More about Afghan realities
1) Further to this post,
2) Further to this post,
The Taliban are indeed our enemy--but, what, me worry?from the Christian Science Monitor:
NYT reporter David Rohde's kidnapping account: Lessons for Afghanistan policymakers?More on what those policymakers are up to here.
New York Times reporter Davide Rohde has recounted his seven months held captive by a Taliban group in Afghanistan, and argues that convincing Taliban militants to make peace with the US and Kabul will be a tall order...
...Mr. Rohde argues against seeing at least one of the Taliban factions as a nationalist force. He said his seven months held captive by the Haqqani network, a hardline Taliban group that has been involved in suicide bombings in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, convinced him that many fighters and commanders are deeply intertwined with Al Qaeda and its vision of global jihad...
(Here's a breakdown of the different leading Taliban groups.)..
2) Further to this post,
Deh-e Bagh realities (and the Afghan space program)I'd say this is a bit premature:
Canadian Afghan mission turns the corner, report
Canadian troops have finally “passed the tipping point on the road to success” in Kandahar, according to a group of mostly retired military officers who have returned to the southern Afghan province several times over the past few years.
But troubling security deficiencies with the upcoming presidential run-off election, and the behaviour of the police, have not been resolved, said the seven travelling members of the Conference of Defence Associations (CDA).This development might well be kept in mind:
The CDA is the oldest, and one of the most influential advocacy groups, in Canada’s defence community, representing 50 Canadian associations...
The collapse of security in the southeastern Afghan province of Khost is highlighting the difficulties of trying to contain the Taliban.But this also should be kept in mind:
In 2007 and early 2008, troops from the Army's 82nd Airborne Division waged a long, bloody and seemingly successful campaign to push Taliban fighters and their allies from the Haqqani terrorist network out of Khost. Diplomat Richard Holbrooke, now President Barack Obama's special envoy to the region, wrote an op-ed calling it "an American success story."
Today, Khost is one of the most dangerous provinces in Afghanistan. Afghan officials say the number of militant attacks in the province is up at least 31% so far this year...
Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, wrote that regaining control of Khost was the insurgents' second-biggest goal in the country, after capturing the city of Kandahar [emphasis added], the Taliban's spiritual birthplace.
The situation in Khost has given the Taliban space to solidify their alliance with the Haqqani network, an extremist group that has become the Taliban's most important battlefield partner in the war against the U.S. The network maintains close ties to the al Qaeda leadership in Pakistan. U.S. officials fear a Haqqani-controlled Khost would quickly become a new haven for al Qaeda in Afghanistan...
A military official said the U.S. now had roughly 2,400 troops in the province, about double what had been there in previous years. A defense official involved in the current administration debate said he thought the U.S. should ideally deploy at least 1,000 or 2,000 more troops there...
THE AFGHANISTAN SCENARIOEarlier:
Memories of Vietnam Haunt War, but Scarcely Apply
As for an Afghan quagmire...
1 Comments:
It is worth remembering that the best quality Corps in the ANA, 203rd Corps, is responsible for the Khost bowl. Arguably he best quality ANP in Afghanistan are the Khost and Paktia provincial AUP (Afghan Uniformed Police.)
Maybe a better solution than sending more ISAF combat troops is to:
1) overstrenght existing ANP in the area
2) overstrenght existing 203rd ANA battalions (since they are the best in the ANA, it would be great training for new recruits)
3) Add a 6th bn (4th combat manouver bn) to 2nd Brigade, 203rd ANA; boosting the number of combat manouver battalions in 203rd ANA to 12 (4 for each of the three brigades)
4) Overstrenght the Combat support battalion for the 203rd Corps (Corps level), and for each of the three 203rd ANA brigades. Especially the ISR scout components, and combat engineers
5) If necessary add a 7th battalion (5th Combat manouver battalion) to each of 203rd ANA's three combat brigades
6) significantly boost the number of ISAF embedded in 203rd ANA Corps (I would super embed an entire colocated ISAF combat brigade inside 203rd ANA . . . either the French brigade or a US brigade)
Post a Comment
<< Home