Fowler, Guay, and the enemy

Obviously, I'm pleased that Canadian diplomats Robert Fowler and Louis Guay are free and relatively unharmed by their long kidnapping ordeal. And equally obviously, I don't know all there is to know about the process that freed them.

But I do have some questions and concerns about that process.

Before I get into those concerns, I'd recommend you read this article in the Globe & Mail by Colin Freeze. Go ahead, I'll wait for you to come back...

OK...the Prime Minister states that Canada paid no ransom for their release. Call me cynical and suspicious, but I highly doubt that's the sainted truth. If I had to bet a week's salary on it, I'd hazard that a ransom was paid by a third party government to Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and that some sort of quid pro quo was arranged with the Canadian government for this political cover - whether promises of aid, future favours, or outright payment to the other government or agency.

I think the chance that AQIM released Fowler and Guay without any ransom at all is somewhat less than zilch.

Was there another option? I don't know, but I found the bare lip-service paid to a military solution telling:

A rotating team of three dozen Canadians worked tirelessly in West Africa over the past four months to secure freedom for two Canadian diplomats, sources say. Drawn from the ranks of the foreign service, Mounties, spies and other agencies, they ran the most sophisticated rescue operation Canada has ever known.

Using the wizardry of modern surveillance, calling in favours and exerting pressure on African governments, the team considered every option, up to and including a military raid.

Nobody mentions who would carry out that raid, but it's pretty obvious which unit has the mandate, the resources, and the skill set to do it.

The question left unanswered is why the military option was rejected. Did they not know where the hostages were being held? Did they not feel confident the team could carry out the mission successfully? Did the government not feel the political optics would be worthwhile?

I don't know the answer to any of those questions. What I do know, however, is that if Canada paid a ransom, or facilitated a ransom, or allowed a ransom to be paid on our behalf when there was a viable military option on the table, that should be cause for concern.

Because while there are undoubtedly grave risks to sending armed professionals in to take back hostages by force, there are also grave risks to funding an organization like AQIM.

A ransom lends them legitimacy - this was a highly successful operation for them from a PR standpoint. A ransom also provides them with much needed pecuniary resources with which to prosecute their murderous campaign. And a ransom encourages more kidnappings.

I would refer those who doubt this line of reasoning to the situation off the Somali coast, where the world has been paying ransoms to an increasingly well equipped, sophisticated, and burgeoning group of criminals for nigh on three years now.

How has that worked out so far?

My concern, in other words, is that in choosing to ransom Fowler and Guay - assuming we did in one way or another - we've also chosen to fund a branch of Al Qaeda, and encouraged them to continue with such tactics going forward. I wonder if we've unintentionally bankrolled the future deaths of innocents at the hands of known terrorists.

When you think of it like that, the idea of hard and quiet Canadian soldiers employing focused violence on the kidnappers seems a lot less risky, doesn't it?