice:

“WE ARE not the public service of Canada,” General Rick Hillier once told journalists. “We are the Canadian Forces and our job is to be able to kill people.” Such a robust view of military power was unusual when General Hillier was appointed chief of the defence staff. In the three years he spent in the post before stepping down earlier this month, he almost succeeded in making it mainstream.

Canadians have often seemed more comfortable with an army that puts up tents and dishes out aid than with one that actually shoots people. The reasons for this are partly historical: the Liberal Party, which ruled Canada for most of the second half of the 20th century, drew much of its support from Quebec, where a dislike of military adventures dates back to the days of the British empire. Defence spending was frozen in the 1970s and 1980s, and then cut back in the 1990s.

Bucking this history, Canada announced in 2005 that it would assume NATO responsibility for providing security in Afghanistan’s Kandahar province and sent 2,000 soldiers to do the job. The task of selling the deployment of these troops fell to the plain-speaking general. The Taliban and Osama bin Laden were, he explained, “detestable murderers and scumbags” who should be hunted down.

To keep public opinion on his side, General Hillier made regular appearances on television accompanied by Afghan veterans, bringing him a level of fame previously unknown for an army officer in Canada...

The point they fail to make - and it's an important one - is that the general's fame wasn't his aim. Rather, it was a necessary evil in order for him to do the job with the level of effectiveness he needed. In other words, Hillier wasn't chasing cameras and microphones for his own sake, but for the sake of his men.

Still, it's interesting to see that the Big Cod has made enough of a splash to get noticed in a big pond.

Thanks for the pointer to Quotulatiousness, home of the former Laziest Reservist in Canada. Or at least, that's how he described himself to me over pints one fine evening a few years back...

The media and the military--and Afstan

Here's an interesting discussion at Milnet.ca.

Meanwhile the Globe and Mail runs a long interview with the senior Canadian with the UN in Afstan:

Chris Alexander will readily admit that Afghanistan is suffering a crisis. He rhymes off the grim indicators that have captured so much attention recently: More insurgents roaming the countryside, more bombings, more violence of all kinds.

But the most influential Canadian in Afghanistan says none of those signs point toward failure. He remains hopeful, and a bit amused that his upbeat view has turned him into a contrarian among the worried observers of the war...

The article, naturally, is not on the front page.

And (further to this post) Mr Alexander, in separate story, is quite undiplomatic:

Pakistan's intelligence agents are likely responsible for recent attacks in Afghanistan, and the international community should support the Afghan government's complaints about such activity, a senior United Nations envoy says.

Chris Alexander, a former Canadian ambassador now serving as a UN deputy special representative in Afghanistan, says he believes the Afghan authorities, who say their neighbour's spy service is sending terrorists across the border...

That does make the front page. Controversial.

Afstan: Pakistan vs. India

Yet another factor complicating things in Afstan. Read this to get a glimpse of the seemingly irreversible mistrust between the two (also note India's large role in Afstan), with plenty of paranoia to go around:

Is India’s Benign Role In Afghanistan Anti-Pakistan?

And guess who many Indians will blame for this:

Deadly Bombs Strike India's West
Attack Came Day After Similar Blasts in South

More CF personnel for Afstan--and more Euros for Kandahar the south?

Seems reasonable for us, but I'd still like to see more Euro details--any combat?

Canada may send more troops [most actually Air Force - MC] to Afghanistan and NATO countries have agreed to bolster their troop numbers in the country's volatile southern region, Foreign Affairs Minister David Emerson says.

During his first-ever trip to Afghanistan, Emerson told reporters at a news conference in Kabul on Saturday that Canada may deploy an additional 200 troops to the conflict-ridden country.

"Canada does have 2,500 troops here in Afghanistan and that number could expand to 2,700 as more equipment arrives," he said.

Emerson appeared to be linking the possible Canadian troop expansion to a new squadron of helicopters and aerial drones [but many personnel for the UAVs are to be supplied by the contractor that wins the lease--see Upperdate here] expected to be in place early next year. The new equipment will require additional pilots, support crews, and mechanics, government officials have previously said.

Emerson noted Canada is "comforted" by NATO's agreement to bolster troops in a region where Canadian troops have seen an increase in Taliban and insurgent attacks.

"We've been talking with our NATO allies and in fact we do now have commitments to increase the number of troops particularly in the Kandahar region," Emerson said. "We're really more comforted that the troop support is being increased in an appropriate way."

