More pieces of the sky raining down upon us
Scott Taylor needs to remember three things.
First, while those who fail to study history are indeed doomed to repeat it, so are those who lack the imagination and resolve to create a future that is better than the past. Ignorance and pessimism both have the same net effect in this sense.
Second, unlike in 1980, today's Afghan army isn't comprised of "unwilling conscripts." As a self-professed student of military matters, surely Taylor understands the qualitative difference between a conscript army and volunteer one. If not, I'd suggest he speak with the myriad of retired U.S. officers who managed the transition between Vietnam and Kuwait over twenty years. As well, using the Soviet experience as your primary point of reference is dangerous, given the major differences between both their intent and their methods, and NATO's.
Third, while tribal realities must be acknowledged in the building of an Afghan army, building factionalism into the structure is a recipe for disaster. The Afghans need a homogenous military precisely because the rest of the country is so fractured along tribal lines.
I'm all for clear-eyed realism, but predicting doom on the basis of shady historical comparisons isn't realism, it's pessimism. And we already have quite enough of that, thank you very much.
First, while those who fail to study history are indeed doomed to repeat it, so are those who lack the imagination and resolve to create a future that is better than the past. Ignorance and pessimism both have the same net effect in this sense.
Second, unlike in 1980, today's Afghan army isn't comprised of "unwilling conscripts." As a self-professed student of military matters, surely Taylor understands the qualitative difference between a conscript army and volunteer one. If not, I'd suggest he speak with the myriad of retired U.S. officers who managed the transition between Vietnam and Kuwait over twenty years. As well, using the Soviet experience as your primary point of reference is dangerous, given the major differences between both their intent and their methods, and NATO's.
Third, while tribal realities must be acknowledged in the building of an Afghan army, building factionalism into the structure is a recipe for disaster. The Afghans need a homogenous military precisely because the rest of the country is so fractured along tribal lines.
I'm all for clear-eyed realism, but predicting doom on the basis of shady historical comparisons isn't realism, it's pessimism. And we already have quite enough of that, thank you very much.
posted by Babbling Brooks at 11:18 a.m.
2 Comments:
Mr. Taylor (no relation) did his best work in the early 90s, as a sort of unofficial ombudsman for the average enlistee. He was good at the grunts-eye-view, and chronicling various deficiencies of individual kit and the administrative bureaucracy (i.e. "HR") side of DND.
When he tries to tackle the bigger picture, though, he just doesn't do enough research, deep thinking, or both.
His little I hate George Bush rant in the middle of the piece shows his lack of elemental understanding of the situation.
If he doesn't know that the UN Security Council has mandated the mission and employed NATO to do the job, then how can anyone take any of his other arguments seriously.
Or take him seriously.
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