Ideology and ignorance, a toxic mix

James Travers needs to either educate himself, or learn to stay in his lane. I'm not normally big on fisking as a form of commentary, but Travers has stacked so many grotesque opinions, misleading statements, and easily-refuted conclusions into one article that a fisking is the only appropriate way to deal with his viral strain of ignorance.

Let's start with the not-so-subtle propagation of the peacekeeping myth:

According to Defence Minister Gordon O'Connor, this peaceable kingdom with peacemaking as well as peacekeeping in its past is prepping for the future with 10 to 15 years of fighting.

Travers needs to stop confusing his own distorted views on our national self-image with reality. That reality is that, with the exception of the Cold War when we were actively preparing to fight a war with the Warsaw Pact in Europe, Canada has been a warfighting nation rather than a peacekeeping one. Furthermore, as explained and vigourously supported by Eric Wagner in the Canadian Military Journal (pdf), our Cold War peacekeeping was a self-interested response to Canada's security needs in a dangerous bi-polar world:

When considering the motivations underpinning Canada’s peacekeeping missions, it is important to place them in context. From 1954 to 1973, the Cold War and the spectre of the Soviet Union were dominant considerations in the formulation of Canadian international policy. Canadian leaders feared Soviet aggression and the spread of communism, and they put their faith in multilateral organizations, such as the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the British Commonwealth, to defend Western interests and to prevent local conflicts from escalating into nuclear war. Peacekeeping was not considered separately from these more pragmatic considerations. In fact, peacekeeping was seen by Canadian planners as complementary to the strategic interests of Canada and NATO. [my emphasis]

Basing one's worldview on a popular myth is hardly confidence-inspiring in a columnist.

Travers follows this most inauspicious start with even more unsubstantiated mischaracterization:

Despite Chief of Defence Staff Rick Hillier's wild accusation of a decade of darkness, Paul Martin recognized the problem and got started on solutions.

The accusation is grounded in fact. I've addressed the issue previously, as has our own Mark Collins. The only reasonable complaint to make against Hillier is that a decade is too short a time frame for the real darkness - that it stretched even further back.


But this conclusion fails to take into account the increased operational tempo (pdf) of the past fifteen years or so, which compounded the budgetary problems while also creating a whole new slate:

Since 1990, the number of operations in which our military has participated has tripled compared to the period between 1945 and 1989. The number of personnel deployed on foreign operations has frequently exceeded the sustainable ceiling of 4,000 set in the 1994 Defence White Paper. At the same time, it was not anticipated that the Canadian Forces would so often deploy simultaneously and for lengthy periods to so many theatres around the globe.

The difference between how Hillier characterized the past decade and how Travers represented Hillier's remarks is that the CDS can back up his assertions with fact. Just because it's a four letter word doesn't mean Travers should avoid it.

Next unsupportable claim?

At Hillier's urging, Ottawa shelved its Cold War weapons and thinking to begin creating armed forces capable of speedy domestic response and swift offshore intervention as well as the slow, problematic work of stabilizing failed and failing states.

I'd love to hear precisely which "Cold War weapons" the CF "shelved." Because the only one I can think of is the Leopard C2 tank weapon system. And you can see just how solid a decision that was by Hillier's obvious relief - and that of his troops - at being able to keep a tracked, heavily armoured, direct-fire platform in the Canadian inventory. Once the CF realized it could move tanks to missions around the world, our soldiers were no longer willing to part with them.

“I think we’re actually losing a millstone around our neck that’s been hamstringing our thinking, hamstringing the way we approach operations based on building around a tank force yet never deploying that tank because it’s not appropriate to do so,” Hillier said in October 2003.

Now, as chief of the Defence Staff, Hillier says he never questioned the use of tanks. He said he questioned the military’s ability to move tanks around the world to places where they would be of use.

Travers barely finishes with one miserably unsupportable argument before he embarks upon his next.

Canadians have no way of knowing if $650 million for 120 leased and mothballed tanks is money well spent or if O'Connor's grim predictions are a reliable forecast or just a tactical justification for a suspect purchase.

I know the media coverage of this has been confusing, but if you go to the source of the agreement, you'll find we're not actually leasing any tanks. We're borrowing twenty Leopard A62M's from the German army.

To replace the Canadian Forces’ 30-year old Leopard 1 tanks, the Government will purchase up to 100 Leopard 2 tanks, as well as securing the loan of 20 Leopard 2A6 tanks for use in Afghanistan this summer. [my emphasis]

Contrary to Travers' assertion, Canadians have a quite credible way of determining if the $650 million is money well-spent. First, ask the CF if the equipment is needed:

The heavily protected direct fire capability of a main battle tank is an invaluable tool in the arsenal of any military. The intensity of recent conflicts in Central Asia and the Middle East has shown western militaries that tanks provide protection that cannot be matched by more lightly armoured wheeled vehicles.