The Associated Press reported Saturday the Belgian government announced it will send 55 military engineers to Afghanistan next week [plus four F-16s - MC]. They are expected to lay the groundwork for 100 more NATO troops heading to the country in September to help Dutch forces...

Working with and training the Afghan police

Embedded in the field with them--note their name has been changed from Afghan National Police to Afghan Uniformed Police (I have a few comments in the first excerpt and at the end):

To get an idea of the daunting task facing Canadian troops who are trying to improve the notoriously inept and often corrupt Afghan police forces you need only look at a recent patrol in the Panjwaii district, one of the most violent areas of Afghanistan.

Canadian soldiers and an RCMP officer mentoring the police were ready to head out on foot patrol through the streets of Bazar-i-Panjwaii at the crack of dawn.

However, the Afghan officers never showed up.

The official explanation was the Afghans were suddenly called away by their commander to conduct a raid in Kandahar City, 40 kilometres away. An unofficial reason that leaked out later was they set off for one of the few banks in the city to see if they were getting paid.

Either way, the Canadians were caught by surprise, about to get all dressed up in their battle gear with nowhere to go.

Making a bad situation look even worse was the fact the these Afghan police are supposed to be among the cream of the crop, having recently graduated from a special U.S.-led eight-week training program to improve their skills and weed out corruption.

However, in the bizarre world of policing in Afghanistan, this could actually be evidence that things are improving.

For one, the officers were not out shaking down Afghans for bribes as they have done for years. For another, they are finally getting paid on a semi-regular basis through a bank in Kandahar City instead of being shortchanged by their government officials who routinely skimmed money off the top. That they even have bank accounts is evidence of progress [that is very real progress, given the primitive state of the Afghan banking system--this change has been arranged by Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan--under US Central Command--which does most training of the Afghan army and police; more here from a Canadian Brigadier-General who just spent a year as Deputy Commander of CSTC-A, and on Canadian involvement at the Upperdate here].

And the officers returned to work later that day, heading off on the next patrol as if nothing had happened.

"People forget in Canada whether it's the Afghan National Army or the police or the justice system or anything, we are building things from nothing, absolute nothing," said Capt. Sheldon Maerz, an infantry officer with 3 Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry based in Wainwright, Alta. "This is an incredibly complex task. It's not like you're trying to build a police force in Saskatoon, Sask., with a bunch of people that don't know anything about policing, but at least they can read and write. Here we can't even assume that."..

Realizing that dismal reputation was undermining the Afghan government's credibility with the public, Canadians here have focused on the police this year, copying their existing program widely praised for mentoring the Afghan National Army.

Locals, though, remain skeptical...

As a way to signal that the widely despised ANP is indeed changing, the force is now being called the Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP) [emphasis added] to reflect the new eight-week training program an increasing number of officers are receiving. That might not seem like much by Canadian standards, but it's a quantum leap by Afghanistan's.

Coupled with a boost in pay -- from the equivalent of $75 a month for an untrained officer to $110 for the new upgraded officers [their pay is now roughly equal to army pay - MC] -- the police force in Bazar-i-Panjwaii is slowly becoming more professional.

The progress might look like baby steps in the grand march toward Afghanistan's modernization but they are part of what the chief of the defence staff, Gen. Walt Natynczyk, recently classified as "localized fragile signs of success."..

Consequently, Canadians are training local police in the basics of combat survival so the Afghan officers can stay alive long enough to one day practice the basics of police work.

"Because this is Panjwaii, we have to be realistic," said Capt. Maerz. "This isn't a benign policing environment. ... Someday maybe they could be a police officer in the true sense, but they're not going to be if we just fling them out there and they walk around there like the Keystone Kops and they all get slaughtered."

Adding to the risk to the fledgling police force is the threat from even the officers' allies. On the weekend, nine Afghan police were killed when U.S.-led troops mistook them for militants and called in air strikes during a battle that lasted four hours.

And here's an account by a Canadian mentor with the Police Operational Mentoring Liaison Team (POMLT)--well worth the read. Some key points:

...
Due to the nature of the operating environment in Afghanistan at this time, the ANP is a paramilitary police force and not a civilian police service of the modern Western type, but this situation should change as the security situation improves. At present, however, the ANP faces an insurgency on top of the normal public order and public safety challenges, so the mentoring teams include infantry soldiers, to teach security and fighting skills, as well as military police members to mentor basic police tactics, techniques and procedures...

