How much help will the US continue to get in Afstan?

Worries:

1) NATO Fears European Pull-Out From Afghanistan

The economic crisis raises the risk that European allies will pull back from Afghanistan at a time when president-elect Barack Obama is expected to reach out to them for help, NATO's supreme commander warned Friday.

At the same time, General Bantz Craddock predicted that US forces will be in Afghanistan for "at least" a decade, and likely have a presence there for decades to come.

His grim assessment comes as Obama prepares to shift the focus of US military operations to Afghanistan from Iraq to stem an insurgency that has rebounded over the past two years.

Craddock said that, although European allies were expecting Obama to ask them to do more, "I think it's going to be harder for them to do it because of decreasing defense budgets."

He said NATO has plans for replacing Dutch forces in southern Afghanistan in 2010 and the Canadians in 2011 [emphasis added].

"The unknown is who else is going to pull out quickly. We don't know that. It's like in Iraq, when nations pulled out without telling anyone ahead time; it's a terrible situation," he told reporters.

The United States has committed to sending an additional 30,000 US troops [30,000 is actually the upper limit now considered - MC] to Afghanistan, nearly doubling US force levels there from 32,000 troops currently...

Craddock said it will be another three years before the shortfall in security requirements there can be filled by the Afghan army, and so more foreign forces will be needed to provide security.

"We have to be able to implement our strategy: one, clear out the insurgency; two, hold; three, build," he said.

However, he said that after clearing, "we don't have enough to hold to allow the build."

Asked whether Afghanistan will require a 10-year US military commitment, he said, "At least."

"Maybe not at current force levels [emphasis added] but I think we'll see a presence there for decades," he added...

2) NATO chief says more support needed in Afghanistan

The commander of NATO-led forces in Afghanistan told U.S. vice-president-elect Joe Biden on Saturday thousands of new U.S. troops expected in the country's south will need more helicopters [emphasis added] and other support to beat back surging Taliban violence, an official said.

Mr. Biden met with U.S. General David McKiernan, head of the NATO-led force in Afghanistan and was scheduled to meet with Afghan President Hamid Karzai later in the day.

“Gen. McKiernan explained the current situation and talked about the incoming troops and the need for additional enablers...things like helicopters, engineers, military police, transportation assets,” said Colonel Greg Julian, a U.S. military spokesman.

“As we expand in the south, we will need those additional enablers to cover for the troops,” Col. Julian said.

The United States is sending up to 30,000 troops over to Afghanistan, some of whom will go to its volatile southern provinces, to combat a Taliban insurgency that has sent violence to record levels...

As for helicopters:

Canadian choppers start flying over Afghanistan Canadian helicopter pilots have begun flying training missions over Afghanistan, practicing tactical manoeuvres, tricky landings and flying through enemy fire -- all scenarios they are likely to face when transporting troops in the coming months.

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The Canadian Forces' new military helicopters [a Griffon here] were used in training on Friday, Jan. 9, 2009.

It is part of a new strategy, as recommended by the Manley report, to prioritize the air transport of Canadian troops and to get them off deadly Afghan roads where they are exposed to improvised explosive devices and other bombing threats.

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The choppers [a Chinook here] were recommended in the Manley report to prioritize the air transport of Canadian troops.

In total, more than half of the Canadian casualties suffered in Afghanistan have resulted from roadside bombs -- including the 10 soldiers killed since the start of December.

The Canadians have been asking for these machines for years.

Before the arrival of these helicopters, when Joint Task Force (Afghanistan) Air Wing was launched last month, the Canadian Forces often had to beg or borrow similar machines from the U.S. and Britain.

As a result, the expectations are running high when it comes to their use in the field.

"It's been a long time that people have wanted our helicopters to be here and they're expecting a lot from us," said Col. Christopher Coates, the commander of Canada's air wing.

"So, we'll try as quickly as we can to meet those expectations."

Some of those in the air wing go further, saying it's about time that they be allowed to participate in the Afghan mission.

Capt. Jay Walker, a pilot who will be flying his fellow soldiers around Afghanistan's skies, said he was "very excited" to get the chance to participate in the mission.

"This is what we've been training to do," he said.

"This is what I've wanted to do since I was eight years old."..

The new air wing fleet includes six Chinooks, newly retrofitted with heavy machine guns to counter Taliban attacks, and eight hefty, even more heavily-armed, Griffons to act as backup...

Of course the Griffons aren't "new", except in theatre. And from the story it would seem the CH-47D Chinooks we are getting from the US are now flying as part of the Wing.

