Germany's evolving Afghan mission--and maybe a real scandal

Further to this post,

Afstan: Bad times for the German mission

something that might really "sully" a country's reputation--excerpts from a lengthy article in Spiegel Online:

Escalation Desired
Germany Intensifies Mission in Afghanistan

REUTERS
German Bundeswehr troops in Afghanistan: In the past year, reconstruction teams have been transformed into Taliban hunters.

The German-ordered air strike that led to civilian casualties in Afghanistan in early September was more than an aberration by a Bundeswehr officer. The German government and the military leadership have long supported taking a tougher approach against the Taliban.

He said nothing about the crux of the matter. German Defense Minister Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg was standing in the German parliament, the Bundestag, giving a speech that was filled, as usual, with well-made sentences, and yet it resolved nothing.

His appearance in the Bundestag last Wednesday [Dec. 16] had been preceeded by reports that morning that Wolfgang Schneiderhan, the former inspector general of the German armed forces, the Bundeswehr, had accused the defense minister of "not telling the truth."

It was a declaration of war, an outrageous move for a senior military commander to be making against his defense minister. In his speech to the Bundestag, Guttenberg could have dismissed the accusation, but he didn't. Instead, he attacked the opposition while saying nothing about Schneiderhan's central charge.

Officials with the Defense Ministry are now claiming that Schneiderhan and Peter Wichert, a state secretary in the defense ministry, concealed the fact that there were other reports on the Kunduz bombing (in addition to the NATO report Guttenberg already had) when the defense minister specifically asked the two men about the existence of such reports in a meeting on Nov. 25. In an interview with the German weekly newspaper Die Zeit, Schneiderhan rejected this claim, saying: "With regard to the afternoon of the 25th, he is not telling the truth."

Both Schneiderhan and Wichert have since been dismissed. But Guttenberg will not be able to remain in office for long if it turns out that he lied about his conversation with the highest-ranking soldier in the Bundeswehr. For the time being, however, it remains a matter of one man's word against another's.

It is now up to the Bundestag Defense Committee, which announced last Wednesday that it would also serve as investigative committee in the Kunduz scandal, to determine who is telling the truth. The committee plans to hear testimony from Guttenberg and Chancellor Angela Merkel soon, and a civil trial could ensue. Meanwhile, Schneiderhan has stated that he had not authorized the publication of the remarks he was quoted as saying.

The committee will also have to determine what really happened in the early morning hours of Sept. 4, when German Colonel Georg Klein ordered an air strike against Taliban fighters gathered around two kidnapped tanker trucks that resulted in numerous civilian casualties.

A Whitewashing Campaign

The incident also marked the beginning of a massive campaign to cover up and whitewash what actually happened in Kunduz. Not a single politician or senior military official told the public the full truth. The subject was to be kept off the radar during Germany's fall parliamentary election campaign, so as not to ruffle the feathers of an already skeptical electorate. Now the incident has been magnified to a far greater extent than would have been the case if those involved had decided to come clean with the public in the first place.

This was precisely what the chancellor had promised voters: that nothing would be withheld or sugarcoated. Precisely the opposite occurred, resulting in a disaster for German democracy...

From Bridge Builders to Combat Soldiers

The group of senior German government officials would convene several times after that initial meeting, always at the Defense Ministry, and it introduced an unspoken paradigm shift: Bit by bit, the bridge builders of the PRT were to become combat soldiers.

The German position shifted a little further in early May [2009]. The BND had located a local Taliban leader named Abdul Razeq, and its agents knew where he was and what he was planning. Razeq, who apparently headed one of the local terrorist cells, was believed to be responsible for various attacks on the Germans. The Bundeswehr knew that it could catch him, but it had to be interested in catching him. Until then, it had had no interest in Razeq.

Then things changed. This time the Bundeswehr sent out its KSK special forces unit. Sixty kilometers (37 miles) southeast of Faizabad, in northeastern Afghanistan, the elite unit stormed a farmhouse and then chased Razeq as he fled into the mountains, where he was caught. The Germans then flew Razeq to Kabul on board a Transall military transport aircraft and turned him over to a special prosecutor.

By now it was clear that the Germans had changed their position. Now they were hunting the Taliban.

Meanwhile, back in Berlin, the defense ministry and senior military officials were hard at work to ensure that German soldiers would be capable of engaging in combat.

Part 2: The Bundeswehr Gets Teeth

On April 8, 2009, the following sentence was deleted from the NATO operations plan: "The use of deadly force is prohibited, unless an attack is underway or imminent."

The Germans had originally included these "national clarifying remarks" in the wording of the NATO plan to ensure that Bundeswehr soldiers would only be permitted to shoot in self-defense. In statements relating to the NATO rules of engagement numbered 421 to 424 and 429A and 429B, the Germans clarified that they did not wish to characterize their attacks as "attacks," but as the "use of appropriate force." But now none of this applied anymore.

At this time, the defense policy experts at the Bundestag were addressing concerns about military equipment. Rainer Arnold, the defense policy spokesman of the center-left Social Democratic Party (SPD) parliamentary group, said that it was irresponsible to "send soldiers on their dangerous missions without giving them the protection that would be possible as a result of superior Western technology." Arnold wanted the Bundeswehr to have combat helicopters in Afghanistan.

His counterpart with the conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU), Bernd Siebert, campaigned for the Panzerhaubitze 2000 ("Armored howitzer 2000"), a serious weapon, the use of which quickly came to be associated with dead civilians.

The soldiers, for their part, were not just concerned about the lack of equipment, but also the question of what exactly they were permitted to do on this mission. The German government has been consistently reluctant to refer to the conflict as a war, even though the men and women stationed in northern Afghanistan had long felt that they were involved in one, except that they were not being truly permitted to fight...

Despite the deleted clauses in the NATO operations plans, the Germans still face limited options. Under the rules of engagement, which every Bundeswehr soldier stationed abroad carries with him in the form of a so-called pocket card, the German troops are only permitted to defend themselves against attack, ward off attacks or provide emergency assistance.

Sounding the Attack

At the behest of members of parliament, the legal department at the Defense Ministry amended the soldiers' pocket cards. The cards now read: "Attacks can be prevented, for example, by taking action against individuals who are planning, preparing or supporting attacks, or who exhibit other forms of hostile behavior." The Bundeswehr was sounding the attack, as the Germans began a major military offensive in an attempt to regain control over the region surrounding Kunduz.

"The time had come to commence the escalation," then Inspector General Schneiderhan told the Berlin press on July 22...

I wonder how all this will affect Germany's future role in Afstan. From a recent Spiegel inteview with NATO's Secretary General:

...General Karl-Heinz Lather, the German chief of staff at NATO military headquarters, says that two battalions are needed in the Kunduz region alone, one for combat missions. That could mean up to 2,000 men. What do you expect from Germany?

Rasmussen: I don't want to discuss concrete numbers before the international conference on Afghanistan in London on Jan. 28. However, a number of European governments have already pledged a total of 7,000 new troops in recent weeks. It's more than I expected, and I'm convinced that it will get even better than that.

SPIEGEL: The French are skeptical. And (German Chancellor) Angela Merkel has not held out the prospect of any concrete commitments yet. What makes you so confident that you will in fact get the soldiers you want from Berlin?

Rasmussen: I know very well that Berlin attaches great importance to NATO and solidarity, in terms of sharing the burden. For this reason, I feel confident that the German government will take the right decision, one that serves both German and NATO interests...

Update: But note Positroll's comment, with which I generally agree.