Living and sharing experiences and hardships with the ANP in close quarters allows us to mentor to a very high standard, and lead by example in all aspects of their professional life. At my PSS [Police Sub-Station], we often ate evening meals with the ANP officers, conversing through hand gestures, our broken Pashto and their broken English, but often relying on the interpreter for more in-depth conversations. Due to the tribal nature of the culture in Afghanistan, many ANP become fiercely loyal to their mentor teams, to the extent that ANP officers have shielded Canadian soldiers with their own bodies during attacks.

Currently, several reform and restructuring initiatives are under way for the ANP in Kandahar Province. One of the most important is an intensive eight-week professional police training course delivered at the Regional Training Centres in Herat and Kandahar City, which more than 400 Afghan policemen have completed to date...

Other info I have learned:

*The US is, as the excerpts suggest, putting a major effort into police training.

*Unlike the Canadians, most NATO forces will not work directly with police in the field.

*The police need to be paramilitary; in 2007 three times as many were killed as army personnel--but the Europeans are nonetheless uncomfortable with the paramilitary role (and have done nowhere near enough in training police).

*Under Afghan law the police are mandated as paramilitary; they are essentially a public order force. Indeed under the law they do not investigate crimes--that is done by a separate judicial police (a European model).

*Unlike the army, most police serve in their own locality.

*Although the army is being massively re-equipped with Western (US in most cases) weapons (M-16s), vehicles (Humvees), etc., the police will stay with Warsaw Pact-type equipment.

"Man, I really stink!"

You know how you hear people complaining "It's not the heat, it's the humidity" when you hit this time of year? Well, in Afghanistan, sometimes it is the frickin' heat.

Just ask those soldiers on patrol in an RG-31 with Seaforth Highlander Sgt S.D. Shannon:

The first part of the trip goes quite well, out to the Zabul border in the west. There’s no sign saying “Welcome to Zabul, The Friendship Province”, just map references and GPS to tell us we’ve crossed the line. Then it’s back east again and, with a quick stop back at camp for fuel — armoured vehicles do not help conserve the world’s oil supply — we’re off once more and heading east to the Helmand border.

...

As we reach the Helmand border, the air-conditioner has all but packed it in; soon it is blowing hot air and the temperature inside must over 60°C. When we stop and my two guys get out to provide vehicle security, a refreshing blast of what seems like a cool, springtime breeze comes in. This never lasts, as the door must close behind them immediately.

Our task complete, we head home using a different routes, part of it cross-country. Now the heat is starting to take its toll on both the RG’s occupants and its equipment. One of the corporals in the back is showing signs of heat exhaustion. We start force-feeding him water with Gatorade crystals and keep him talking.

Things are really bad when we arrive at another ISAF outpost. We pour out of the RG, and my corporal is immediately taken to the Unit Medical Station for treatment. The rest of us take off our PPE, and we look as if we walked through the shower with our clothes on. We are literally drenched with sweat from head to toe. When our garments dry, they are crisp and streaked with white salt.

We stay at this camp longer than we intended to, but after everyone is fully recovered — including my corporal, who got two litres of IV fluids — we’re off on the last leg of our homeward journey. Now that it is late afternoon, and knowing our plight inside the RG, the Patrol Commander decides we should move at the best speed we can make using proper precautions. In Afghanistan, you’re not safe until you have passed through the gates into your own camp. When you get lazy or start to rush, you can get yourself killed.

Help the good guys, hurt the bad guys, and stay safe, Sergeant.

Afstan is complicated

A pretty balanced piece:

After a brazen Taliban attack killed nine U.S. soldiers in a remote outpost in Afghanistan on July 13, Sens. McCain and Obama seemed to start a competition over who would more rapidly surge U.S. military forces to Afghanistan. Sen. Obama's trip to Afghanistan and Iraq has further focused attention on the vast disparity in U.S. resources going to the two wars. Americans should welcome the recognition by both presidential contenders that Afghanistan is central to U.S. and international security. But we should remain wary of promises to apply an Iraq-style surge to Afghanistan.

Afghanistan is even more complex than Iraq, and given complicating factors such as the presence of al-Qaida senior leadership, global narco-trafficking, and Pakistani nuclear weapons, the stakes in Afghanistan are higher. The challenge in Afghanistan differs from that in Iraq in several critical ways that raise questions about what a military surge alone can accomplish.

First, porous borders are a much bigger problem in Afghanistan. While Iraqi and coalition forces face extremist infiltration from Iran and Syria, Afghan, U.S. and NATO forces face a more daunting 1,640-mile ungoverned border with Pakistan. This line is recognized and sparsely defended by government forces but ignored by Taliban and al-Qaida fighters. The result is a battlefield where the enemy has ready sanctuary from which to stage attacks. How will additional U.S. forces fare any better without either a new partnership with Pakistan on border security or rules that allow counterinsurgency efforts reach across the border into Pakistan?