Why not keep our helicopters there, plus somewhat more, after 2011?

Thoughts for after 2011. How about keeping the PRT and a fair number of troops to mentor the ANA. But focus the mission on the Air Force, using the CH-47Ds and also new build CH-47Fs as and when we ever get them, Griffons, Heron UAVs, and C-17s and C-130Js to support our force and allies. Troops at KAF to provide force protection and support the mentors in the field when necessary, with required armour, and some JTF2 too. Probably a maximum of around 1,000 from the Army (about what the Aussies now have). No real idea of Air Force numbers but should be I imagine in the mid-hundreds actually in country (then there's Camp Mirage).

That would be a significant and useful contribution that the CF should be able to implement, and that I think would be welcomed by NATO and President Obama. I don't see why, in principle, the Canadian public could not be convinced to go along.

Moving from Kandahar would be very expensive and forgo all the local knowledge and familiarity acquired.

Update: The American CSIS publishes a paper saying, in effect, it's essentially all up to the US. Quite. Sure seems to be the way things are going, with Brits doing what they can:

Synopsis:

The situation in Afghanistan has reached the brink of chaos. The Taliban, Haqqani, and HIG forces have become far more lethal, and casualties for US, NATO, Afghan Army and Afghan Police forces are on the rise. US commanders have called for 20,000 more troops, but this is the number needed to buy time, not the number needed to win. Any effective counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan must build up strong Afghan security forces, and the use them to both defeat the enemy and create the level of security that is a critical prerequisite for governance and development.

The Burke Chair has developed a draft analysis detailing the continued development of the Afghan National Security Forces, the historic challenges they have faced, their strengths and weaknesses, and the problems and prospects of future force development. The study, entitled “Winning in Afghanistan: Creating Effective Afghan Security Forces,” is available on the CSIS web site at:
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/081211_ansfreport.pdf

Independent and declassified DoD reporting on the situation in Afghanistan remains woefully insufficient. What recent reporting is available allows for tentative conclusions about the problems facing the effort to secure Afghanistan, and what additional unclassified reporting is necessary to bring the public’s understanding of the war in Afghanistan to the same level as current DoD reporting on the Iraq War.

This study examines the ideological, civil, military and economic conflict that now affects two very different nations: Afghanistan and Pakistan. It analyzes the historic consequences of missed opportunities in the early years of reconstruction, and how a lack of troops and of effective local training programs has made it possible for the Taliban, HIG, and Haqqani networks to gain strength and expand their capabilities.

While “clear, hold, and build” may be the mantra the US and NATO/ISAF are beginning to use to describe their strategy,; meaningful progress has only been made in shaping the Afghan army forces needed to perform the “clear” role. When it comes to “hold” and “build,” the threat has grown far more quickly than the capabilities of both the ANA and ANP. Worse, the Afghan government, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), and other aid efforts fall dismally short of providing effective governance, government services, and adequate levels of employment and economic security

The effort to increase security by means of building up Afghan forces has been badly mismanaged and underfunded in the past, and many of the lessons of Iraq and other recent wars were ignored. Seven years after the invasion of Afghanistan, neither the Afghan National Army (ANA) or Police (ANP) force are capable of standing on its their own. Afghan military forces are still heavily reliant upon NATO forces for leadership, logistics, and air support in combat. Under-armed and under-manned ANA and ANP forces often face extreme risk from IEDs and Taliban attacks on their bases, and must compensate for a lack of troops with an overreliance on US close air support.

This capability gap has helped lead to serious and continuing declines in security. Outside of major urban centers, the population scarcely has contact with the ANA and ANP, and the contact that occurs is fraught with corruption and the risk of bad targeting, which often harms rather than helps rural perceptions of the central government. Where the Taliban or other anti-government forces control the security environment, no amount of development or reconstruction work alone will be sufficient to turn back the tide. Urban areas also continue to decline in security, and many have either poor or corrupt policing...

Afghanistan is not yet on track for a “slow win.” Only quick and decisive action can change this situation and keep the military situation from steadily deteriorating. Only decisive improvements in capability by the ANA and ANP can create the security environment necessary for future development. There are many countries that can and should provide crucial assistance, including the Afghan government.

Only the US, however, has the resources to change this situation [emphasis added]. For more than half a decade, it has failed to do so. It has not provided the money, the mentors and training personnel, or the kind of partners in the field necessary to create the scale and quality of the Afghan forces required. If the next President and Administration do not act quickly and decisively to reverse this situation, Afghanistan, NATO/ISAF, and the US may well lose the war...