Fighting IEDs in Afstan: US Task Force ODIN

This sure should help (via GAP):

IqAF King Air 350-ISR
(click to view full)

The Ottawa Citizen’s defense reporter David Pugliese reports that the US military is about to spend $100 million to upgrade the facilities at Kandahar, Afghanistan, in order to accommodate up to 26 aircraft for “Task Force ODIN” in Afghanistan. At first glance, this might seem like just another infrastructure play – unless one realizes that Task Force ODIN (Observe, Detect, Identify & Neutralize) may be the second-most underrated fusion of technology and operating tactics in America’s counter-insurgency arsenal.

Task Force ODIN was created on orders of Gen. Richard A. Cody, the Army’s outgoing vice chief of staff. Its initial goal involved better ways of finding IED land mines, a need triggered by the limited numbers of USAF Predator UAVs in Iraq, and consequent refusal of many Army requests. Despite its small size (about 25 aircraft and 250 personnel) and cobbled-together nature, Task Force ODIN became a huge success. Operating from Camp Speicher near Tikrit, it expanded its focus to become a full surveillance/ strike effort in Iraq – one that ground commanders came to see as more precise than conventional air strikes, and less likely to cause collateral damage that would create problems for them. From its inception in July 2007 to June 2008, the effort reportedly killed more than 3,000 adversaries, and led to the capture of almost 150 insurgent leaders.

With Secretary of Defense Gates paying particular attention to improving ISR capabilities, replication in Afghanistan was inevitable. The coming construction at Kandahar marks the beginning of that effort…

Drawing from the Well of Wisdom: Task Force ODIN in Iraq

MQ-5 w. Viper Strikes
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Task Force ODIN’s success stems from a combination of 4 elements. The result is a surveillance/strike package whose elements contribute diverse strengths and cover for each others’ weaknesses, achieving results that each element could not achieve on its own:

The first element is inexpensive, modern-day “Bird Dog” type propeller planes like the Cessna Caravan 208B, C-12R “Horned Owl” King Air ISR aircraft, etc. Advanced surveillance and targeting turrets, hyperspectral sensors, and ground-looking radars like General Atomics’ APY-8 Lynx, are integrated with these aircraft, which have higher carrying capacities than most UAVs. Manned aircraft also have much wider fields of view than UAVs, and allow pilots to use other senses like hearing.

The second element is UAVs like the Army’s RQ-5 Hunters, RQ-7 Shadows, MQ-1C Sky Warriors, et. al. At the high end, these drones are actually more expensive than their companion manned aircraft. Smaller UAVs do offer cost advantages, but all UAVs have the problem of “looking through a soda straw,” which makes them better suited to more focused surveillance of marked areas or key infrastructure like roads, power lines, etc. UAVs’ biggest advantages are twofold: longer time-on-station for persistent surveillance, and the ability to carry precision weapons like Viper Strike, Hellfire missiles, and perhaps even GPS-guided 81mm mortar bombs that would allow the Army to arm its Shadow UAVs as well.

APY-8 Lynx, housing off

The third element is math. Its role is highly under-rated, but new and improved algorithms have made both UAVs and manned “bird dogs” more useful, by offering better analysis of what’s in their scans. A new technology called “Constant Hawk,” for instance, can identify changes in an area, based on multiple scans sing hyperspectral or other sensors. One obvious thing to look for is the signature of disturbed earth or new pavement, which may indicate a new land mine.

Better targeting and attention is the scarcest resource in counter-insurgency operations. Nothing can substitute for human intelligence sources on the ground, but better technologies can mitigate harm by seeing threats in advance – and if their cues are timely enough, they can help begin the capture and interrogation of low-level operatives. This may seem like wasted effort, but with a proper approach, those captures allow investigators to begin working their way up the chain successfully.

AH-64 in Afghanistan
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The last element is close co-ordination with Army ground elements, including special forces, and army aviation elements like the AH-64 Apache attack and OH-58D Kiowa Warrior scout helicopters. The AH-64’s 30mm cannon has received significant use, as a weapon that offers exceptional accuracy, usefulness as an inducement to surrender rather than just being a simple shoot/kill weapon, and almost no collateral damage beyond the identified target’s immediate area.

That integration is also a kind of fifth element, beyond the individual resources it calls. Dispensing with the need for special personnel embedded with ground units, long pre-request and decision times for air surveillance, or additional layers of approval up and down both Army and Air Force commands, is another major contributor to Task Force ODIN’s success. Minutes matter during the kinds of operations Task Force ODIN carries out. These lower integration requirements both expand the number and type of forces that can both call on ODIN’s assets, and expand the forces that can and will be called on in response to the task force’s efforts.

The end result has been success, and now replication. In the valleys of the blind, the one-eyed king is the man.

Update: Related:

Taliban militants in Kandahar using bigger IEDs, expert says
Number of attacks in four-month period more than doubles

Kandahar IEDs less effective despite increased use: Canadian military