Second, having a real coalition in Afghanistan brings real complications. In contrast to being relatively alone and in charge of the mission in Iraq, in Afghanistan the U.S. is both blessed and cursed by the support of over 40 partner countries and countless NGOs, all with their own strategies. How can a change in American military strategy overcome the command split between NATO and the United States and help coordinate dozens of independent actors?

Third, the extremists in Afghanistan have a different resource base: heroin. Oil fuels some insurgent capabilities in Iraq, but it cannot be compared to the challenge of poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. Over 90 percent of the world's heroin now originates in the most lawless Afghan regions, funding the recruitment, training, and deployment of insurgents and terrorists. But the poppy also supports local economies for average Afghans, putting the coalition in a quandary: tolerate poppy and fund the Taliban or eradicate poppy and drive poor farmers into extremists' arms. How can a military surge help Afghanistan find an effective solution for this poppy paradox?

Finally, although Iraq is ailing and damaged, it has modern infrastructure and a history of central control that is alien to the Afghan and Pakistani tribal areas in which the current conflict is concentrated. How would more U.S. forces helping to extend central government control in Afghanistan be more than a band aid?

None of these questions are answered, but it is clear that a surge in U.S. military capabilities can only be effective if complemented by several other steps. The most important are increased civilian reconstruction capabilities and well-funded, long-term training and mentoring of the Afghan military and police. These are the kind of measures that the U.S. could not muster for the surge in Iraq, and yet they are far more important in Afghanistan where the existing systems are so much weaker.

Many of the steps taken under the leadership of Gen. Petraeus in Iraq do have relevance for Afghanistan. Chief among these would be a focus on population security that involves U.S., NATO and Afghan soldiers and civilians living in district centers and villages with the people under threat from the Taliban and al-Qaida. Second is a willingness to engage with the very tribes and clans that may have been shooting at allied forces the previous day. The coalition will continue to find local allies if our commitment is to be seen as credible and enduring.

Afghanistan is in trouble but far from lost. Less than one-third of the country is really unstable and only about 10 percent of Afghan districts are under significant Taliban sway [emphasis added]. But a surge of all types of effort -- military and civilian -- is needed to turn the tide. The mini-surge of 3,000 marines into the south and east of the country will soon draw to close after some success clearing insurgents, but the U.S. and its allies have little ability to hold and build those areas without capable Afghan security forces and Afghan and international civilians.

U.S. forces should only surge into Afghanistan with a workable and comprehensive strategy and the right civilian counterparts. The renewal of interest in Afghanistan and Pakistan offers a real opportunity. The presidential candidates -- or indeed President Bush in his remaining months -- should craft a strategy that ensures money and personnel for a civilian and military surge tailored to Afghanistan.

Vikram Singh is a fellow at the Center for a New American Security and former Pentagon official.

Warning orders...

...prepare to devour new book coming out shortly...



The picture you're looking at is the dust cover for the much-anticipated new book from Chris Wattie, entitled Contact Charlie: The Canadian Army, The Taliban and The Battle That Saved Afghanistan. It's about Charlie Company of the PPCLI Battle Group that formed the lion's share of Task Force Orion in Kandahar in the first half of 2006.

The book isn't due in stores until mid-October, but I'm really looking forward to its release. Not only do I know quite a few of the players in the story, I know they've read it and liked it. That's endorsement enough for me.

Bisley

All members of the CF are required to shoot straight. But some have learned how to shoot straighter than others - in combat, and in competition too:

The 2008 Canadian Forces Combat Shooting Team (CFCST) is back in Canada after much success at the International Small Arms Competition in Bisley, United Kingdom. This competition is world renowned, bringing together military marksmen from as far away as Australia, New Zealand and the Sultanate of Oman to compete head to head in some of the most competitive military shooting there is.

After four weeks of training, the team won the very first event, the National Rifle Association (NRA) Falling Plates match, putting an end to Oman’s nine year winning streak. By the second day, every CFCST member was ranked in the top fifty shooters among all two hundred and forty competitors. On 10 July, Canadians won third place, ahead of Australia and New Zealand, in the International Service Rifle Championship which encompassed the aggregate of all matches from the previous four days. That very afternoon, they came in second for the Army Rifle Association (ARA) Falling Plates match. On 11 July, the battle for The Methuen Cup saw the Canadian team rank second behind Oman for the international teams and third overall (including the United Kingdom teams). The CFCST generally stayed ahead of Australia and New Zealand throughout the competition, winning gold in the Brinsmead match, silver in the Mappin match and seeing many team members earning bronze bars.

