Afstan is complicated

A pretty balanced piece:

After a brazen Taliban attack killed nine U.S. soldiers in a remote outpost in Afghanistan on July 13, Sens. McCain and Obama seemed to start a competition over who would more rapidly surge U.S. military forces to Afghanistan. Sen. Obama's trip to Afghanistan and Iraq has further focused attention on the vast disparity in U.S. resources going to the two wars. Americans should welcome the recognition by both presidential contenders that Afghanistan is central to U.S. and international security. But we should remain wary of promises to apply an Iraq-style surge to Afghanistan.

Afghanistan is even more complex than Iraq, and given complicating factors such as the presence of al-Qaida senior leadership, global narco-trafficking, and Pakistani nuclear weapons, the stakes in Afghanistan are higher. The challenge in Afghanistan differs from that in Iraq in several critical ways that raise questions about what a military surge alone can accomplish.

First, porous borders are a much bigger problem in Afghanistan. While Iraqi and coalition forces face extremist infiltration from Iran and Syria, Afghan, U.S. and NATO forces face a more daunting 1,640-mile ungoverned border with Pakistan. This line is recognized and sparsely defended by government forces but ignored by Taliban and al-Qaida fighters. The result is a battlefield where the enemy has ready sanctuary from which to stage attacks. How will additional U.S. forces fare any better without either a new partnership with Pakistan on border security or rules that allow counterinsurgency efforts reach across the border into Pakistan?

Second, having a real coalition in Afghanistan brings real complications. In contrast to being relatively alone and in charge of the mission in Iraq, in Afghanistan the U.S. is both blessed and cursed by the support of over 40 partner countries and countless NGOs, all with their own strategies. How can a change in American military strategy overcome the command split between NATO and the United States and help coordinate dozens of independent actors?

Third, the extremists in Afghanistan have a different resource base: heroin. Oil fuels some insurgent capabilities in Iraq, but it cannot be compared to the challenge of poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. Over 90 percent of the world's heroin now originates in the most lawless Afghan regions, funding the recruitment, training, and deployment of insurgents and terrorists. But the poppy also supports local economies for average Afghans, putting the coalition in a quandary: tolerate poppy and fund the Taliban or eradicate poppy and drive poor farmers into extremists' arms. How can a military surge help Afghanistan find an effective solution for this poppy paradox?

Finally, although Iraq is ailing and damaged, it has modern infrastructure and a history of central control that is alien to the Afghan and Pakistani tribal areas in which the current conflict is concentrated. How would more U.S. forces helping to extend central government control in Afghanistan be more than a band aid?

None of these questions are answered, but it is clear that a surge in U.S. military capabilities can only be effective if complemented by several other steps. The most important are increased civilian reconstruction capabilities and well-funded, long-term training and mentoring of the Afghan military and police. These are the kind of measures that the U.S. could not muster for the surge in Iraq, and yet they are far more important in Afghanistan where the existing systems are so much weaker.

Many of the steps taken under the leadership of Gen. Petraeus in Iraq do have relevance for Afghanistan. Chief among these would be a focus on population security that involves U.S., NATO and Afghan soldiers and civilians living in district centers and villages with the people under threat from the Taliban and al-Qaida. Second is a willingness to engage with the very tribes and clans that may have been shooting at allied forces the previous day. The coalition will continue to find local allies if our commitment is to be seen as credible and enduring.

Afghanistan is in trouble but far from lost. Less than one-third of the country is really unstable and only about 10 percent of Afghan districts are under significant Taliban sway [emphasis added]. But a surge of all types of effort -- military and civilian -- is needed to turn the tide. The mini-surge of 3,000 marines into the south and east of the country will soon draw to close after some success clearing insurgents, but the U.S. and its allies have little ability to hold and build those areas without capable Afghan security forces and Afghan and international civilians.

U.S. forces should only surge into Afghanistan with a workable and comprehensive strategy and the right civilian counterparts. The renewal of interest in Afghanistan and Pakistan offers a real opportunity. The presidential candidates -- or indeed President Bush in his remaining months -- should craft a strategy that ensures money and personnel for a civilian and military surge tailored to Afghanistan.

Vikram Singh is a fellow at the Center for a New American Security and former Pentagon official.