When the facts get in the way

Scott Taylor, editor of the not-so-aptly-named Esprit de Corps "military affairs magazine," and columnist with the Halifax ChronicleHerald seems to enjoy stirring the pot above all else. His reputation, his call. But in an article published this week, Taylor ventured into the realm of revisionist fantasy in order to write something flashy and sensational, and I say he crossed a line (ht:MediaRight):

As we were all about to join our families, relax in our warm homes and enjoy a turkey feast, the Canadian battle group was poised to launch a massive offensive against Taliban holdouts in southern Afghanistan.

Cleverly dubbed Operation Baaz Tsouka (Bazooka, get it?), this joint NATO attack was predicted to be a major set-piece battle. [my emphasis]

Time to call bullshit. If Op Baaz Tsuka was all about "set-piece" combat, why would the ISAF have provided this release to the press back on December 15th?

“The main aim of Operation Baaz Tsuka is to work together with tribal elders and district leaders to provide vital assistance and targeted development directly to the people of Zahre and Panjwayi districts”, said Major General Ton Van Loon, Commander of ISAF Regional Command-South.

Tribal elders and district leaders have been extensively consulted in the build up to this operation, and planned for jointly by Afghan security forces and ISAF personnel.

Operation Baaz Tsuka builds on the success of Operation Medusa and aims to establish an enduring and stable environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance, reconstruction and development initiatives for the people of Zahre/Panjwayi. [my bold]

Or this one on the 20th, where the focus remains on reconstruction?

As part of the main efforts of Operation Baaz Tsuka, humanitarian aid, reconstruction and redevelopment tools and packages have been distributed to tribal elders throughout the Zahri and Panjawayi districts. Furthermore, in the area south of Panjawayi, where ISAF patrols discovered groups of local Afghans displaced from their homes by insurgents, essential medical aid, water, food and life essentials are being provided.

In fact, feel free to scroll through the list of ISAF press releases and tell me if I just missed the ones in which they predict anything other than security operations to facilitate aid and reconstruction operations. Because all I saw was a consistent narrative focusing on aid, local cooperation, and security.

Taylor again plays up the combat angle, and implies that the ISAF forces bungled the job:

By Dec. 23, it was reported that our troops had encircled up to 900 Taliban fighters whose only option was "to surrender or fight their way out."

It seemed that victory in southern Afghanistan was finally at hand and that NATO was about to present the Afghans with the gift of peace for Christmas. The killing or capture of 900 Taliban would certainly set the insurgency back on its heels, if not break its back.

However, as events unfolded, it appears a third option was open to these allegedly surrounded Afghan guerrillas — to simply leave their weapons hidden and stay home to celebrate the Eid festivities.

Yup. And those weapons are in many cases no longer available to the celebrants:

During today’s Operation Baaz Tsuka manoeuvres, Afghan National Security Forces and ISAF forces discovered and destroyed a large enemy weapons cache that included anti-tank mines, 82 mm mortar rounds, rocket propelled grenades and communications equipment.

ISAF and Afghan forces continue to make steady progress as part of the operation. Only sporadic resistance has been encountered so far. The troops will continue manoeuvring through the region in the coming days in order to improve security, which in turn will foster future reconstruction and development efforts.

If the "Tier 2" Taliban - the farmers who pick up a weapon for a paycheque, rather than the "Tier 1" hard-core ideologues - are dumping weapons in caches and refusing to fight, and if we're finding and destroying those caches, that's a good thing, Taylor.

True to form, though, with his head buried firmly in...the sand (it's a family blog), and sheathed in a tinfoil condom one would presume, Taylor isn't taken in by the PAffO hype:

Operation Baaz Tsouka only came back into the spotlight last week when a NATO spokesperson declared a successful conclusion to the mission. There was, of course, no mention of the elusive 900 Taliban fighters who had evaded capture. Instead, we were told that the lack of fighting and the low body count of Afghan insurgents was exactly the reason why Baaz Tsouka was so successful.

Keep in mind that last September we were told by these same spokesmen Operation Medusa was a major NATO success because nearly 1,500 Taliban were killed in combat.

...

Let’s hope it’s not just a case of public affairs officers once again putting a bold spin on a much-hyped operation that ultimately resulted in a dismal failure.