Well done to all the Canadian marksmen who participated.

More on Canadian snipers...

It's inevitable

When you try to slide something by quietly in Ottawa, it generally backfires.

Col. blamed for Somalia failure gets promotion
David Pugliese, Canwest News Service
Published: Friday, July 25, 2008

Canada's military leadership has quietly promoted to general the soldier who led the ill-fated Somalia mission, and who was subsequently found to have failed as a commander.

The military has not publicized the July 2 promotion of Col. Serge Labbe to the rank of brigadier-general. But sources contacted by the Ottawa Citizen about the promotion on Thursday confirmed that the new rank for the officer will be retroactive to the year 2000.

I have no issue with Col. Labbe being promoted, but a seven and a half year backdate stretches the imagination somewhat. That has quite significant pay and pension implications.

The message this sends is that there remains a significant disconnect between the treatment of senior officers and the remainder of military members.

If I'm missing something here, please feel free to enlighten me in the comments.

Navy RSS feeds

I got tired of waiting for the Navy to join the 21st century and add RSS feeds to their sites so I scraped together a couple of feeds.


Marlant News Releases



Marpac News Releases


When I get a chance I'll run these through Yahoo Pipes and create one overall Navy Feed.

I have another feed that I've created to cover all the various News Story categories on the site, but that one is going to need some tweaking before it's ready.

Update: that was easier than I thought. Here is the combined Marlant/Marpac News Release Feed.

Afstan: Your tax dollars at good work

The power of the pen is needed too:

Amid the violence and chaos of the insurgency in southern Afghanistan, a different kind of war is being fought.

It is a conflict without guns or bombs, but with no lack of courage.

Its front lines are private homes scattered throughout Kandahar City, where each day women discreetly gather to learn how to read and write. It is a dangerous undertaking in a country where women are treated as second-class citizens and who, under the Taliban, were often barred from even the most basic education.

To make sure the students keep coming to classes, organizers offer an incentive almost impossible for the women and their hungry families to refuse: food.

Every two months, they each receive four litres of cooking oil, eight kilograms of lentils, a kilogram of salt and a bag of wheat so big it takes two or three women to lift the 50-kilogram weight.

This is a war against hunger and illiteracy. In a country well-known for its misogyny, it is also a subtle war against sexism.

"I'm taking this class to help myself and my family as well," said an 18-year-old woman, Shpozai, who, like many Afghans, goes by one name. "The main reason is to become educated and after that I will become a teacher to teach other students."

Shpozai is not used to speaking with men, especially a male western journalist. Indeed, there is an air of caution in the classroom, where two dozen burka-clad women sit cross-legged on the floor while a teacher writes simple arithmetic lessons on a blackboard propped against the wall. Most of these adult classes are held in private homes, which ensures the gatherings are hidden, informal and inexpensive.

Learning the basics of reading, writing and arithmetic in the local Pashto language could change the lives of Shpozai and her fellow students who hope to one day find work -- something unthinkable under the Taliban and still unusual in this conservative corner of Afghanistan.

But the literacy-for-food program is slowly overcoming local taboos. Families are attracted by the allure of food, but women are discovering the course satisfies an intellectual hunger, too.

"Before these classes it was like being blind," said Khadaaja.

She guesses her age to be "about 40." She is not being coy. Up until recently Khadaaja, like 95 per cent of women in Kandahar, couldn't even make sense of a calendar. "Now, we can read the billboards. We can write and we can read."

Run by UNICEF and the World Food Programme with funding from the Canadian government [emphasis added], the literacy program has almost 11,500 students in Kandahar province, more than twice the number enrolled last year.

About 80 per cent are women who never had a chance to go to school because of poverty and a cultural tradition that does not value an educated woman. Even men are not particularly well educated, with an illiteracy rate approaching 75 per cent in Kandahar City.

Introducing women to the value of education will have a ripple effect in society, says Cindy McAlpine, a development officer with the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) in Kandahar. "Research shows that educating women has the greatest sustainable developmental payoffs for both their immediate families and society at large," said McAlpine...

What do Jack Layton et al. think would happen should the Taliban return? Do they really care or simply dislike Stephen Harper and hate George Bush? But why then do they love Barack Obama? Confusing.

Obamalot

Haroon the Magnificent of the Toronto Star swoons--and then takes Mr Obama's Afghan policy to pieces. So what's to swoon about?

