The "Afghan face", or, problems operating with and mentoring the ANA

Capt. G.B. Rolston gives a lucid account (highlighting US Marines in Helmand) in an article in SITREP, The Journal of the Royal Canadian Military Institute. A particular difficulty is the effective inability to shift units from quieter parts of the country to reinforce or relieve those in more heavily contested ones:

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Even a one-for-one swap of just a kandak or a brigade between mentor teams on opposite sides of the country would be extremely difficult (I’ve never heard of it actually being done): neither mentoring country involved would likely trust the outcome, if only because Afghan logistical administration is so appallingly poor, with most of the equipment of both kandaks likely “disappearing” during the handover in mentoring. So left unchanged, depending on which corps they were assigned to, some Afghan soldiers in some areas will fight until they die or quit, and some will see very little action for years.

The one clear exception I have ever heard of a mentored ANA kandak operating outside its home area for an extended period is, of course, the Canadian-mentored ANA’s repeated trips into Helmand to help 3rd Brigade out. As in so many things, we’re the exception to the NATO standard on this one...

Capt. G.B. Rolston is a member of 2 Intelligence Company. In September 2008 he deployed to Afghanistan as S2 and Intelligence mentor for the Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT).

Via Spotlight on Military News and International Affairs. More on the Marines here, here and here.