Canadian Forces: Three things you need to know

Jack Granatstein outlines the basics.

1) Procurement costs:

...Consider the four C-17s the Harper government has agreed to buy. Each of the huge transports costs about $250-million. The accrual cost, again in round numbers, is $4-billion. Many Canadians remain unaware of the change in accounting methodology, and government rules (or practice) do not appear to permit explanation. So a $1-billion purchase of necessary equipment appears to many as a $4-billion boondoggle. It's not, but it's a hard sell for all of us whose eyes glaze over at the mention of accountants' rules. The answer, of course, is to explain defence purchases (and purchases in every other government department, as well) by making it clear that the total lifetime package is included in the announced sum.

2) Procurement precariousness:

The second problem is that the $17-billion in promised equipment purchases naturally enough makes Canadians believe money is flowing in a torrent to the military. So it is, but only after a fashion. Equipment purchases are never final until they are contracted, built, and put into the hands of the troops. Governments can change and, with them, priorities. The Navy needed helicopters to replace the aged Sea Kings back in the 1980s, and the contract for those machines was carved in stone -- until Jean Chrétien came to power in 1993 and killed the deal. In other words, it ain't over till it's over...

3) Operational and maintenance lunches eaten:

...No one can say with confidence what extra costs the Kandahar operation is imposing on the military, but they are substantial -- certainly well above $1-billion a year. Most of this money seems to be coming from the existing budgets of the Department of National Defence, and the difficulty is that the Army, Navy, and Air Force are being forced to scramble to keep themselves operating as funds (and personnel) are pared away to support the mission.

The Navy made the front pages a few weeks ago when it tied up ships in Halifax and Esquimalt because it had run out of operating funds in fiscal year 2006-07, and would not have any more until fiscal year 2007-08 began. That was an unwise, partly political, ploy by the Navy's commanders, to be sure, but the problem is all too real. The operations and maintenance budgets of all three service environments are stretched to the breaking point now...

Mr Granatstein's conclusion:

There is only one answer: The Harper government must supplement the Canadian Forces' operations and maintenance funding now. An emergency appropriation of $1-billion will keep the military running at home and keep the soldiers in Kandahar supplied with what they need. Anything less and the government risks destroying the kudos it has deservedly won for its efforts to rebuild the Forces. The military might not survive, either.

And for the longer run the conclusions of the Senate Committee Senate on National Security and Defence are equally valid. Defence spending needs to be almost doubled in real terms to around two percent of GDP. Heck, let's just spend as much as the Dutch.