Unless he blows it today in Berlin, Barack Obama has made a successful debut on the world stage. Rarely has an American presidential candidate walked taller abroad than he.

Poised, polished and well-informed, he has marched through the political minefields of Afghanistan, Iraq and Israel. He looked and sounded presidential ("as president, I would ..."; "as commander-in-chief, it'd be my job to ...")...

Almost overnight, his agenda – pull out of Iraq, concentrate on Afghanistan – is accepted wisdom...

His call for an additional 10,000 American troops for Afghanistan, welcomed by Canada and other NATO allies, is not a long-term solution. A military surge is less likely to work there than in Iraq. Just as he is advocating a political solution for Iraq, he needs one for Afghanistan – in fact, more so.

To the West, more troops mean more resources to beat back the Taliban. To many Afghans, however, more Western troops mean more of a foreign military stranglehold on their country and, more immediately, more civilian deaths.

NATO troops, especially Americans, have lately been involved in a steady stream of incidents in which civilians have been killed.

Some of these incidents don't even make it to our media and, when they do, dutifully echo NATO claims that so many "militants" or "Taliban" were killed. Within hours comes word that either all or many of the victims had been civilians. This is fuelling widespread anger and eroding NATO's legitimacy [but see this post; Mr Siddiqui seems not quite up to speed - MC].

Similarly, Obama's position, repeated on this trip, that he'd bomb Pakistani hideouts of the Taliban is a recipe for igniting more anti-Americanism in Pakistan, which, in turn, will make it nearly impossible for the newly elected, still teetering, government to do much...

Bit of a disconnect, eh?

Update: Chris Selley at Macleans' Megapundit blog can spot a swoon too! Take a look also at his dissection of Jim Travesty's paean to Mr Obama and slash at prime minister Harper.

Rebuilding capabilities!

Sweet.

June 26, 2008 - Cold Lake, Alberta

The Air Force will soon have strategic air-to-air refuelling (SAAR) capability View of a modified CC-150 Polaris (or Airbus A-310) refuelling a CF-18 Hornet. The CC-150T (tanker) aircraft is being tested and evaluated at 4 Wing Cold Lake, Alberta for this purpose.

Canada’s Air Force has not had this capability since it retired its fleet of CC-137 (Boeing 707) aircraft in 1997.

Photo : Master Corporal Paul Green

It's complicated...

A better story about Natynczyk's views, and a better editorial position about those views.

It is both refreshing and encouraging to see print journalism that acknowledges complexity and doesn't simply play 'gotcha!' with its subject.

Nanook of the North

The exercise, that is:

The 5,000-ton Canadian warship that fought piracy while cruising around the entire continent of Africa last year may be ill-equipped for its own Arctic waters.

Ice chunks, oil spills and mechanical problems due to cold, slushy water are just some of the worries of HMCS Toronto naval captains when the ship heads to the Arctic next month for a sovereignty mission.

"I don't expect I'll sleep a lot when we're operating in the Arctic," Commander Alex Grant said yesterday while making a presentation to about 20 academics at the Laurier Centre for Military Strategic and Disarmament Studies.

The ship may be loaded with modern missiles, guns and first-rate surveillance technology, but it has no ice capabilities.

So when the 235-member crew goes north, they'll be completely reliant on the Canadian Coast Guard's icebreakers, Grant said.

The naval ship will participate in Operation Nanook, a joint mission starting Aug. 11 with the Canadian navy, army and air forces, in close co-operation with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the Canadian Coast Guard [more details at this link].

"We'll be recording all the information about the activity that's going on around us," said Angus Topshee, executive officer of HMCS Toronto.

The operation will also involve exercises to practise a full-scale search and rescue mission, a fuel spill and a hostage-taking.

"We'll pretend to be a cruise ship and provide a hostage," Topshee said.

He said the operation is part of a broader strategy to establish a larger military presence in Canada's north.

"There is a presence, and it's a presence I think needs to grow."..

Afstan: Slow US surge?

I'd still like to know when that American battalion will be assigned to Regional Command South:

Top Pentagon leaders are expected to recommend soon that Defense Secretary Robert Gates order hundreds of additional U.S. troops to Afghanistan over the next month or so, according to a senior military official.

The units are likely to be small and could include engineers, ordnance disposal troops and other support forces needed to shore up fighting needs and the training of Afghan forces. Officials have not ruled out identifying a larger, brigade-sized unit before the end of the year that could either be shifted to Afghanistan from a planned deployment to Iraq or moved from some other location.

