Thinking Manley

John Manley's article in the October 2007 issue of Policy Options (pdf) muddles mostly even-handedly through a series of facts and impressions anyone who seriously follows the situation in Afghanistan already knows. It's useful in an 'another voice in the chorus' sort of way, but that's all.

Right up until the end, that is, where he says something that got me thinking:

Roads, bridges and electrification must be enhanced, so that ordinary Afghans can see progress. We love to do what we call “capacity-building”, which is doubtless very important, but invisible to the average villager in an Afghan province.

I'm a big fan of capacity-building: the "teach a man to fish" philosophy resonates strongly with me. Looking solely at the problem of reconstructing a nation, it's the strategy that holds the most promise of long-term success, because it not only invests the population in a solution, but develops within them the skills to maintain that solution once the outside support is removed.

But Manley's remark reminded me that capacity-building requires patience, which is something the Afghans might not have in sufficient quantity to see this effort all the way through. It also reminded me that, while Manley avoids mentioning it, the same problem exists to an even greater degree in Canada: capacity-building is invisible to the average Canadian voter as well.

Unless both the average Afghan and the average Canadian see progress - are convinced things are getting better with their own eyes and ears and mind - then all the capacity-building in the world won't amount to a fart in a hurricane when everyone bails out on the effort for lack of immediate progress.

So I'm wondering if the balance needs to shift. For awhile now, I've been trying to find out what's going on at the KPRT, only to be told that there are a pile of projects on the go, but nothing sexy and complete. We're letting Afghans decide which efforts should take priority, we're using Afghans to do much of the actual work involved, and we're just lending our expertise and our technology where requested. Oh, and don't forget, we're paying for a bunch of it too.

I'm wondering if we need to invest in more quick-impact projects, where we do the work, where we make it big and shiny, and where we point both Afghans and Canadians to it and say "See? We're moving forward!" That doesn't mean we abandon capacity-building, just that we produce a steady stream of visible short-term successes that will allow us the time to make capacity-building work.

I don't have the answers, but I think that's a decent question.