Canada isn't the only country that thinks so (pdf):

Warfare is evolving rapidly in the computer age, especially in sensing technology, precision guidance, and control of forces. Heavy forces benefit from these advances while continuing to offerthe advantage of survivability. They were developed during World War I to solve the problem of crossing terrain swept by enemy fire. Ninety years later, they still solve this problem despite a wide range of efforts to make them obsolete.

The answer is that Canada does need tanks.

Next, ask if $650 million is a good price for one hundred tanks, upgrades, and a preliminary raft of spare parts:

Acquiring new tanks off a production line was also examined, but delivery would not occur for a few years and the individual tank cost is approximately three times as expensive as procuring and upgrading the same capability that exists on the surplus market. [my emphasis]

According to DND sources with insight on this project, only the Greeks are building new Leo 2's. The price tag for the tank alone, without any throw-ins would be approximately $10M per unit, and we'd have to try to wiggle our way into some other country's production schedule. Using those numbers, we're buying $1 billion worth of heavy armour for $650 million, plus we're getting training and spares thrown into the deal, plus we're getting them far more quickly than we would buying new.

Could we have gotten an even better deal on surplus? Well, the only way to know that is to shop around. Which we did:

When examining the surplus tank option, Canada approached six allied nations to enquire about availability. Formal proposals from three nations were thoroughly evaluated by Public Works and Government Services Canada and the Department of National Defence (DND) in terms of price, upgrade costs, delivery schedule, operational performance, survivability and through-life operating and maintenance costs.

Even if you're not inclined to trust DND numbers, a quick Google search reveals a 1998 Spanish purchase of 239 Leo 2A6's for 1.94 billion Euros. While the Spaniards got more in the way of frills thrown into the deal (simulators, logistics, etc), the unit price breaks down to over 8 million Euros per tank - almost double what Canada is paying. And that's without adjusting for inflation.

The Defence Industry Daily article also notes:

These figures help to explain how the Leopard 2 has become the modern-day standard European and Scandinavian tank via second-hand purchases and upgrades. Not to mention the remarkably inexpensive terms on which countries like Greece and Spain are acquiring them. While Germany will not sell them to just anybody (it refused Turkey, for instance), the fire-sale process for those countries that are on the approved list make serious consideration of new-built Western 6th generation tanks like the American M1 Abrams, British Challenger, or French LeClerc virtually impossible. Even far-inferior options like the T-72 make little sense in this context.

With armored vehicle production the next target of consolidation for European bureaucrats, the German government's fire sale of Krauss-Maffei Wegman's Leopard 2s may do much more than just bring in revenues and send some refurbishment work KMW's way. Given the virtual European standardization on the Leopard 2 tank, with more likely to come, Germany's near-giveaways may have also put KMW in the driver's seat. [my emphasis]

So when Travers questions if we're getting value for the money, he's pontificating from a position of profound ignorance on the subject. Canada is getting fantastic value for the money in this procurement.

Ignoring his political opinions, which fall outside the purview of this blog's mandate, Travers stumbles his way through one last piece of faulty reasoning:

In practice as well as in philosophy the Armed Forces are edging closer to becoming interoperable – as well as heavily dependent – on the United States, just as foreign policy, with a few notable exceptions including Arctic sovereignty, is becoming more aligned.

There are as many defence, security and continental cohabitation advantages in that closeness as there are difficult, overarching questions about Ottawa's freedom to hunt national interests as relentlessly as Washington pursues its own.

Canada's military purchases have precisely the opposite effect on the range of foreign policy options available to us than Travers suggests. Right now, if the Americans aren't involved, it's awfully tough for us to support an overseas mission on our own, and almost impossible to engage independently if the mission is in a remote and isolated area.

But when we buy C-17 transport aircraft, it means we don't need to rely on the Yanks to move our personnel and equipment into an overseas theatre of operation, or into a domestic emergency zone for that matter. When we buy CH-47 heavy helicopters, it means we're free to engage in operations where we can't count on allied helo support. When we buy Leopard 2 tanks, it means our forces are more capable and robust, which means we require less American involvement in any mission in which we choose to participate, not more.

Being able to stand on our own two feet militarily means Canada can engage in missions where the U.S. has no national interest to compel their involvement. It means we can chart our own course, instead of being forced to simply tag along on other countries' pet projects because we lack the capability to do anything without them.

If James Travers is going to continue to opine on military matters, he needs to correct his ill-informed and ideologically-motivated misconceptions. He needs to develop some factually-based expertise in matters martial. He needs to do some research and educate himself.

Until then, he needs to stop embarrassing himself and his newspaper with tripe like this.