US in Afstan: Why Helmand before Kandahar? Logistics

Joe Klein of Time magazine thinks the Americans have goofed by going on the offensive in Helmand first:

...yet, the COIN effort in Kandahar has been halfhearted at best.

Part of the problem is a strategic blunder the U.S. military has made: it diverted crucial resources from Kandahar to a peripheral battle in neighboring Helmand province. McChrystal questioned the Helmand effort when he took charge a year ago, but he then — inexplicably — doubled down on it by ordering the attack on the Taliban stronghold of Marjah in February. Marjah was taken, but most of the Taliban slipped away and have now reconstituted themselves in the countryside; a game of whack-a-mole seems likely to ensue. Meanwhile, the counterinsurgency effort in Kandahar was crippled by the diversion of Afghan troops and police (and also of U.S. civilian aid efforts) to Helmand: an entire Afghan regiment that was supposed to partner with U.S. troops in the crucial Zhari district — where Senjaray is located [more here] — was sent to Marjah. There are also 600 of Afghanistan's best-trained police officers (ANCOPs) in Marjah, while the police presence in Zhari is negligible. The fabled U.S. civilian surge is, well, a fable in the district. U.S. forces will triple in Zhari during the next few months, but that won't make much of a difference if the Afghan security and governmental presence remains as pathetic as it now is...

But there were likely practical reasons for the rapid US Marine build-up at Helmand--and thus the early Marjah operation--while a slower US Army increase at Kandahar has been taking place. See last three paras here, 2) here, and this post. Sometimes war is mainly about logistics after all.