U.S. commanders in Afghanistan have been asking for three combat brigades, or roughly 10,000 more troops, to help quash rising violence there.

The senior official, who requested anonymity because the proposals are not public, said the recommendations have not yet been approved by Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or delivered to Gates. The Joint Chiefs and military commanders are reviewing a number of options.

Last week Gates said he is hoping to address some of those requirements sooner rather than later.

On Wednesday [July 23], Pentagon press secretary Geoff Morrell said that any sizable increase in troop levels in Afghanistan may not come until the new administration takes over next year [emphasis added].

Any decision to shift large units such as combat brigades into Afghanistan after they've been preparing to go to Iraq later this year would take additional training and time, Morrell said...

More (seem to be rather mixed signals):

...
The NATO-led mission in Afghanistan had in many ways failed to recognize that the violence amounted to an insurgency, and it has struggled to get its arms around the fight. Now, recognition is increasing that the violence must be countered with a proper counterinsurgency strategy, but there are no simple solutions. Mounting such a strategy will be challenging in Afghanistan, where the NATO-led mission has a labyrinthine command structure made up of 40 countries with divergent political and military views. In Iraq, one top American commander essentially calls the shots.

Pentagon officials are considering significant changes to the command structure in the NATO-led mission. In the coming weeks, the US four-star general who leads the NATO command, Gen. David McKiernan, will probably be given a new command relationship with US Central Command in Florida [emphasis added]. The aim is to give a more cohesive, if not American, influence on the mission.

"With everything that we face, I think that has to happen. It's going to streamline," says one senior military officer who didn't want his name used because he was commenting on an active proposal.

And in a sign that the United States is still pushing for more control of the troubled southern sector of the country, where the fight against the Taliban and other "anticoalition militias" is the most violent, the US is considering installing a new deputy commander to work under the NATO commanders there [emphasis added--more on command issues here] to help focus efforts. These and other proposed changes to the command structure would help "clean up the spaghetti sandwich," as one retired officer put it...

Still, in the end, more troops will be necessary in Afghanistan, military experts and analysts say. The first of those three brigades, possibly amounting to more than 10,000 troops, could be deployed by the end of this year [emphasis added], defense officials say.

But the senior military officer says no decision on troops will probably be made until October [emphasis added], when Gen. David Petraeus, now the top commander in Iraq, will make a final assessment, before leaving that post, about the number of troops necessary for Iraq. That assessment will largely determine what size force can be deployed to Afghanistan, where there are now about 63,000 troops – about half American...

Greater restrictions on air strikes in Afstan

Will the anti-combat types notice? Our media? And note who's killing most of the civilians:

Dawn was breaking over Afghanistan one day this month as Air Force surveillance planes locked in on a top-ranking insurgent commander as he traveled in secret around Kandahar, the spiritual home of the Taliban.

But as attack aircraft were summoned overhead to strike, according to a recounting of the mission by Air Force commanders, the Taliban leader entered a building. Intelligence specialists scrambled to determine whether civilians were inside. Weapons experts calculated what bomb could destroy the structure with the least damage.

It had taken the American military many days to identify, track and target the senior Taliban officer. But the risk of civilian deaths was deemed too high. Air Force commanders, working with military lawyers, aborted the mission. The Taliban leader escaped.

“We miss the opportunity, but the beauty of what we do is we will get them eventually,” said Lt. Gen. Gary L. North, commander of American and allied air forces in the Middle East and Southwest Asia. “We will continue to track them. Eventually, we will get to the point where we can achieve — within the constraints of which we operate, which by the way the enemy does not operate under — and we will get them.”

In interviews at the air operations headquarters in Southwest Asia, American and allied commanders said that even as orders for air attacks in Afghanistan had increased significantly this year, their ability to strike top insurgent leaders from the air was severely restricted by rules intended to minimize civilian casualties.

The rules that govern dropping bombs and firing missiles are far more restrictive now in Afghanistan than in Iraq, senior Pentagon and military officials say.

The rules of engagement were reviewed and tightened in 2007 after a spate of civilian casualties, under Gen. Dan K. McNeill, then the top NATO commander in Afghanistan, and reviewed and revised again in April, officials said [emphasis added].

American commanders acknowledge that civilian casualties undermine support for the NATO-led stability mission exactly at a time when the Taliban is experiencing a potent resurgence across the country. They say Afghan officials, including President Hamid Karzai, routinely complain about civilian deaths in meetings with Americans.

Military officers also acknowledge that their control over airstrikes is reduced when crews scramble to help NATO contingents under attack.

