Facts? We don't need no stinkin' facts!

Scott Taylor, pontificating in full "end of days" mode:

Closer to home, Operation Medusa, launched in the fall of 2006, was proclaimed to have successfully broken the back of the Taliban insurgency. This particular offensive was chronicled in Chris Wattie's book Contact Charlie: The Canadian Army, the Taliban and the Battle that Saved Afghanistan. Given that this work was published in September 2008, the last phrase in the title had long since been moved from the "wishful thinking" bin into the "delusional dream" cupboard.

Except...Chris Wattie's book wasn't about Op Medusa:

While Scott Taylor is certainly entitled to his opinion regarding recent counter-insurgency operations in southern Afghanistan, his reference to my book Contact Charlie does not build confidence in his command of the facts (RE: "Breaking the Taliban's back is just so many words," Feb. 10).

Mr. Taylor refers to my book as a chronicle of Operation Medusa, the Canadian battle group's offensive against the Taliban in Zhari/Panjwayi districts in the fall of 2006, suggesting that its full title, Contact Charlie: The Canadian Army, the Taliban and the Battle That Saved Afghanistan, belongs in "the 'delusional dream' cupboard."

Unfortunately for Mr. Taylor's rather belaboured point, my book was entirely about the operations of Task Force Orion, the first Canadian battle group on the ground in Kandahar Province, in the summer of 2006, specifically in the months of May to August leading up to Operation Medusa. Medusa was carried out by the next battle group, built around the 1st Battalion, Royal Canadian Regiment, which succeeded Task Force Orion.

All of this is made quite clear in my book and at least three other published works about Canadian operations in southern Afghanistan, not to mention dozens if not hundreds of media reports on the subject.

As for the "delusional" title, it is drawn from a quote by then brigadier-general David Fraser, whose point was that this first Canadian battle group in Kandahar prevented a Taliban offensive aimed at capturing (at least temporarily) the provincial capital of Kandahar City, which would have had potentially disastrous consequences for the entire Afghan mission.

Mr. Taylor may not agree with Mr. Fraser's analysis, or the thesis of my book, but it would lend some credibility to his critique if he at least read it first.

That's gonna leave a mark.

You'd figure after getting publicly spanked on matters of factual accuracy a few times now, that he'd be a bit more diligent vetting his own work before submitting it for publication. Maybe he's just one of those people who think any attention is good attention.