Non-kinetic COIN in Afstan

A US soldier working as an Embetted Tactical Trainer (ETT-equivalent to CF "mentors") with the Afghan National Army has a very interesting post at his blog. A sample:

What Price Victory for an Afghan ETT?

There’s been a lot in the news lately about what “victory” in Afghanistan looks like. I really don’t know, nor do I want to venture an opinion on that one. People at much higher pay grades than mine can figure that one out. All I can speak for is the little piece of Afghanistan that I share with my ANA and the local populace of Bermel.

I’ll tell you this; it’s little things. Try to accomplish much more you’ll begin a slow circle of the drain leading to frustration and self induced psychosis. What I’m about to tell you about is 5 kilometers. That’s 3.1 miles, not very far. But it might as well be a light year here.

When we arrived here the fighting season was drawing to a close. The fighting season typically runs from late March to early December. Then snow shuts down the rugged passes used by the Taliban to enter into the country. During the fighting season military operations focus on what’s termed as kinetic, meaning we focus on fighting the enemy directly. As this time drew to a close we were somewhat at a loss for our next course of action.

We sat down and started brain storming for a direction in which to proceed. As an ETT in a remote area we have quite a bit of leeway in determining our strategies. We started with the central premise of counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare. Separate the insurgents from the local populace. How could we do this based upon the assets we had at our disposal?

I can’t claim sole responsibility for this course of action as it was developed by me and one of my CPTs here CPT Brain. He’s an extremely intelligent, well read and insightful individual who was called out of the individual ready reserve to serve with us here in Afghanistan. He’s doing great things for his country.

We noticed that our contact with the enemy and their means of support ran along a north/south road. What I’ll call the line of friction. This is the best description that I can think of as it’s wasn’t open conflict all the time, thus friction seems better than conflict. This line traced the western wall of the desolate valley in which we live. Along this line lay the main villages and it served as the major travel corridor. Our hope was to push this line farther to the east.

Next we analyzed our assets. Obviously we had firepower but that didn’t accomplish what we hoped to do. The best asset we had was humanitarian and medical assistance. Tons of food, clothing, cooking oil and blankets were here on the FOB. We also had a US aid station and an ANA aid station from which we could pull medics and medical supplies for use in the local area. We saw these as our conduit to engage with the locals on a frequent and more direct basis allowing them to see the ANA as bringers of hope and not violence.

The timeframe to capitalize was limited. We only had between December and late March while the ACM were out of the valley and couldn’t hinder our operations. Thus, we needed to be out of the wire at least three times a week. That doesn’t sound like much but planning and staging a military operation takes time. It was a very high operational tempo to shoot for.

Our strategy consisted of two tasks in support of our overarching goal of population separation. One, demonstrate that the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan could assist them materially and in conjunction with this conduct an information operations (IO) campaign. Two, we try to gather intelligence on the local area and personalities in preparation for the upcoming fighting season. All of this was focused on the line of friction. We defined some criteria that would cause us to deviate from the line. I won’t elaborate on those but we stuck to them and didn’t lose our focus.

We also decided on criteria that would cause us to go into kinetic operations. Basically; this was self defense only; we would not chase the enemy [emphasis added]. We couldn’t allow the enemy to distract us from our task. That may sound strange. However insurgency warfare is theater in the round and often their attacks are conducted just to provoke a response which detracts from the greater purpose.

The single theme of our IO [information operations] campaign was this, “The government is here supporting you during the winter and the ACM is not”. It was as simple as that. We didn’t deviate or elaborate and as the politicians like to say we always stayed on message. Simple to the point and undisputable. The sub-governor, ANP, ANA and CF [coalition forces] all communicated this message. If we heard about someone sending a different message we sat down with them and discussed why they’d strayed off the message. Everyone pounded this message into whoever we could anytime we could.

Along with the IO; we brought all of the humanitarian assistance that we could find...