The strategy for Afstan/Update: Lt.-Gen. McChrystal

The start of a piece by David Kilcullen (via Moby Media Updates):

If we lose hearts and minds, we will lose the war

Sir Olaf Caroe — a legendary figure of the Raj, ethnographer of the Pashtuns [I have his book, The Pathans, bought in Rawalpindi in 1976--the full text is available here] and last administrator of the North-West Frontier of British India — wrote in 1958 that ‘unlike other wars, Afghan wars become serious only when they are over; in British times at least they were apt to produce an after-crop of tribal unrest [and] constant intrigue among the border tribes.’ Western leaders would have been wise to consider his words after the ‘stunning defeat’ of the Taleban, whose ramshackle theocratic tyranny crumbled in less than ten weeks’ fighting after 9/11.

On 7 December 2001, as the last Taleban stronghold fell at Kandahar, only 110 CIA and a few hundred Special Forces officers were inside Afghanistan [emphasis added]. Donald Rumsfeld mused that this lightning success by an elite ground force, operating under a high-tech umbrella of precision airpower, space-based surveillance and satellite communications, heralded a ‘transformation’ that would remake the rules of war. General Tommy Franks exulted that ‘information dominance’ — omniscience through pervasive real-time intelligence — had given him ‘the kind of Olympian perspective that Homer had given his gods’. ..

Well, not quite. It turns out that old Olaf was closer to the mark.

After a two-year lull the Taleban returned with a vengeance, escalating their insurgency and threatening the security of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Tribal unrest, extremist brutality and terrorist violence have soared, coalition resolve is faltering and local governments seem unable, or unwilling, to deal with the threat. There have been signs, in recent days, that the Pentagon understands the urgent need for a new approach to Afghanistan. Lieutenant General Stanley A. McChrystal, the new American [and NATO ISAF] commander in Afghanistan [more here and here (lengthy piece) ], had his first meeting with President Obama on Tuesday this week and his appointment at least signifies a desire to move away from conventional warfare to the sort of counter-insurgency thinking that was so successful in Iraq. But Pentagon officials have also indicated drone strikes are to be a significant part of any new approach, and drones are not the answer.

The key to winning this most crucial war is not an increase in attacks or a greater focus on ‘bounty-hunting’ — the bringing in of so called ‘high-value’ targets. Though killing terrorists is no bad thing in itself, the only real solution involves engaging indigenous forces — the Afghan people — to help us help them liberate their country.

Since 2006, I have talked with many locals in Afghanistan: tribal elders, government officials, police and soldiers, Taleban defectors, religious leaders, educated intellectuals and ordinary people in the valleys and villages. None has ever called 2001 an ‘invasion’. They remember, as we sometimes forget, that the key to victory in 2001 was not Western technology, but the Afghan people [emphasis added, see this 2006 letter of mine in the Ottawa Citizen].

Afghans hated the Taleban — even today, only 4 per cent want them back — and the tiny coalition force joined an existing alliance of anti-Taleban Pashtuns and northern ethnic groups that had 50,000 fighters in the field by the fall of Kandahar. This, not high-tech weaponry, was the source of success. Victory was achieved by a genuine partnership with Afghans who rejected the Taleban and joined in the struggle for freedom.

Afghan support remains our most important asset. If you’re at all sceptical about this, just consider the recent polls: 63 per cent of Afghans surveyed wanted coalition troops to stay, while 82 per cent wanted the current government to continue ruling Afghanistan. Around 49 per cent rated the government’s performance as good or excellent, while 52 per cent thought President Karzai was doing a good or excellent job. For comparison, Barack Obama’s approval rating in the United States was 63 per cent last week...

David Kilcullen, author of The Accidental Guerrilla, was Special Advisor for Counterinsurgency to the Secretary of State, Senior Counterinsurgency Advisor to General David Petraeus in Iraq, and Chief Counterterrorism Strategist of the US State Department. He is a former Australian infantry officer who has worked in Afghanistan and in Pakistan’s tribal areas since 2006.

Do read the whole thing. BruceR at Flit has his own excerpt and comment:

Today's essential Afstan reading

David Kilcullen gives the most realistic timeline for victory I've seen yet:

As of mid-2008 only about one quarter of Afghanistan was under government control, half was disputed, and the remaining quarter was Taleban-controlled. Should everything go well this year, we will succeed — at best — in stopping the rot, stabilising the country and setting the conditions for progress from next year onwards.

Either way, we can expect at least another year or two of serious combat before we can begin handing over more fully to newly expanded Afghan police and military units; these will become available around 2011 as current schemes to increase their numbers come to fruition. This handover process could take another three to five years, and we may then be in a position, after (say) 2015, to drop back to a mentoring, partnering and overwatch role — a role we may need to maintain for several more years to come.

Don't like the sound of that? Doesn't fit with current Canadian government pledges. As an operations officer counterpart of mine in KAF liked to say, "Suck it up, stringbean."

Also sounds similar to what US defense secretary Gates has been saying. I haven't seen any Canadian government reaction to Mr Gates' views.

Update: Another article on Lt.-Gen. McChrystal here, and his official biography--I suspect he'll be a full general soon (via Spotlight on Military News and International Affairs). Official info on Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC):

Joint Special Operations Command is a joint headquarters designed to study special operations requirements and techniques; ensure interoperability and equipment standardization; plan and conduct joint special operations exercises and training; and develop joint special operations tactics.

More on JSOC from GlobalSecurity.org, and from a March 2008 post:

...
United States special operations forces in Afghanistan, whose commando raids and airstrikes against suspected Taliban targets have caused large numbers of civilian casualties that have angered Afghans, have quietly been put under the "tactical control" of the commander of US and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces in Afghanistan, General David McKiernan, for the first time...