US Marine realities in Helmand

Further to this post, more from BruceR at Flit:

Tomorrow's essential Afghan reading, early

Didn't want to wait until tomorrow. This is spot-on analysis, by Australian MGen (retd.) Jim Molan. I think it goes a long way toward explaining the odd remarks on the lack of ANSF in the NYT (post below):

There is unlikely to be anything like a decisive result out of this operation, even in the local area in the short term. Marine commanders will talk up the operation because that is what you do, and the media, Congress and commentators will project their own hopes and desires onto the operation, and then castigate the Marines for not meeting them.

Molan, Chief of Operations (ChOps) for Multinational Force-Iraq in 2004-05, has some more good stuff below the fold.

With 4000 deployed troops from this 11,000-strong Marine force, relatively few small outposts can be established because each outpost must be big enough to protect itself against initial attack, and must be backed up by quick reaction forces held in reserve. So even if this operation goes perfectly it will merely establish small groups of Marines in a number of local areas. This is the right first step. It then requires the re-establishment of local governance, which will take years, and the replacement of the Marines with Afghan troops and police...

The other side of locating Marines in many local villages to help establish governance, control and protection is that this Marine force is now tied down in that area for (probably) some years to come. If there were adequate coalition troops in Afghanistan this would not be a problem. Given there is only one-third to one-half the number of capable troops needed in Afghanistan, this is a big problem indeed. And the area in which they are tied down is relatively close to the Pakistan border and (it is assumed) to larger numbers of Taliban forces. An even greater reliance on air power may be the result.

Once again, non-military agencies have failed to support the US military’s actions. Talk in the Obama strategy about diplomacy, aid, governance, policing, agriculture and local infrastructure has come to nought because none of the people have been made available by their agencies. The US military might be at war, but the rest of the US and the US government certainly is not. The troops will have to do it all, probably until at least the end of this year. The two constants of modern military operations (Australia included) are the failure of our societies to ever provide enough troops initially, and the failure of our governments to provide non-military (interagency) personnel.

The pitiful lack of Afghan troops involved in KHANJAR (4000 Marines deployed but only about 650 Afghan troops) indicates that the hope of producing an Afghan force numerous and capable enough to take over counterinsurgency from the coalition is five to ten years away. Most of the Marines won't have nearby Afghan troops to provide them with local knowledge.

The nature of this operation indicates that regardless of what Obama’s strategy might say, the US is still in a holding strategy. Petraeus knows this better than anyone and as much said so at recent House Armed Services Committee hearings...

Update: From The Economist (nice map-- note the Danes, see 2) here):

...

The operations have two main aims: to enlarge and merge the patches of territory controlled by NATO along the “green zone” (the ribbon of irrigated land alongside the Helmand river and its tributaries) and to interdict the flow of Taliban fighters and weapons through the desert from Pakistan. The marines are pushing into insurgent-held areas in the districts of Nawa and Garmser (see map). They have also struck deep in the south to build a new base in the town of Khanishin, from where marines will try to disrupt Taliban supply routes. On July 8th the Afghan flag was raised over the town’s 18th-century fort.

General Stanley McChrystal, the overall American commander, said his force may soon assault Marja, a well defended stronghold of the Taliban and drug smugglers. The Taliban said their own response, Operation Foladi Jal (Iron Net), would avoid frontal battles but would teach the marines “a lesson” through roadside bombs and ambushes...

The biggest change under General McChrystal is the instruction to reduce civilian casualties. A “tactical directive”, issued at the start of Thrust of the Sword, says that winning the support of the Afghans overrides all else. “We must avoid the trap of winning tactical victories—but suffering strategic defeats—by causing civilian casualties or excessive damage and thus alienating the people,” he says. This may increase the danger to troops; but the greater risk is to push Afghans into the arms of the Taliban.

A classified passage sets out how air strikes will be curtailed. But on the ground, his officials say, the share of firefights involving close air support has already fallen from 35% to 17% in the past month [emphasis added]. During the summer of 2007 an average of 22 tonnes of ordnance was dropped on Helmand every month...