According to our Department of National Defence, Canada's defence budget ranks 16th in the world and 7th in NATO1. Despite a steep decline in allocation -- from CDN $12 billion in FY 1992-93 to CDN $9.38 billion in FY 1998-99 -- Canadian troops still proudly serve with their NATO counterparts and still patrol former "hot zones" across the globe. What about all the national bellyaching about reduced capabilities, ancient equipment and recruiting / retention problems? For answers, it might be instructive to look at the example of our southern neighbours, who are also looking at their defense expenditures and wonder if it's all being wisely spent.
Apparently, the US spends more per year [on defense] than the next 15 countries combined,” Donald H. Rumsfeld wrote on Jan. 3.
In a memo to his top aides, the evidently surprised Defense Secretary noted that the US last year devoted $456 billion to the military, while the nations ranked No. 2 (China) through 16 (Israel) together shelled out only $454 billion...
These amounts stir political sensitivities at a time of huge budget deficits. A recent poll for the Pew Research Center found 42 percent of Americans gave “top priority” to reducing the $319 billion deficit. Thirty-six percent wanted to do so by cutting defense spending.
Right on cue, the New York Times chimed in, “After the Pentagon’s spending orgy over the past five years, there is plenty of scope for cutting.”
-- "What It Means To Be No. 1", Air Force magazine, February 2006.
As one might expect, the Air Force Association does not exactly castigate the administration for its spending habits; rather it tries to make sense of them in the context of America's strategic posture and security commitments. Is the fact that America spends more than the next fifteen runners-up significant? The AFA answers with an emphatic no. The next fifteen nations2 have small economies relative to the United States; their combined GDP is a mere USD $17 trillion, while the United States alone weighs in with USD $13 trillion. There are other considerations that drive US defense spending, and they are certainly relevant to Canada.
Start with the obvious strategic considerations. The United States, unlike any other nation, is a global power with worldwide interests, responsibilities, and allies. No other nation would be called on to extend its deterrent power around the world or would even want to. None have the power to fight and win two major regional wars at a time. Only Washington can do that.
Indeed, the scale of US military might enables some other major nations—Germany, say, or Japan [ed. and certainly neighboring Canada]—to be relaxed about their own defenses.
Another factor to consider: Americans have decided that, if war comes, it will be waged far from US shores. That decision imposes certain military demands, all of them expensive.
-- "What It Means To Be No. 1", Air Force magazine, February 2006.
The money 'graph there is the last one: if America fights a war, she has decided in advance that it will be fought far from continental North America. This immediately alleviates Canada's defence establishment of certain territorial responsibilities that it would otherwise be hard-pressed to meet. Significantly, American political leadership has for generations recognised that their forces will defend the homeland from afar, and structured their military forces appropriately. On the other hand, Canada's political leadership has for generations committed our forces to distant peacemaking operations while simultaneously starving them of appropriate kinetic and logistic capabilities.
Lest anyone think sort of political over-reach is a uniquely Canadian situation, take a look at Japan. A major regional power with a highly effective fighting force, Japan's Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) deployed 550 non-combat troops to Iraq in 2003. The JSDF soon found that keeping those troops supplied was a major undertaking, since it was never before authorised nor equipped to operate a globe-spanning combat logistics chain. Japan stepped into a domestically unpopular role she wasn't equipped for, but is able to shoulder for a limited period of time. Canada has been doing it for decades.
Fighting far from home requires lots and lots of transport—especially airlift—to haul bullets, beans, parts, and troops. It also requires costly overseas bases. Because every war they fight is an “away game” in an enemy’s backyard, US combat forces can’t be just a little stronger; they must be much stronger—in the air, on land, or at sea—and that requires high-technology weapons.
It also requires a huge amount of combat support. At present, about 50 percent of USAF’s budget goes to so-called “joint force enablers”—tankers, satellites, and surveillance aircraft.
Much of today’s defense cost flows from the kind of force to which we Americans have committed ourselves psychologically. It is an all-volunteer force, not conscripted. Attracting and keeping high-quality personnel costs a fortune—$111 billion a year just for pay—and grows more expensive each year. Health care costs and other benefits have been soaring.
Such a professional combat force, in turn, requires extensive, realistic training, which pushes up outlays on fuel, spare parts, repairs, and depot labor. The US military spends $150 billion a year on these accounts, twice as much as it spends on weapons...
Second, the US took a “procurement holiday” in the 1990s, deferring acquisition of new systems, so weapons are now wearing out all at once and are in urgent need of replacement.
-- "What It Means To Be No. 1", Air Force magazine, February 2006.
These factors are also in play for the Canadian Forces. Every war since 1812 has been an "away game" for Canadian soldiers, too, although to be generous the Great War and Second World War did involve a terrific amount of territorial patrolling. And every peacekeeping or peacemaking assignment is, at heart, a combat operation. Peacekeeping is a nice way of saying internationally-sanctioned gunboat diplomacy. It means getting between warring parties -- often over their objections -- and promising to retaliate in kind if anyone should harm the peacekeepers.
