Chief of the Land Staff Gen. Leslie on the Army's future

The start of a piece from Vanguard magazine online:

Mission tested: Preparing the Army for 2021

Engaged in one of the most complex asymmetrical conflicts it has ever encountered, its resources stretched and its people at a premium, the Army faces considerable challenges. In addition, the Land Force is also part of a major transformation project affecting the entire Canadian Forces. Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie, Chief of the Land Staff, spoke with associate editor Chris Thatcher about the effects of transformation, the Army’s vision beyond 2021, and the people it will need to get there.

What has transformation meant for Army? How has it affected your ability to deploy soldiers?

The Army is generating roughly 2000 soldiers for international missions at any one point. We also have thousands who are dedicated to protecting Canadians at home. The institutional army, which has a remit to train, equip and provide leadership – the foundational base – for soldiers who are then used by one of the force employers, often ends up with more demands for soldiers then we can meet. We need a bigger army. I’ve been assured that we will be growing by about 3075 Regular Force soldiers over the next couple of years, but I kind of need then right now. That is not going to happen because we have an institutional capacity issue in terms of finding enough instructors and facilities to train the soldiers at a faster rate because we are so busy doing operations.

Why do I bring that up in the context of transformation? The original idea was to have a clear demarcation between force employment and force generation. Force employers are the four headquarters that actually use the troops after they have been prepared. Transformation crystallized the responsibilities of force generation and force deployment. But what we’re now seeing is a blurring of the lines. The Army only does force generation, but some of the force employers are starting to get more and more involved in force generation, which arguably calls into question the logic behind the initiative. I’m not saying it’s good or bad, but if that was the original premise, and that premise is not being followed through, then there are some questions that need to be resolved amongst military professionals.

The second impact of transformation has been the creation of new headquarters. Almost 2000 people have been taken out of the existing services to form the cadres of these new headquarters and the elements that work for them. They have been replaced within the Army, but we’ve taken warrant officers and captains and replaced them with privates; they have not been replaced with the equivalent experience levels. And the army is running short of experienced folk in the 15-20 year range to actually provide the mid and junior level leadership. In time we will make that up, but by definition it takes 15 years to produce a 15-year veteran.

With the combat experience that our young soldiers are bringing back from overseas, others and I want to promote them faster then has been done in the past. We’re facing a shortfall of a 1000 master corporals in the Army. We’re getting pretty close to the 800 mark (I wanted that done by December), which means we’re going to have an even bigger training load just for master corporals next year, as well as sergeants, warrant officers, captains and majors.

Eventually, we are going to have to have a full debate on how many people we want to staff in non-deployable headquarters, and where on the priority list do battalions, regiments and brigades fit into all this, because they have been the source, in the main, of most of the folk for these headquarters.

The current plan is to stick with this. But there is going to be a review at some point. And I look forward to taking part because there is an argument to be made that we have a lot of headquarters for the size of our Army...

Keep reading...this is especially interesting:

The Canadian Army has become one of the most heavily digitized. What now sets us apart?

In 2003 when I and 2500 of my closest friends first deployed to Afghanistan, the idea of an all-source intelligence centre was started by a team – smart young warrant officers, majors and lieutenant-colonels – where the intelligence functions were all nested within the battlegroup and brigade headquarters. “Intelligence-driven” became a mantra. But maps were 1/50,000, with shiny plastic covering them and soldiers using grease pencils to indicate what they were doing, when they were doing it. And almost all the traffic between the soldiers and their command vehicles was done by voice radio.

Now the Canadian Army is the most digitally advanced in the world. We’re not perfect, but when you go into a brigade or battlegroup headquarters, its crude in the sense that it is a rough wood building, but it closely resembles the bridge of The Enterprise, where you have huge screens on which real-time feeds from UAVs or aircraft or helicopters are portrayed. Most of the communications happens digitally, with updates on positioning right down to the vehicle level, with information and secret reports being transmitted right down to combat team and platoon, with feedback and amendments happening automatically. The model for this is actually a combat information centre on a frigate. It is essentially the same approach with the same awareness, information feeds, sequencing and queuing of work and responsibilities. We’ve learned an enormous amount in the last three years. We’re at the cutting edge right now.