Embedded US Marine trainers in Afstan
How the Corps is doing things:
President Obama recently announced his new strategy for stabilizing Afghanistan, the centerpiece of which is sending additional troops to fight the Taliban and train the Afghan forces. Yet a successful strategy has been in place in Afghanistan for more than a year - it is Muscular Mentoring, and it has been practiced by the Marines.Earlier post here on a US Army regular brigade training before deploying to Afstan as trainers. A post here on Canadian mentors, and one here on them in the field with the Afghan police. This will be the Operational Mentor and Liaison Team for the next CF roto, arriving late this summer:
Last year, Marine Col. Jeffrey Haynes commanded Embedded Training Team (ETT) 3-5, a part of the Regional Corps Advisory Command-Central (RCAC-C) [more here, with photos]. Based east of Kabul, ETT 3-5 was drawn primarily from 3rd Marine Division's III Marine Expeditionary Force from Okinawa along with Army, Navy and Air Force personnel and individuals of the Montana, Utah and New York National Guard. They arrived in February 2008 with a mission to "mentor the 201st Corps of the Afghan National Army (ANA) by providing military advice and training guidance" to its officers and staff noncommissioned officers [here's a blog from an embedded ETT trainer, an infantry major with the Nevada National Guard, in eastern Afstan].
The 201st Corps is responsible for 11 provinces in the east, northeast and center of the country, including Kabul. This is a key part of the country; it is where the fertile river valleys that supply much of Afghanistan's food and produce are located. Hence, support from the locals is of paramount importance to success in Afghanistan. "The Afghan people need to see the ANA and their government are protecting and developing the river valleys," Col. Haynes said, "not the U.S. or NATO. When the locals see that the ANA can protect them, they'll be more inclined to believe in their government."
To accomplish this, Col. Haynes and his Marines and soldiers took to the field with the ANA. NATO forces can "train" from a classroom, but it was "mentoring" when ETT 3-5 went out in the field with their Afghan counterparts. Virtually every Marine and soldier above the rank of sergeant spent several hours a day mentoring; Col. Haynes mentored the 201st Corps commander, Brig. Gen. Mohammed Wardak, while his executive officer mentored Gen. Wardak's executive officer. The key is to lead by example and not by lecturing. This is how the skills necessary for successful soldiering get transmitted.
"The 201st Corps is very good," Col. Haynes said. "When the Taliban attacked the prison in Kandahar last summer, they spearheaded the ANA effort into Anghardab and recaptured that strategic valley. [The ANA] handled their own logistics and their own intelligence."
Col. Haynes continued the policy of assigning small groups of Marines and soldiers to the remote forward operating bases and combat outposts in the eastern provinces [emphasis added]. The energy and professionalism of the Americans rubbed off on the 201st Corps troops stationed with them.
"The Afghan army is tailor-made for mentoring by the Marines," said Marine Sgt. Maj. Patrick Dougherty of ETT 3-5. "They respect strength and strong leadership, and they come from a society built on the cohesion of small groups - all of which makes the Marine Corps the most appropriate service for training them."
A recent Marine-ANA-French [emphasis added] operation demonstrated that the 201st Corps learned its lessons well. In Operation Nan-e-Shab Berun, coalition and ANA forces cleared the Alah Say Valley of insurgents and then provided security and stability for the locals when they built and occupied two new combat outposts. The insurgents then conceded the valley because the ANA is now stationed there permanently. Success came with casualties: One French and four ANA soldiers were killed; also, 37 opponents were killed in action [more on the French fatality and the operation here, with video--note the air support].
A key element of Mr. Obama's policy in Afghanistan is demonstrating that cooperation with America brings security, jobs and a future, whereas the Taliban and al Qaeda bring only death. This is the decision Sheik Sattar Abu Risha made in 2006 when he persuaded the Iraqi Sunnis to work with the Marines and drive the insurgents out of Anbar province; the Marines and the Afghans' 201st Corps can do the same in Afghanistan.
Getting the Afghan army and police trained and motivated will be at the heart of Afghanistan's ability to rebuild itself. The country is the world's third-poorest and has a 76 percent illiteracy rate and a weak central government (often lambasted for its incompetence and corruption and for failing to stop a drug trade that supplies 90 percent of the world's opium). There is no purely military solution; the answers and effort to succeed permanently must come from the Afghans themselves.
Andrew Lubin is the author of "Charlie Battery: A Marine Artillery Battery in Iraq." He was embedded with Marines and soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2006 and 2007.
...Update: Excerpt from another NY Times story on embedded Marine trainers:
About 150 soldiers with the Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT) [emphasis added - MC] [primarily from 3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry (3PPCLI) – Edmonton, AB]
A Young Marine’s Dream Job
Corporal Conroy at Firebase Vimoto. In Corporal Conroy's war, two Marines train Afghans in weapons, tactics, first aid, hygiene and leadership. They keep the firebase supplied with ammunition, water, batteries and food. More Photos >
The corporal [Sean P. Conroy, of Carmel, N.Y., 25 years old] has tied a flea collar through his belt loops; he needs it like a dog. He served two tours in Iraq. His four-year enlistment ended last month, but he extended for nine months when promised he would be assigned to a combat outpost in Afghanistan.
He hopes to attend college later. For now, he represents a class of Marine and soldier that has quietly populated the ranks since 2003. He enlisted not to pick up job skills or to travel the world at government expense. He enlisted to fight. “We’re the new generation,” he said. “I’ll tell you what — there are a lot of young Marines who’ve seen more combat than all of the guys up top who joined in the ’90s.”
He is supremely cocky, but unpretentious. When he met two journalists from The New York Times he asked what news agency they represented. Hearing the answer, he replied with one extended syllable: “Boooooo.” He prefers a good tabloid, he said.
He does not hide that he likes his life here: the senior man in an isolated post, surrounded by the Taliban, waking to a new patrol every day and drilling what he calls the Alamo Plan, to be executed if the firebase is overrun.
“This is the sweetest deal ever,” he said one evening between firefights. “There is no other place I could get a job like this — not at this rank.”..
1 Comments:
That young Marine is an example of the "Strategic Corporal" concept that the USMC began working on in the mid '90s.
Something that is not often mentioned in regard to the Al Anbar Awakening...
It was, actually, the 1920s Revolutionary Brigade that started a lot of it.
They were, nearly all, former Saddam Loyalists from various Republican Guard units. It was a large and well organized outfit.
They had gone up against the Marines all over Al Anbar and gotten hammered constantly for it.
So, one day, one of their bosses approached the Marines and asked if their guys could change sides.
The Marines arranged for them to be "uniformed" with sports jerseys so they could be visually identified. Lots of the "sectarian violence" that was reported in the Al Anbar province just prior to the Awakening becoming the talk of the media was actually former 1920s going against AQI in their AO.
What it boils down to is, the enemy was met, closed with and very nearly obliterated. THAT convinced them that fighting our guys was not a good idea anymore.
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