Might, Will, and Sacrifice
An interesting post from Junker over at Celestial Junk, on what it takes to win a war.
When it comes to dealing with insurgencies, it seems that we have the Might, but our Will ebbs more quickly than we can make entrenched progress, and we'd prefer any Sacrifice to be solely 'humanitarian aid' rather than the 'blood and treasure' required to effect long-lasting change.
I've talked to a few well-informed people this week who are having a really difficult time staying optimistic about the Afghan mission. Not because of the casualties - they understand those are the regrettable cost of undertaking such a task. No, their concerns boil down to lack of Will and a reluctance to Sacrifice on the part of the West.
I think we're going to leave Afghanistan better than how we found it. But I don't know if that will be enough: if we don't push past the 'tipping point', all our progress will remain reversible, like a sand castle build too close to the surf. And that would be a crying shame. Especially for those who made the ultimate Sacrifice.
When it comes to dealing with insurgencies, it seems that we have the Might, but our Will ebbs more quickly than we can make entrenched progress, and we'd prefer any Sacrifice to be solely 'humanitarian aid' rather than the 'blood and treasure' required to effect long-lasting change.
I've talked to a few well-informed people this week who are having a really difficult time staying optimistic about the Afghan mission. Not because of the casualties - they understand those are the regrettable cost of undertaking such a task. No, their concerns boil down to lack of Will and a reluctance to Sacrifice on the part of the West.
I think we're going to leave Afghanistan better than how we found it. But I don't know if that will be enough: if we don't push past the 'tipping point', all our progress will remain reversible, like a sand castle build too close to the surf. And that would be a crying shame. Especially for those who made the ultimate Sacrifice.
7 Comments:
I generally agree with what you are saying but I have one comment and one point that are interrelated.
Political will is playing a significant component to the Canadian Component in Afghanistan. Looking at the “Meta-Politics” of it all is a hobby of mine. Politics being a representation of what the citizenry would want of their country is very polarized in Canada. Such are some of the perils (or strengths) of democracy. These events in Canada are more amplified given the minority government treading cautiously. A much more assertive position, for or against, would be easier even on such a divisive issue with a majority government. Put simply the lack of political will stems from the fact that it is too difficult or onerous to get a plurality of support on this issue with an election threat looming over Canadian politicians. The question to ask is why their roughly an equal number of Canadians who oppose and support the Canadian involvement in the war in Afghanistan. Some people are uniformed (both sides) but I would argue that the cause, though it is of value, is not as compelling enough to generate a clear plurality. I would argue that it is not a simple communication issue as Mr. Manley and Company would have us believe. Canada is doing a lot of good in Afghanistan but the overall picture is very hazy and holds little promise of getting better in the near term. The post @ celestial junk point out the key issue, there is no decisive battle that will be fought in this war. As it stands it is likely there will be no clear time when things are over. Given the current operational model in Afghanistan there will be an ebb and flow indefinitely. It should be clear to everyone that there will be a slow and steady war of attrition for the west until the insurgents (of all types and flavors) loose their critical mass. This is entirely possible but the time it will take for this to occur is inherently unpredictable.
I would take a qualified exception as to your statement that the “might” is there. Sure western armies are the best trained and equipped and by far the best suited in terms of “might”. I think the problem in Afghanistan though is organizational paralysis. Various caveats and ROEs significantly impede the effective deployment and utilization of “might” in Afghanistan. Given a unified command and with no restrictions I firmly believe that this war in Afghanistan would be in a significantly better position. Failing that I feel we are doomed to half measures and decisions by committee. NATO has not been fully effective in brining to bear a cohesive and effective fight force in Afghanistan.
If the people of celestial junk were open to suggestion I would make a comment on their article on I would point out that their article is missing a significant dimension that is pertinent in this situation. What will it take for the local population to come to grip with their situation? Given the drug economy, lack of ability of the government to effectively project control, monumental corruption, a very sketchy legal system and the war lords in the north, what will it take for Afghanistan to become an “unfailed state”? In some cases the insurgency is just the symptom. In these cases the real problem is the lack of political leadership which is creating a vacuum which gives the insurgents room to fester and gain strength and will to address issues which face the Afghans.
Great comment, Fotis.
You could be right that the political will issue isn't just about communication. It could be that a significant portion of our population wouldn't support any military effort outside our own borders, and certainly not one led by the U.S.
But it would be nice if our government could enunciate their case and test that hypothesis. As it stands, I wonder if the domestic communications war was lost back in the summer of 1996, when DND was all on it's lonesome, the other departments shut right up, the government thought that DND was 'taking up too much public space' in newspapers & TV, and - this is the strategic error - it told everyone to stop talking, instead of getting CIDA, DFAIT, and the gov't to catch up to DND on the PA front.
In other words, while there won't likely be a decisive battle in Afghanistan, I'd argue there was a decisive one to be had in terms of domestic public opinion, and our government withdrew from the field rather than fight it.
I'd disagree with your quibbling about Might. While the various caveats and ROE's are limiting, nations have been fighting in coalitions for millenia now. Off the top of my head, you can start with Thermopylae and go right through to the Gulf War for decent examples of wins and losses. WWII was a coalition effort on both sides. Sometimes they get it together, sometimes they don't.
Your analysis of the political situation in Afghanistan is spot on, from my perspective. Which is why I'm wondering how the development and capacity-building political and diplomatic help is working out. What is our embassy doing? What about the newly civilianized SAT? Are we helping the various Afghan factions develop a vested interest in the success of the nation, rather than just their part of it?
Who knows? The Canadian gov't sure isn't saying.
There are some Afghanistan stories in this Vanguard article. Text content only - print subscribers get the pictures. Disclaimer - I write for Vanguard.
Fotis,
If there is a better expression of a countries will than ROE and associated caveats, I'd like to know what it is.
The amount of risk a nation is willing to assume is directly determined by its will to achieve the mission.
The Junker is correct about our situation and, I have said this here before and I will say it again, we lack will because we did the right thing for the wrong reason, we went to Afghanistan because it was not Iraq.
This is an insufficient moral underpinning to win the long war by accepting its high cost.
And about the comms fight in what I assume Damian meant to say summer 2006 vice 1996, he is spot on too.
Well done Junker, well done Damian.
I've talked to supporters of the mission, and they said that basically if 2011 rolls around and Canada is still one of the few nations carrying the heavy load, it'll be an indication of NATO's failing, and time to leave.
In that case, support here is not unconditional, even among supporters.
Very interesting discussion folks, and thanks for the compliments. I may weight in on the great discussion here tommorow.
In the meantime, take note that I added an ammendment to the Might, Will and Sacrifice equation here:
http://cjunk.blogspot.com/2007/11/western-apathy.html
Northtea's correction is welcome: summer of 2006 is indeed what I meant to say...
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