PBS Frontline: "Obama's War"/Globeite quagmiritis

Comprehensive website, with video of full program here (55 minutes).

From the "Introduction":

...

In Obama's War, veteran correspondent Martin Smith travels across Afghanistan and Pakistan to see first-hand how the president's new strategy is taking shape, delivering vivid, on-the-ground reporting from this eight-year-old war's many fronts. Through interviews with top generals, diplomats and government officials, Smith also reports the internal debates over President Obama's grand attempt to combat terrorism at its roots.

"What we found on the ground was a huge exercise in nation building," says Smith. "The concept's become a bit of a dirty word, but that's what this is. We started with the goal of eliminating Al Qaeda, and now we've wound up with the immense task of re-engineering two nations."

The brunt of the work is falling on rank-and-file soldiers, and nowhere is it more difficult than in the dusty, unforgiving landscape of Helmand province, the Taliban stronghold in southern Afghanistan, where FRONTLINE embedded with Echo Company, 2nd Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment. Since the Marines' arrival in July, Helmand has become the most lethal battlefield in Afghanistan. But FRONTLINE found the Marines trying to act as armed diplomats, attempting to build the necessary trust for badly needed economic development [more on Echo Company here, Marines' orbat in Afstan here]...

Even as American soldiers struggle to make progress in Afghanistan village by village, equally vexing challenges remain across the border in Pakistan. "In Afghanistan we know what to do; we just don't know if we have the resources or the time available to do it," David Kilcullen, a leading counterinsurgency expert, tells FRONTLINE. "The problem in Pakistan is we're not really sure what to do."

When FRONTLINE confronts the Pakistani army about its reluctance to take out key Taliban leaders, the military's chief spokesman, Gen. Athar Abbas, argues that the accusations are misplaced. There is no truth, he claims, that insurgents stage attacks on American forces from the Pakistani side of the border. "They operate from Afghanistan. If somebody claims that everything is happening from this side of the border, I am sorry, this is misplaced, and we refute it."

Barred from sending troops across the border, the United States is left with few good options. No quick fix will solve Pakistan...

Via Brian Platt. Earlier, Globeite TV columnist Andrew Ryan leaves no doubt what he thinks:

...Frontline places correspondent Martin Smith on the front lines of America's worst military nightmare realized – an unwinnable war. This time the media focus is moved as far as possible from the U.S. commander-in-chief and placed sharply on the war he inherited, still raging in the far-off hills of Afghanistan. Less than a year in office and Barack Obama already has his own Vietnam [more about that view here]...

The futility of the mission is made clear in the repeated scenes of soldiers in full battle gear trying to connect with simple, destitute farmers. Through translators, the GIs try to explain that the Taliban are very bad and that the military might of America is there only to protect them. In most instances, the Afghans look bewildered or disbelieving...

Update: Bruce R. has a more, er, nuanced review at Flit:

...Finally, if you are an avid reader of all things Afghanistan, you won't get much out of last night's Frontline documentary you haven't heard before. I thought it a stark, almost devastating argument against a COIN approach: Gen. McChrystal is positively Quixotic (Cyranoic?) in his insistence it's the right thing to do regardless of the cost, but the example from Helmand is not encouraging to look at in any way, the COIN advocates (Exum and Nagl) are sublimely unconvincing ("even if we do everything right we could still lose", "we'll never have enough soldiers to meet the normal requirements of COIN"), the Pakistani allies come across as extremely feckless, the Afghans are largely mute (not a single Afghan advocate for us staying is featured) and the ISAF ChOps' statement at the end all we can hope for for all the years of effort to come will be "an Afghan solution to an Afghan problem"... that's right up there with "put an Afghan face on the operation" as far as useless, meaningless buzzwords go. Still, I would recommend it to those less engaged in the debate thus far as a good primer.

Lots of interesting other stuff at the post.