Tuesday, October 27, 2009

Agincourt... and counterinsurgency?

Further to this post,
Agincourt and...Afstan? Update: And Winston
some observations passed on by a friend in a message to him:
I have Anne Curry's book and it is a very fine work. She is very careful in evaluating numbers and in the end concludes that the English numbered about 1600 men-at-arms and 7600 archers, for a total of 9270. This is based on musters and contracts and records of sick and dead along the way. The French, in Curry's view, numbered about 12,000, 8,000 of whom were men-at-arms, the rest archers (3,000 long-bow, 1,000 cross-bow). She believes that the army was intended to be larger but several key contingents did not arrive in time. In her view, keeping an army of 15,000 to 16,000 in the field was a big accomplishment. Curry is at odds with another recent history that argues for a much larger French force, up to 15,000 men-at-arms but even this estimate is well short of the fantastic numbers quoted by some (60 K). Curry rings true to me. Her analysis of the contracting, mustering, moving, feeding of medieval armies is detailed and convincing. The French were politically in chaos, facing near civil war, and had to leave some good troops to defend Paris in case the Burgundians went off on their own, as was their wont, and tried to capture the capital. Curry's numbers for the French are derived in part from the independent estimates of a number of chroniclers, who were known to be good observers.

The entire campaign is interesting for a number of reasons. The 'reason why' is different from those of the Crecy and Poitiers campaigns which were 'chevauchees' or long-distance raids intended to impose serious economic and physical costs on the foe through looting, burning, and destruction of all kinds. Henry intended his campaign as a manifestation of his kingship, both to convince doubters at home and solidify his reign, and to bolster his claims to Normandy and France. Curry says that while some loot and pillaging went on, there was much less than usual on raids and he did enforce discipline. The story of the execution of a soldier for robbing a church is apparently true. Another interesting feature is the very high mortality rate among the French, higher than the average for medieval pitched battles, which were quite sanguinary as a rule. More noble captives were deliberately killed by the English, probably because they feared another French onslaught and that the captives - still in armour - would turn on them since there were enough to cause real trouble. Also the packed battleground. All the chronicles attest to very high casualty rates and the number of nobles known to be killed was impressive, even dukes, who normally were valuable. The French casualty lists were certainly large enough to stun European opinion.

Curry concludes that the French lost because they did not work out a good plan, were impetuous and that the archers really did break the cavalry charges. Nothing unusual in her interpretation. She considers the battle to be one of the 'decisive battles of the western world' although it is not usually numbered among them, mainly for the political aftermath in both kingdoms. From the day after the French have tried to rationalise the catastrophe, suggesting larger numbers of English and hurling charges of cowardice and treason against one or other faction of the nobility. Overall, I think Curry is close to the mark in her interpretations. (It is now in a PB.)

In no way can the Agincourt campaign be interpreted as a counter-insurgency and it has no lessons in that line [emphasis added]. The idea that the Burgundians were the 'local forces' for the English is just crazy since the Burgundians assumed themselves almost a royal dynasty on their own, every bit the equal of other great houses. As a military event it is a mix between an advance to contact and a manoeuvre campaign. Much of the Hundred Years War combat was of this nature, seiges big and little, and la petite guerre of incessant skirmishing and raiding. Medieval COIN can be seen in putting down the Jacquerie or peasants' revolt in the 14thc, when apparently English, Burgundia and French cooperated in a true class war. It was a brutal affair.

Bernard Cornwell - prolific historical novelist - has published a very good fictional interpretation, Azincourt. Worth a read as is his trilogy set earlier in the Hundred Years War. Cornwell bases his novel on Curry and the other recent historian but accepts the latter's larger numbers for the French forces.

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