The Afghan elections and counterinsurgency

According to this view, severe problems with the one by no means negates the possible success of the other (contrary to many nay-sayers):

Counterintuitive counterinsurgency
An illegitimate election in Afghanistan does not mean legitimate American military and political goals can't be met.

As the Obama administration debates whether to stick with the counterinsurgency strategy for Afghanistan, opponents point to that nation's flawed presidential election as a reason why this approach cannot work. Counterinsurgency is premised, they argue, on the presence of a legitimate national government that can win allegiance from local populations. Given credible allegations of rampant abuse in Afghanistan's August election, President Hamid Karzai's newly illegitimate government cannot play this role. As a result, the United States has little choice but to change strategies.

This argument is badly flawed. Electoral fraud will render our task in Afghanistan more difficult, but it does not make counterinsurgency impossible. On the contrary, a counterinsurgency approach -- and not a narrowly tailored mission focused solely on killing or capturing enemies -- remains the best path to success in Afghanistan.

To understand why, consider the analogous case of Iraq over the last three years. In January 2007, the "surge" of combat forces began as part of a new counterinsurgency strategy that emphasized clearing areas of fighters, holding that territory and building the infrastructure and institutions that had been so badly lacking -- just as Army Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal has proposed for Afghanistan...

...With U.S. forces clearing and holding territory and demonstrating to the Sunnis that they had a reasonable alternative to Al Qaeda and its sectarian warfare, the extremists were sidelined. Security began to improve, and the political space necessary for reconciliation began to open.

Prospects for such an outcome in Afghanistan actually look better now than they did in Iraq in early 2007...

This is not to say that a stolen presidential election is meaningless. But our main goal should be helping the Afghan government work at the local level -- providing the marginal but tangible improvements in security, governance and prosperity that ordinary Afghans say they want, and stopping the corruption and abuses they personally contend with and resent.

Ironically, the greatest effect of Afghanistan's botched election may be felt outside the country -- reinforcing doubts in the United States and Europe about whether a corrupt Afghan government really deserves our help. But this misses the point. We are in Afghanistan because its takeover by the Taliban would be catastrophic for American national interests. The Taliban seeks to achieve that goal by exploiting any gaps it can find between the government and the people. Our task is to see clearly the causes for these gaps and take the steps necessary to close them.

This is precisely what McChrystal spent upward of 60 pages explaining in his recent assessment. The counterinsurgency strategy he describes -- difficult and costly though it may be -- remains the best possible path to preventing the return of Afghanistan to a Taliban-dominated terrorist sanctuary.

Richard Fontaine was a foreign policy advisor to John McCain during his presidential campaign and in the Senate. John Nagl was part of the team that produced Petraeus' counterinsurgency manual. Nagl is president and Fontaine is a senior fellow of the Center for New American Security.

Meanwhile, Fareed Zakaria seems to be advocating continuing a mix of counterinsurgency and counter-terrorist strategy, with no significant US troop increase:

What Failure in Afghanistan?

As for the McChrystal approach in action:

Advancing Marines test new Afghan war doctrine

BARCHA, Afghanistan (Reuters) - Winning ground is one thing. Convincing Afghan villagers you will not leave, abandoning them to a vengeful Taliban, is a bigger challenge for U.S. Marines advancing deep into southern Helmand province.

The Marines, part of a 10,000-strong force sent to Afghanistan this year, have pushed south into hostile terrain, winning ground and pledging to build the long-term trust and security needed to prevent insurgents from returning...

The conclusion of an earlier post:

...
Should President Obama turn down any substantial increase in forces, what's a poor Afghan to conclude? The top US military man in country say more forces are needed or mission failure is possible. The president disagrees. What faith is that Afghan to have that the Taliban won't be back sooner or later? Which horse may he lay side bets on, at a minimum? The PR impact of the US decision-making stinks from an Afghan standpoint--even if those forces are sent, it certainly looks like this administration's commitment is increasingly grudging. Not a happy longer-term prospect for those Afghans unless the ANSF really do get built up and really effective pretty soon.

Ending the CF's "combat operations" at Kandahar (the governmen's latest policy dance step) won't be great for Afghan morale in any case.