Three wise men?

The holiday-themed title was too good to pass up...besides, I normally can't think of anything remotely clever to title my posts with, so this is as good as you're likely to get.

Paul Wells was recently in Afghanistan, and has penned a very good article here. If you haven't already read it, you should. But in a blog post at Inkless Wells, he links to two of his fellow travelers on the trip, and their writings are also well worth your time.

Michael O'Hanlon lays out some of the lessons of Iraq that can be applied to Afghanistan, much as everyone rightly warns of the dangers of conflating the two conflicts. One of the points I thought most useful was this one:

The strategy for securing the country is following the concept of "clear, hold and build." Until now, NATO forces have often moved into populated areas to pursue insurgents and then pulled out once a given search and destroy operation was complete. They have then ceded control of the town back to Taliban and other insurgent forces, whereupon friendly Afghans were often killed or intimidated into never helping us again. This method does not work, as we also learned during the first four years of the Iraq war. Today, as in Iraq, NATO and Afghan security forces are proceeding more deliberately, only moving into new regions when forces are available to hold onto them after the initial incursions.

I say "useful" because when Canadian and other allied militaries have called for more boots on the ground in Afghanistan over the past few years, I'm not sure they've always done a good enough job explaining just why the numbers matter. That's important, and I think those reasons need to be explained to the general public with more consistency and patience until they sink in. Otherwise, it's awfully difficult to maintain the requisite political support for such a move.

I was also interested to read Roland Paris' piece in the Globe & Mail, and especially the part where he lays out possible next phases of a Canadian mission:

For Canada, too, 2009 may be crucial. Although 2011 seems far off, we'll soon have to decide whether to continue our Afghan engagement, and in what form if we do. NATO is already planning for the arrival of new U.S. forces in Kandahar. If we wish to carve out specific responsibilities for ourselves, we'll need to make a claim to them, probably before 2010.

Such decisions, however, presuppose serious public debate in Canada over the next year, informed by the evolving circumstances of the mission.

Apart from withdrawing our 2,700-strong contingent or simply continuing the existing deployment, four other options should be examined:

1. Move Canadian troops to safer parts of Afghanistan (although this is not where NATO forces are most needed).


2. Focus our military mission on Kandahar city and the strategically important districts of Panjwai and Zhari (which may be possible with a reduced force of about 1,800 soldiers, including support elements).


3. Keep only a garrison in Kandahar city to provide security for residents and Canadian development officials (requiring a few hundred soldiers, including support elements).


4. Shift entirely to a training mission for Afghan army and police units (the risks should not be underestimated, since trainers typically accompany their units on operations).

But first, we must decide whether it's in Canada's interest to remain in Afghanistan at all. We have no obligation to make further sacrifices, particularly if the mission's prospects do not improve. But the costs of allowing Afghanistan to collapse back into civil war would be enormous – for regional security (the stability of nuclear-armed Pakistan is at stake), for our own security (as we learned in the 1990s when al-Qaeda used Afghanistan as a base for global attacks), and not least for ordinary Afghans, who have suffered through decades of war.

Good on DND for getting these thinkers over there.