But air commanders say they have a commitment to support ground forces in trouble. Only last weekend, nine Afghan police officers were killed in western Afghanistan when Afghan and United States forces called in airstrikes on the officers, thinking they were militants.

According to the United Nations, 698 civilians were killed in the first six months of this year, compared with 430 in the same period last year. The United Nations report said nearly two-thirds of the deaths this year resulted from actions by the Taliban and other insurgents [emphasis added]. The remainder were attributed to actions by Afghan government, American or allied forces...

Note also that if fatalities continue at the current rate there will be some 1,400 for the whole year. In Iraq, with a smaller population, there were 27,538 civilian deaths in 2006 according to Iraq Body Count (see "Monthly table")--and even this year, after the surge, there have been 4,875 there.

So, when you see media stories saying civilian deaths in Afstan are up 50%, take the context into consideration.

Update: Nonetheless:

Civilian Airstrike Deaths Probed
78 Have Died in Three Incidents This Month Alone, Afghan Officials Say

Bomb, bomb, bomb--bomb Pakistan!

I wonder what the great majority of Canadians who say they support Barack Obama think about this:

...Well, what I’ve said is that if we had actionable intelligence against high-value Al Qaida targets and the Pakistani government was unwilling to go after those targets, that we should...

And, for the life of me, I cannot figure out why a surge in Iraq was not a Good Thing but a surge in Afstan is a Good Thing:

...I believe U.S. troop levels need to increase. And I for at least a year now have called for two additional brigades, perhaps three...

Afstan: The Globe and Mail manufactures a story undercutting our mission

A front-page (why?) non-story created to suit the paper's agenda:

Canada's once-lofty Afghan goals downgraded, defence files show

The Globe manufactured the story by comparing a February 2007 memo from then-CDS Gen. Hillier's office, obtained under Access to Information, with broad government priorities outlined in June 2008. Though the story purports to discover telling discrepancies between the two, it's really an apples and oranges thing--unless the story is also maintaining that the CDS's office set government policy as a whole. As Alain Pellerin, Colonel (Ret'd), Executive Director, Conference of Defence Associations, writes:

...this February 2007 CDS directive was meant to “provide overarching military strategic guidance for the conduct of operations in Afghanistan” to the Canadian Forces, while the goals set out in the government website links above describe the Canadian government’s stated goals for the mission in Kandahar until 2011. Furthermore, in February 2007 the Canadian Forces had just participated in Operation Medusa in fall 2006, and the Canadian government’s goals in Afghanistan were not fully articulated...

Moreover the story makes much of this:

...
Now, a key focus of the Harper government's strategy in Kandahar is turning over responsibilities for maintaining order and fighting insurgents to local army and police. The Tories said in their June statement of priorities that they plan to "maintain a more secure environment and establish law and order by building the capacity of the Afghan National Army and Police."..

Some "now". That was the announced policy exactly a year ago. No change there. Funny that the story doesn't mention that. What's the blinking big deal? Unless one is trying to give the impression that there has been some great and recent policy shift that shows weaknesses in the mission.

And how come the Globe reporter didn't remember that his paper (along with much of the media) made a huge stink last year about fabricated differences between Gen. Hillier and then-MND O'Connor over how rapidly the Afghans could assume that greater combat role?

Globe really has its guns out
Media create fake war: Hillier et al. vs. O'Connor

The Globe and Mail, committing "journalism" yet again.

Meanwhile, the Toronto Star (!?!) cuts CDS Gen. Natynczyk some slack in an editorial. Go figure.

Update: Yet the next day the Globe publishes a reasonable editorial; really go figure:

CANADA IN AFGHANISTAN
Staying the course with realistic goals

Plus an excellent letter:

Afghan aspirations

ERIC MORSE
July 23, 2008

Toronto -- A question for James Laxer (It's Time To Recalibrate Canada's Mission - July 22): Since when are identical values, legal or otherwise, a prerequisite for military alliance? The Karzai government is no worse (by our standards) than most Afghan regimes have been in terms of values and is considerably better than the Taliban one it replaced.

The assumption that Canada is in Afghanistan to impose our value system on a society that does not accept it is both false and pernicious. We are there to ensure that a political and strategic vacuum is not once again filled by a regime that is a dedicated enemy of the West and its values. Progress in other directions is a necessary part of that process, but it is not the strategic objective.

Values cannot be imposed by any outside force, though local values can be temporarily suppressed by force and fear. As for withdrawing because Afghan values are not ours, if perfection is your only standard, you will be forever disappointed. Indeed, you might as well go home.