Despite our secure national land mass and increasing political emphasis on overseas peacemaking operations, the Canadian body politic has not adapted to the change. The Canadian Forces have had their logistical capabilities shortened and starved in the postwar years to the point where they can bareful fulfil their territorial mission, let alone overseas commitments. We will run out of mission-capable airlift, sealift and (most urgently) invaluable human capital before replacements are fully procured and operational.
Canada's been on a bit of a procurement holiday since the late 1980s. At present only our
CF-188 fighters can be air refueled (by specially fitted
CC-130 tactical transports), and the turboprop-powered tactical airlifters are too slow to keep up with the turbine-powered fighters they refuel. The potential C-130J replacements can be air refueled, but not by the
probe-and-drogue method used by the CF-188s; the Js require "
flying boom" capability. The potential
C-17 strategic airlifters can also be air-refueled, but again, only by boom-equipped tankers. Canada has never operated boom-equipped tankers, and our last turbine-powered
CC-137 tanker was retired in 1997, without any planned or anticipated replacement.
High-quality volunteer personnel is also a cost not often appreciated. The much-lauded Scott Taylor of
Esprit de Corps magazine compared the armed forces of Turkey and Canada in an October 31, 2005 article. Turkey apparently spends a similar amount of money -- CDN $11 billion -- but appears to get much more bang for its defence budget buck.
Canada has a paper strength of 57,000 regular service personnel, with a reserve force hovering around 14,000. So we could mobilize 71,000 troops in a time of crisis. For their part, the Turks maintain a regular force of about 500,000 and a reserve of close to one million. In terms of combat units, Canada has just three under-strength brigades, and the Turks have four entire field armies, with no less than 14 armoured brigades.
While keen-eyed military buffs will point out that the Turkish tanks are mostly older models, the same can be said for Canada’s leopard tanks. The difference is that Turkey is in the process of replacing its armoured fleet with newer main battle tanks, while Canada is purchasing lightweight wheeled vehicles instead.
Canada’s army crown jewel is the elite 300-member Joint Task Force 2 commando unit. The Turkish generals can deploy up to five commando brigades (20,000 troops), with most of these special forces soldiers being battle-tested in combat.
In the air, Canada can scramble just three squadrons of CF-18 fighters, with another three squadrons of these planes sitting in mothballs. The Turks operate no fewer than 19 combat squadrons equipped with many of the newer-model F-16 fighters.
At sea, Canada can float 12 patrol frigates, three destroyers, two supply ships and 12 minesweepers, and we have four second-hand British subs still in the workshops. Turkey can put to sea 13 submarines, 20 frigates, 21 fast patrol boats, 21 minesweepers and 52 landing ships, and their navy has its very own amphibious brigade of marines.
Given the Turkish example, it is obviously possible to maintain a NATO-standard army, navy and air force for less than $12 billion a year. So are Canada’s defence woes really due to a lack of funding?
-- "Defence woes more than money", Scott Taylor, October 31, 2005.
All due respect to Mr. Taylor, but he is broadly misinterpreting the data. Yes, it's possible to have a robust Turkish-style armed forces, provided your soldiers, mechanics, suppliers and utilities are content with Turkish-style standards of living. The majority of the Turkish armed forces are conscripts, not volunteers; the military does not have to provide market-based wages to compete with private industry. A Turkish private earns about USD $2.25 a month; a Canadian private earns much more than that. A Turk's per capita share of his nation's GDP is a mere USD $7,900; per capita GDP for a Canadian is USD $32,8003. The tanks are also a non-starter. Turkey does operate some Leopard-1s as we do, but the majority of their armored force consists of ancient M-48s and M-60s -- tanks that pre-date the Leopard-1.
If the cost of living and doing business in Turkey is so much lower than in Canada, then naturally they will have more money available for capital projects -- does that mean DND is frittering away its budget? Or simply that the Canadian Forces should buy Turkish?
If Canada wants to revitalise its military forces, then Canadian politicians (and Canadians in general) should determine whether they want a force optimised for territorial defence or "away game" peacemaking missions. The two require very different force structures and funding commitments. If no one wants to spend a lot of money on expensive military toys, then bring our folks home from their far-flung assignments. It's not fair to send them into harm's way on a shoestring budget with inadequate equipment. If we are content to freeload off the Americans for territorial defence and want to focus on expeditionary peacemaking (like Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan), then spend appropriately on the kinetic and logistic elements required for globe-spanning operations. But please, let's dispense with the fiction that we can do both with what we've got now.
1 Measured by budget size using 2001 figures. More recent US figures place Canada in 14th.
2 China, Russia, France, Britain, Japan, Germany, Italy, Saudi Arabia, India, South Korea, Spain, Australia, Canada, Turkey, and Israel.
3 GDP per capita figures from CIA World Factbook, 2005.
Cross-posted to Taylor & Company
UPDATE: Thanks to Damian for pointing out that our CC-150 Polaris aircraft are being refitted with drogue pods on the wingtips, and commenter Chris for noting that RAF Hercs and USMC KC-130s have probe refueling capability.