I suspect if we'd gone in and killed another 1,500 fighters, Taylor would be bemoaning the fact that we'd made no progress since Op Medusa and were being forced to fight an endless supply of Taliban insurgents in a deadly real-life Groundhog Day. It amazes me that a man who purports to speak with authority on military matters refuses to admit that perhaps Op Medusa's fighting laid the groundwork for Op Baaz Tsuka's lack of it.

Counterinsurgency doctrine is a rapidly evolving field, but no contemporary thinking that I know of questions the need for an integrated approach that balances fighting with building:

"There are more than just lethal operations involved in a counterinsurgency campaign," said Conrad Crane, director of the U.S. Army Military History Institute, in Carlisle, Pa...

Before beginning a campaign, planners must identify the problem that needs solving, then be ready to change the plan as conditions change on the ground, Crane said. "In counterinsurgency, that is so important because it is a complex situation," he said.

A counterinsurgency campaign is much more complex than a traditional military-on-military conflict. The make-up of the community, the needs of the various groups, the history of the area, traditional allies in the region, and many other things contribute to understanding how to design a counterinsurgency campaign. "It takes a lot more analysis before you jump into it, because if you do the wrong thing, it could have major implications," Crane said. "You have to be sure you are applying the right solution to the right problem."

Canadian counterinsurgency doctrine not only echoes this theme, but fleshes it out - most notably by incorporating the idea of simultaneity:

For the Canadians, there are three components of the model for the continuum of operations—the spectrum of conflict, predominant campaign themes, and types of operations. Counterinsurgency is considered one of four ‘predominant campaign themes’ (the others being peacetime military engagement, peace support and major combat). But campaign themes should not be confused with tactical operations, they argue, which include offensive, defensive and stability operations. These types of operations, the Canadians explain, must be combined with simultaneity — that is, the three types of tactical operations occurring simultaneously.

We're seeing that flexible, multifaceted, simultaneous approach being applied here. In fact, it seems to me that the ISAF experience with Op Baaz Tsuka provides us with at least a couple of different insights, both of which Taylor seems to have missed.

It shows the brass understand that they don't have to be a hammer all the time, since not every problem is a nail. That is to say, if combat's required, fine: sometimes a military just needs to do pest control and put rounds on target. If not, then let the security and reconstruction efforts proceed, as they did here.

It also reminds us that the NATO forces all engage in critical navel-gazing (AAR's), learn from previous experience, and incorporate that experience in future plans. The result? Surprise, surprise: Baaz Tsuka wasn't Medusa all over again.

Critics of the mission can legitimately ask if all the work NATO military forces are doing is enough to ensure the success of the overall mission. They can question if it will really transform Afghanistan into a productive and peaceful member of the international community instead of a cesspool of poverty, oppression, and violence. None of us has a crystal ball or a monopoly on reality, and this subject is complex enough that reasoned debate is both valuable and necessary if we're to have any hope of charting the best course.

But some things are objectively true or false. Operation Baaz Tsuka succeeded in its stated objectives, and Taylor's sneering doesn't change that in the slightest.

If Taylor is going to make a living sniping at the Canadian and international community's efforts in Afghanistan, he needs to come up with better material than this. Blatant revisionism and uninformed criticism just won't cut it.

Update: Following are tidbits from an e-mail correspondent who was commanding men before I even learned how to stand at attention, and who seems to think even less of Scott Taylor's piece than I do. I hardly thought that possible.

• The Army tends not to use the term "set-piece battle." An attack is either "hasty" or "deliberate;" if you have time to coordinate with other forces, it's deliberate, otherwise it's hasty. Operations are always deliberate because it's part of the definition of "operation"...Mr Taylor is opining with his use of the term and this indicates a lack of comprehension in the Military Arts and Sciences.


• The fact that the NATO forces were hunting for and discovering weapons caches should be evidence that Mr Taylor's discovery of a surprise third option for the Taleban was not unexpected by the operation's planners, and probably not a surprise for the soldiers conducting the operation; unlike Mr Taylor, they have experience in combat operations. And the fact that the guerrillas faded into the civilian population is unexpected only to those whose military awareness is less than adequately developed.


• Fighting a battle of any kind requires training, practice, discipline and expertise. It took the Army a long time to build institutions capable of creating and maintaining professional military competence. Unfortunately, the media has yet to follow suit. [my emphasis throughout]

Ouch. That's going to leave a mark.