Some Afghan COIN thoughts from a Canadian officer/Upperdate: Another officer's reaction

Interesting questions (via Spotlight on Military News and International Affairs):

USA and USMC Counterinsurgency Center Blog

WHERE ARE THE AFGHAN INGLORIOUS BASTARDS?

I was struck by a comment from an Army officer fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan. He said, “fighting these guys (the Taliban) is like fighting the Marines.” I want to know who is training those guys, and where can we get them because without air support, artillery, armoured vehicles or large training centers, they seem to be getting pretty impressive results on the cheap.

There are a few facts and questions that we need to address honestly in an “understanding the environment” way before we can go on. We need to be honest with ourselves before we move forward because platitudes and slogans won’t win the COIN fight.

Here are some hard questions we need to ask:

We learn from Afghan/Pashtun culture that one of the basic tenants of “Pashtun Wali” (way of the Pashtun) is “Badal” (revenge). Logic dictates that if we kill one Afghan, we make 10 enemies. Where are the slighted Afghans that have been grieved by the Taliban who are thirsting for revenge or does this only work against us?

We know that the Taliban are not one monolithic group, but several small groups each with their own goals and area of operations. That is a weakness that begs to be exploited. We know that they have village auxiliaries who support hard corps fighters who travel around in groups from 10 – 50. History also shows that from the 1940’s the Afghans were quite adept at infiltrating insurgents into the Pakistan’s FATA in order to instigate trouble. We know that part of COIN theory speaks of denying sanctuary to the insurgents. Afghan forces are more welcome and can operate more freely than Western troops. So, where are those Afghan Inglorious Bastards? Where are the small bands of Government of Afghanistan fighters operating on foot in Taliban safe havens, mixing with the people, getting intelligence, denying the Taliban that safe haven, ambushing Taliban groups, (with coalition backup) giving them no respite, taking away their feeling of invulnerability and exacerbating mistrust between Taliban groups? Where is the Afghan version of the “Les Commandos Tigres Noir,” (The Black Tigers), a group of former Viet-minh who under the leadership of Sergeant-Major Roger Vanenberghe in 1952 Indo China dressed in black uniforms and brought the fight to the insurgents and captured one of their command-posts?

We also know that the Taliban are very good at setting up roadblocks to collect taxes and control the population. Roadblocks, were used effectively to prevent voting materials getting distributed in the 20 Aug elections and also to prevent Afghans from voting. They are also quite effective at preventing IOs, NGOs and Afghan civil servants from getting out and working with the people. Where are the undercover Afghan Inglorious Bastards, who roll down the road in an old truck either armed to the teeth or armed with radios that talk to a trailing UAV or Attack Helicopter or follow-on truck full of undercover hard men? If a few of these check points were hit, the Taliban or local criminals might be less inclined to use them. This tactic was used quite effectively by Canadian troops in Somalia. Why aren’t we seeing it in Afghanistan?

These are not hi-tech, complicated solutions, but they could be effective. If we can’t find the Afghan Inglorious Bastards and figure out why criminals without money, air support, artillery, armoured vehicles or large training centers can be compared to the Marines, we will never win this fight. We need to ask tough questions and stop making up the answers that please us.

LCol JJ Malevich, Canadian Exchange Officer, COIN Branch Chief US Army/ USMC Counter Insurgency Center.

Earlier post by Milnews.ca:

Canada's Voice in U.S. Counterinsurgency Centre

Update thought: Perhaps Western countries, mainly the US, are in a sense over-training the ANA (including their special forces) to operate essentially as we do? Rather than sometimes operate as, er, Afghans--though that manner of fighting might cause human rights concerns.

Upperdate: From BruceR at Flit:

...Our plan, which depends on interoperability with Western forces for all the battle-winning things the Afghans need from us (intelligence, casevac, fires, quick reaction forces, etc.) requires Afghans who can tell us accurately, without imbedded Western soldiers, where they are on a map, what the enemy is doing, etc. That doesn't exist, and isn't likely to exist any time soon. To be interoperable, they must be able to function at close to our level. The Taliban doesn't need to be interoperable with anybody...

...I would suggest that we don't have Afghans doing the kinds of things he suggests, mostly because we ourselves have discouraged it. Because the Afghan army holds no ground by itself, because our troops are interspersed with theirs, we need to know where they are. Which means we need to be with them. Which means their forces have to operate to the same levels of force protection as ours, to protect the mentors or partnered troops. Which means all those kinds of tactics that good irregular troops can do, and which in other contexts Afghans can excel at, are not on the table...

A sounder approach might be to use the ANP as your adjunct force, pouring resources into growing its size, while downplaying ANA growth, in favour of ANA quality improvements. Now to do that, you'd need to get out of the mindset that the ANP are, in fact, serving as police, in any Western sense of the word, rather than paramilitaries. Civilian police mentors are, as valuable as their contributions have been, somewhat of a distraction in this regard.

Afghanistan does not need a national police force per se: there is no justice system that it could serve. It does need a large national paramilitary corps that can do the local defence cadre task and take over the western military auxiliary tasks. And it needs, second and separately, an army of its own that can take over for those westerners some day. Which needs to be small, lethal, and able to fight in an Afghan-appropriate, technologically-light way. That's what we should have been trying to create these last eight years, and which I'm afraid we are still very far from achieving...

Do read the whole post.