CF in Panjawai: a British view

A story today in The Times (where are Canadian reporters, other than the Globe and Mail's Oliver Moore?):

Beleaguered Canadians face a long wait for the cavalry

Private Terry John Street was on a routine patrol along a lonely stretch of road flanked by green marijuana fields and deserted towns when his armoured vehicle struck a roadside bomb, killing him instantly.

On the same road, less than three hours earlier, two Canadian soldiers and their Afghan interpreter were wounded in another explosion. As their comrades struggled to clear the remains of the vehicle they hit another bomb.

The attacks ended an especially bloody week for Canadian forces who, more than any other nation, have been at the violent forefront of the mission in Afghanistan. Since taking command of the alliance in the unhospitable province of Kandahar in 2006, Canadian soldiers have taken the lead in training Afghan police to assume eventual control over their own security. Without enough troops, and with insufficient airpower and poor intelligence, they have been frustrated by an increasing number of attacks that undermine their exit strategy.

In the week of Private Street’s death, patrols discovered more than 12 improvised explosive devices (IEDs) buried in the road. “It’s anarchy out there. We’re begging for somebody to fire at us so we can shoot back, but this battle has changed,” said Sergeant-Major Gorden Cavanaugh, from the 2nd Battalion of Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry, the principal unit patrolling the volatile region southwest of Kandahar city...

...“Sometimes it feels like every time we make progress, we fall two steps back. The problem is we’re overstretched and a thousand more troops isn’t going to solve that,” one soldier, who has served in the Canadian military for nearly 20 years, said.

The battle group of Private Street patrolled three police substations, where Canadian soldiers mentor Afghan police. The crude, barbed-wire fortresses, made of oil drums and sandbags, were viewed as a victory for Nato forces when they were built deep in the Taleban territory last year. Canadian troops were welcomed by villagers who had long been victimised by Taleban insurgents.

When the current rotation of Canadian soldiers arrived in February “this was pretty much the place to come to get shot at”, Captain Bob Barker, 26, said as he stood on an observation post pockmarked with bullet holes.

The police who were meant to patrol the area were rife with corruption. They lacked proper equipment and basic training, and routinely took bribes to compensate for their lack of pay. The Canadians parachuted in a contingent of civil-order police from Kabul, sent the police on a training course and set out on joint patrols.

The ferocious fighting with the Taleban tapered off. But without enough troops to train police, gather intelligence on foot patrols and guard the road to prevent insurgents from planting explosives, soldiers were sometimes faced with a stark choice.

Private Street died on a road that had been recently cleared of IEDs, which Major Mike Lane describes as “the perfect weapon against us because we can’t be there 100 per cent of the time”. When his convoy was hit, a road that had been secured was revealed to be surprisingly vulnerable, so the mission was “refocused”.

Canadians have been criticised by some American officials for allegedly prioritising peacekeeping over counter-insurgency operations meant to hunt down the Taleban [emphasis added; would be news to the Liberals and NDP].

Canadians counter that without more troops, they are most effective by securing areas where they have the greatest chance of success — in populated areas where locals can be won over and eventually stand up to the Taleban themselves...

When asked how long Afghanistan needed Canadian support before his troops could handle security alone, Corporal Izatullah Hotak, a 22-year-old Afghan commander, said: “We need the Canadians until 2050. The Taleban is supported by foreign countries. We need to be as well.”