Afstan: The way the Wente blows/Update: Cash? and confusion

Ominous. The right-of-centre Globe and Mail columnist has joined the thundering herd in throwing in the towel (more here, here and here).

Here's a response to one aspect of her argument:

Troops are over the wire

Having spent the past four months photographing the front lines in Afghanistan, I was appalled to read Margaret Wente’s contention that soldiers “don’t get out much” and “no longer chase the Taliban” (The Tragedy Of Good Intentions – Sept. 17). I’ve covered numerous combat operations this summer and suggest that perhaps Ms. Wente should go “over the wire” to personally witness the mortars, rockets and machine-gun fire from the Taliban that hundreds of Canadian troops experience on a regular basis. Most of the battle group is in the field fighting the insurgency and is not in Deh-e-Bagh or at the main base.

Soldiers have contact with Afghans in the field every day. This year, medics at forward operating bases have treated more Afghan victims of violence than at any other stage of the mission.

Louie Palu, Kandahar

Deh-e-Bagh is in Dand district, more:

...
The effort in Dand district has shown promising signs...

But what occurred in Dand [more here, here and here] may be hard to pull off elsewhere, Canadians note, because that district has fewer tribal rivalries and is relatively small, resulting in a much higher concentration of NATO troops to residents than will be possible in other places...

Regarding Mr Palu (these troops are certainly outside the wire):

Combat video of Candian Army mentoring ANA and Afghan police

In any event the US Army will also be outside the wire in much of the rest of Kandahar province, and also doing a great deal in the city itself. Canadians, pundits, politicians, and the public, should really wake up to the fact that success, failure, or something in between, at Kandahar are now beyond the hands of the CF. Though we can still make a significant, more concentrated and--one hopes--effective contribution as a cog in a much greater wheel.

So why the mad rush to the exits, now that the, er, cavalry has arrived?

Update thought: When you can't beat them, buy them. After all there's a long tradition in Afstan of switching sides, or simply dropping out of a fight, in return for suitable "considerations". And the Americans spent millions buying off Sunni tribal sheiks in Iraq around the time of the surge there:

An offer of money could persuade Afghan insurgents to drop their arms, a former British general said today.

Former special forces commander Lieutenant-General Sir Graeme Lamb, who has been appointed to oversee a programme of reconciliation with moderate elements of the Taliban, said he believed 'you can buy an insurgency if you have enough money'.

Lt Gen Lamb said the campaign in Afghanistan had 'drifted' until US commander General Stanley McChrystal took charge...

Meanwhile this isn't helping things:

...There had been an 'incoherent' approach involving different governments and charity organisations in Afghanistan.

'So far we've identified 69 programmes which have ... a significant contribution to reintegration - most of these programmes are not in any way co-ordinated. We do need to bring some coherence.'

And this isn't helping in that regard:

...
Diplomat in Kabul Leaves in Dispute
U.N. Deputy Head of Mission Differs With Boss on Recognizing Flawed Election

The deputy head of the U.N. mission here has abruptly left the country after a dispute with the mission's Norwegian chief over whether to publicly denounce Afghanistan's election commission for not discounting clearly fraudulent votes cast in favor of President Hamid Karzai's reelection...

American diplomat Peter W. Galbraith and his Norwegian boss, U.N. Special Representative Kai Eide, disagreed so strongly over the right post-election approach that they were unable to keep working together, prompting Galbraith's departure from the country Sunday...

Galbraith is an Obama appointee and a pretty heavy hitter; I think Eide's future is in real jeopardy. From an earlier post:

...In addition to increasing its own civilian component, the administration seeks better coordination among the many other governments and international and nongovernmental agencies operating in Afghanistan [emphasis added], often with different rules and objectives. The strategy proposals include a strengthening of the United Nations as a clearinghouse and overall coordinator of nonmilitary efforts, including the appointment of veteran U.S. diplomat Peter W. Galbraith as deputy to Norwegian Kai Eide, the head of the U.N. mission in Afghanistan...