A coalition government: Relations with the US and the CF

Jack Granatstein worries about the effect of a coalition government in terms of the CF and relations with the Obama administration (hell, I worry about what will happen to the CF's budget under a continuing Conservative government--more--many of the basic points are similar):

The Liberal-NDP-Bloc Québécois coalition may be, as columnist Mark Steyn observed, a pantomime horse with three rear ends, but there is still a real possibility, even with a less-than-enthusiastic Michael Ignatieff as leader, that it could take power after the budget vote at the end of January. If so, what could this mean for relations with the United States and for the Canadian Forces?

The implications are serious, primarily because the level of governmental anti-Americanism, recently held in check, may well increase substantially if the coalition comes to power. The reasons are obvious: The New Democratic Party has always been soft on defence and has historically trafficked in anti-Americanism; the Bloc has used anti-Americanism when it suited its purposes, which include pacifism and neutralism; and elements of the Liberals, up to and including foreign ministers and prime ministers, have not ordinarily been interested in the Canadian Forces and, when it suited their purposes, have deliberately played the anti-American card.

This has serious implications for the Canadian Forces and for relations with the United States. In the first place, the re-equipment of the armed forces, already slowed by an unwieldy procurement system, may not proceed under the coalition. The acquisition of new supply ships and Arctic patrol vessels; replacements for the navy's aged destroyers and for its frigates; the finalization of contracts for Chinook helicopters; new Hercules transports, unmanned aircraft and fighters; a replacement for the Aurora surveillance aircraft; new search-and-rescue aircraft, trucks and light armoured vehicles - all had become stuck in the sclerotic processes of the departments of National Defence and Public Works and could be killed. The Liberals have been lamentably soft on defence for the past 40 years; there is little doubt they will be even less interested in spending the very large sums that are necessary to restore the Canadian Forces if they are dependent on the NDP and Bloc.

This will have a serious impact on relations with Barack Obama's new administration, which will surely want Canada to do more in Afghanistan and in North America. The coalition document affirmed that Canada will keep its troops in Kandahar until 2011, but to do what? Will the battle group will be allowed to fight ? Or would a new coalition government oblige it to pursue the passive, purely defensive role wanted by the NDP and Bloc [see this post--but what about the effect of Mr Harper's own position] ?

Moreover, Mr. Obama cannot be less assertive in defending the American homeland than his predecessors - a Canadian government that pulls out of Afghanistan and retreats on re-equipping the weak Canadian Forces will not win much favour. And this matters on virtually every issue confronting Canada in the dramatically weakened continental economy. Could anyone doubt that the basis for a productive partnership in solving economic problems lies in persuading the new U.S. leadership that Canada is, and will remain, a reliable security partner?

A Michael Ignatieff-led coalition may not take office next month. Even if it does not, Stephen Harper's government will almost certainly be more constrained in its defence expenditures, such will be the demands for massive investments in economic stimulus in a recessionary climate, especially with a cocky opposition. Defence investments are at least as stimulative as infrastructure repairs or house-building - more so, in fact, given the high-tech nature of military equipment. But the ideological and anti-military concerns of the coalition partners will likely not permit this thought to be entertained.

The result is that we can expect military rebuilding to slow, and it is entirely possible that the Canadian Forces that leaves Kandahar in 2011 with its personnel and equipment battered and bruised will be weaker than the military that went into action there at the beginning of 2006. The new cadre of leaders that learned its trade on the Afghan battlefield will probably have little to work with in the second decade of the 21st century.

Will the government, whether coalition or Conservative, recognize that Canada's defences need to be restored in its own national interest? That a capable Canadian Forces is necessary not only to meet the U.S. demand for a secure continent but also to further our interests at home and abroad? The impact of the recent political crisis has weakened the possibility that any Canadian government in the near future will be interested in following a rational national-interest-based defence policy. Such a policy requires a strong, well-equipped military, and the chance of that has decreased thanks to Canada's political and economic uncertainty.

J.L. Granatstein is senior research fellow at the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute.

Update thought: Mr Granatstein does not consider whether the three services' individual shopping lists really will be affordable, in a timely fashion, under any government--he accepts it as given that each service will keep doing what it has, with necessary re-equipment to carry out those roles. I honestly doubt the realism of that position, as time goes by.