Two flaws in Dyer's case

Gwynne Dyer is nothing if not consistent in his criticism of the Afghan conflict as unwinnable. And in his most recent op-ed today, he makes some very good points in support of that position.

Of course, I don't happen to agree with him: we may not accomplish our goal in Afghanistan at the end of the day, but if that turns out to be the case, it won't be because the objectives were impossible, just that we weren't properly committed to them.

Without getting too far into that broader debate, I'd like to point to two particular interrelated flaws in Dyer's argument. From today's piece:

The Taliban were and are almost exclusively Pashtuns, so it was the Pashtuns, 40 per cent of the population and traditionally Afghanistan's dominant ethnic group, who were driven from power by the 2001 U.S. invasion. They are fighting foreign, nonMuslim invaders, and the government the foreigners put in is corrupt, incompetent and mostly nonPashtun.

The implication there is that the Pashtun are solidly behind the insurgency. This isn't the first time Dyer's made this point:

What's need is "fresh thinking, fresh eyes on the problem," said Secretary Gates, explaining why he was appointing General Stanley McChrystal to the job instead. So what should General McChrystal's fresh eyes see?

He could start by understanding that the United States is not fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan. It is fighting the entire Pashtun nation, some thirty million people, two-thirds of whom live across the border in Pakistan. That border has never really existed for the Pashtuns, who move freely across it in peace and in war. [my emphasis]

Dyer's statement isn't supported by the facts. The Asia Foundation's latest public opinion polling in Afghanistan (pdf) shows that 61% of those in the most troubled South Western region (Nimroz, Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzghan, Zabul - the Taliban heartland) think their provincial government is doing a "somewhat" or "very" good job. Those numbers are only slightly lower for the same group's assessment of their municipal or local government (58%). A full 64% of them feel "someone like them" can have a "lot" or "some" influence over government decisions. When asked if they agree with the statement "Local jirga/shura are fair and trusted," 61% of them agreed "strongly" or "somewhat." A full 50% of them believe "that voting can lead to improvement in the future."

Hell, half of those in the South Western polling area said "that today [their] family is more prosperous" or "about as prosperous" as under Taliban rule. Remember, all the numbers I'm giving you are specifically for the heartland of Taliban support; the outlook is significantly more positive throughout the rest of the country.

While it remains an open question exactly how much popular support an insurgency requires in order to be successful, I'd suggest that if more than half of the population in the most difficult region in the country still support their various governments at different levels, believe they can effect positive change through their vote, and believe they weren't better off when the insurgents held power, the situation is far from hopeless.

Dyer also conveniently omits certain facts in his rush to draw conclusions:

Karzai and the United States are shackled to the warlords because those were the allies the U.S. recruited to fight the Taliban on the ground when it invaded Afghanistan in 2001. The Taliban, being exclusively Pashtun, never controlled all of the country; Tajik, Hazara and Uzbek militias continued to hold out all across the north. So the U.S. made deals with their leaders, showered them with weapons and money, and helped them into power instead.

The U.S. didn't just make deals with the Northern Alliance factions. In the fall of 2001 as the Taliban was being driven out of power by the Northern Alliance, mostly U.S. special forces (and CIA), and U.S. airpower, the American government was also successfully making deals with local Taliban leaders to take them out of the fight. This strategy was written into the Operation Enduring Freedom plan, according to Hank Crumpton, a CIA officer intimately involved in the campaign:

...the centre of gravity rested in the minds of those widespread tribal militia leaders, who were allied with the Taliban and al-Qaeda out of political convenience or necessity. The CIA understood this political dynamic and could therefore define the enemy in the narrowest terms - for example, as al-Qaeda and intransigent Taliban leaders - while viewing all of the Taliban or Taliban-allied militias as potential allies.

If the Pashtun nation uniformly saw the regime change as a threat to their hegemony, why were so many of them so very quick to change sides? From the newly-released The Difficult War:

Local warlords were offered direct cash payments in exchange for their support. The co-operation of local Taliban commanders could be bought for US$50,000 to US$100,000.

This is indeed a Pashtun insurgency, not an Afghan one, and the Taliban remain a Pashtun movement. In that, I agree with Dyer. But that statement simply isolates the problem: the battle is specifically for the hearts and minds of the Pashtun. And although the evidence suggests that battle is currently stalemated, it is hardly lost.